THE NYĀYA SŪTRAS:

A New Commentary on an old Text

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INTRODUCTION

INDIA'S philosophical traditions present a baffling and almost insoluble problem to those who try to understand them nowadays. They are usually presented in a way that ignores both the way they *developed* in historical times and the manner in which they conceived of philosophical problems as 'philosophical' and tried to solve them. This, to a certain extent, is due to the way it *historically* developed, creating the illusion of an 'unbroken continuity' which was seen as an 'unending repetition' of an age-less truth propounded in primordial 'texts' which were composed by ṛsis or seers who were a 'witness' to the 'eternal' truth. No matter, if these 'texts' were diverse and conflicting, or if the 'seers' or 'witnesses' spoke with different voices.

The façade of an 'illusory unity' was kept alive by a twin stratagem; the first nurtured by the tradition of writing an endless succession of commentaries on the so-called 'original' or the 'founding' text of the tradition and the second, by accommodating the diversity and the conflict within an overarching unity where texts were related to the intellectual and spiritual 'needs' and 'capacities' of the persons concerned. But both the strategies were unavailing as, in a sense, they were superimposed on the tradition by the 'educated' elite that came into being after the coming of the British into this country. Before it, the tradition had 'seen' itself in a different manner as is evidenced by almost all the surveys of the philosophical scene starting from Haribhadra Sūrī onwards in the eighth century A.D. It was the *prasthāna-bheda*, as Madhusudana Saraswatī called it, that differentiated the

sampradāyas or the schools in an irreconcilable manner as each wanted to preserve its separate identity at all costs, even when it considered such 'identification' basically mistaken as was the case with Sāṁkhya and Advaita Vedānta. Even the Jains stuck to their notion of *'anekānta'* as they thought it gave them that distinctive identity which differentiated them from others.

But what was this *prasthāna-bheda* which defined the philosophical school in its distinctive difference and in terms of which it sought to seek and preserve it for at least two millennia of its recorded history. In the case of the philosophical tradition these are, as is well known, the *sūtras,* the founding texts of the tradition. But what are these *sūtra-texts* from which everything is supposed to have flowed and which, like the Vedas, are supposed to have the same authority in respect of those traditions.

There could not perhaps have been a greater 'myth' superimposed on the tradition, but this time it was by the tradition itself. This was facilitated, perhaps even buttressed, by the style and character of the composition of these texts which, at least at first sight, seemed to render them unintelligible. The compression, the brevity and the opaqueness, coupled with almost a total lack of information about the *'context'* of discussion within the text itself made it virtually impossible to get directly at their meaning without which their very 'foundational' character would obviously be lost. This is supposed to be 'saved' by the universally held belief that the key to the meaning of the *sūtras* lies in the commentaries on them which, of course, are generally available and treated as if without their 'mediation' the 'secret' of the text would remain undeciphered. But, why the 'commentaries' in the plural, and why the commentaries on the commentaries, remains the unanswered question by those who have swallowed wholesale this myth about the tradition superimposed by the tradition itself.

What was the sūtra-text doing, and what are the commentaries doing, is the question that has to be raised in order that we may have some idea of what the philosophical enterprise of India was

about, and this is what this work sets about to do in respect of one such foundational text of the tradition, that is, the *Nyāya Sūtras.*

The long engagement with this foundational text has revealed that the usual views held about them, if not entirely false, are almost totally so. The text *is* intelligible, even if not completely so. There *are* places which are dense and opaque, but there also are others which are not so. But what comes out and strikes one as even stranger, is the intensely polemical character of the text which, yet, is full of an awareness that is amazingly self-critical of its own formulations and positions. And, even when it opts for a position, many a time it seems to be still in two minds and, at others, gives an impression of doing so only for pragmatic or cultural reasons. As the text unfolds, the story and its context becomes more and more clear and the intellectual milieu within which it was composed takes shape before one's eyes. It slowly ceases to be a 'foundational' text and begins to be seen as mirroring the past and reflecting the times in which it was written. It contains in itself intellectual and philosophical 'history' in a way that has not yet been seen even by those who have dealt with it generally for purposes of translating and making it available to the contemporary readers. This, as everyone knows, has been because those who have translated the text have invariably done so in the light of the commentaries written on it and, generally, with the accompanying translations of the commentaries which go with them also. The sūtra-texts have, therefore, never been seen in their own right and studied for what is contained in them. Nor has there been any attempt to articulate the issues and problems dealt with therein or the controversies it is engaged and involved in.

Yet, it is also a fact that these texts gave rise to works that are collectively known by the name of 'commentaries' in the english language, even though in Sanskrit they are known by different names and 'connote' different things. What is, however, most significant about these is that they occur in 'succession' and

show remarkable differences amongst them. The full corpus of these texts is so large and so varied that no one has yet come to terms with it, not even those who write with 'authority' on what they call 'Nyāya' or Vedānta' or 'Sāṁkhya' or anything else.

To make the 'understanding' of these so-called 'schools' of Indian philosophy even *more* difficult, there are what can only be called 'independent' texts in the tradition which, then, begin to have commentaries on them giving rise to varied and conflicting interpretations which can only be regarded as 'sub-schools' within the system. This is well known in respect of Gangeśa's work in Nyāya and, at a different level, in respect of Śaṁkara's Bhāṣya on the Brahma sūtras.

To compound the difficulties even further, there is the 'myth', invented by God knows whom, that nothing 'new' has been said in Indian philosophy in particular and Indian thought in general since the time of the Vedas or the Upaniṣads or the Mahāvīra or the Buddha or those who are said to have written the 'founding texts' of the tradition. There are, of course, those who would like to draw the line somewhere else, but that the line has to be drawn 'somewhere' is accepted by everybody. In fact, the 'line' is not a function of empirical information but of an a priori belief in the trans-empirical authority of those who are supposed to have laid the foundation of, or initiated, the tradition. The true nature of the 'mythical' character of this myth, however, is captured not by those who write on these matters but by those who ascribe all 'beginnings', including the beginning of knowledge, to the creator of the world, that is, Brahmā.

But the myth, though hiding a profound insight, still remains a myth as is evidenced by the 'arbitrariness' of the line that is drawn by the person concerned and the 'shifting' character it has always displayed in the tradition.

The foundational texts are not all of a piece, nor are they concerned with an identical task and, for that matter, they even do not evince the same style. The Mīmāṁsā sūtra and the Brahma sūtra are concerned with the discrepant statements in a pre-

existent text whose authority they unquestioningly accept and which they attempt to present in a manner as if there were no discrepancies or contradictions within it. They both presuppose some sort of a desire to know or jijñāsā which is specifically restricted to *dharma* and Brahman respectively. The Nyāya sūtra does nothing of the sort. It merely recounts the topics it proposes to deal with and promises only that, if correctly understood and applied, it would lead to true knowledge of any subject whatsoever and the realisation of the purpose or value inherent in it. The Vaiśeṣika sūtras claim to be authoritative exposition of the way the world should be understood in terms of the relevant similarities and dissimilarities in the properties that objects display and suggests that if these are correctly known, they would lead to 'success' both in 'this-worldly' and 'other-worldly' enterprises of man. For some strange reason, the historians of Indian philosophy club it with the Nyāya tradition, but its 'no-nonsense', 'non-polemical' expository style is so different from that of the Nyāya sūtra that only those who are taken in by the later developments in Nyāya, forgetting its earlier history, would agree to this.

The retrospective superimposition of an spurious identity or similarity of interests which has been the fate of the presentation of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika thought in most texts on the subject, has also happened in the case of Sāṁkhya and Yoga, though perhaps for different reasons. The *Yoga-sūtra* is primarily a prescriptive text and proclaims this in the first sūtra itself, which is 'athayogānuśāsnam'. It is *not* a theoretical, discursive, argumentative, ratiocinative philosophical exercise. The Sāṁkhya Sūtra, though not a founding text of the system and supposed to be written much later, is nothing of the kind. Those who try to save the situation by suggesting that yoga is the 'applied' or the 'practical' supplement to what the Sāṁkhya theoretically propounds forget that the 'transcendental praxis' the *Yoga sūtra* delineates is practically accepted by everybody in the Indian tradition whether he theoretically believes in the 'truth' of Sāṁkhya or not.

The diversity of these 'founding' texts for the philosophical traditions of India and their being not so 'foundational' as has generally been supposed, dawned on me only gradually during the long, intensive, detailed interrogation and questioning of each sūtra of the Nyāya Sūtra in order to get into the spirit of the text and understand from within the philosophical endeavour which Gautama was engaged in. The present work documents this and suggests that the 'experiment' should be repeated with the other sūtra-texts so that a different picture of India's philosophical traditions may emerge which, hopefully, will be a little more in consonance with what actually happened and how it developed over time.

In fact, the idea was mooted and informally discussed, and even provisionally accepted at a meeting attended by Prof. D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Prof. K. Satcidananda Murty, Prof. R. Balsubramanyan and myself. But perhaps the idea was too premature and, in any case, no one seemed to know how to give shape to it. Another factor which intervened was the increasing realisation that these texts could not be understood in isolation, or even in the context of what preceded or succeeded them, but rather in the context of the issues and problems that were 'troubling' the philosophical minds in India those days. This realisation which cuts at the very roots of almost all writings on Indian philosophy till today found expression in the article "Towards a Field Theory of Indian philosophy"[1] where it was argued that instead of 'seeing' philosophical schools in India only in terms of their own history, they should be seen in an interactive, interdetermining relationship developing over time, each influencing and shaping the other and being influenced and shaped by them in its own turn.

This, however, remains still a dream and at least this work does not even attempt to do it as, perhaps, that type of work could only be undertaken *after* works of this nature have been done in respect of all the basic sūtra-texts of the Indian philosophical tradition. That might perhaps be one reason why D.N. Shastri's

path-breaking work *Critique of Indian Realism* could not be carried forward, as not only did he ignore the major players on the Indian philosophical scene and concentrated only on the interaction, and the gradual change introduced by this, in the positions of Nyāya and Buddhism in the long debate that occurred between them during the first millennium A.D. The exclusion of other 'schools', for example, resulted in the total absence and complete neglect of the debate over *śabda pramāṇa* which practically was non-existent for the Buddhist and played no role in his philosophical thought.

The only other person who has tried to see the philosophical 'schools' in some sort of an interrelationship is Karl Potter who in his *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* relates them to the goal they seek, that is, *moksa,* the differences between them arising because of the philosophical problems this goal gives rise to, and the different ways in which they were attempted to be solved. But the picture remains static, there is no interaction or 'influencing' as if all of them had sprung out of Brahmā's head. His later attempt to bring some movement into the picture by suggesting that there are five stages in the development of a school, paradigmatically illustrated in the advaitic tradition of Vedānta by the text called *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* which, according to him, represents the fifth and final stage of the evolution of Advaitic thought in the Indian tradition[2], is no better as it conveniently forgets the *history* of adyaitin's polemics *after* Madhusūdana Saraswatī's *Advaita Siddhi* which itself was a reply to Vyāsatīrtha II's *Nyāyāmṛta,* the most well known attack on the Advaitic position from the Madhva side. Even in the twentieth century, the veteran Ananta Kṛṣṇa Śāstrī felt the need of replying to the famous Vedāntadeśika on the one hand and Jayatīrtha on the other. His *Śatabhūṣaṇī is* a reply to the *Śatadūṣaṇi* of the former and the *Advaita-tattva sudhā* to the *Nyāya Sudhā of* the latter. Vedānta Deśika's attack was, as is well known, from the Viśiṣṭādvaita side while that of Jayatīrtha was from the Madhva side.

The deliberate ignoring of this twentieth century discussion by Potter who, because of his long involvement and engagement with the Project on *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* may be presumed to have been aware of it, is only a symptom of that widespread attitude which does not want to see Indian philosophy as a ratiocinative enterprise seriously engaged in argument and counter-argument in its long history and developing because of this. This, and not mokṣa, is its life-breath as it is sustained and developed by it. Those, and this includes almost everybody, who think otherwise believe also that Indian philosophy stopped growing long ago, a claim refuted in detail and depth in *Developments in Indian Philosophy from eighteenth century onwards: Classical and Modem*[3] where it has been shown that in almost every field of Indian thought innovative developments occurred during this period. And, if it *developed* till as late as the end of the twentieth century, why it should not have developed earlier? A closer look at the texts and the history of thought developing from and around them is, thus, a necessity without which we will continue to remain, as we have done up till now, in the realm of vague generalisations and stock descriptions which cannot stand the test when subjected to closer questioning and scrutiny.

This work is an attempt in this direction and continues what occurred, almost as an accident, a long time ago. *Three Myths about Indian philosophy* and *Three Conceptions of Indian Philosophy* were the first two papers that questioned the prevailing 'orthodoxy' at that time. Since then, the series of papers collected now and published under the title *Indian Philosophy—A Counter Perspective*^ and *New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy*[5] have raised questions based on 'indisputable' facts regarding not only the widely accepted positions termed as *Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta, Śāṁkhya* or *Nyāya* but also that which is designated by the terms *Upaniṣads* and *Veda* in the tradition. The Jains have been asked *'How anekantic is anekānta?'* and the Buddhists 'Does Pratītyasamutpāda say anything new?'.

The questions raised have been attempted to be answered by scholars of eminence, starting from Karl H. Potter whose view of Indian philosophy propounded in his *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* was questioned in *Three Conceptions of Indian Philosophy.* Potter's was a serious attempt at meeting the objections and hence had to be taken 'seriously'. The reply is contained in the pivotal article entitled *Indian Philosophy and Mokṣa: Revisiting an old controversy to* which Potter replied by asking "Why cannot an Indian be Indian?"[6] which, essentially, was a non-reply as he chose to opt out of the debate.

For some reason, this business of mokṣa and its relation to Indian philosophy seems to touch a raw nerve as five thinkers, including N.S. Dravid, J.N. Mohanty, Harsh Narain, K.J. Shah and Pratap Chandra disputed this directly or indirectly. The reply to each of these was given in the chapter entitled *Response to my Critics* in *The Philosophy of Daya Krishna.*[7]

This, of course, is the basic issue but 'orthodoxy' reigns in respect of almost every field of Indian philosophy. Even such a simple query as '*Nyāya-Realist or idealist*? offended the 'orthodox' to rush in and 'save' the citadel of Indian philosophy. Similarly, the question regarding the 'presence' of Vedānta in the first millennium A.D. was treated as if the holy waters of the Ganges were being polluted, or the 'unquestionable' questioned. The story of these may easily be found in the pages of the *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research* where the discussion and debate regarding them, along with many others, is recorded.[8] The whole material which includes detailed discussion on the contentions of such stalwarts as J.H. Staal and Karl H. Potter awaits publication by the Council in whose archives it has been lying for some time. It would be difficult for the 'orthodox' picture to remain unaffected once the concentrated and cumulative discussion on many of these issues are brought together and made available under one cover, instead of bring scattered over issues and volumes which may not be all there even at one place in the libraries where journals are usually found.

The methodology explored in this work has to be extended to other texts in the tradition. Some preliminary work has been done on the Vaiśeṣika sūtras which awaits completion. The first tentative 'discovery' through this work on the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra has been that the foundational texts of the two systems which are supposed to be so closely allied as to be regarded as almost one by every student of the subject just could hot be true as the spirit, style and content of the two are so different that even the 'blindest eye' could not fail to feel it.

The story of the other sūtras could not be different, nor perhaps the relationship the explication and elaboration on the text, as the *Padārtha Dharma Saṁgraha* of Praśastapāda shows it. This, though related to the sūtra text, is so independent that it is literally unbelievable how the traditional orthodox view of the 'relationship' could be unquestioningly accepted.

The relation of the *Nyāya Sūtra* to the texts from Vātasyāyana to Udayana, including Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña, which has been explored in this work does not seem to be the same as the differences are subdued and not easily discernible at first sight. Yet, if this work had been undertaken *after* the work on the Vaiśeṣika sūtras we would have looked for what was so obviously there in the case of Praśastapāda's work on it. In fact, the work of Bhāsarvajña which was looked into almost at the end of the enterprise revealed a spirit similar to that of Praśastapāda. In any case, the relation of the foundational text to the commentaries and sub-commentaries on them was not, and never could be, the same as has been proclaimed by the orthodox pundits or the modern scholars who have built the picture of Indian philosophy up till now.

The generally accepted picture of Indian philosophy which is perpetrated through 'teaching' and thus passed on from generation to generation has to be replaced by an alternative picture that takes into account the facts and the arguments contained in the articles collected and published in the two volumes entitled *Indian Philosophy: A Counter-perspective and New Perspectives in*

Indian Philosophy, along with others not included in them. Such an alternative picture has been attempted in the author's two works; *Indian Philosophy: A New Approach*[9] and *Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about Man, Society and Polity.*[10] The former attempts to tell the story of Indian philosophy as it has developed from the times of the Vedas upto the twentieth century, while the latter tries to articulate the intellectual problems that the Indian thinkers felt and faced, and the conceptual categories and structures in which they formulated them.

But the work on both of these, and even the work in Hindi (Bhartīya Darśana: Aika Nayī Dṛṣṭi)[11], revealed the need for detailed micro-studies and a relatively firmer grasp of the temporal placement and sequence of the texts in order that a more secure foundation be there for an 'objective' picture to emerge that is not just a 'subjective' superimposition of the thinker concerned. The present work thus arose out of the discovery that there were no such works even in the case of such a well known field of Indian philosophy as Nyāya, not to talk of the other so-called 'schools' of Indian philosophy.

But even this work is only a preliminary step as it not only leaves the story hanging mid-way, but does not do justice to the texts of the major thinkers considered in it. It is *sūtra*-centered, and remains focussed on it. The works of Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara Vācaspati Miśra I, Udayana, Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña are basically peripheral to it and hence treated in a manner that may appear perfunctory, but is not really so as it subserves a different purpose. Yet, each of these works deserves to be studied independently in its own right even if it is seen, as it should be, in relation to its predecessors, successors and contemporaries. This, however, is left for others who, hopefully, will contribute in their own way to the building of a new picture of Indian philosophy. The present work, it is hoped, will provide some impetus and impulse in this direction.

The work, I may add, was conceived a long time ago and

bears the mark of that chequered history. So many people have helped in the way it has come into being, but two names stand out, Rashmi and Rachna. The former was involved with almost everything that I wrote during that long period when not only the Project Volume on *Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards* but *Prolegomena to any future historiography of Cultures and Civilizations,*[12] *Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about Man, Society and Polity* and *Indian Philosophy: A New Approach* were written. As for the latter, she helped not only on the Project Volume in the later stages of work on it, but also worked more collaboratively on this text on the *Nyāya Sūtras* particularly the portion relating to the discussion on the texts of Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara Vācaspati Miśra, Udayana, Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña which would have been scarcely possible without her active involvement in thinking about them. The memory of these two is deeply entwined with the works they have been associated with, and it is a pleasure to remember and record it here.

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Chapter 1

The Structure of the Nyāya Sūtras

THE *Nyāya Sūtra* is not an unknown text in the Indian tradition. In fact, it is not only regarded as the foundational text of Nyāya but also has been extensively commented upon by a number of very well known thinkers in that tradition. Not only this, there has been a concern with the text and the fixing of both the reading of the sūtras and the numbers contained in each section. The article entitled '*The Text of the Nyāya Sūtras-Some Problems*', given in Appendix 1, attempts to deal with some of these problems. The task of finalising the text, and giving an analysis of its contents was undertaken by Vācaspati Miśra I in his *Nyāya Sūcīnibandha* where he gave an exhaustive list of the topics dealt with there and the sūtras devoted to each *prakaraṇa* in the text (Appendix n). But, no one has given any reasons as to why he should have felt the necessity of writing such a work giving not only the exact number of the sūtras in each section, but also dividing the sūtras in detail on the basis of the issues they had dealt with and also giving the exact number of the words in them. It is of course true that Uddyotakara's Vārttika on Vatsyāyana's Bhāṣya on the Nyāya Sūtras had perhaps been forgotten as has been explicitly mentioned by Vācaspati Miśra-I in his well known 'Tātparyaṭikā' on the Vārttika but there is little reason to believe that the Nyāya Sūtras themselves had become unknown by his time or the Vatsyāyana's Bhāṣya on them was not known.

Yet, though Vācaspati Miśra I's attempt in the *Nyāyasūcī Nibandha* is well known to all students of Nyāya it has not been the subject of any special attention either in the tradition or

amongst those in modern times who have been interested in the subject. A close look therefore on the way Vācaspati Miśra I has described the topics dealt with in Nyāya Sūtras and the number of sūtras devoted to each topic therefore a desideratum for any intensive study of this work which has provided the foundation for all Nyāya thinking in the Indian tradition. According to Vācaspati Miśra I there are five chapters, each containing two sections, containing the following number of sūtras in each:

1.1	41
1.2	20
2.1	61
2.2	61
3.1	73
3.2	72
4.1	68
4.2	51
5.1	40
5.2	24
Total:	511 Sūtras

The Nyāya Sūtras (150 A.D.) has two different purposes combined into one text and hence shows an inner conflict and tension in the thinking of the author of the work. The conflict and the pension can perhaps be resolved, but it will require at least a preliminary awareness about it. A reflection on this may also provide a clue to the insoluble problem that seems to plague Indian philosophical enterprise from its very beginning. The sūtra has not one, but two *prayojanas* or purposes as enshrined in the first two sūtras which, according to the author of the *Nyāya sūcīnibandha*, should be regarded as the *prayojana* sūtras. These are explicitly stated to be *niḥśreyasa* and *apavarga*. What is the exact relation between the two should be the central concern of Nyāya but this has nowhere been attempted in the tradition at least in a focal manner.

The tradition emphasizes *only* the first *prayojana* and treats

Nyāya as *pramāṇa śāstra* whose end is supposed to be the attainment of *niḥśreyasa*. The *pramāṇa vidyā*, however, is available to every one who wants to argue for any thing and hence is, as an instrument, available to every other discipline and also all those who want to use *buddhi* for the attainment of any purpose whatsoever. As these purposes are diverse, the term *niḥśreyasa* also may be seen as implying an intrinsic and essential diversity in it. Uddyotakara (610 AD) makes this clear in his Vārttika on the Sūtra 1.1.1.

The second sūtra is concerned with an analysis of the human situation and concerns itself with its articulation in the usual traditional manner which appears to be common to all Indian philosophical and non-philosophical disciplines. The question with respect to it, then, will be as to how the Nyāya Sūtra analysis of the human situation differs from that which is offered by the other schools of Indian philosophy. As for the *pramāṇa śāstra* portion of the Nyāya *Sūtras* which explicitly is termed by Vātsyāyana (425 AD) as ānvīkṣikī, the question, then, will be as to how its understanding and presentation differs from that which is offered by the other *pramāṇa śāstras* in the tradition.

The structural organisation of the Sūtras presents a distinctive character of its own which perhaps may provide a clue to the way India's intellectual enterprises were conducted in the past or, in other words, how a scientific enterprise in the field of knowledge conceived of itself and understood what it meant to be "scientific" or *Śāstric* in character. In other words, what did it mean to compose a *Śāstra* in the Indian tradition? This seems to have been divided into the following parts: (1) A clear and precise statement of the *prayojana* or the purpose of the *śastra*, (2) To give a *lakṣaṇa* or the precise definition of the basic terms used in the construction of the *śāstra;* this was called the *lakṣaṇa-vicāra* (3) The next step was to engage in a detailed examination of the adequacy of the definitions offered. This was called the *parīkṣā prakaraṇa* and in this it differed from the notion of definition as offered in both the classical and the modern versions of logic in the western

tradition. This examination of the adequacy of definition was divided into three parts. The first concerned the definition in its generality and was called *sāmānya lakṣaṇa parīkṣā.* This was done at the most abstract and general level of the concept whose definition was given. The second was concerned with the more concrete and specific levels at which the concept was applied and was called *viśeṣa lakṣaṇa parīkṣā.* The third was concerned with discriminating and distinguishing the concept from other related concepts with which it could easily be confused because of the nature of objects to which the concept was applied. It may be called lakṣaṇa bheda vicāra.

Within this general framework, the Nyāya Sūtra begins a close examination of the concepts which define and demarcate the area of knowledge with which it is concerned. This area is extensionally presented in the sūtra 1.1.1 and is intensionally treated in the later discussion on the subject. The sixteen topics enumerated in this first sūtra, however, do not appear to form a homogeneous class and hence the author of the *Nyāya Sūcīnibandha* clearly distinguishes them in separate classes. These, strangely, recall *Bharata 's Nāṭya Śāstra* (2nd Century AD) which shows some analogous similarity with the *Nyāya Sūtra* as seen by *Vācaspati Miśra* I (960 AD) in his analysis of the structure of the composition of the sūtra text. These he calls *pūrvānga, āśrayasiddhānta, nyāya, uttarānga* and *kathā.*

The term *pūrvānga,* strangely, refers to doubt which in this characterization is regarded as a necessary pre-condition of the process of self-conscious search for validation to start. Thus, in the opinion of Gautama, those who do not doubt can not embark on the enterprise of knowledge, at least as self-conscious human beings. If doubt is the foundational presupposition of all cognitive activity then, according to the Nyāya Sūtra, the resolution of the doubt is the end of the cognitive activity. The term 'Nyāya' denotes, in this context, the different steps of the process which lead from doubt to its resolution, that is, *nirṇaya.* It is not clear what role *prayojana, dṛṣṭānta* and *siddhānta* are supposed to play

in this process. Nor is it clear why the author of the Nyāya Sūcī Nibandha has included *prayojana* and *dṛṣṭānta* in the *pūrvānga* and why the author discusses time particularly in the present tense.

The discussion of *śabda* starts with 2.1.49 and is divided into *śabda anityatā, śabda pariṇāma* and *śabda śakti*. The total number of sūtras devoted to this topic are seventy-six and form perhaps the largest number on any single topic discussed in the text. It is however, not clear what exactly is meant by the term *śabda* in this text. Śabda as a *pramāṇa* is defined as the *upādeśa* of an *āptapuruṣa,* but much. of the discussion in the text does not seem to have any connection with this definition. The problem of eternity or non-eternity of *śabda,* for example, seems completely irrelevant to the definition offered by Gautama in the text. Thus, one has to find whether the term *śabda* means sound in general or word as spoken, or as the advice of a trustworthy person (āpta) for the well-being of the person concerned.

The sūtras try to establish the necessity for the postulation of a self or soul as distinct from the senses, the body, the mind and the buddhi. However, there is an interesting discussion on the eternity of buddhi as well as the problem whether the self can be conceived of as consisting of momentary phenomenological experiences as is argued for by the Buddhists. The whole of the third *adhyāya* including 3.1 and 3.2 is devoted to the discussion and elucidation of the various aspects and faculties constituting the embodied person and distinguishing the *ātman* from these. The various topics discussed in this *adhyāya* need to be separated and the issues raised therein distinguished from one another. The total number of sūtras comes to about 145 (see the detailed discussion in Ch. 2).

The fourth chapter shifts the discussion to the sūtra 1.1.2 which is concerned with *apavarga* and seems to be a different, though related, concern of the author of the Nyāya sūtras. The discussion provides a natural transition from the one which has been attempted in chapter 3 which is concerned primarily with

the establishment of the reality of *ātman* and hence may be regarded as connected with the attainment of *apavarga* or *moksa* by the *ātman* or self, a concern which is found in other schools of Indian philosophy also. The chapter 4.1 gives the *sāmānya lakṣaṇa* of *pravṛtti, doṣa, pretyābhāva, phala, duhkha* and *apavarga,* and examines the adequacy of the way the concepts have been defined in the text. These basically refer to the standard Indian formulation in terms of suffering, birth, the outgoing tendency of the consciousness and the basic problems arising from it along with the foundational false knowledge about these whose removal gives rise to liberation or *mokṣa* or *apavarga.* The roots of the whole cycle of birth and death are supposed to lie in false knowledge or *mithyā jñāna* which according to Vātsyāyana consists of the following: (1) To think of self as the not-self and not-self as the self or subject as object and the object as subject; (2) To find pleasure or happiness in that which is essentially the opposite of these; (3) To consider that which is impermanent as permanent; (4) To regard that as living which is lifeless because it is infected with death; (5) To be fearless about that which on reflection one would find that one should be afraid of it.

It is this foundational false knowledge which gives rise to desire or unfulfillable seeking for objects which are mistakenly supposed to give one happiness but, in fact, give rise to suffering and lead to rebirth.

The notions of birth, suffering, desire, action, fruit and rebirth imply, in an essential sense, the existence of a world which is both independent of these and yet is dependent on these in the sense that it is only through a reference to these and in the context of these that it makes sense. There is, thus, an interesting discussion in the *adhyāya* 4.1 on the reality of the world and the mistaken notions that one may entertain regarding it. These need to be separated and analysed for the correct understanding of the Nyāya position in this regard.

The Nyāya Sūtras are known for the fact that they have not separately mentioned *Īśwara* or God as one of the *premeyas* in

their system. Yet they have accepted the reality of *Īśwara* and referred to it in some of the sūtras, but only negatively. A negative reference to *Īśwara* occurs in the sūtras 4.1.19-21 where it is said that he can not be considered to be an *upādāna kāraṇa* of the world.

The chapter four of the Nyāya sūtra is concerned with the achievement of the *tattva jñāna* which is the 'opposite' of *mithyā jñāna* and thus, provides a link between the themes of the two sūtras (I.I.I and 1.1.2). The term *tattva jñāna* which occurs at the end of the first sūtra is thus seen as related to the second sūtra which ends with *mithyā jñāna* whose removal is supposed to lead to apavarga. Strangely, a discussion of *avayava* and *avayavī* is introduced at this point by the author of the Nyāya Sūtras who is self-conscious of the fact that there is something strange in introducing it and hence is called *prāsangika*. He returns back to the notion of doubt, perhaps existential doubt in this case, and suggests why he treated *siddhānta* separately in his classification of the topics mentioned in the N.S. 1.1.1. Similarly, the use of the term āśraya in the context of the topic of *siddhānta* does not seem to be clear unless it be assumed that the whole process of justification or validation which is required to resolve the doubt that has arisen presupposes some accepted and established siddhānta without which the process can not even start. The *siddhānta* and the *nirṇaya* will, in that case, be related in an intimate manner so that the latter only explicates what is already implicitly contained in the *siddhānta* and the whole process of the resolution of doubt will be, in a sense, to make oneself aware of the implications of that which one already believed on non-rational or trans-rational grounds. The steps, however, appear to be divided into three separate parts, the first of which alone is called nyāya, while the latter two are termed as *uttarānga* and consist of *tarka* and *nirṇaya*. These are the concluding portion of the process and, strangely, *tarka* is said to be a necessary step without which the *nirṇaya* or the resolution can not be attained. The distinction between nyāya or *avayava* and *tarka* and *nirṇaya* needs

to be clarified as also the inter-relationship between them. What exactly is the difference, for example, between *nigamana* and *nirṇaya?* The term *kathā* which includes *vāda, jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* refers to the seriousness of the intension of those who engage in a discussion to settle a problem or explore an issue. Normally, the terms are said to apply only in the context of a discussion between two persons who hold opposite positions. But this is not necessary as the same distinctions may apply to the way one argues in a group or with oneself.

Interestingly, after examining the adequacy of the definitions (lakṣaṇa) of *saṁśaya, pramāṇa sāmānya, pratyakṣa* and *anumāna,* as all knowledge simultaneously involves questions about the world and the self and as unless doubts about these are resolved, one can not 'know' the truth or 'be' what one ought to be, Gautama in his discussion of *tattva jñāna* and the related problem of the removal of two kinds of radical doubt, introduces the epistemological contention regarding the reality or indubitability of *bāhyārtha* or 'reference' as the essential foundation of all knowledge which is primarily epistemological in character in sūtras 4.25.26-37. As for the existential doubt, Gautama suggests that this can only be removed by a continuous process of 'existential living', something that is indicated by the term *sādhanā* in the Indian tradition. The contention seems to be that this kind of doubt about the nature of consciousness or self or ātman can not be removed by any *pramāṇa vyāpāra* or the exercise of the theoretical reason. The practical reason, however, comes here in a radically different sense than the way it has in the western tradition where it primarily deals with morality and law on the one hand and instrumental rationality on the other. The existential concern is with the nature of the self and the attempt is to change it in the context of the existentially experienced dissatisfaction felt about it.

Chapter five in both its sections returns back to the discussion of the fallacies and the various methods employed by the

opponents to defeat each other or to frustrate each other by arguments which are inadmissible on logical grounds.

The Structure of the Nyāya Sūtra

A quantitive analysis reveals that in terms of the number of sūtras devoted to a topic or *adhikaraṇa* the situation is as follows:

(1) Pramāṇa—145
(2) Ātman—114
(3) Prameya—8 4 excluding atman and jagat Buddhi—5 5 3.2.1-3.2.55
(4) Śabda—76
(5) Hetvābhāsa—47
(6) Jagat—30
(7) Nigraha Sthāna—23
(8) Tattvajñāna—17
(9) Phala—11
(10) Apavarga—10
(11) Pravṛtti Doṣa—9
(12) Chala, jāti—8
(13) Saṁśaya—7
(14) Siddhānta—6
(15) Duḥkḥa—4
(16) Īśwara—3
(17) Vāda, jalpa, Vitaṇḍā—3 (Kathā Lakṣaṇa)

The largest number of sūtras are, as is to be expected, concerned with *pramāṇa*. The sūtras number about 145 and the matter is dealt with in 1.1, 2.2 and 2.1. The next topic that engages the attention of the author in his work is the establishment of the necessity for the postulation of *ātman* or soul or self, a reality independent from the senses, body, mind and the buddhi. The sūtras number around 114. The focus of the text thus is obvious. In other words, it seeks to establish the reality of *ātman* on the basis of the *pramāṇas* which have already been enumerated

and discussed and considering the contemporary context it is primarily an anti-Buddhist work.

However, as it tries to distinguish the self from the senses, the body, the mind and the intellect, it reminds one of the Sāṁkhyan position and hence one has to examine as to how its position differs from that of Sāṁkhya, which also makes the same distinction.

Yet, though the *ātman* seems to be the most important *prameya* which author of the N.S. wants to establish, it is not on the basis of the *śabda pramāṇa* which is the subject of the largest number of the sūtras among the *pramāṇas* dealt with in the text.

Strangely, the next topic that gets the largest number of sūtras is *prameya* (84), but as the *prameyas* include the atman also, the total number is both illusory and misleading. The prameyas mentioned in the text are *ātman, śarīra, indriya, artha, buddhi, manas, pravṛtti, doṣa, pretyābhāva, phala, duhkha, apavarga.* These are, for the author of the text those things which have to be established by argument and hence it may be said that the text is not a pure text on logic or even epistemology but is already prejudiced in favour of certain objects or entities or states which have to be established by argument and reason *at all cost,* irrespective of the possibility of any defects in the argument given.

A closer look at the *prameyas* reveals that the text is primarily concerned with man and accepts the general position of almost all philosophical schools in India regarding the theory of *karma,* the consequences thereof, the fact of rebirth, all of these implying that the outward-going tendency of consciousness and its engagement with the world in all its forms, that is, *pravṛtti* is necessarily mistaken and hence is by its very nature full of defects requiring a redress through the reverse movement (*nivṛtti* or *pratyāhāra*) which ends in *apavarga* or *moksa.*

The term *apavarga* occurs in the sūtra 1.1.2 where we also have the following terms which are regarded as *prameyas* in the

system—*duhkha, pravṛtti, doṣa* and *janma*. Strangely, neither the term *niḥśreyasa* nor *Īśwara* find a place in the list of *prameyas* given in the text. Also, the world is seen in terms of its relationship to the senses and finds no place as a reality independent of it. Jagat which may be considered as an equivalent of what is called the world is dealt with in thirty sūtras and is not considered as an independent *prameya* by the author of the sūtras. No distinction seems to have been made at least explicitly between the concept of *artha* that is the object of the senses and *jagat* that is the world.

After the *prameyas* the largest number of sūtras are concerned with *śabda* both as a *pramāṇa* and not as word but sound. It consists of seventy-six sūtras and argues against the *nityatva* of sound and *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda. In this, it is obviously controverting the mīmāṁsā position on this issue.

The next largest number of sūtras are concerned with fallacies, but the term used suggests something else. It connotes what may be called illusory arguments or illusions of reason. However, it does not distinguish between removable and irremovable illusions as one normally does in case of sensory and perceptual illusions. In fact, the term should have been *pramaṇābhāsa* of which the *hetvābhāsa* is only a sub-class, as these occur only in case of *anumāna,* while illusions may occur in the case of all the pramāṇas.

The next largest number of sūtras are concerned with the world which is defined as an object of the senses and deal with the problem of its origin. The next largest number is concerned with *nigrahsthāna* which only means check and mate in argument. The sūtras dealing with pramāṇa, śabda, hetvābhāsa and nigrahsthāna deal with the same subject, that is, reasoning or *pramāṇa vyāpāra* and refers to different aspects or stages of it. Thus, the total number of sūtras concerned with reason or reasoning in the Nyāya Sūtras are 333 and form about 62% of the total number of sūtras in the text which amount to 530.

	Reasoning			Prameyas	
(1)	Pramāṇa	146	(1)	Prameyas	84
(2)	Śabda	76	(2)	Ātman 114	
(3)	Hetvābhāsa	47	(3)	Jagat 30	
(4)	Nigrahastthāna	23	(4)	Īśwara	11
(5)	Chala, jāti	8	(5)	Pravṛtti-Doṣa	9
(6)	Siddhānta	6	(6)	Duhkha	4
(7)	Vāda, jalpa, vitaṇḍā (Kathālakṣaṇa)	3	(7)	Apavarga	10
(8)	Saṁsaya	7			
(9)	Tattvajnana	17			
		333			262

The constituents of the reasoning process or *pramāṇa vyāpāra* as articulated in the Nyāya Sūtra consist of two radically different parts which, however, are integrally linked to each other. The first consists of the elements internal to the reasoning process, while the latter treats the reasoning process itself as embedded in the reasoning activity of human beings who engage in it. This involves psychological elements including motivation, desire to find the truth and/or to establish a doctrine or to deceive the other or to win an argument. The terms *vāda, jalpa, vitaṇḍā, chala* and *jāti* refer to these aspects of the reasoning activity. It should be noticed that *jalpa* is defined in terms of *chala* and *jāti* and hence consists of them (see sūtra 1.2.2). Thus, really speaking, there are only *vāda, jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* as *jalpa* consists of *chala* and *jāti.* This reveals that ultimately the act of reasoning in its psychological aspect consists only of honesty and dishonesty in reasoning. Both *vāda* and *vitaṇḍā* are honest, even though the latter is not generally considered as such. But, the person who engages in *vitaṇḍā* is perhaps even more honest than the one who engages in *vāda,* because he openly declares that he has not yet found the truth or does not have any settled *siddhānta* of his own, but that he sees the defects in what someone else is claiming to be truth or proclaiming as a *siddhānta.* However, in this sense

of *vitanḍā* one who argues that reasoning can not establish any *siddhānta* at all or, in other words, can not find the truth or is a complete skeptic can not be considered a *vaitanḍic.* Nāgārjuna, thus, can not be regarded as a *vaitanḍic* for he proclaims that reasoning *per se* can not find truth or establish any *siddhānta.* Perhaps, the real skeptic is one who believes that not only reason, but nothing else can establish truth and, at a still deeper level, the complete skeptic will be one who believes that all the human faculties together can not, in principle, approach truth in any realm in an asymptotic manner, even in infinite time.

Issues to be closely examined in the Nyāya Sūtra and their subsequent discussion in Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācasapati Miśra I, Udayana (Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña may also be included).

1. Definition of *śabda pramāṇa* in the establishment of the authority of the Veda's.
2. How does the mention of Āyurveda as the paradigm case of śabda pramāṇa, affect the authority of the Veda, or even the notion of practice itself.
3. The discussion of *nityatva* of *śabda* and its reputation in the Nyāya Sūtra.
4. How is *śabda* distinguished from sound.
5. What are the arguments for the reality of ātman and its distinction from the *indriyas,* the body, the mind and the *buddhi.*
6. What is the difference between these arguments and the ones given by Sāmkhya on the same subject.
7. What are the arguments for *Īśwara* or God in the Nyāya Sūtra and what is the relationship, if any, between the *Īśwara* and the ātman. Is ātman eternal, and is its eternity the same as that of Īśwara.
8. What is the difference and relationship between the different *padārthas* accepted as *nity* in Nyāya.
9. What is the distinction between *niḥsreyasa* and *apavarga* and what are the relations between the two.

Śabda Pramāṇa

The discussion of the *śabda pramāṇa* in the Nyāya Sūtra is divided into the following topics: (1) The establishment of *śabda* as an independent *pramāṇa* which can not be reduced to *anumāna*. The discussion points out that *śabda* primarily relates not to the content of what is spoken or said but to the source from which it arises. In other words, it is the truthfulness or trustworthiness of the speaker which ensures the truth or credibility of what is said. There is, however, an implicit contention that a statement may generally be believed unless there are reasons to the contrary just as in the case of perception one normally takes for granted the "truth" or veridicality of what is perceived unless there are reasons to doubt it.

The discussion about word deals with two different issues. The first deals with the relation between the word and the object it refers to; and the second relating to the person who uses the language. The contention regarding the first is that the relation is conventional and not natural. Even if it be accepted that there is a rule governing the use of the language concerned, it is confined to a particular linguistic community alone and does not extend to communities outside it. The second is not the object of a general discussion but seems to be concerned specifically with the authority of the Vedas alone which, on the basis of the definition given in the text, should be treated as the word of an *āpta puruṣa*. This is indirectly made clear by a reference to the Āyurveda which is given as a paradigmatic example of what may be regarded as an authoritative text proper in the light of the definition of the *śabda pramāṇa* as given by the author of the Nyāya Sūtra. There is, thus, a two-fold distinction amongst the texts which are treated as authoritative under this heading. The first refers to the Vedas which are only indirectly referred to in the sūtras, while the latter alone is specifically mentioned in the sūtra 2.1.68 and is brought in to suggest that the former's authority is to be understood in the light of the latter. Normally,

the Vedas are supposed to be 'authoritative' in themselves and no one brings any of the other texts which are also known as 'Veda' to provide support or foundation for their authority. In fact, the Āyurveda is not counted amongst what are called *upaveda* or even amongst the *vedāṅgas*. The mention of the Āyurveda as the standard example of the *śabda pramāṇa* is thus, surprising in more ways than one and, if properly reflected upon, will be seen as questioning the very authority of the Vedas, at least in the way they had been treated by the mīmāṁsakas and others who would not entertain even the possibility of their being ever mistaken in principle.

The discussion on the eternality or non-eternality of sound which follows the discussion on the *śabda pramāṇa* of the Vedas seems only indirectly relevant as it is concerned not with the problem of *śabda* but sound in general and deals with the question whether the latter is eternal or not. Perhaps, the mīmāṁsaka had argued for the eternity of sound in order to defend the authority of the Vedas by suggesting that they were eternal. But, then, all sound will become eternal entailing the conclusion that all words are eternal, and thus destroy the special character of the Vedic authority as it will make every statement equally authoritative. Also, as all sounds do not presumably have meaning or *artha* for the mīmāṁsaka, he will have to distinguish between sounds which have meaning and those which have not. It is not clear what the mīmāṁsaka will do with the eternality of all sounds such as those one hears in pure music which are difficult to associate with any meaning. In any case, the discussion has no relation to śabda as a pramāṇa as defined in sūtra 1.1.7. Same is the case with the discussion on the problem raised by the new meanings generated by *sandhi* and *samāsa* in the Sanskrit language and the different rules which govern this transformation. The discussion, though interesting, has hardly any relevance to the acceptance of śabda as an independent *pramāṇa,* unless it be argued that the content of the *upadeśa* is itself changed by this transformation. Gautama does not seem to argue explicitly for this position, but

there is the larger question that ultimately *upadeśa* is conveyed through words and any problem that affects the words is bound to have some direct or indirect relevance to the problem of the pramāṇa which is being discussed here. Strangely, the *vidhilīnga* through which an injunction is conveyed does not seem to have been discussed by Gautama in his Sūtras. This is not understandable as the issue has been specifically discussed in the Mīmāṁśa which believes that only the *vidhi-niṣedha vākyas* of the Veda have an authoritative character. Perhaps, 'upadeśa' has to be distinguished from the injunctive imperatives of the mīmāṁsaka which have an authority of a different kind. *Upadeśa is* more like an advice than a command and may or may not be accepted or followed by one who hears it.

The discussion on meaning or the power of words to convey meanings is discussed in sūtras 2.2.58-69 but this too has little relevance to the basic issue of *śabda pramāṇa.* The discussion would perhaps have been relevant if it were conducted in the context of what has been called the 'performative' power of words. In other words, a word by itself has the power to bring reality into being or constituted just by the fact that it is uttered or spoken in a certain way. Austin's famous example in this connection is the statement "I promise" which when spoken in a certain way, brings promising into being. The discussion could easily have been done in the context of what in Mīmāṁśa has been called the *śabdī* and the *śrthi bhāvanā,* and could easily have been widened further to include the emotive power of words, as discussed in the *alaṁkāra śāstra* or poetics in the Indian tradition.

The discussion of *śabda pramāṇa* is primarily divided into three parts. The first relates to its definition, the second to the establishment of it as a separate *pramāṇa* which is irreducible to the other *pramāṇas* and the third, to the establishment of the authority of the Vedas on the basis of this *pramāṇa.* Gautama's definition of *śabda pramāṇa* brings in the notion of an *āpta puruṣa* and hence depends upon the exact characterization of the characteristics of the person whose statement is to be regarded

as 'true' because it is '*his*' statement. There is, of course, the added condition that such a statement is meant to be helpful to the listener concerned or to the person for whom the advice is intended. This suggests that there is a three-fold requirement which has to be fulfilled if a person is to be regarded as an *āpta puruṣa*. He should intend it to be helpful to human beings and he should have the relevant knowledge based directly on his own experience and that he should be able to convey this knowledge as adequately as possible (this was added by Vācaspati Miśra). These conditions apply to all kinds of knowledge and all persons in all societies and at all times. There is, and can be, no restriction of any kind on these conditions and, in a sense, this is accepted by the commentators when they include even the *miecchas* among those who can be *āpta* in this sense (Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya on sūtra 1.1.7).

The condition of knowledge, even existential knowledge, would however vary from person to person and from time to time, even if it be assumed that the existential structure of human conditions remains the same, or is invariant over spaces and times. The solution for this inescapable problem has been sought to be found in the postulation of an omniscient being or *sarvajña* which may be called by the names of God or Allāha or Īśwara, or the Buddha or the Mahāvīra. Unfortunately the postulation does not help much as the text in which the omniscient being's message is conveyed is confined not only to a particular language but also is subject both to interpretation and verification by beings who are not only not omniscient, but differ radically in their cognitive and existential experiences.

The solution suggested, at least in the Indian tradition, is to confine the message received from the omniscient being to injunctive statements alone and/or to statements concerned with that which can not, in principle, be known either by human perception or by inference. The mīmāṁsaka, thus, treats only the *vidhi-niṣedha vākyas* of the Veda as authoritative while the Vedāntin confines them to those which speak of *Brahaman* alone.

The Naiyāyika, on the other hand, talks of *upadeśa* and suggests that the *upadeśa* that is contained in the Veda is given by Īśwara who is the most perfect embodiment of what may be called an *āpta-puruṣa* or, to use another term, is *Puruṣottama*. Unfortunately, Gautama does not establish the reality of Īśwara before bringing in the discussion of the *pramāṇatva* of the Veda in the Sūtras and hence it is a pure conjecture that the Vedas, according to him, are the *upadesa* of Īśwara. To make matters worse, he cites the examples of *mantra* and Āyurveda in the sūtra 2.1.67 to suggest that the authority of the Vedas is like the authority of these which are known to us in other contexts. The term *mantra*, it should be noted, does not refer to what is ordinarily known as the mantras in the Veda, but only to Incantations (वात्स्यायन). It is conveniently assumed by the commentators from Vātsyāyana onwards that the mantras and the prescriptions given in the Āyurveda always achieve this result while the fact is that medicines do not always cure and the *mantras* do not always work. The recourse to the arguments given in the sūtra 2.1.57 to save the failure of the Vedic *yajñas* to achieve their result would hardly satisfy the person who dies because of the failure of medicine prescribed in the Āyurveda. Also, it is forgotten that the 'knowledge' contained in the Āyurveda goes on increasing and this is done by successive generations of medical practitioners who observe the way the medicine works and the course that the illness takes over time. The medical knowledge is like all other knowledge, fallible and hence subject to improvement and corrections. There can, thus, be no fundamental difference between the knowledge contained in the Vedas and the one contained in other fields of human knowledge. The latter are as 'beginningless' as the former or, ultimately, shrouded in mythical or transcendental, timeless origins, their validity derived from that source from which everything may be said to originate.

Strangely, the argument given in the successive commentaries on the sūtra 2.1.68 brings in considerations which, if taken seriously, would involve the acceptance of *pratyakṣa* and

anumāna as the basis of the *śabda pramāṇa* and invalidate the contention that it has to be accepted ultimately as a separate, independent *pramāṇa* as without postulating it certain kinds of knowledge can not be accounted for. "दृष्टार्थेनाप्तेपदेशेनायुर्वेदेनादृष्टार्थो वेदभागोऽनुमातत्यः प्रमाणमिति, आप्तप्रामाण्यस्य हेतोः समानत्वादिति" (Bhāṣya on sūtra 2.1.68). Vārttika on sūtra 2.1.68 reads "यथा मन्त्रायुर्वैदवाक्यानिपुरुषविशेषभिहितत्वात् प्रमाणम् तथा वेदवाक्यानीति पुरुषविशेषाभिहितत्वं हेतुः (Page 257). Vācaspati Miśra I's *Ṭīkā* on the *Vārttika* takes the discussion in a different direction which, as far as I know, has not been noticed. The discussion perhaps arises in the context of the issue as to why the Vedas, and the Vedas alone should be regarded as the source of the *śabda pramāṇa,* excluding other Āgamic texts such as those of the Buddhists and the Jains. Vācaspati takes recourse to the fact that only that *upadeśa* can be regarded as being of a perfect *āpta* puruṣa which covers *all* aspects of life and not he one dealing just with *adhyātama* or *ātma vidyā* alone. And, hence he must be a *sarvajña* in the real sense of the term. Both the Buddha and the Mahāvīra are supposed to be *sarvajaña* but as they do not deal with the life of man in the world, their *upadeśa* cannot be regarded as that of a *sarvajña* in the fullest sense of the term. The vedic tradition alone has dealt with all the aspects of human life in detail as given in the Dharma Śāstra and the Vyavāhara Śastra texts (Page 375, line 5-10 Vācaspati).

The mention of Īśwara in this connection by Vācaspati Miśra is instructive as it reveals the growing 'theisfic' emphasis in Nyāya. The author of the Nyāya Sūtra, as is well-known, does not mention Īśwara amongst the prameyas and the only place where a reference to it is made, is in the context *of a pūrva-pa]csa which* is refuted in the sūtras. The sūtras 4.1.19-21 provide an evidence for this as they are concerned with the refutation of the contention that Īśwara is the *upādāna kāraṇa* of the world. Strangely, even Vātsyāyana in his Bhāṣya only says, "गुणविशिष्टात्मान्तरमीश्वरः" (page 228, Vātsyāyana).

It is only Uddyotakara (610 A.D.) who elaborates the statement in his *Vārttika*. He not only does this but also attempts to provide an argument for the postulation of the idea of Īśwara. In this connection he makes explicit use of the Vaiśeṣika idea of atoms as being the ultimate constituents of the physical universe and the Sāṁkhyan idea of *prakṛti* and suggests that the world, conceived in either form, can not have the principle of motion within it as that can only be found in a being which is conscious and hence be the sufficient ground for the world as we find it. This is a familiar argument and reminds one of Aristotle who defines God as the prime-mover from whom all other motions may be said to follow.

The discussion on the eternity (*nityatva*) or non-eternity (*anityatva*) of *śabda* which follows in the sūtras 2.2.13-57 has little relation to the question whether *śabda* should be regarded as a *pramāṇa* and, if so, in what sense. However, it raises interesting issues, particularly when it distinguishes two different aspects of *śabda*, that is, *varṇa* and *dhvani* and discusses the peculiar problem created by the combination of *varṇas* in *saṇdhi* and *samāsa* in the Sanskrit language.

The idea of Īśwara or God in the *prācīna* Nyāya has always been a matter of dispute and it has generally been thought that it is only around 10th century that Nyāya becomes a theistic system in the full sense of the term (quote from Potter's Nyāya volume) but a close reading of the Nyāya texts from the Nyāya Sūtra onwards reveals a different picture. The *Nyāya Sūtras* mention Īśwara only in Sūtras (4.1.19-21) but it appears there in the context of a *pūrva pakṣa* as the *upādāna Pāraṇa* of the *Jagata* and the author of the *Sūtras* refutes the view propounded in the *pūrva pakṣa*. There is no independent attempt at either establishing or refuting the existence of God in the *Nyāya Sūtras*. In fact, as is well-known, Īśwara is not mentioned as a separate *prameya* in the *Sūtras* and if a correct knowledge of the *prameyas* is supposed to be necessary for *apavarga* then one may conclude

that at least for the author of the *Nyāya Sūtra,* Īśwara was not necessary for attaining *apavarga.*

However, the situation seems to change dramatically from Vatsyāyana onwards. The *Bhāṣya,* which is assigned to around 410 A.D. by Potter in his Bibliography, clearly mentions Īśwara and describes it as गुणविशिष्टात्मान: (4.1.21, Page 227). He is supposed to be completely without *adharma, mithyājñāna* and *pramāda.* Positively he is supposed to be especially endowed with *dharma, jñāna,* and *samādhi* (the meaning of the last is not very clear). Besides this, he is supposed to have all the eight *siddhis* which the *Yoga Sūtra* ascribes to a person who has attained *samādhi.* However, the *Yoga Sūtra* considers these as harmful, or at least not very helpful for those who are seeking the real samādhi. The Īśwara is also supposed to be indirectly the cause or the distributor of the fruits of actions according to the *dharma* or *adharma* done by human beings. This he does by imparting motion to the material world so that it may work in correspondence with the *dharma* or *adharma* done by human beings. This argument is developed by Uddyotakara further who suggests as against Sāṁkhya that God is the prime mover who imparts motion to the universe.

Surprisingly, Vātsyāyana also thinks of Īśwara as one who is compassionate to his creation like a father and helps human beings in their distress. The term used is *parama kāruṇika* and is thus the model for others who help human beings and hence always act for the sake of others rather than for their own interests. This reminds one of the Buddhist Ideal of Bodhisattva who refuses to attain Nirvāṇa because of his desire to help the suffering humanity. In fact, Udaydana later gives this as an argument to explain why Īśwara, inspite of the fact that he engages in action such as the creation of the world is not bound by the law of *karma.* "यद्यपि स्वसमवेतधर्मव्यतिरेकेणापि भगवतो स्यैश्वर्यस्य नाकृताभ्यागमदोषः अस्वार्थत्वात् मुक्तात्मनाभिव संयोगविभागवत्" (p.511, सूत्र 4.1.21).

Also, strangely Vācaspati Miśra in his NVTT gives an argument why Īśwara alone as the creator of the world may be regarded as Sarvajña and not the Buddha or the Mahāvīra who may be said to know only the path to nrivvāna or kaivalya or mokṣa. The proof of this is provided by the fact that the Īśwara is not only the creator of the Vedas but also of the Dharma Śāstras and the Vyavahāra Śāstras which guide the worldly life of man.

Ātman

The discussion on the Ātman begins with the raising of the question as to why the self should not be considered to be a *Sanghāta* of the body, the senses, the mind and the intellect and the answer given is that it can not be so considered as the unity of the self is not the unity of the aggregates, but something radically different from them, though they are the means of both knowing and doing. The argument is against the Buddhists who consider that self is an aggregate and is built on the basis of the fact that the wholes or *avayavīs* are of two different types; the one consisting of parts which constitute the whole which itself is nothing apart from, or different from, them. The other type of whole or *avayavī* consists of that which may be called the unity of the agent, the instrumental cause and the action (कर्ता, करण व कर्म). The latter recalls the analogous unity of efficient, formal and final cause in Aristotle where only the material cause has to be conceived of always separately, even though the other three can also be separate from one another.

The second argument given by Vātsyāyana is in terms of the moral predicates that can not be ascribed to either the body or the senses or the mind or the intellect and hence have to be ascribed to some other entity which has to be separated from them.

Uddyotakara interestingly raises the question as to how a negation can ever deny the absolute existence of that which is negated for what it denies is only the existence of that entity at

a particular place or time, and in case the entity is not spatio-temporal its 'being' or reality can not be denied in any significant sense. Uddyotakara, however, does not seem to discuss the question as to how the existence of any entity whatsoever can be denied, if the argument is seriously accepted. If the 'temporal' condition is seriously accepted, then one cannot argue that such an entity will not ever exist in future. Also, he does not appear to give any criterion or lakṣaṇa in respect of entities that are to be regarded as non-spatio-temporal. Nor does he seem to make a distinction between that which is eternal and that which is non-spatio-temporal, or in case there are a number of such entities, how may one distinguish between them.

Uddyotakara's discussion reminds one of Quine's well known objections to such a kind of argument and it will be interesting to find what objections, if any, have been raised against Uddyotakara's argument, or any extentions or modifications made in respect of it.

Also, neither Vātsyāyana nor Uddyotakara seem to accept the 'self-certainty' of the 'I-consciousness' as given by the advaitins later. For them, the *ātman* is a matter of inference on the grounds given in the sūtra 1.1.10, but it is a strange kind of argument which attempts to prove the existential reality of an entity without having ever known it directly in perception. Can there ever be a *vyāpti* between experienced and non-experienced objects which is supposed to be the basis of *anumāna* in the Nyāya tradition? A similar problem is faced by the advaitin when he has to argue for the occurrence of an *adhyāsa* between that which 'is perceived and that which is not perceived (see Sankara's discussion on *adhyāsa* at the beginning of the Brahman Sūtra *Bhāṣya*).

The discussion regarding the reality of *ātman* as an entity separate from the body, the senses, the mind and the intellect is primarily done in the context of the Buddhist position which denies it completely. The discussion from Vātsyāyana to Udayana concerns itself with the following issues chiefly:

1. What sort of whole or *avayavī* is formed by the elements

or parts consisting of the body, the senses, the mind and the intellect? Is some separate entity to be assumed in order to provide a unity to these or there is no necessity of assuming it at all. In other words, is the so-called *ātman* only a sanghāta of these elements or something over and above them. But the critical problem as to what is exactly meant by a unity of elements which themselves are multiple or plural in character, is not discussed at all. Some attempt is made to distinguish between different kinds of unities. Also, the unity is sometimes seen as provided by that which may be said to support the diversity of the elements, or that in which they inhere. Besides this, the issue of this 'support' being external or internal is also raised.

2. Another interesting issue that is raised relates to the fact whether the problem arises in respect of every thing, that is, the body, the mind, the senses and the intellect and even such sensed qualities as colour etc., or it arises only in the case of *ātman*. A question which is even deeper than these is raised in respect of the notion of 'appearing' itself and its distinction or difference from another 'appearance' and the question whether everything that appears is necessarily to be thought of as belonging to 'something', for we can not consider any quality as standing by itself and not as belonging to anything.

Yet, in spite of these and many other points which are philosophically highly interesting, none of these thinkers seems to have seen that all the arguments that they give for the reality and existence of the *ātman* will 'prove' the reality of anything whatsoever.

There seems, however, to be one difference which again does not seem to have been highlighted. This perhaps lies in the distinction between those kinds of objects which are both directly apprehensible and also provable by 'other *pramāṇas*' and those which can only be proved by other *pramāṇas* such as *anumāna* and *śabda* but which can never be apprehended through *pratyakṣa*. Īśwara or God is perhaps some such type of entity in Nyāya which can be established by *anumāna* and *śabda* but never by *pratyakṣa*.

On the other hand, the ātman according to the Naiyāyika, is established by all the three .... that is, *pratyakṣa, anumāna* and *śabda.* The term *pratyakṣa,* in this context has, however, an intrinsic ambiguity which does not seem to have been paid attention to at least in the Nyāya literature. There is no *pratyakṣa* of *ātman* in the sense in which *pratyakṣa* is defined in the *'Nyāya Sūtra.* There is no *indriyārtha sannikarṣa,* unless some *antarendriya,* that is, inner sense is postulated. But, even in that case, the *ātman* cannot be said to be an object of pratyakṣa as it does not appear as a *viṣaya* in the sense in which all objects of internal perception appear to be so. It obviously cannot be considered to be an object of introspective awareness as one finds in the case of *mānasa pratyakṣa* or even that which may be said to be known by the intellect or buddhi as it is the precondition of them all and is known as the 'I-awareness' which can not be said even to be that which is conveyed by the term 'ahaṁkāra', as the latter is not the 'I-awareness' but the awareness of the I. In any case, even if this awareness be termed as 'pratyakṣa' in some sense or other, the awareness of the Īśwara can not be the same, even if it be conceded that it may possibly become an 'object' to the same or some similar kind of awareness. The awareness of the self or the 'I' is a perpetual fact, something that is involved implicitly in the very nature of consciousness and it becomes explicit at the level of self consciousness. The co-relate awareness of the 'other' which occurs at the self-conscious level may either take the form of Īśwara or Brahman. In the former case it is the unity of all that appears as the 'other' to which the self that is aware of it has a positive relationship where the feeling of the other-ness predominates even though it occurs in the context of a positive relationship which may assume all forms that such a positive relationship takes in actual life. In the case of the latter, the other is seen more in terms of Identity underlying and pervading everything, including the self. This sense of an essential identity relationship with the other only makes explicit at the self-

conscious level what is inalienably involved at the level of consciousness.

Prameyas

Amongst the *prameyas* the most pre-eminent is the *ātman*, but besides that there are also the body, whose existence is also to be proved. Strangely, not much attention has been paid to the establishment of these in the Nyāya tradition. The proof for the postulation of the reality of the senses is given on the ground of the fact that we apprehend colour, taste, smell, touch etc. and as we can not apprehend any of these through the other senses, each of the separate senses for these has to be postulated. A clearer presentation of this argument would involve a distinction between sensation or sense-data and the object on the one hand which is postulated to be its cause and the sense organ which is postulated to account for its apprehension by us. The body has to be postulated as that in which the senses inhere or exist. Also, it is seen as that through which, and in which, the effort to bring about any change occurs. Besides this, it has to be postulated as that in and through which we feel pleasure and pain.

The arguments for the postulation of the reality of mind as distinct from both the senses and the body, consist in the fact that even if the senses are in contact with the object, the knowledge of it may not arise and hence some thing else has to be postulated which has necessarily to be in contact with the senses so that the 'knowledge' of the colour or smell may occur (to be seen in the text).

The other argument that is given relates to the fact that we have to postulate something which feels pleasure or pain and mind or *manas* may be regarded as that which feels that. There is also another argument which is supposed to deal with the fact that we apprehend only one sensation at one time and it is the mind that makes us do so as otherwise we will be overwhelmed by a multiplicity of sensations at the same time. No argument

seems to have been given to explain the unification of sensations from different sense organs into knowledge of one object which possesses these different qualities.

The argument for the *nityatva* or eternity of soul seems to be established on two grounds, the second of which is stronger than the first. The first consists in the contention that we find the distinction of objects or entities which are *nitya* and *anitya* in our experience. Hence the question raised is relevant in the sense that the soul which is distinct from the senses, the body, the mind and intellect etc. is *nitya* or *anitya.* The contention is strange for, as a matter of fact, we do not find any entity which can be considered as *nitya* in the strict sense of the term. Things that are found to be *nitya* may be regarded as relatively more or less permanent but that something is eternal, or that which will never be subject to any change or destruction is not found in experience. As a matter of fact, such a thing can not, in principle, be found, for, how can one ever ensure that which is found in experience will never ever cease to exist in future. Such an argument can only be given by an analysis of the concept of destruction which has not been given either in the *Sūtra* or the *Bhāsya.* Such an argument is given in the case of the atoms in the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* but, as far as we know, the same argument has not been applied to the case of the *ātman.* Perhaps, the translation of *nitya* as eternal or unchanging is mistaken. But, if so, the distinction between *nitya* and *anitya* will have to be understood differently.

The second argument is relatively stronger as it depends on an analysis of the behaviour of the living being at the moment of birth which, for its understanding, requires that some previous experience and its memory has to be assumed, as otherwise it will remain inexplicable. The behaviour of the new born infant shows fear, joy and sorrow in the context of *specific* objects which suggests that it must have experienced these feelings or emotions in relation to these objects in the past, which could have only occurred in some previous life prior to its birth. But this

only proves that the soul must have existed prior to its birth and not that it is *nitya*. Perhaps the argument is that one will have to assume an unending series of previous births where each is postulated to account for the behaviour of the new born infant as mentioned above. But, then, the series will become beginningless and its 'beginning' will be without explanation. The postulation of a birth after death seems to have no other ground than this, that is, if there was a life before birth then why should not there be one *after* death? But this, by itself, is a weak argument as death, at best will mean the destruction of the body with its five senses and not that of the mind and the intellect. Thus, one will have to postulate the existence of both the mind and the intellect and the *ātman* after the death of the body, proving each of them to be *nitya* and associated with one another. But, then, one need not postulate any rebirth in the sense of the association of these with a new body which, in any case, will require an explanation for such an event to occur. The separation of the mind and the intellect from the body and the senses raises the same problems as the separation of the *ātman* from the body. There is also the problem of the relation between the body and the senses, particularly as the Nyāya argument seems to make a distinction between the two. It is true that the body is supposed to be the *āśraya* of the senses, just as it is supposed to be the *āśraya* of pleasure and pain. But, then, the soul is also supposed to be the *āśraya* of *icchā, dveśa, prayatna, sukha, duhkha* and *jñāna* but as body is considered to be the *āśraya* of *sukha, duhkha* also the destruction of the body should result in the cessation of that pleasure and pain which is due to it.

The argument, in any case, will apply to all living beings, particularly to those of the animal world where the new born child displays the same behaviour as that of. the new born infant. Interestingly, the *sūtra* shows awareness of a 'naturalistic' explanation of all such phenomena, particularly in the context of the example it gives from the world of the plants where opening and closing of the petals occurs in the same way as is found in

the human world. This, paradoxically is the current paradigm of explanation of all that happens in the human world, including the behaviour of the infant on the basis of which the old Nyāya argument is based. At a deeper level, modern science finds he same phenomena even at the level of chemistry and physics in the behaviour of the elements that occur at that level.

The problem with the use of the word *nitya* does not seem to have been seriously analysed in the Indian philosophical tradition, even though the distinction between the *nitya* and *anitya* is supposed to lie at the heart of that enterprise in the tradition. The terms are defined in terms of origination and destruction and their absence. Buddhi which means knowledge or jñāna in the context of the *Nyāya Sūtras* is obviously something that is *anitya* in the sense that it is liable to origination and destruction. However, while it is clear that it comes into being, or that it has origination it is not clear why it is considered as liable to destruction. One, of course, does not continue to 'know' all the time, but one has memory of the same and one can recall it generally whenever one likes. It is true that one may forget, but forgetfulness is not destruction as one can successfully recall even after forgetfulness.

The Nyāya position is further complicated by the fact that it accepts both *prāgabhāva* and *dhvaṃsābhāva* which it considers as *nitya* and, if so, that which in beginningless can end and that which has a beginning can be endless. In other words, there may be no origination and yet there can be destruction; on the other hand there may be origination but no destruction. Strictly speaking, therefore, only that can be regarded as *nitya* which is both beginningless and endless. Such an entity, however, can not be found in experience.

There is another problem in Nyāya which does not seem to have been paid attention to. It relates to the question whether that which is *nitya* can have properties that are *anitya*? This is important as *buddhi* which is regarded as *anitya* is considered to be a property of *ātman* which is considered as *nitya*. But, in that

case, if the *buddhi* as an *anitya* property is accepted as a quality of the *nitya ātman, buddhi's anityatā* will affect the *nityatva* of the *ātman,* and it will no longer remain a *nitya* entity as 'unchanging'.

There is also the problem as to how one shall distinguish between the *nitya padārthas* in case they are more than one. Moreover, as *ākāśa* is supposed to be a *nitya padārtha* in Nyāya and as it is presumably the object of the senses, there will arise the problem as to how something that is *nitya* can be apprehended by something that is *anitya.*

There is another problem in Nyāya which perhaps has not been seen. The senses, the body, the mind and the *buddhi* are all supposed to be *anitya* and the last which means knowledge in the Nyāya presumably has *manas, śarīra* and the indriyas as its objects. But how can knowledge which itself is *anitya* have all these as its objects even though they are all *anitya*? But, surprisingly, it itself is the *result* of them. Knowledge or *jñāna* or *buddhi* is thus both the effect or the *phala* of the *śarīra,* the *indriyas,* the *manas* and the object of the senses and yet it is that which knows them.

There is the further problem as to how much of *anityatā* is there. A mountain may last a thousand years and a flower may not outlast the morning when it blooms. Both are *anitya,* a statement which may be 'philosophically' interesting but existentially totally irrelevant. And, how does the *nityatā* of *ākaśa,* if it is held to be *nitya,* make it more interesting or important or valuable than the eye which sees it and which, though *anitya,* is yet that which 'sees' it.

Niḥśreyasa

The *sūtra* 1.1.! talks of *niḥśreyasa* and the sūtra 1.1.2 talks of *apavarga* raising the question, what is the difference between the two. Normally, not much distinction is made between them and the two terms are used interchangeably, just as the term

tattvajñana is used to denote the knowledge of that which is real. Yet, though the Nyāya tradition points to a radical difference between them, it does not deal with the important issues raised by the distinction they have drawn. The term *niḥśreyasa* is supposed to refer to the *phala* which is achievesd through the knowledge gained in any field whatsoever. Each *śāstra* or realm of knowledge is thus said to have its own *niḥśreyasa* and this is achieved through the correct knowledge of that realm which the *śāstra* is supposed to provide. *Apavarga* is the *niḥśreyasa* of *ātma vidyā* alone as it is concerned with the problem of suffering which seems to have been seen as the *only* problem belonging to this realm, an analysis which of course is totally absurd. The problem of *ātman* is *not* the problem of suffering as the Indian seems to have seen it. It certainly is one of the problems, but not the only one, or even the most important one as they seem to have thought.

The problem of the relation between different *niḥśreyasas* which are ultimately to be pursued by man and their relation to the *niḥśreyasa* called *apavarga* is the central issue that should have been attended to if the above analysis were to be accepted as it defines the human situation on the one hand and the relation between different fields of knowledge on the other. Strangely, there seems to be no śāstra of action or *karma* without which no knowledge or *tattvajñāna* can achieve its *niḥśreyasa*. The thinking on action or what may be called sādhanā or *karma* occurs only sporadically and tangentially except perhaps in the Gītā which, however, is not concerned with the relation between the different types of *niḥśreyasa* or *puruṣārthas*. Also, the problem created by the fact that Nyāya subscribes to the reality of the plurality of selves, it is surprising that no attention seems to have been paid to the relation between these selves and the *apavarga* which would have to be attained in and through this interrelationship. *Dharma* is not a *prameya* in Nyāya, just as Īśwara is not one and it does not seem to have been even seen that knowledge itself is the result of the collective effort of a plurality of beings who have *indnyas*,

śarīra, manas etc. Even in respect of *sukha, duhkha, prayatna, ceṣṭa* etc., it has not been seen that these are not possible without the cooperation, help or even opposition of 'other' persons who are like oneself.

Notes

1. The Vaidalya Sūtra of Nāgārjuna is an attempt at the refutation of the *padārthas* propounded in the *Nyāya Sūtras* arguing that the so-called *pramāṇas* can not prove anything, a position that even the Buddhists did not seem to have accepted as otherwise they could not have developed a *pramāṇas śāstra of* their own. In fact, Nāgārjuna's *Śynyavāda* which is the logical result of his denial of the possibility of any theory of *pramāṇa* is only *one of* the four Buddhist philosophical schools, the rest of which actively reject his position.

   On the whole question of the relation between the Nyāya Sūtra and the *Vaidalya Sūtra.* See Vaidalya Prakaraṇa, Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1995.

Chapter 2

Questions and Problems Pertaining to the Sūtras : A Dialogue with the text and development of a new methodology for understanding the Sūtras

Part I - Section I - (41 Sūtras)

Sūtra 1

Chapter 1 Sūtra 1.1.1

The Sūtra gives a list of the topics which are to be discussed in the whole text and has a sequence in which these topics have been given. It is also claimed that a correct knowledge of these topics that is their *tattva jñāna* will lead to Niḥśreyasa which usually is regarded as connoting Iberation or mokṣa in the Indian tradition.

The following are some of the questions which may be raised with respect to the sūtra:

1. The *sūtra* is concerned with *pramāṇa, prameya, saṁśaya, prayojana, dṛṣṭānta, siddhānta, avayava, tarka, njrṇaya, vāda, jalpa, vitaṇḍa, hetvābhāsa, chala, jāti* and *nigraha sthāna.* These are the topics that have been mentioned in the first *sūtra* and it is promised that a correct or true knowledge of these will lead to liberation or Niḥśreyasa.

It is not clear why the author of the *sūtras* did not stop with

mentioning the *pramāṇa-prameya vyāpāra* alone as the rest of the topics mentioned are an integral part of these two topics. Furthermore, what the text seems to be basically concerned with is only the theory of proof or inference or evidence on the basis of which we are justified in believing anything or claiming to have knowledge about it. Hence, fundamentally, *only pramāṇa* should have been mentioned as the notion *oi prameya* is relative to it. It is the *pramāṇatva* which establishes that some thing is a *prameya* or not. Rather, everything can become a *prameya* if a *pramāṇa* is given for it.

The first topic mentioned by the author of the *sūtra* after *pramāṇa* and *prameya* is *saṁśaya* or doubt. Perhaps what the author of *Nyāya sūtras* wants to say is that unless there is some doubt the activity of rational justification does not arise. But, if this is so, then *saṁśaya* should have been mentioned first as it is the doubt which makes one seek the *pramāṇa* and the whole issue of justification is only indulged in to resolve it. Strangely, the fourth topic mentioned is *prayojana* or purpose for which the whole activity of finding a *pramāṇa* is undertaken. But, if *saṁśaya* or doubt is the real ground for engaging in the *pramāṇa-vyāpāra*, there can be no other *prayojana* other than the removal of the doubt which had caused the undertaking of the justificatory activity. On the other hand, if the subject matter of the text is 'knowledge' itself then one could perhaps understand that knowledge itself is sought for some purpose and hence the term *prayojana* is used immediately after *saṁśaya*. But, then, does the author believe that the seeking for knowledge cannot be for its own sake and is always to be for the sake of something else? Whatever be the belief of the author in this connection, the term *prayojana* should have, in such a context, occurred earlier. The next term in the list of topics given in the *sūtra* is *dṛṣṭānta* or example. It is not clear what the idea of an example is doing in this context. The example to be given has to be of the purpose or of the doubt or of what? The insertion of the topic of example or *dṛṣṭānta* here does not seem to make any sense at all.

There term '*siddhānta*' in the sūtra is in a sense irrelevant for, it cannot be different from '*prameya*', that is, that which is to be established or proved or justified through the '*pramāṇa*' which has to be given. The next term, that is, *avayava*, should refer to the structural elements of *pramāṇa* but surprisingly, it is confined to only one of the *pramāṇas* that is *anumāna* which is supposed to have five elements constituting it. Strangely, *dṛṣṭānta* which has been mentioned earlier in the sūtra, is itself a part of the so-called elements of the *anumāna*, which are collectively called by the name of *avayava*.

The term *tarka* only refers to a special kind of reasoning which is generally described as hypothetical in nature. But, if so, it should be treated as a type of *pramāṇa* even though it is not usually regarded as such. In fact, the relation of *tarka* and *anumana* needs to be clarified in order that the process of reasoning as understood in the Nyāya tradition may be correctly grasped. The term *nirṇaya* seems to be again irrelevant as normally it should be taken to mean the same as *siddhānta* or *prameya*, that is, the one which has been proved or established or decided.

Vāda, Jalpa and *Vitaṇḍā* are forms of argumentation and they have nothing to do with the strict *pramāṇa-vyāpāra* as they have nothing to do with the argument. Hetvābhāsas are, of courses, the enumeration of the possible types of fallacious reasoning. As for *chala, jāti* and *nigṛah-sthāna*, these are terms that have nothing to do with the theory of *pramāṇa*, as they refer to debate or strategies employed by disputants to win an argument, the last specifically referring to winning or losing which can hardly be considered to be the *prayojana* of engaging in the *pramāṇa-vyāpāra* to attain certitude or knowledge.

The 'extensional' enumeration of the subject-matter of the Nyāya-sūtras, thus, is an amalgamation of two different discourses, the one relating to the forms of argumentation between different persons debating a point and winning or losing in the argument, and the other relating to the theory of proof or justification. The

mixing of these different discourses in the first sūtra is a sign of a basic confusion in the mind of Gautama, the supposed author of the Nyāya-sūtra.

The claim that a correct knowledge of all the elements mentioned in thesūtra will lead to *tattva-jñāna* is preposterous as, firstly, to win a debate certainly cannot be a sign of having knowledge of that which is ultimately real, assuming that the term *tattva* in the sūtra refers to that which is ultimately real, as it would only prove that one is more skillful in debate or argumentation than the other with whom -one is debating. Moreover, the idea that from this one would get *Niḥśreyas,* that is, liberation or *Mokṣa,* is highly debatable, for it is difficult to see how a knowledge of valid argument can ever give rise to a state of being or consciousness, which is free from any kind of determination or bondage.

The second sūtra is strange in as much as it does not seem to follow from the first. It neither talks of *Niḥśreyas,* nor of *tattva-jñāna* or *oi pramāṇa,* which one would normally expect to be dealt with after the subject-matter of theNyāya-sūtras had been laid down in the first sūtra. It may be said that the sūtra carries on the discussion of *Niḥśreyas* by spelling out what *Apavarga* is, which is merely another name for *Niḥśreyas,* and also links the discussion to the term *tattva-jñāna* by suggesting that it is the opposite of that which is *Mithyā-jñāna* which is the cause of the non-attainment of *apavarga* or *Niḥśreyas.* However, *tattva-jñāna* can not be the opposite of *mithyā-jñāna,* for the correction of an illusory perception, which is a fair example of a *Mithyā-jñāna,* will generally not be taken to be as *tattva-jñāna.* Also, the sequence given in the sūtra of *Mithyā-jñāna* leading to *doṣa* which itself leads to *pravṛtti* giving rise to *janma* and then to *duhkha* does not seem to be correct. Illusory knowledge can give rise to happiness while the knowledge of truth can make one unhappy. Similarly, while falsity can be considered to be a *doṣa,* that is, something requiring to be corrected or removed, it need not give rise to *pravṛtti* or desire. The same is the case with the relationship

between desire, birth and suffering. The whole of the second sūtra seems to occupy a dubious place in the sequence of the sūtras in the Nyāya *sūtra.*

With the third sūtra, we revert back to an enumeration of extensional definitions of the term *pramāṇa,* which is not given an independent *lakṣaṇa* of its own. The mention of *pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna* and *śabda* as the four *pramāṇas,* are merely enumerative and do not give a definition of what constitutes the *pramāṇatva* of a *pramāṇa.* The preference for extensional definitions in the sūtra literature is extensively found and it should be a matter of investigation as to when the notion of definition as giving a *vyāvartaka lakṣaṇa* arose.

The fourth sūtra gives the definition of *pratyakṣa,* which is very strange indeed for, it enumerates four characteristics of *pratyakṣa,* which are all equally necessary to make it a *pramāṇa.*

First, it should arise because of the contact of the senses with the object. However, besides this it should also be *avyabhicāri* and *vyavasāyātmaka.* It is obvious that the characteristic of *vyavasāyātmaka* and of being *avyabhicāri* cannot be given just by perception alone and would have to involve the process of inference or *anumāna.* Besides these, it is also supposed to be *avyapadeśya* which probably means incapable of being grasped by language. The definition therefore is faulty in the extreme for, it does not try to distinguish between *pratyakṣa* as a *pramāṇa* without the involvement of any element of *anumāṇa* in it. Perhaps the author wants to say that there is no *pramāṇa,* which does not involve the elements of both *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* in it or even all the four *pramāṇas* mentioned by him. But firstly, he has not said so and secondly, the whole discussion does not seem to imply it. The issue was later on discussed in the context, of the theory of *pramāṇa-saṁplava.* But, even there, the problem is not discussed exactly in this context;, but rather whether that which is known by one *pramāṇa* can also be known by another. Also, it is not clear whether a *pratyakṣa* in order to be a *pramāṇa,* will require all the four characteristics mentioned in the sūtra or only

one of them. There is, in fact, another problem with the definition for, if it is accepted then there can be no such thing as *alaukika pratyakṣa,* an idea which the Nyāya accepts. There is nothing to indicate in the sūtra that it is talking about *laukika pratyakṣa* only. In *alaukika pratyakṣa,* the way the Nyāya understands it, there is no *indriyārtha-sannikarṣa* and, in fact, it cannot be so in principle for the universals are not the type of entities with which there can be any sense-contact.

The fifth sūtra mentions three types of *anumāna,* the *pūrvavata,* the *śeṣavata* and the *sāmānyatodṛṣaṭa.* Once again it does not give any definition of *anumāna,* but only tells us its varieties. Also, the distinctions between the three types of anumāṇa is not concerned with the nature of anumāṇa, but rather, with what is inferred, that is, the object of inference, which obviously is irrelevant unless it be argued that the object itself makes a difference to the type or types of argumentation by which it may be reached.

The sixth sūtra gives the definition of *upamāna,* which may be considered as argument by analogy. It is not clearly indicated as to why it should be considered as a separate *pramāṇa.* The ground for *upamāna* is given as *sādharmya,* that is, well known similarities of properties. But this is unsatisfactory for unless a distinction is made between essential and inessential properties, the argument cannot be valid. The sūtra does not attempt to do this even by implication. Perhaps the term *prasiddha* tries to do this. But the term normally means that which is well known or well established, but, even well-known or well-established similarities in properties cannot give a legitimate ground for inference or function as a *pramāṇa* unless the property or properties themselves are considered as essential.

The seventh sūtra gives the definition of *śabda* as a *pramāṇa* and suggests that it is the *upadeśa* of an *āpta puruṣa.* The definition is in a sense, circular because the term *apta* means a reliable person. How a person becomes *āpta* and why and in what respects he or she should be considered as an *āpta* is not given.

Can a person be *āpta* in all respects? Moreover, if we take the term *upadeśa* seriously then every thing that an *āpta puruṣa* says cannot be a *pramāṇa* but only that which he says as an *upadeśa,* that is, as instruction. But the notion of instruction assumes somebody who is to be instructed and normally such a situation obtains only in the context of verbal communication but not so much where something is written and hence has not only to be interpreted but also where one cannot relevantly ask questions for further clarification of what is said.

The eighth sūtra classifies *śabda* into two kinds: one whose object is *dṛṣṭa* and the other which concerns objects which are essentially *adṛṣṭa* in nature or unobservable in principle. The validity of a statement about objects that are either observed or at least observable in principle would ultimately depend on *pratyakṣa* and not on *śabda* while those which concern objects which are unobservable in principle can hardly be even known to be true or false. The assertion of *śabda* as a separate, independent *pramāṇa* therefore is either redundant or unverifiable in principle. In the latter case, therefore, it will only be a matter of faith and not a *pramāṇa* at all. Furthermore, it is not clear how the *pramāṇa* shall work if the two *upadeśas* of an *āpta puruṣa* are contradictory in nature or alternatively the *upadeśas* given by different *āpta puruṣas* are found to be opposed in nature. Will, in such cases, the *āpta puruṣa* be not regarded as an *āpta* at all? But unless some further ground is given to show that the so called opposed statements are not really so the issue cannot be settled. And, in case the two contradictory statements refer to *adṛṣṭa,* that is, matters unobservable in principle, the issue between them cannot be settled in principle also.

The ninth sūtra gives the list of the *prameyas* which is strange indeed as the term *prameya* may not be regarded as independent of *pramāṇa.* Whatever can be established by a *pramāṇa* is a *prameya.* Perhaps the author wants to classify important objects which need to be established by *pramāṇa,* but this seems to be totally arbitrary. The list gives is *ātman, śarīra, indriyartha,* the

object of the senses, *buddhi, mana, pravṛtti, doṣa, pratyābhāva, phala, duhkha* and *apavarga* as the *prameyas*. The inclusion of *duhkm* as a *prameya* seems strange for why should one need to have a *pramāṇa* for establishing the reality of *duhkha* for there can be no *saṁśaya* about it, when it occurs. Similarly, if *saṁśaya* is necessary for the *pramāṇa-prameya-vyāpāra* then *śarīra-indriya* and the objects of *indriyas* along with intellect (*buddhi*) and mind (*mana*) cannot be considered as *prameyas*. It may also be noted that *Īśvara* or *Brahman* are not included as *prameyas* in the sūtra.

The tenth sūtra tries to establish the *ātman* as a *prameya* on the basis of *icchā, dveśa, prayatna, duhkha, sukha* and *jñāna*. But firstly *duhkha* itself was given as an independent *prameya* in the ninth sūtra and has not yet been independently established as a *prameya* and hence its use to establish the reality of *ātman* is unjustified. The author of the sūtras has brought in *iccha, dveśa, prayatna, sukha* and *jñāna* as the basis for establishing the reality of *ātman*, but he has nowhere established them independently as *prameyas* nor has he shown as to why *ātman* has to be postulated for understanding these. Moreover, if all these are considered as providing the ground for the belief in *ātman*, then the *ātman* cannot be conceived as ever being without them. It is also not clear what *pramāṇa* has been used to establish the reality of *ātman*. It cannot be *pratyakṣa* and if it is an *anumāna*, which is supported by the use of the word *liṅga* then the *vyāpti* relation between the two will have to be established, which in this case is impossible in principle for the simple reason that the *ātman* itself is never directly known. In fact the author of the sūtras is using *icchā* and *dveśa* on the one hand and *sukha-duhkha* on the other as opposed to each other. But if two opposed qualities can both be the ground for the belief in *Ātman*, then the *ātman* would have to be treated as the *āśraya* of contradictory qualities, which would be very strange indeed, for normally one does not attribute contradictory qualities to an object. The sūtra can perhaps be interpreted to mean that it is the knowledge of *icchā, dveśa, prayatna, sukha, duhkha* which is the ground for the belief in the

ātman and not any or all of these properties themselves. But even in that case *jñāna* or knowledge would have to be treated as an intrinsic property of the *ātman* and not its accidental property as Nyāya is supposed to believe. Also, there will be no reason for confining the objects of knowledge only to those mentioned in the sūtra. There is another problem which arises if the term *ātman* is interpreted to include *Īśvara* or God, for it should be noted that God (*Īśvara*) is not mentioned as a separate *prameya* in the sūtra number nine, which gives an exhaustive list of the *prameyas*. In case it is supposed to be included as Nyāya is supposed to hold, it will have to have all the characteristics on the basis of which the reality of the *ātman* is sought to be established as it cannot have any other grounds to be believed in than those which have been given for the *ātman*.

The sūtra number eleven tries to give a *pramāṇa* for *śarīra* and says that it is the *āśrya* of *ceṣṭā*, that is, effort and the *indriyas* and their objects. Besides the general problem of what sort of a *pramāṇa* is this, a specific problem also arises as to how *ceṣṭā* *is* different from *prayatna*. Perhaps *ceṣṭā* is considered as bodily and physical while *prayatna* is supposed to be mental. But as mind has not yet been established as a *prameya*, such a distinction cannot be tenable. There is another problem with the sūtra as it does not merely infer *śarīra* as an *āśraya* of the *indriyas* but rather of the object of the *indriyas* for the term used is *indriyārtha*. But surely the body cannot be considered as the *aśraya* of the objects of the senses. It is also not clear what is the relation between the *ātman* and the *śarīra*. Is it being maintained that without the *ātman*, the *śarīra* can still do the *ceṣṭā*, but can not experience pleasure or pain?

The twelfth sūtra gives a list of the five senses: smell, taste, sight, touch and hearing. However, it is not quite clear what is meant by the term *bhūtebhyaḥ* as the term is again introduced in sūtra thirteen while enumerating the objects of the senses. The sūtra thirteen gives a list of the elements which are *pṛithvī*, *jala*, *agni*, *vāyu*, *ākaśa* (that is, earth, water, fire, air, sky) as the *bhūtas*,

but the technical term used for them in sūtra number nine which enumerates the list of *prameyas* was *indriyārtha* or the objects of the senses. The term *bhūta* was not mentioned there at all. Moreover, the sūtra does not give any grounds for believing in them. If they are to be considered as *prameyas,* their enumeration is no proof that they are real. Perhaps, it is being suggested that the senses and sense-objects are coordinate with each other and that if there is a sense organ then there must be an appropriate object for it to be known. But then this would involve that each object can only be known by the sense appropriate to it and that one object cannot be known by more than one sense. In any case, the logical and the epistemological issues involved do not seem to have been touched by the author.

The sūtra fourteen gives the qualities *gandha, rasa, rūpa, sparśa* and *śabda* as the qualities of the *bhūtas* mentioned in sūtra thirteen respectively and says that these are the objects of the senses mentioned in sūtra twelve. But then the *bhūtas* mentioned in sūtra thirteen will have to be taken as the *prameyas* on the ground of their being the *āśraya* of the *guṇas* mentioned in the sūtra fourteen, which themselves would have no independent grounds for being established as a *prameya.*

The sūtra fifteen does not establish *buddhi* as a *prameya* but only gives alternative names for it, such as *upalabdhi* and *jñāna* which have the same meaning as *buddhi. Buddhi,* of course, may be regarded as an instrument of getting *jñāna* or *upalabdhi.* But, firstly the sūtra does not seem to say this; and secondly, either *upalabdhi* and *jñāna* will have to be treated as identical with the *buddhi or* one would not know what is exactly meant by the latter.

The sūtra sixteen again gives a ground for establishing *manas* as a *prameya* and the ground given is that one cannot have two 'knowledges' or *jñāna* at the same time. It should be noted that the term *jñāna* has been considered as a synonym of *buddhi* in sūtra fifteen and a ground for believing in *ātman* as a *prameya* in sūtra ten, while here in sūtra sixteen the non-occurrence of two pieces of knowledge is taken as the ground for postulating the

reality of *manas* as a *prameya.* Now it^is not quite clear what the author of the sūtra wants to say by maintaining that two instances of knowledge cannot occur together. What shall count as two instances of knowledge? If *jñāna* is treated as identical with *buddhi,* the question is meaningless. And if *jñāna* can have both *icchā* and *sukha* as its object or *duhkha* and *prayatna,* then obviously knowledge can have two different objects at the same time. In any case, the ground given for the postulation of mind as an entity is very weak indeed and it is surprising that the long *Nyāya* tradition should have accepted it on the ground given in the sūtra.

The sūtra seventeenth again gives no ground for the justification of admitting *pravṛtti* as an independent *prameya.* First, it is not clear why *icchā, prayatna* and *sukha* etc. cannot themselves be considered as a sufficient cause *of pravṛtti or* the relation between the senses and their objects together with *ceṣṭā* whose *āśraya* is supposed to be the body. The sūtra merely says that *pravṛtti, vāk* and *buddhi* provide the beginning of the *śarīra.* One does not know how *vāk* or speech has come into the picture. Nor does one understand how the question of the origins of the body has arisen and not of anything else which has been mentioned uptill now. Nor does one understand what *buddhi* has to do with the beginning of the body. Perhaps the sūtra means to say that *pravṛtti* is the cause of both the *buddhi* and the *śarīra* but that makes no sense either.

The sūtra eighteenth tries to define *doṣa* which, along with *duhkha, janma, pravṛtti,* and *mithyā jñāna* have been mentioned in the second sūtra. It is not quite clear how *pravṛtti,* that is, movement towards something or causing some thing to happen can be characterised as *doṣa.* If it is taken to mean that *pravṛtti* necessarily leads to *prayatna* and thus leads to *doṣa,* the whole thing is not clarified any better, for *doṣa* means a defect and there is certainly no defect in a change occurring because of *pravṛtti,* unless it be assumed that *pravṛtti* itself is a *doṣa* because it can arise only because of a sense of insufficiency or incompleteness

in consciousness. For, if one had the sense of self-sufficiency or completeness one would not have *pravṛtti* at all and thus not bring about change in one's condition either. But if this analysis be accepted, then there will be no place for either the concept of *līlā* or of *avatāra* to arise in any situation whatsoever. Similarly, the birth of a Buddha or a Mahāvīra or the *avatāra* of a Rāma or a Kṛṣṇa, would be because of a *pravṛtti* and hence full of *doṣa*. Perhaps these ideas and concepts had not gained currency when Gautama wrote the *Nyāya-sūtras* and hence he felt no necessity to accommodate them in his system.

Sutra nineteen gives a definition of *pretyābhāva* which occurs for the first time in the text as being born again but as it has not yet been given any definition, it is difficult to understand why *punarutpatti* is being talked about. The fact of being born again is clearly found in the plants but nobody will apply the term *pretyābhāva* to them. A *kṣaṇa* gives rise to another every moment, but nobody would call it *pretyābhāva*. Thus the *lakṣaṇa* of *pretyābhāva* given by the *sūtrakāra* suffers from *atjvyāpti doṣa*.

Sūtra twenty gives the definition of *phala* as that which is born out of *pravṛtti* and *doṣa*. As according to Gautama *pravṛtti* necessarily leads to *doṣa*, it is not quite clear what is the difference between *phala* and *doṣa*. But even if it be accepted that there is a difference between the two and presumably *phala* can be both good and bad, one will have to accept that *doṣa* can give rise to good results also. It is also not clear how *phala* comes into the picture, as it is being introduced for the first time. Nor is it clear whether it is being used in a technical or non-technical sense here.

The sūtra twenty-one tries to define *duhkha* or suffering as obstruction or hinderance in one's way. But as the concepts of obstruction and hinderance presuppose *pravṛtti* it would follow that if *pravṛtti* does not meet with obstruction or hinderance it will give, not suffering, but pleasure or happiness. Thus *pravṛtti* will also give rise to *sukha* and unless *sukha* or happiness is also regarded as *doṣa*, *pravṛtti* will not always give rise to *doṣa* as

has been mentioned in the previous sūtras. Moreover, obstruction or hinderance does not always give rise to *duhkha* or suffering. There is a joy in overcoming obstacles and if there are no obstacles, there is no fun either. In many of the sports, one wants a strong opponent against whom one can test one's skill and strength. On the other hand, there are also situations where one suffers or has pain without there being any obstruction or hinderance.

The definition of suffering given in the sūtra is related too much to willing or activity, but this is not necessarily true of all cases of suffering.

The sūtra twenty-two defines *apavarga* as absolute release from suffering. But, firstly, this is a negative definition and does not positively indicate what *apavarga* is. Secondly, if *apavarga* is treated as an *abhāva,* whose *pratiyogi* is *duhkha,* then one would not only have to have first *duhkha,* then have its *abhāva* in order to get *apavarga* but even when there is the *abhāva,* one will have to be aware of its *pratiyogi, duhkha,* in order to know that it is the *abhāva* of *duhkha* and not of anything else. A *ghaṭābhāva* is not a *duhkhābhāva* and hence *apavarga* will. involve not only an absence or knowledge of absence, but knowledge of absence of *duhkha.* Would *duhkha* then be remembered in the state of *apavarga* along with the consciousness that it is absent. But then, would not the memory of *duhkha* create some *duhkha* in consciousness. Furthermore, the concept of *atyantābhāva* which is being used in the concept of *apavarga* is not applicable in the Nyāya mode of analysis to the *abhāva* of *duhkha* in the state of *apavarga,* because *atyantābhāva* is applied in those cases where the *abhāva* is eternally present and has normally been seen as a characteristic of such objects as are self contradictory in character such as *vandhyāputra* or objects whose empirical existence cannot even be imagined such as *ākāśa kusuma* or *śaśaśṛṅga.*

The twenty-third sūtra tries to describe the conditions under which doubt or *saṁśaya* arises or what it basically is. The

description emphasizes that when many opposite qualities, which are equally balanced, appear to characterize an object, doubt arises regarding what is there or what is not there. However, while the description is fairly accurate, it does not cover all cases of doubt. The Cartesian doubt, for example, will hardly be covered by the description given by the author of the Nyāyasūtras, for it operates even when there are no opposed qualities apprehended by consciousness.

Sutra twenty-four defines *prayojana* as that because of which one engages in an action as the term used is *pravartate.* It may however, be interpreted in a wider sense than what is usually implied by the term action and may be regarded as co-terminus with what is termed as *pravṛtti* in the system.

The sūtra twenty-five defines *dṛṣṭānta* as an example in respect of which both the common people and the experts agree as having the same meaning. This is an interesting definition of 'example' as it provides the link between common sense and the critical intelligence. However, as one may assume common sense to remain constant and critical intelligence to go on changing with the changes in knowledge, that which is accepted as *dṛṣṭānta* at one time may not be so at another. On the other hand, the sūtra may be interpreted as the world of commonsense with respect to which there can be no difference between the experts and the common man as the expert is also a common man and hence shares all the commonality with the others.

The sūtras twenty-six to thirty-one try to explicate the notion of *siddhānta* or the different kinds of *siddhānta* that there can be. The definition of *siddhānta* in sūtra twenty-six leads to the notion of *tantra* or a system and *abhyupagama* or that which is assumed or presupposed. The sūtra twenty-eight suggests the notion of *sarvatantra siddhānta,* that is, a doctrine which is admitted by all systems. It is not clear what the term *all* means here. Does it mean only all the existing *tantras* or all the possible *tantras.* In other words, is it merely the statement of a contingent fact or does it refer to some sort of necessary preconditions of a *tantra* being

a *tantra,* so that there can be no *tantra* in principle which will not accept those conditions. It is not made quite clear, whether the notion of a *siddhānta* is necessarily related to a *tantra* or system or it can be independent of it at all. Furthermore, is *siddhānta* only a hypothesis which is justified or established by a relevant argument. In other words, is *abhyupgama* like a *pratijñā* and *siddhānta* like an *anumiti,* which is established by an *anumāna* or a *pramāṇa*?

The sūtra twenty-seven suggests that there are four kinds of *siddhānta* such as *sarvatantra siddhānta, pratitantra siddhānta, adhikaraṇa siddhānta* and *abhyupagama siddhānta.* But if *abhyupagama* itself can be treated as a kind of *siddhānta,* then how would there be a difference between what is to be established and what has been established. Similarly, the definition of *pratitantra siddhānta* is given as that which is accepted by similar systems and not accepted by opposed systems. But how can that which is not proved *{asidda)* in another system be its *siddhānta.* The concept of an *adhikaraṇa siddhānta* which is sought to be explicated in sūtra thirty is not clear. Similarly, the idea of *abhyupagama siddhānta* explained in sūtra thirty-one is not quite clear as it seems to suggest that an *abhyupagama siddhānta* is the result of the critical examination of an *abhyupagama* which was not critically examined before. But the very definition of *siddhānta* is an *abhyupagama* which has been justified and validated. On the other hand, the notion of an *abhyupagama* or hypothesis is that it is only imagined or postulated to account for something.

The sūtra thirty-two enumerates the five elements of an argument which are known as *pratijñā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya* and *nigamana.*

Sutras thirty-three to thirty-nine try to give the definitions of these five elements of *anumāna* given in the sūtra thirty-two. *Pratijñā* is supposed to be that which is to be proved, *hetu* is supposed to be the reason which is offered as the ground for believing in its being true and this ground is supposed to be its

'similarities' with the *udāharaṇa* or the example where it actually obtains. But this is an absurd kind of definition, as, firstly, the concept of *udāharaṇa* has not yet been clarified and, two, if it is because of its similarity with the *udāharana* that the *hetu* can prove the *sādhya* then why cannot the *udāharaṇa* do the job by itself.

The sūtra thirty-five talks of *vaidharmya* without clarifying how and why the notion of *vaidharmya* is being introduced.

Sutra thirty-six gives a double notion of *udāharaṇa,* that is, it should be both positive and negative as having a common characteristic with that which is to be proved and also a different one where that which is to be proved is absent.

Sūtras thirty-seven, thirty-eight and thirty-nine try to explain something that is opposed and the notions of *upanaya* and *nigamana.* Similarly sūtras forty and forty-one try to say what exactly is meant by *tarka* and *nirṇaya* in the system.

General observations on the Nyāya-Sūtra (1.1)

The first section of the first chapter of the Sūtras thus tries to enumerate what is to be discussed in the text and the first section only discusses up to *nirṇaya* given in the first sūtra, thus implying that there is a radical difference between these and those which are discussed later in the second section of the first chapter. Thus we have two different types of topics which have been discussed and enumerated as *pramāṇa, prameya, saṁśaya, prayojana, dṛṣṭānta siddhānta, avayava, tarka,* and *nirṇaya* on the one hand and *vāda, jalpa, vitaṇḍā, hetvābhāsa, chala, jāti* and *nigrahsthāna* on the other. The latter obviously relate to discussion and argument between persons while the former seem to be more internal to the nature of argument itself. The latter therefore have psychological elements intermixed with other things while the former seem to be more logical in character. However, even among the former there is a radical difference between the topics mentioned in sūtra one, and those mentioned in sūtra two.

Furthermore, there seems to be no logical distinction between the discussion of *abhyupagama* and *siddhānta* on the one hand and *pratijñā* and *nigamana* on the other. Similarly, one does not understand the need for a distinction between a *dṛṣṭānta* and *udāharaṇa* and why the former should be mentioned separately as an item to be dealt with in a formal discussion of what is to count as a *pramāṇa*. The concept of *tantra* or system remains unexamined and not discussed at all, though perhaps it is philosophically the most important for purposes of logic and epistemology. The distinction between *tarka* and *anumāna* is not quite clear. Similarly, one does not understand what is the relationship between the three types of *anumāṇa* and the whole discussion of the *avayava* in the sūtras.

Part I - Section 2 - (20 Sūtras)

Chapter (1.2)

In sūtra (1.2.1), the author tries to give what he considers to be the ideal type of discussion, which he calls *Vāda*. The conditions for any discussion being a *Vāda* are mentioned as consisting of *pramāṇa* and *tarka*, which are not against one's *siddhānta* and which consist of five elements which constitute an argument wherein the two sides, the *pakṣa* and the *pratipakṣa* engage in a discussion. However, it is not quite clear how there could be a real discussion if the condition of not being opposed to one's *siddhānta* is observed by both the parties to the discussion. In other words, how will a discussion be possible between persons who have different *siddhāntas* and, in case they do not have different *siddhāntas,* what is the point of discussion.

Sūtra (1.2.2) tries to define *jalpa* as using all means like *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* for establishing one's position. As the *Sūtrakāra* has not yet defined what is meant by *chala, jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*, he is not justified in using these terms for defining

jalpa. Furthermore, as at least *nigrahasthāna* is found in all kinds of argument it cannot be a distinctive feature of *jalpa*.

Sūtra (1.2.3) describes *vjtaṇḍā* as a discussion where the opponent does not have a position of his own to defend. But even if one does not have a position of one's own, one can reasonably point out a defect in someone else's argument or in the position that he holds.

The sūtra (1.2.4) tries to define the *hetvābhāsa* or that which is not a *hetu* but appears as one. Here again the *hetvābhāsa* is not defined but only its various types are mentioned. They are supposed to be five in number and are named as *svayabhicāri, viruddha, prakaraṇasama, sādhya sama* and *kālātīta*.

The sūtras (1.2.5), (1.2.6), (1.2.7), (1.2.8) and (1.2.9) try to define these *hetvābhāsas*. The sūtra (1.2.5) defines *savyabhicārai* as *anekāntika*.

The sūtra (1.2.6) defines *viruddha* as a *hetu* which proves the opposite of the *siddhānta* one wishes to establish. The sūtra (1.2.7) defines *prakaraṇasama* as trying to give that as a *hetu* which itself is to be proved.

The sūtra (1.2.8) defines *sādhyasama* as that which uses that which is to be proved to prove something other than itself. It is not quite clear what is the distinction between the *prakaraṇasama* and *sādhyasama*.

The sūtra (1.2.9) tries to explain the fallacy of *kālātīta* as a *hetu* that is given after the time for the argument is over. It is not clear how this can ever be a fallacy except in an argument where one is time-bound, that is, obliged to reply to one's opponent within a limited time. However, even in such a situation, it cannot be called a *hetvābhāsa* in any relevant sense of the term.

The sūtra (1.2.10) tries to define *chala* as an argument where one tries to interpret the meaning of a word used by an opponent in a sense different from the one that he intended. In other words, it is to take advantage of the ambiguity of the language and play

a verbal trick on one's opponent rather than refute the point he is making.

The sūtra (1.2.11) distinguishes between different kinds of *chala* and calls them *vāk chala, sāmānya chala* and *upacāra chala.* The sūtra (1.2.12) defines *vāk chala* as where one imagines or ascribes a meaning different from the one intended by the speaker because of the fact that the same was not specifically mentioned by him.

The sūtra (1.2.13) gives the meaning of *sāmānya chala* when, though the intended meaning is present in what the speaker has said, still, by an over generalization or universalization one imagines an unintended meaning.

The sūtra (1.2.14) defines *upacāra chala* as where there is an alternative to the qualities mentioned by the speaker, the opponent chooses the alternative which is opposed to the obvious one intended by the speaker.

The sūtra (1.2.15) tries to raise an objection saying that *vāk chala* is itself the same as *upacāra chala* as there is no distinction between them.

The sūtra (1.2.16) tries to reply to this objection by saying that it is not so as there is a difference of meaning in the two cases. The sūtra (1.2.17) seems to continue the discussion and tries to suggest that even if there is some similarity between the *vāk chala* and *upacāra chala* it is not so in all cases.

The sūtra (1.2.18) and the sūtra (1.2.19) define *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* respectively. The sūtra (1.2.20) says that both *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* are plural in number as they are of many kinds.

Part II - Section 1 - (69 Sūtras)

The sūtra (2.1.1) starts with describing what is doubt or *saṁśaya* and suggests that when a number of equal qualities opposed to each other are entertained at the same time, doubt arises. It is not clear why the discussion of *saṁśaya* is introduced once again when its *lakṣaṇa* was already given in the sūtra

(1.1.23). Also it is not clear what difference obtains between the *lakṣaṇa* of *saṁśaya* as given in the sūtra (1.1.23) and (2.1.1) and (2.1.2). The key words used are *aneka dharma, adhyavasāya, vipratipatti* and *vyavasthā*. Perhaps the sūtras (2.1.1) and (2.1.2) are trying to distinguish between cases which appear to be like *saṁśaya* but are not really so. This perhaps is the reason why the term '*na*' is used in the sūtra (2.1.1).

The sūtra (2.1.3), (2.1.4), (2.1.5), (2.1.6) and (2.1.7) continue the discussion regarding *saṁśaya*. [The sūtra (2.1.8) seems to turn the discussion regarding *saṁśaya* to the possibility of there being no *pramāṇa* at all. The sūtra (2.1.9) tries to raise an objection to the definition of *pratyakṣa* when *pramāṇa* is supposed to exist before the perception of object while the sūtra (2.1.10) examines the question in case *pramāṇa* is given after the perception of object.

The treatment of doubt in the Nyāyasūtra from (2.1.1) to (2.1.7) is supposed to have been undertaken to clarify the general problem of doubt which may be raised with respect to any of the contentions made earlier. Doubt was already defined in Nyāya sūtra (1.1.23), the objections to the definition given in the Sūtra (1.1.23) are supposed to be raised in the sūtras (2.1.1) to (2.1.5) and Gautama's reply to these objections is given in the sūtras (2.1.6) onwards. But the discussion on doubt or *saṁśaya* given in the sūtras (2.1.1) to (2.1.7) is inadequate as the objections to the definition of doubt as given in (1.1.23) in the sūtras (2.1.1) to (2.1.5) do not seem to be very serious ones. Similarly, the reply given to the objections raised in these sūtras as given in (2.1.6) and (2.1.7) seems merely a repetition of the position without giving any fresh reasons for accepting the definition. It is not made quite clear whether doubt has been considered at the psychological level or at the epistemological level, nor is it made clear as to what is meant by the opposite of doubt, that is, certainty. Nor is any distinction made between dubitability and non-dubitability, nor is it made clear what role, if any, does doubt play in giving rise to knowledge. Both the objections raised and

the arguments given seem to be at a very elementary level and can hardly satisfy a modern student of the subject. It would be interesting to find the other discussions on doubt that have taken place in Indian philosophy after Gautama.

The author in sūtra (2.1.6) seems to suggest that one may not reasonably doubt that there can be such a thing as doubt. It is not made quite clear as to what the author means either by the first or by the second. That one may not doubt that there is such a thing as doubt or that there can be such a thing as doubt is not quite easy to understand. The first problem relates to the factuality of doubt, while the second relates to the possibility of doubt. Furthermore, there is the added problem whether I can not doubt that I am doubting or that I can possibly doubt if I want to do so, or that somebody else, may doubt whether I am 'really' doubting or that I could even possibly doubt, even if I wished to do so. Similarly, it is not quite clear what is meant by absolute doubt or *atyanta saṁśaya.* Does it mean that there are objects of knowledge about which doubting is impossible in principle or that there is no doubt which is not resolvable in principle? Does the denial of absolute doubt mean that every object of knowledge can be fully and finally established so that there cannot even be the possibility of future doubt arising with respect to that object? If, for example, it is accepted that one may argue that human experience regarding the existence of things is not always trustworthy or that if the frontiers of one's knowledge are not the limits of reality, then how can the possibility of doubt ever be denied and the removal of each particular doubt be considered only as a temporary removal and not as an absolute denial of its very possibility. Perhaps the word *atyanta saṁśaya* or absolute doubt refers only to the fact that every particular instance of a specific doubt is removable in principle even though the possibility of a doubt arising in future may always remain.

Sūtras (2.1.8) to (2.1.20) discuss the general concept of *pramāṇa*. The sūtras discuss the question regarding the concept of *pramāṇa* itself and not of any specific *pramāṇa* in particular.

The sūtra (2.1.8) tries to raise the objection that *pramāṇa* can never prove anything at all, for that which is to prove must exist either before the proof or after it. It seems reasonable to assume that what is to be regarded as a source of knowledge must precede that knowledge, as only that can be regarded as a source of knowledge which produces that knowledge, but what is actually a source will only be decided after it has resulted in knowledge.

The problem that is presented in the sūtras relates both to the notion of causation in general and the relation of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* in particular. What is a cause can only be known as 'cause' after the effect has been produced. Similarly, it is urged that what is a *pramāṇa* can only be known when the *prameya* is produced but though this seems obvious, it cannot always be true as in perception the object which is supposed to be known through perception, or for which *pratyakṣa* functions as a *pramāṇa* already exists, even according to the definition of perception given in the sūtra (1.1.4). On the other hand, if it is accepted that knowledge that succeeds the object is known on the basis of *pramāṇa* then it will also have to be accepted that it, that is, 'knowledge' already exists independently of it.

The sūtra (2.1.10) seems to thrive on an ambiguity between knowledge of an object as an object of knowledge and knowledge of an object independent of its being known. Sūtra (2.1.11) argues that if it be said that both the knowledge and the object of knowledge occur simultaneously, and neither is before or after the other in time, then the problem arises as to why we have knowledge of one thing at a time and not of all things all the time. The sūtra (2.1.12) suggests that if the opponent's objections were valid then he could not establish his position either, for the argument precludes the possibility of establishing any thing whatsoever. Sūtra (2.1.13) says this explicitly and argues that if all the *pramāṇas* are impossible in principle, then so will be their refutation. On the other hand, if the opponent thinks that what he is saying is established on the basis of some *pramāṇa,* then

it is obvious that all the *pramāṇas* are not being denied by the opponent. So the sūtra (2.1.14) argues that one can reasonably infer the knowledge of a *pramāṇa* just as one infers the existence of a drum on the basis of the sound that it has produced. Thus while the drum exists before the sound it has caused, it is inferred on the basis of the sound that it has produced. Hence while the drum exists before the sound it has caused, it is inferred on the basis of the sound, which now functions as the basis or the ground on which it is known. The sūtra (2.1.16) suggests that the *pramāṇa* and the *prameya* may be regarded as we regard a balance in which we determine the weight of some thing on the basis of some other standard measure of weight which itself has been established through other weights. Perhaps, what is being suggested is that what is a *prameya*, once it is established, can itself function as a *pramāṇa* later in some other context. On the other hand, the analogical example also may be taken to suggest that *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are relative terms that may *simultaneously* be seen as both *pramāṇa* and *prameya* alternatively depending upon the view point adopted by the concerned observer.

The sūtra (2.1.17) and (2.1.18) again raise possible objections against the position whether anything can function as a means of knowledge. The sūtra (2.1.17) says that if something is required to establish anything as a piece of knowledge then that too would require another means of knowledge to know it, and so on indefinitely. Sūtra (2.1.18) argues that if, at any point, this unending chain is to be arbitrarily stopped, then it could easily have been stopped earlier. The sūtra (2.1.19) tries to suggest the untenability of this objection by pointing out the example of a lamp which is required for the illumination of objects, but which does not require any other light for being revealed itself.

The reply given in sūtra (2.1.19) reveals that the sūtrakāra does not seem to have understood the force of the objections given in the sūtras (2.1.17) and (2.1.18). The objection emanates from the idea of *infinite regress* in the establishment of knowledge in case it is supposed to require a *pramāṇa* for its establishment.

The idea of any self-justifying or self-establishing piece of knowledge would make it immune from the necessity of having any *pramāṇa* for its establishment. This would be something like the notion of an axiom in western thought. But if so, Gautama should have started with this notion and given instances of those pieces of knowledge which are self-justified and hence do not require any *pramāṇa* for their establishment, but which provide the basis for all knowledge other than themselves. They would function as *pramāṇas* without being *prameyas* themselves.

The sūtra (2.1.20) perhaps tries to suggest that perception functions in such a fundamental sense as it is like the light which illumines everything else without needing something to illumine itself.

The sūtra 2.1.20 seems to argue that the example of the lamp can not be uniformly applied to all cases of knowledge. In other words, while in some cases the ground that is given for the knowledge is self-justified, in other cases it may not be so. The discussion in the commentaries does not attempt to give the criterion on the basis of which one will be able to make a distinction between the two cases. Ultimately, the problem relates to the notion of "self-justification" or "self-proved", which does not seem to have been discussed in the commentaries on the text. The problem has been extensively discussed in the western tradition and one of the strongest criterion that has been given is the one that is used in "indirect-proof", that is, the one where the contradictory of what is sought to be proved involves a self-contradiction. Thus, if something is self-contradictory then it is bound to be false and hence the self-contradictory of the self-contradictory is bound to be necessarily true. This is not accepted by those who want always a direct proof as the intuitionists in mathematics. There is also the problem of what exactly is meant by self-contradiction and the contention that ultimately the opposite of self-contradiction is bound to be a tautology which is necessarily true because it does not say anything new. The problem of analytic and synthetic in western tradition is closely

related to this issue and it will be interesting to find the discussion in this regard in the Indian tradition.

The sūtra (2.1.21) argues that perception cannot function as a foundation for all knowledge without requiring any foundation for itself as the definition of perception given in the sūtra (1.1.4) is incomplete in that it does not enumerate all the objects which are to be in contact with the senses for perception to take place.

The sūtra (2.1.21) gives an example of this and suggests that unless there were to be a contact between the *ātman* and the *manas*, perception will not take place even if there were to occur a contact between the senses and the object, as is mentioned in the sūtra (1.1.14). The sūtra (2.1.22) seems to suggest that the same would be true also of space, place, dik, time and *ākāśas*. The exact relevance of this sūtra is not clear. Furthermore, the sūtra makes a distinction between *dik* and *deśa* which is not quite clear; perhaps what the sūtra wants to say is that perception requires not merely the contact between the *ātman* and the *manas* but also of *dik, deśa, kāla* and *ākāsa,* besides those of the *indnyas* and the objects in order to take place. The sūtra (2.1.23) tries to suggest that the *ātman* has not been excluded as, in sūtra 1.1.10, it was clearly said that *jñāna* or knowledge is a sign of the presence of the self. The reply while correct is not satisfactory as it is not explicitly mentioned in (1.1.4) and has to be inferred as an implication of sūtra (1.1.10). The sūtra (2.1.24) again suggests that the conjunction of the mind with the senses has not been excluded as the sūtra (1.1.16) clearly mentions that one cannot have two simultaneous perceptions. The sūtra (2.1.25) clarifies why only the contact between the senses and objects is mentioned in the definition of perception. The reason given is that these are the only distinctive contacts in the case of perception as the contact of the mind and the soul is a constant feature of all knowledge, including those which are not perceptual in character. The sūtra (2.1.26) tries to give another reason why the contact of the senses with the object is decisive for perception as in the case of sleep and inattention, perception will take place

if there is a strong contact with the object. The example is unfortunate as it cuts both ways, for in cases of deep sleep, one is not aware of objects, even when they are in contact with the senses and many things remain unperceived, if one is not attentive to them. The sūtra (2.1.27) and (2.1.28) try to give other reasons why, in the case of perception, sense-object contact has been given primacy. One reason for this is that perceptual knowledge is distinguished on the basis of the sense with which it is obtained and not in any other way. We say, for example, that we see colours with our eyes and hear sound with our ears, even though the mind and the soul are equally in contact in both the cases. The sūtra (2.1.28) raises an unnecessary objection. It has already been discussed a number of times. It seems to argue that as mind and soul have not been mentioned in the definition of perception, they cannot be brought in as *hetu*. The answer given in the sūtra (2.1.29) is that not mentioning cannot be taken as a defect, since only the distinctive conditions are to be mentioned and not those which are constant for all kinds of knowledge. The sūtra (2.1.30) tries to suggest that *pratyakṣa* should be treated as a case of inference, for what we perceive is only a part of the object, and not the whole of it. The sūtra (2.1.31) tries to give a reply to this objection by saying that the objection itself presupposes at least a perception of the part of the object which itself is non-inferential in character. The sūtra (2.1.32) raises again the issue of the perception of the whole on the basis of the perception of the part. It argues that how can one be said to perceive the whole, when one has actually perceived only a part of it. The sūtra (2.1.33) further objects that as the whole is a matter only of inference one may doubt whether there is such a thing as a whole or not. The sūtra (2.1.34) tries to reply that in case wholes are not accepted, all things that are accepted by everybody will become unintelligible. The sūtra (2.1.35) further argues that if we did not know the whole, how would we be able to hold things or put them in different directions. In other words, how could we deal with them as wholes. The sūtra (2.1.36) tries to answer

the objection that the so-called whole may be like the army or the forest, that is, 'whole' only in name but no real whole at all, being only an aggregate of its parts. The reply to this given in the sūtra itself is that this could not be the case as unlike the trees and the individual soldiers, which constitute the forest and the army respectively, ultimate atoms which are the ultimate constituents of all wholes are not perceptible. But the problem of wholes was not being discussed in the context of ultimate atoms. The problem in the case of ultimate atoms would have to be phrased differently, for in their case the problem is how can something perceptible arise from parts or elements which themselves are imperceptible in principle. There is, of course, another problem which has not been discussed by any of the opponents and it is about the sort of contact between the senses and the object on the one hand and mind and the soul on the other. This cannot be either in terms of *saṁyoga* or *samavāya* or *svarūpa*, the three relations which are generally accepted in Nyāya. The sūtra (2.1.37) raises a possible objection regarding the acceptance of *anumāna* as a *pramāṇa* on the ground that the inference of an antecedent on the ground of what has happened or of a consequent on the basis of what has occurred, is liable to be false because of the fact that the cause of the effect may be other than the one on the basis of which the inference is being made. The usual examples given in this connection relate to the inference of rainfall because of the swelling of the river or to the occurrence of rainfall in the future because of the carrying of the eggs by the ants or of the inference from the crying of peacocks to the present phenomenon of the gathering of clouds. In each of these cases the objector suggests that the inference may be invalid because the supposed relationships may not obtain. The answer given in sūtra (2.1.38) tries to suggest that the similarity of the ground on the basis of which the inference is being made is only partial and hence it is because of the ignoring of the dissimilarity with the genuine cases that a false inference is being generated. It is interesting to note in this connection that the

concept of *vyāpti* is not being used in the sūtras nor is the problem being faced as to the exact nature of the circumstances in which the relation of inference would be supposed to obtain. The sūtras (2.1.39) to (2.1.43) discuss the concept of the present as contrasted with the past and the future. Presumably, the discussion arises because in the earlier two sūtras the inference was supposed to be from something in the present to something in the past or in the future or even in the present at a different point in space. The sūtra (2.1.39) tries to argue against the existence of the present as it suggests that in the case of something which is falling, it is reasonable to say that the distance that it has covered in the course of its falling was in the past and that the distance that it is going to cover is in the future, for it is continuously falling, and hence not static in any position whatsoever so that it could be said to be 'present'. Gautama's reply in sūtra (2.1.40) is that if the present is denied, the past and the future will also have to be denied, because they are relative to that which is present. The sūtra (2.1.41) tries to suggest that it would not be proper to think that the past and the future are relative to each other and not relative to the present as this will result in the charge of circularity. The sūtra (2.1.42) tries to argue further that if the present were not to be accepted, then there will be no such thing as perception and hence nothing will be known. The sūtra (2.1.43) further argues that as the distinction between action that has already been completed and that which is yet to be done is intrinsic to action and as action can only be done in the present, the distinction between the past and the future are necessarily implied in all action and thus have to be accepted as real. The discussion does not take into account a radical distinction between knowledge and action in this context. It is not clear whether the temporal distinctions of past, present and future are necessary for knowledge in the same way as they seem necessary for action.

The sūtras (2.1.44) to (2.1.48) are concerned with establishing the validity of accepting *upamāna* as a source of valid knowledge.

The sūtra (2.1.44) raises an objection against accepting *upamāna* or comparison as a separate valid source of knowledge as it is based on similarity of one or more characteristics and hence might be wrong. In other words, there is no necessity about it as two different objects may have certain characteristics in common and yet be different in other respects. The sūtra (2.1.45) tries to reply that this is not exactly a defect, since the comparison is generally on the basis of those characteristics which are important and hence associated with other characteristics also. The sūtra (2.1.46) tries to suggest that *upamāna* should be treated as a case of *anumāna* as it is on the basis of perception that something which is unperceived is known and hence it cannot be treated as a separate *pramāṇa.*

The sūtra (2.1.47) replies to this objection by saying that the term *gavaya* is applied to something which is perceived and hence the case of *upamāna* is totally different from that of *anumāna,* where the object that is inferred is totally absent. Does this mean that in the case of *anumāna* it is necessary that something which is not perceived is inferred on the basis of that which is perceived?

The sūtra (2.1.48) concludes the discussion and tries to suggest that *upamāna* is a distinct form of *pramāṇa* and cannot be reduced to *anumāna* or inference.

The sūtra (2.1.49) starts the discussion on *śabda pramāṇa.* The whole sequence of sūtras (2.1.49) to (2.1.56) treats the objections against *śabda* as a *svatantra pramāṇa* and answers the objections raised by the opponents. First, it is pointed out that there is a similarity between the object of *anumāna* and the object of *śabda pramāṇa* in that both are not present to perception. There is supposed to be a further similarly between *anumāna* and *śabda pramāṇa* as in both we start with the knowledge of something which is perceived. The sūtra (2.1.51) gives another reason pointing out the similarity between *anumāna* and *śabda pramāṇa* in that there is a known relationship between that which is perceived and that which is unperceived. In the case of *śabda pramāṇa,* it is the relationship between the words and that which

is meant by the words, which is the basis of the knowledge of that which is unperceived. The obvious reply to this which is given in the sūtra (2.1.52) is that it is not on the basis of the relationship between the words and the objects to which they apply that the *śabda pramāṇa* is based, but rather on the relation between the words and the speaker who speaks them, for it is the *śabda* of an *āpta puruṣa* which is a *pramāṇa* and not *śabda* spoken by anybody. But this only shifts the problem to the relation between the *śabda* and the reliability or the authority of the person who utters the words and is an *āpta puruṣa.* Moreover, the relation between words and objects is a necessary condition for knowledge to arise. Whether this knowledge is to be believed as true or not is, of course, another question but at least it should first be understood as without this, the question of believing or disbelieving cannot arise.

The sūtra (2.1.53) makes the point that it would be a mistake to think that *śabda pramāṇa* is about words in general on which the objection made earlier rests. The sūtra (2.1.54) concedes that even if the *śabda pramāṇa* does not relate to all words, it still depends on the relationship between words and objects. Gautama's reply to this is that the relationship between words and objects is conventional, while the relationship between the *hetu* and the *sādhya* is natural and hence one will have to distinguish between *anumāna* and *śabda pramāṇa.* The answer seems to be misconceived in two ways. One, it is not necessary that the relation between the *hetu* and the *sādhya* be always natural as firstly this condition has not been given as a *lakṣaṇa* of *anumāna* and secondly, it would not apply to those schools of thought which regard the relation between *śabda* and *artha* to be *nitya.* It should be noted in this connection that, at least for Gautama, the relationship between words and the objects which they denote is artificial or conventional. Nor is it clear whether a relevant distinction is being made between *artha* or meaning and reference or the objects denoted by the words.

The sūtra (2.1.54) tries to strengthen further the point by

saying that there is no direct or natural relationship between words and the objects they denote, as otherwise while uttering the words 'fire' or 'rice', one's mouth would burn or be filled with rice. The sūtra (2.1.55) raises the possible objection that the relation between the word and its meaning is due to a rule accepted by the linguistic community concerned.

The answer to this objection is given in the sūtras (2.1.56) and (2.1.57) where it is clarified that, firstly, the acceptance of the rule is itself conventional and that it also varies from one group or part of the linguistic community to another. The sūtras do not raise the central question regarding the reliability of the speaker on which the *pramāṇa* ultimately rests.

The sūtras (2.1.57) to (2.1.68) are concerned specifically with the authority of the Vedas. The sūtra (2.1.58) says that the Vedic sentences cannot be authoritative as they are full of inner contradictions, irrelevant repetitions and even straight falsehood. The sūtra (2.1.59) tries to answer the objection regarding the falsity of the Vedic sentences by suggesting that there might be a fault in the agent or/and the procedures adopted by him. The defence is strange, for it can be applied to explain away all cases of apparent falsity of injunctive statements on these grounds and not merely those of the Vedic sentences. Furthermore, the answer concedes that an injunctive statement can be true or false, while in reality questions of truth and falsity cannot be raised with respect to all imperative sentences. It is, of course, true that a hypothetical imperative may be understood in such a way particularly if it is of a causal nature, as it may be found to be true or false. But then it would mean that the Vedic injunctions are about actions of a causal variety and are hypothetical in nature. This would completely destroy the absolute and unconditional nature of the Vedic injunctions. The sūtra (2.1.60) tries to answer the charge of inconsistency. It suggests that the inconsistency is only apparent and that they should be understood either as alternatives to be adopted by the person concerned or seen as referring to different occasions or times when what is

being prescribed is to be done. As far as the charge of irrelevant repetition is concerned, the sūtra (2.1.61) suggests that the repetition serves a useful purpose which is not being grasped by the objector.

However, the three ways suggested to meet the three objections do not seem to be very successful as they can always be adopted whenever such objections are raised .and hence suffer from the *ativyāpti doṣa,* that is they have nothing specific in respect of the Vedas, which are the subject of discussion. The sūtra (2.1.62) suggests that the meaning of the Vedic sentences should be grasped by arranging; them in different groups or classes.

The sūtra (2.1.63) suggests the groups into which these sentences are to be classified, that is, we should separate those sentences which are injunctive in character from those which have only *arthavāda* as their character. These two should be distinguished from those which are only repetitive in character. The sūtra (2.1.64) defines injunction as an authoritative imperative sentence which has to be followed. The sūtra (2.1.65) defines *arthavāda* sentences as praising or blaming. The terms *prakṛti* and *purākalpa* have been used in the context of the *arthavāda* sentences. These have been taken to mean that some persons have performed an action in a deviant way or followed the tradition and not the Vedic injunction. The meaning of *prakṛti* and *purākalpa* is to be determined, for if *purākalpa* means following the tradition and not the injunction of the Veda and if this is to condemn such action, then what happens to the role of the *yājñika* in the performance of the Vedic *yajña* and the authority he is supposed to enjoy therein. Sūtra (2.1.66) suggests that repetition of an injunctive statement is at another place or another context; in the sūtra (2.1.67) suggests that the definition given does not seem to be correct as there are repetitions of other kinds also. The sūtra (2.1.68) suggests that the repetition can be meaningful as sometime when we want a person to go faster, we say "go, go" again and again. The sūtra (2.1.69) strangely bases the *prāmāṇya* of the *mantra* or the Vedas on the

analogy of the authority of the *Āyurveda* whose authority itself is based on the authority and reliability of the persons who have composed them. This closes the first section of the second part of the Nyāya sūtras.

Part II - Section 2 - (69 Sūtras)

The first section of the second *adhyāya* of the Nyāya sūtras deals with the various *pramāṇas* and with the objections that may be raised against them. Thus it is primarily concerned with a detailed discussion of the first topic mentioned in the opening sūtra (I.I.I). The second section of the second chapter starts with raising the issue whether the number of *pramāṇas* are only four. The sūtra (2.2.1) raises the question as to why other *pramāṇas* such as *aitihya, arthāpatti, saṁbhava* and *abhāva* should not be regarded as *pramāṇas.* The point is that besides perception, inference, knowledge by comparison or *upamāna* and testimony, there are other sources of knowledge such as knowledge from tradition, knowledge by implication, knowledge by subsumption and knowledge by negation.

The sūtra (2.2.2) argues that while there are cases of knowledge based on these, they can easily be understood as instances of the four sources of knowledge already accepted by him. Knowledge from tradition, for example, could be treated as *śabda pramāṇa,* while the remaining three could easily be understood as based on *anumāna.*

The sūtra (2.2.3) raises an objection that there cannot exist knowledge by implication or *arthāpatti* as the generalization on which it is based is not a true generalization, for it is *anekāntic* in character, meaning thereby that the same effect could have been produced by many different causes and hence the inference to any one of them may not be correct.

In sūtra (2.2.4) Gautama's reply to the objection from *anekāntikatā* is that the instances chosen for establishing it are not genuine cases of inference or *anumāna* but the real issue is as to what is a genuine case of *anumāna* and how the theoretical

anekāntikatā of the relationship can be avoided. The sūtra uses a very strange word, *abhimāna,* to convey the inappropriateness of the examples. One should carefully examine the peculiar use of this word in the sūtra. The sūtra (2.2.5) again raises the objection from *anekāntikatā,* but neither the potential objector nor Gautama himself seem to be clear about the generalized nature of the objection and the real point of it. The sūtra (2.2.6) tries to suggest that if all inferences are vitiated because of *anekāntikatā* then the argument from *anekāntikatā* should also be so vitiated and hence be invalid. The general position of Gautama seems to be that even in order to object one has to accept at least some instances of inferential knowledge or rather some forms of argument as valid.

The sūtra (2.2.7) discusses knowledge by negation. The sūtra seems to argue that *abhāva* can not be regarded as a *pramāṇa* as what it is supposed to establish is itself non-existent. The sūtra (2.2.8) perhaps tries to explicate what exactly is meant by the sūtra (2.2.7). It suggests that if, in a situation, a number of things are identified as having a certain distinguishing property, then by virtue of that very fact they are also understood as different or distinguished from other similar things which lack that distinguishing property and hence absence or *abhāva* of a property can also be legitimately regarded as a property of objects. Perhaps the sūtra (2.2.7) objects that absence of something cannot be a property of objects. *Abhāva* cannot be accepted as a *pramāṇa* or *hetu* for proving anything. The sūtra (2.2.8) therefore is a reply to this objection suggesting that *abhāva* or absence can legitimately be regarded as a property of objects and hence as a ground of inferring something else. The sūtra (2.2.9) seems to raise the issue whether absence can properly be attributed to an object unless it earlier possessed the property which now is absent. In case it never possessed it, how can its absence be meaningfully attributed to it. Perhaps the question relates to the conditions under which absence of a property can be meaningfully predicated of an object and when it is just a vacuous assertion of absence.

Gautama seems to suggest a reply in the later part of the sūtra itself and says that the condition suggested for the meaningful predication of absence does not seem to be correct as it is not necessary that the absence predicated should be only of a property which was present earlier in that thing, as it might be present in something else and this should be no bar to the legitimacy of the statement that this property is present in this object and not in that object. The sūtra (2.2.10) seems to raise the objection that the very statement that something is non-existent implies its existence at some other place or some other time and thus leads to the simultaneous assertion of existence and non-existence together. But this presupposes that existence is always spatio-temporal in character and in case it is so it has to be specified. The reply of Gautama in (2.2.11) is something of the same sort as it says that the presence or absence of the property which is being asserted is relative to the object concerned and hence it is not in the same object that both presence and absence are being predicated. The sūtra (2.2.12) continues the argument and points out that the objector himself had admitted the absence of a property in an object after its having been present earlier. But this, in his opinion, did not lead to the simultaneous assertion of both presence and absence as time matters in such situations when difference of place does not. The larger question whether there are any radical differences with respect to the possession of contrary or even contradictory properties with respect to differences in space-time location has not been discussed either by Gautama or his *pratipakṣī*.

It would be interesting to see how the argument is developed from Vātsyāyana onwards.

The sūtra (2.2.13) which deals with *saṁśaya* is not regarded as a sūtra in the *Nyāya Sūcī Nibandha.* The discussion onwards is concerned with establishing the non-eternality of sound, perhaps against the *mīmāṅsaka* position which is a pre-condition for their view that the Vedas are eternal. From the sūtras (2.2.13) to (2.2.21) Gautama gives his reasons why he regards sound as

non-eternal. The first argument given in sūtra (2.2.13) is that sound is non-eternal because it has a beginning, also because it is perceived with the help of an external sense-organ and because it is such that it is spoken of as a thing having properties and features that are only found in objects that have been created and hence are non-eternal. The sūtra (2.2.14) continues the discussion and suggests that none of these reasons is sufficient to establish the non-eternality of sound. For example, the *dhvaṅsābhāva* is generally regarded as eternal, even though it has a beginning and hence the fact that sound has a beginning does not prove that it is not eternal in the sense that once produced it is never destroyed. Similarly, the fact that something is perceived by an external sense-organ does not prove that it cannot be eternal for the *sāmānya* such as the *āhatatva* along with the object such as the pot by means of which it is produced and the external sense-organ such as the eye by which it is seen is still regarded by everyone as being eternal. Similarly the fact that some features are ascribed to sound, which are only found in non-eternal things would not necessarily make it non-eternal, for though parts are generally found only in non-eternal things, still we think of *ākāsa* as having parts or the self as having parts even though both of them are conceived as eternal. The sūtra (2.2.15) further argues that things may be eternal even when they are produced and when they are apprehended by the senses as in the case of *ghaṭābhāva* and the apprehensions of *sāmānya* or universal in perception. The sūtra (2.2.16) suggests that the analogy of perceiving a universal which is eternal along with the particular perceived by the visual sense-organ can not be held to be correct, as in the case of the ear, it does not reach out to the place where the sound is produced but rather the sound produced successively travels to the cavity of the ear, where it is apprehended as sound. Even otherwise, we will have to distinguish between the universal sound from the particular sound which will have to be admitted as non-eternal. It is thus not the particular sound which is heard which will be eternal, but the 'soundness', which will be perceived along with

it that will be regarded as eternal. The Nyāya analysis of the visual and the auditory perception seems to suggest that there is a radical distinction between them. However, it is not clear if the same analyses have been extended to other senses such as smell, taste and touch. The sūtra (2.2.17) again suggests that the use of the word 'part' in parts of *ākāsa* or of self are used incorrectly and hence can provide no ground for the belief that sound is eternal. The important point that Gautama seems to be considering is that if any thing is spatio-temporal and has parts or has a beginning then it can not strictly be considered as eternal. But the Indian analyst had suggested particularly in his analysis of *prāgbhāva* and *dhvaṅsābhāva* that something which is beginningless can still have an end and that something which has a beginning can be endless. There should, therefore, be three kinds of eternal objects, that is, those that have a beginning but have no end, those that have an end but no beginning and lastly those that have neither a beginning nor an end. Similarly, we should perhaps distinguish between objects which occupy space and thus are said to have parts in the sense that they are divisible and separable and those complex objects of thought which do not occupy space and yet have properties which are distinguishable by analysis. Perhaps, a further distinction should be made between properties which are only distinguishable and not seperable and those which are both separable and distinguishable. The sūtra (2.2.18) offers some more arguments for the non-eternality of sound. The first argument is that sound is non-eternal because we do not hear it before it is uttered. In case it were already there and we were not hearing it, we would have to postulate some obstruction or countervailing factor because of which we did not hear it. However, our ordinary experience does not seem to support this. The sūtra (2.2.19) and (2.2.20) raise the interesting issue whether the fact that we are not aware of the exact nature of obstruction, because of which the sound is not perceived before it is actually heard, can be taken as a sufficient ground for the assertion that there is. no obstruction or veil hindering our knowledge of the presence of the sound.

The argument is a general one and suggests that the absence of knowledge cannot be a ground for the rejection of something. But then there must be some independent grounds for the assertion that we have to postulate the existence of that thing and that without postulating it our experience will remain unintelligible. Also, if we postulate something like obstruction or a veil which is hindering our knowledge then it should be removable and there should be specifiable processes for its removal.

Otherwise, on the ground of *lāghava* or parsimony, there is no point in postulating such a thing. Gautama in the sūtra (2.2.21) does not see the general nature of the objection or the problem that it raises in the context of knowledge but argues that the absence, on the ground of which he has asserted the legitimacy of the inference of something, was a positive absence and not just absence as such. The point perhaps is that earlier Gautama had accepted the legitimacy of inferring something on the basis of its *abhāva,* even though he had not accepted *abhāva* as an independent *pramāṇa* and the opponent appears to have misconstrued what he was saying as arguing that we may postulate the existence of an obstruction on the basis of the fact that we do not hear the sound, even though it is eternal. The sūtras (2.2.22) to (2.2.39) give the positive arguments for the position that sound is eternal. The whole sequence of the sūtras is topsy-turvy as normally one would have assumed that the arguments for the eternality of sound would be given first and then refuted. However, Gautama does just the opposite. He first gives the arguments for the non-eternality of sound and answers the possible objections against it and then gives the positive arguments for the opponents and then refutes them. The first argument that the opponent gives for the eternality of sound is that it is eternal because it lacks the quality of touch. This is a strange argument because it implies that whatever cannot be touched, is eternal. The argument is so weak that it is surprising that it should have been given and taken seriously. The sūtra (2.2.23) and (2.2.24) give two examples of something being non-eternal and yet

lacking in the quality of touch. The example given is that of *karma*. One cannot touch action and yet it is not eternal. The sūtra (2.2.24) gives the counter-example of something being eternal which also has the quality of touch, an atom, which is supposed to be both eternal and having the quality of touch. However, it is not quite clear how an atom is supposed to have the quality of touch, as one certainly cannot touch it. The sūtra (2.2.25) gives a very strange argument from the word *saṁpradāna* which is not normally used.

The sūtra (2.2.24) gives another interesting example of something which lacks the quality of touch and yet is non-eternal. The example given is that of action and it is very strange to have the issue whether an action can have tactile qualities, raised. In fact, an action cannot be said, meaningfully, not only to have the quality of touch but also those of smell and taste. As for the qualities of sight and sound, it is not quite clear how they can be ascribed to it, though actions certainly can be seen but they do not have colour. The whole question of the relevant predicates of action is interesting and needs to be explored further. There is, also, the related question as to how is an action known and what are the sources of the knowledge of action and how is such knowledge validated. There is also the distinction between *kriyā* and *karma* and, in case this is accepted, the problem will be regarding the difference that such a distinction makes in respect of the questions of knowledge and validity. The sūtra (2.2.25) gives a strange argument from the linguistic construction which allows one to say that one can 'give' a 'word' and argues that in case the construction is meaningful it implies that the word must have existed even before it was given as one cannot give a thing which was not existent before its being given. The argument is to establish the eternality of sound. But if its logic were to be accepted, then everything will become eternal for, if it can be given then it must have existed before and in case it is a thing, for only that which is a thing can be given, it must have existed before. In fact, there is another analogous argument

for the eternity of every thing as nothing can come into being if it was not already there, for nothing can come out of nothing and hence the illusion of something coming into being and passing away is only an appearance and not its 'real' reality. At a still deeper level it has been argued that the very notion of "appearing" and "disappearing" involves the reality of time with its distinctions of past, present and future which themselves are indefensible as they are continuously changing.

The sūtra (2.2.26) controverts the argument for the sound being eternal because of the fact that one can give one's word to somebody and one can give only what one has already got. The objection raised by Gautama is that there is always an interval between the giving and the receiving and normally the object continues to exist, but, in the case of sound, nothing is apprehended between the act of uttering and the act of hearing and hence it is improper to talk of "giving" in the case of sound as the opponent seems to do. The sūtra (2.2.27) gives a counter-argument that sound can be regarded as a thing that can be given, for a teacher does teach a student how to utter a word properly and he can do so only by first uttering the sounds himself and then listening to the same sounds being repeated by the student and correcting him if he has not uttered them in the same way. In sūtra (2.2.28) Gautama points out in reply that the argument from the teaching of sound in the case of words cannot establish that something is being given to somebody else, for the phenomenon of teaching can be understood in terms of the student imitating the teacher as he does, say, in the case of dance. A dance movement is not exactly given but is imitated by the student who watches the teacher's movement and tries to replicate it. The sūtra (2.2.29) tries to answer a possible objection that, after all, the sound is repeated and we say that it is the same sound that is being uttered again and again and hence it proves that the sound is eternal and its different utterances are so many instances of it. In a sense, this is the problem of the universal and the particular which is being discussed in the context of sound and neither the

eternity nor the non-eternity of sound can be established through this way of arguing. For, to take the Platonic line, it will be the universal which will be enduring and eternal, and not the particular which will be changing and ephemeral. In sūtra (2.2.30) Gautama points out that a repetition of the same does not argue for non-difference as the two cases are not numerically identical. It is certainly true that the same sound can be repeated but each instance of its repetition is different from the other and this is indicated by the fact that we say "it is the same as the other one was." It should be noted here that the sūtra uses the term *abhyāsa* in a very strange sense for though the term *abhyāsa* does mean repetition, it also implies improvement through repetition. The sūtra (2.2.31) raises the issue as to what exactly is meant by the words 'other than' for if something, say x, is held to be other than, say y, then it is obvious that x cannot be regarded as other than x and hence, as the concept of 'other than' cannot be applied to a thing itself, there is no point in treating sheer numerical difference as affecting the identity of the object concerned. The issue is whether numerical difference can be relevantly said to affect the identity of an object. (Those people who have said that Indian philosophy does not discuss the abstract law of identity as discussed by Aristotle have not paid attention to the discussion of it in the Nyāya sūtras as indicated here). In sūtra (2.2.32) Gautama points out that the idea of something not being other than itself cannot make sense if there was nothing which was not other than what a thing itself is supposed to be. While, there certainly is a play on the word 'other than' in the phrase 'a thing is not other than itself' there is a subtle philosophical point that is being made, that is, that the assertion of identity has no meaning except when an entity is being differentiated from all the other things which are not the same as itself. The usual formulation of the law of identity in the western philosophical tradition masks this basic fact which Gautama is trying to point out. However, the irony is that this is exactly the position that the Buddhists developed to the extreme in their doctrine of *apoha*

and the followers of the author of the Nyāya sūtras opposed them on this point.

The sūtra (2.2.33) imagines a new argument in favour of the eternity of sound and tries to refute it in (2.2.34). The argument imagined in (2.2.33) is that if sound was not regarded as eternal, then it would have to be considered as non-eternal, i.e. it would have to be regarded as something that is destroyed or ceases to be, but if so, there has to be some cause for the destruction or cessation of sound. But we do not know of any such cause and hence sound will have to be regarded as eternal. Gautama's reply to this in sūtra (2.2.34) is that in case this were to be true, then one will have to explain why one does not hear a sound constantly. Further, in sūtra (2.2.35), Gautama argues that though it is true that we do not perceive any cause for the cessation of sound, we certainly can infer it. For example, we may say that the members in a series of sounds are such that the next sound is produced by the earlier members which themselves perish after producing the next sound. Strangely, this is very much like the Buddhist position of *kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda* where reality is supposed to be momentary and this doctrine of the momentariness of reality itself is supposed to be a logical consequence of the criterion of reality given in their doctrine of *artha kriyā kārritva.* The Buddhists, of course, did not confine it merely to the realm of sound but extended it to all that was considered as real. The sūtra (2.2.36) tries to suggest that it is not a fact that we do not have any knowledge of the conditions causing the cessation of sound for if we put our hands on a bell then we can see the sound as ceasing. The sūtra (2.2.37) argues further that in case the sound was to be regarded as eternal then one would have to find the conditions for the fact that we do not hear it continuously and that we cease to hear it after a certain time. The sūtra (2.2.37), in fact, tries to answer the point that was made by the opponent in sūtra (2.2.33). The sūtra (2.2.38) discusses a different point and is concerned with the issue as to what is the substratum of sound or what is that in which sound inheres. The position of

the author of the Nyāya Sūtra is that sound inheres in *ākāśa* while the sūtra (2.2.38) tries to argue that the sound inheres not in *ākāśa* but in the physical substratum in which also inheres the contact with the striking instrument and the intensity or speed with which the object is struck. The sūtra (2.2.38) suggests that such a position cannot be maintained because the auditory sense organ is confined to the cavity of the ear and one would have to assume that the sound which travels from the object to the ear continuously ceases and gives rise to its successor till it reaches the ear. But between the object and the ear, in what substance will this sound inhere. Ultimately, therefore, the objection is untenable and one will have to assume that sound does not inhere in the object from which it is supposed to travel to the ear. The sūtra (2.2.39) makes another important point and suggests that sound, unlike other sense qualities, such as colour, taste, smell and touch, does not inhere in any object and hence one will have to assume some other non-objective substratum for it and this probably can only be *ākāśa.* However, even though the sound may not inhere in the object there can be little doubt that most objects have a sound of their own which they emit when struck by something. It is strange that Gautama did not anticipate this objection in sūtra (2.2.39).

The sūtras (2.2.40-57) are concerned with the issue of the transformation of sound. The sūtras (2.2.40) onwards consider an issue regarding sound which may seem very strange to one at first sight. The issue relates to the question whether sound is undifferentiated in itself and that if differentiations occur they are only due to accidental, external circumstances. On the other hand, sound may be essentially differentiated in terms of phonemes out of which all complex utterances are constituted. Perhaps an analogy with colour might help in understanding the nature of the discussion. Normally we do not think that there is anything like colour in itself but only determinate colours such as blue, green, purple etc. But if we treat white and black also as colours, then it will be clear that nothing can be colourless in principle.

On the other hand, if white is regarded as lack of colour then to be coloured would only mean that something is not white, but it will not determine as to what colour the object has. Similarly, sound may be considered to consist actually only of determinate sounds, but without there being anything like "white" in it, though perhaps a confused buzzing sound may be considered as akin to something like "white colour" in the realm of sound. In fact, the case of sound is very peculiar as phonems are known only analytically and are normally postulated only in relation to language while in the context of music, the ultimate elements of sound are considered to be *swaras* (notes) or *śruti* (the ultimate distinguishable microtones that can be heard by the human ear and/or produced by the human voice). Strangely, while we know of sounds which are inaudible to the human ear but audible to other species of animals and we also correlate sounds with vibration frequencies of the air, we do not have any thing analogous in the realm of sound to infra-red and ultra-violet in the realm of colours. The colour spectrum and the sound spectrum seem to be very different in nature even though there seem to be seven notes just as we have seven colours.

It is also not quite clear as to what is the relation between what are usually called phonems and notes or even *śrutis* and though both of them relate to sounds which are produced by human beings, they seem to have little relation to each other. Perhaps, in pure music or *alāpa* where no words are present, the sounds produced do not employ all the instrumentalities used in the production of words or their combinations. But then the question will arise as to what is produced by instrumental music and what exactly is the difference between words as they are produced on an instrument and those that are produced by the instrumentation of the vocal mechanism in human beings. The point is that for producing linguistic sounds, one needs the movement of the tongue touching different parts of the mouth. However, this does not take place in instruments,, at least not ostensibly. There is also the problem that if words are produced

primarily by a mechanism which is different from that which produces only sound and if there is such a thing as pure *alāpa* in music where words do not play any role at all, then why does a person who is dumb in the sense that he cannot produce linguistic sounds cannot sing pure *alāpa* where words are not required. It would be equally interesting to find whether persons who are dumb can play instrumental music and if not, why not. We are, of course, assuming that a person who is dumb is not deaf but such a combination is supposed to be possible on pure physiological grounds. One may also explore the possibility as to why a dumb person cannot produce word music instrumentally. In any case, the Nyāya Sutra does not discuss all these issues but is interested in something else whose importance again does not seem to have been noticed by commentators. It is concerned with the phenomenon of *saṁdhi* and *samāsa* in language, particularly as it occurs in the Sanskrit language, where two separate words can be combined into one word but during the combination their last letters are combined in such a way as to change their *vibhakti.* Now the problem that is being discussed in the sūtras (2.2.40 to 2.2.57) leads to the issue of the nature of the transformation of two words when they undergo the process of being combined together in one word and the rules of combination that determine this conjoining of words that are separate into a new unity. The discussion recalls strangely the one that occurs in science dealing with the problem of chemical combination. In chemistry we are concerned with elements and their combinations to produce new compounds and what exactly happens during this combination. One of the problems relates to what is known as conservation of matter, later distinguished between conservation of mass and conservation of energy. The problem of combination of words through rules governing it, results in analogous problem as it is being argued that two words ending in the short "i" and the ones ending in the long "i" get combined in the same way without distinguishing between the shortness or the longness of the "i" concerned and hence violate

what may be called the law of conservation of linguistic combination. The issue relates only tangentially to the basic problem which is being discussed in the sūtras, that is, the eternity or transience of sound. The problem perhaps is how to understand the transformation of vowels when two words combine with each other, for if the sound were to be eternal then the transformation and change in vowels could not have taken place. But, then, what is supposed to be eternal in sound; the undifferentiated sound or sound as differentiated? In case it is the latter, then alone can the problem arise; otherwise there is no difficulty as the sound is supposed to be transient and can certainly change. Persons who think of sound as eternal seem to suggest a way out of the difficulty posed by the transformation of vowels in the process of combination. They seem to suggest that the same sound which appeared earlier in one form now occurs in another form when the two are brought together. But this obviously seems to be an unsatisfactory explanation. It appears that two different issues are being confused here; the one relating to the problem of transformation in general, the other relating to lack of differential transformation even when there is a relevant difference in the vowels that have to be combined. Somehow, on a *prima facie* view, the two issues which are very different in nature and lead in different directions seem to have been confused in the discussion.

The sūtra (2.2.40) suggests that because of the variable rules of combination and transformation in grammar, it would not be proper to regard sound as consisting ultimately of phonems for if it were so, one would not have this variability in the situation. The sūtra (2.2.41) suggests that perhaps the variability pointed out is not exactly correct as it is the change in the volume of the sound uttered which is the more fundamental factor and which remains constant. The sūtra (2.2.42) suggests an objection to this way of defending the position and states that there are other cases where the volume undergoes a variation and sometimes increases and sometimes decreases and sometimes remains constant. The

sūtra (2.2.43) tries to suggest that if the situation is so variable then nothing is proved either way. The sūtra (2.2.44) tries to say that the examples of variability were given to show negative instances which disprove or at least go counter to the thesis that the volume remains constant. The sūtra 2.2.44 further argues that it is not the case that the original material and its transformation share everything in common, for if it were so then they would have been identical.

As there is some identity and some difference in the transformation, we may say that some properties remain constant and some undergo a change. But what are the fundamental properties that do not vary in the transformation and what are those properties which change. Gautama's reply to this is that it is not the case that only some generic properties remain constant. The original material and the transformation share some specific and significant features in common and not such a general universal thing as sound which is being argued for by those who think that sound is something eternal and unchanging. The sūtra (2.2.45) suggests the counterargument from the opponent that it is being assumed that both the substance which is transformed and the substance into which it is transformed are substances and in case this is so it is only substances which can get transformed into other substances. And though Gautama does not ask this question it can be asked here whether sound can be regarded as a substance just as gold and clay, which are given as examples, are regarded as substances. However, the point made by the opponent is that just as substantiality remains a constant even though there is a variation in form and other properties, similarly the phonemes even after combination remain the same even if there is a change in other properties. The sūtra (2.2.46) argues that the objection would be valid only if in the conjunctive transformation some new properties would come into being. But if the same properties continue then where is the transformation? But in the conjunctive transformation what is there except phonemes which persist after the transformation. The sūtra

(2.2.47) raises the question that the linguistic combination is a very strange kind of combination as, though some sort of change occurs through the combination one can revert back to the old position by analytically decomposing what had been conjoined according to the rules. On the other hand, in nature if once a transformation has taken place one can hardly get back to the original situation which obtained before. For example, if milk gets transformed, into curd one cannot retransform it into milk again. In (2.2.48) the suggestion is made that this is not quite true as gold can be transformed into ornaments and the ornaments can be changed back into gold. Sūtra (2.2.49) points out that there is a radical difference between the two situations. Ornaments which are made of gold do not cease to be gold but phonems do not retain their identity when they are transformed through conjunction and hence they are more akin to the example of milk and yogurt than gold and its ornaments. The sūtra (2.2.50) tries to suggest that the thesis of transformation of one phoneme into another is in any case untenable whether sound is considered to be eternal or transient, for if it were eternal then the phonemes' nature would never be transformed and if it is transient, there would be nothing to be transformed. The sūtra (2.2.51) gives a very interesting rejoinder to the point made by Gautama about eternal and non-eternal things. The opponent argues that it is not necessary for all eternal things to have the same properties as even according to the Naiyāyika, some eternal things like the universal have the property of perceptibility while others do not. Similarly, some eternal things may have the property of changeability while others may not have this quality. This, of course, is a tangential move in the argument as the opponent is not directly arguing that eternal things are changeable but only suggesting that it may be so. He is also not exploring the relationship between the concept of eternity and that of changeability and finding whether the two were compatible or not.

The sūtra (2.2.52) carries on the argument further and says that the incompatibility of transience with transformation which

was argued in (2.2.50) is not correct either, for in case sound is supposed to be transient then it is obvious that when one hears, the sound as an object in nature has ceased to exist and yet it has given rise to the sound that is heard. Similarly, a transient thing can always give rise to another, even though it is transient and thus result in something which may be similar to itself or even different from it. Thus both the sūtras 51 and 52 argue that the dilemma presented in sūtra 50 is not correct as in both the presuppositions of the eternity and transience of sound, the notion of transformation is tenable. The sūtra (2.2.53) returns back to he argument of (2.2.50) and suggests that the alternatives suggested in the sūtras 51 and 52 are untenable for, on the one hand, the concept of eternity and transformation are incompatible in principle while the concept of transience, if understood in its extreme logical Buddhist sense, will make the notion of transformation inapplicable. The problem in fact is a larger one and has plagued philosophers almost from the beginning. In the Greek tradition we had the Parmenidean contention that if the reality has to be a plenum there can be no change. On the other hand, if you have a Heraclitean universe, it becomes meaningless to say that something changes because there is "no" thing to change. We have the same problem in Indian philosophy between Sāṁkhyans and Buddhists or between Advaitins and Buddhists. The compromise in the Greek tradition was- to postulate a plurality of unchanging, permanent substances and to understand change in terms of their combination and separation. It is not quite easy to say that there were corresponding attempts at solution in the Indian tradition. Still, it is interesting to note that the discussion here in the context of sound is very similar to the one that took place in Greece on the same subject. In the sūtra (2.2.54), the argument is carried forward and it is said that to assert the transformation of anything is at least to assert that that thing would remain recognizably constant after the transformation so that we may say that the same thing has been transformed. But in the case of the phonemes such a situation does not obtain and

hence, to say that the rules of combination transform the one into the other is meaningless. The sūtra (2.2.55 and 56) relate to almost a verbal quibbling which however hides an important philosophical point, that is, whether a lack of necessity itself can be regarded as necessary. To put the point differently, when we say that in the empirical world there is no necessity, is this lack of necessity itself necessary. This may remind some of the distinction in modal logic between 'necessarily necessary' and 'possibly necessary'. It is not quite clear whether modal logic developed alternative notions of 'necessarily possible' and 'possibly possible'. The sūtra (2.2.57) concludes the discussion by suggesting that the concept of substitution will perhaps apply more relevantly to the situation than the concept of transformation. However, it is not clear what is gained by the change in terminology to describe what is happening and how does it resolve the theoretical difficulties with respect to the concepts of change and permanence which have been discussed here only in the context of sound but which have a wider relevance in all fields of knowledge.

From the sūtra 2.2.58 onwards, the discussion shifts from the problem of permanence or transience of sound to the problem of meaning of words or the performative power that language possesses. Interestingly, the discussion of the power of language leads to a discussion of meaning, as linguistic power is mediated through the meaning that it conveys. If the earlier discussion was centered on the ultimate units of sound in the context of language conceived as phonemes, the present discussion starts with the notion of roots or *dhātu* out of which the words are built by adding prefixes and suffixes. Gautama's contention seems to be that only word has meaning and that roots by themselves have no meaning. However, it does not seem to have been discussed as to what is the distinction between a root and a phoneme, for both are supposed to be the ultimate constituents out of which language is built. The distinction obviously cannot lie in one being spoken and the other being written as all language is first spoken and then written. The other question to which Gautama addresses

himself is whether words refer to particulars or universals. In sūtra (2.2.60) he gives a number of examples which suggest that the meaning of the words can only refer to particulars and not universals. However in the earlier sūtra (2.2.59) Gautama had raised the issue as to what constitutes the word and in case word alone has meaning then what is it that constitutes the meaning. Gautama gives no answer to the first question. However, with respect to the second issue, he suggests that after all the meaning of the word can refer only to the individual entity to which it applies or to the universal properties embodied in that individual or it may refer to the peculiar form of the individual by virtue of which it is designated as that individual and which may also be correctly regarded as that individual. The idea of a visible form as the meaning of words and as perhaps constituting something midway between the individual and the universal is peculiar to Gautama. However, as far as I know, this issue has not been paid attention to, nor has it been seen that the form stands somewhere midway between the individual and the universal. The sūtra (2.2.60) tries to suggest by concrete examples that the meaning of the word is the individual to which it applies. However, the sūtra (2.2.61) refutes this view. The sūtra (2.2.61) suggests that while it is true that many of the examples given in 2.2.60 refer to individual, it argues that they do so only in the secondary sense for in the primary sense what is referred to is not this or that individual but rather the individual as belonging to a particular class and hence the meaning of the word is primarily the universal or the *jāti* and only secondarily, the specific individual to whom it is applied. The sūtra (2.2.62) gives a number of examples to substantiate that words can also be used in a secondary sense to denote specific individuals because of considerations of associations with place, functions, designs, measures etc. However, strangely, Gautama does not raise the question of proper names which are the heart of the matter. Nor does he raise the question whether the primary meaning of the word consists in designating objects, a function which is performed by nouns or to refer to activities

and processes, a function performed by verbs in a language. If it is remembered that this is the earliest controversy in the Indian tradition with respect to the problem of meaning, then its omission may be regarded as even more surprising. The sūtra (2.2.63) reverts back to the question that even if it is not the individual concerned which is primarily referred to by words, it is not the so-called universal either but rather the form or *ākṛti* which one sensuously apprehends as being embodied or exhibited by the individual concerned. However, the problem of the relation between the form and the universal is difficult to clarify and in any case the form also would have a universal of its own as it too is exhibited by diverse objects. There seems to be very little discussion of form as an independent claimant for the meaning of a word and Gautama seems to have too easily dismissed it. Nor does he seem to have raised the question as to how we refer to the individual if the meanings of words are always universal. The sūtra (2.2.64) further discusses the question of the form as the meaning of a word and suggests that even when the form is similar we do not treat it as the referrent of the word but only as an apparent or virtual example of it. The problem that is being discussed is regarding the picture or an image in clay or stone of an object which also we call by the same name as it has the same form but which we do not regard as the real cow or horse or man as we do treat it in a way we will not do with the actual example of that object. However, Gautama does not discuss the whole problem of the status of an art object to which we react emotionally as if it were the real object. Nor does he discuss the issue as to why we call it by the same name or the same word if the meaning of the word has no relation to it at all. The sūtra (2.2.65) poses the problem that the universal alone cannot also be regarded as the meaning of a word as unless it were related to the form and the specific individual concerned we would not know what it referred to. The sūtra (2.2.66) suggests that perhaps a more complex theory has to be built and suggests that perhaps neither the universal, nor the individual nor the form can

constitute by themselves the meaning of a word. The sūtra (2.2.67) raises an even more interesting question and asks that after all, we have been using the words "individual", "universal" and "form", but what are the meanings of these words and how do we know them. The sūtra (2.2.68) tries to give some idea as to what form could possibly mean and suggests that the form is a half way house to the universal as it suggests that the object which is perceived falls under some class or other which has to be further determined and understood. However, it does not discuss the question whether there can be any object without form, a subject which has been discussed in Greek philosophy with respect to the relation between form and matter. The sūtra (2.2.69) closes the discussion and suggests that it is the universal which allows us both to know that a number of objects belong to the same class and the way they are different from objects in other classes.

Part III - Section 1 - (71 Sūtras)

The third chapter of the Nyāya sūtras is concerned with the *prameyas* or the objects that are established by reasoning. In a sense almost everything can be a *prameya* provided one wants to justify the belief in it and offers a ground for holding the belief. Thus *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are relative terms and while it seems meaningful to ask what are the legitimate grounds for believing in something, it is surprising that the author of the Nyāya sūtras should have thought it worthwhile to mention the possible objects of such belief. If one looks at the list of *prameyas* or things that are to be established by *pramāṇa,* one is surprised at many of the things mentioned therein. The list is given in sūtra 1.1.9 and contains *ātman,* that is the self, *śarīra* or the body, the senses and their objects, *buddhi,* that is the reasoning faculty, *manas,* that is mind, *pravṛtti doṣa,* that is the fault of desiring or being attracted towards the world or engaging with it in some sense or other, *pretyā bhāva,* that is, rebirth, *phala,* that is the result

of action, *duhkha,* that is, suffering, *apavarga* or release from suffering. The list is obviously fantastic and makes sense only in a framework where it is dogmatically assumed that the task of the whole enterprise of reasoning is to establish that *pravṛtti* is a *doṣa* whose *phala* is both suffering and rebirth from which release is required. Perhaps it is also implied that the *pravṛtti* is natural to man and consists in the body along with the senses being attracted towards the objects, and that it is the task of the reasoning faculty that is, *buddhi,* to understand this whole chain and try to get rid of it. The sūtra 1.1.9 relates perhaps to sūtra 1.1.2 which also had talked of *duhkha* and *janma, pravṛtti and doṣa* and had suggested that it all arises because of *mithyā jñāna* or false knowledge. The task of *buddhi* therefore is supposed to be to get rid of *mithyā jñāna,* that is, false knowledge.

However, though this seems to be a most plausible construction of the issue concerned, still it does not seem very intelligible as to how each of the elements mentioned can be regarded either separately or jointly as a *prameya.* The chapter 3 is supposed to deal exhaustively with each of these *prameyas.* The sūtra 3.1.1 starts by saying that we grasp the same object both by sight and touch and sūtra 3.1.2 tries to dispute this by suggesting that the identity of the object cannot be established by this supposed commonality between sight and touch. The chapter 3.1 seems concerned with establishing the *ātman* as a *prameya* and showing it as distinct from the sense organs, the body and mind. The problem therefore seems to be as to why postulate the existence of the *ātman* as separate from the body, the senses and the mind. This seems a legitimate enterprise for if the *ātman* has to be established as a separate entity, then grounds have to be given to show why it is necessary to postulate it and what are the grounds for such postulation. But then, as both the body and the senses and the mind are also supposed to be *prameyas,* they have to be established first, for to say that we have to believe in the reality of a soul which is different from the senses, the body and the mind implies that at least the reality of these has already been

established. The sequence of the sūtras in chapter 3, section 1 seems therefore to be wrong.

The sūtra 3.1.1 starts by giving the first argument for the necessity of the postulation of an entity which is different from the senses either individually or collectively. The argument is that we apprehend the same object both by sight and by touch. The argument should in fact have been formulated in a more general way, that is, we apprehend the same object through different senses, and there was no need to confine this situation to sight and touch alone. In fact, normally the difference between perception and sensation is given in terms of the fact that the object of the former is that which is, or can be, grasped by different senses while the latter can only be grasped by one sense alone. Gautama however seems to be saying that the apprehension of identity of an object which is apprehended through different senses can not be derived from the senses which apprehended it as they happen to be different in nature. It is not clear whether the argument hinges on the difference in the senses or on the identity of the object which is apprehended. For, in case it is the latter, then even in the case of an object apprehended by one sense alone the problem would occur as to how does one know whether the blue which one apprehended sometime ago was the same which one is apprehending now. On the other hand, if the argument is based on the fact that as the senses are different, their object can only be apprehended as different by them and therefore if they apprehend the object as one and the same, there must be some other entity besides the senses which apprehends the identity and that this entity can only apprehend identities and not differences. This would mean that the *ātman* in principle cannot know the difference between one object and another and the apprehension of difference is primarily due to the intervening instruments of cognition such as the senses. However, besides the sense objects, there are also abstract entities which are apprehended by the *buddhi* and hence *buddhi* again would have to be postulated as being essentially different on the analogy of the senses. But, then

nobody knows how many different kinds of *buddhi* there are. And, if one accepts the possibility of different spiritual realizations, then the same problem would recur therein also. The argument, if sufficiently pursued would result in the advaitic position where the *ātman* can only apprehend identities and all difference will be due to something else such as māyā or *avidyā.* But such a conclusion would hardly be acceptable to the author of the Nyāya sūtras.

The sūtra 3.1.2 raises the objection that the argument given in 3.1.1 is not correct as the apprehension of any object is through the senses alone and not through any other faculty. The point that is being made is that in the absence of the senses the object cannot be known and that each of the senses is restricted to the type of objects it apprehends. The objection is irrelevant as the issue raised in 3.1.1 did not relate to the fact that the senses apprehend objects or even that the senses alone reveal a restricted range of objects but that the same object is apprehended by different senses and hence something else has to be postulated for apprehending their identity besides the senses. What is surprising is that Gautama should have given this objection in sūtra 3.1.2 without seeing the irrelevance of the objection to the argument given by him in 3.1.1. It is obvious that the author is presenting the opponent's position in a weak fashion rather than making it more directly pertinent to the point he had raised in 3.1.1.

The sūtra 3.1.3 points out that it is because of the restriction of each sense to the apprehension of only one set of qualities that one needs to postulate something like the *ātman* which will see the object as a unified whole consisting of all the qualities. It has however not been made clear as to why such a unificatory function cannot be performed by the mind or *buddhi* and has to be performed by the *ātman.* However, if the function of the *ātman* is to unify the manifold of sensations into an apprehensible object, then it cannot be given any further qualities or functions unless they are necessarily implied or involved by this unifying function for which it is postulated.

The sūtras 3.1.4 to 3.1.6 argue that the soul is not merely distinct from the senses but also from the body. The sūtra 3.1.4 gives a very strange argument saying that if the soul were identical with the body there would be no sin from burning a living body. The sūtra seems to have been badly formulated as what is perhaps meant is that in case the soul is identified with the body, it cannot have such attributes as virtue and vice or sin and merit. The point of the argument seems to be that if the body were to be completely identified with the soul then, in case one harms someone else, one cannot be said to incur any sin. The sūtra 3.1.4 thus introduces a new reason for postulating the soul as the subject of moral predicates and not just that which performs the unificatory function in knowing the object. At a deeper level perhaps, the first three sūtras may be seen in terms of the necessity of postulating a soul for making intelligible the knowing function in man while the sūtra 3.1.4 sees it necessary for understanding human action which is necessarily characterized as good or bad or right or wrong.

The sūtra 3.1.5 suggests that the postulation of a soul will not exactly help matters for, on such a postulation, there will be no such thing as killing or harming another, as soul is supposed to be eternal and cannot be killed or harmed. The other part of the argument would be that if the soul is supposed to be eternal and unchanging then no new predicates could accrue to it and thus it could not incur sin or merit by any action that is performed. In fact, the deeper question should be whether such a soul could be thought of in these terms.

The sūtra 3.1.6 tries to suggest a distinction between the soul and the body in terms of the body being the necessary *āśraya* of action and hence its being killed or harmed in any way is as effective an action against another person as harming the soul itself. The problem basically pertains to the relation between the soul and the body and relates to the question whether the body is necessary for purposes of knowledge, feeling and action and if it is so then harming it is almost as bad as harming the soul

itself because it destroys its capacity to know, feel and act. However, it is not clear as to what is the use of postulating such an entity which can neither know, feel or act without depending on some thing else and secondly, the whole issue of moral predication or change of any kind in an entity which by definition is eternal and unchanging is not even raised by the author of the Nyāya Sūtra. In fact it is not even asked as to how the soul is affected by the knowledge, action and feelings for which the body is supposed to be the necessary instrument. Moreover, there is a continuous confusion between the problem of the ascription of a moral quality to the person who harms another person and the issue whether somebody can be really harmed by the fact that his body alone is harmed. The problem would recur in the Gītā and elsewhere without in any way getting seriously considered or resolved in any meaningful manner.

The sūtra 3.1.7 seems to give a very strange argument for the necessity of the postulation of the soul. The argument is that one recognizes that what one is seeing with the 'right eye is the same as what one sees with the left eye. In a sense, the argument is reminiscent of what was already said in sūtra 3.1.1 where the same object was apprehended by different senses. Here the same object is supposed to be apprehended by the same sense organ which consists of two eyes instead of one. In fact, there was no necessity of bringing in this unusual argument. The same purpose would have been served better by considering the case of memory or even of recognition which in fact is the term used in the sūtra. It may be interesting to note that the term *pratyabhijñā* was later used for powerful philosophical construction in Kashmir Śaivism by Abhinavagupta.

The sūtra 3.1.8 suggests that such an example is not correct because there are in fact not two eyes as the visual organ is only one and appears to be two because it is divided by the bridge of the nose.

The sūtra 3.1.9 suggests that the objection is mistaken and that the eyes are two and not one, for if one of the eyes is destroyed we continue to see with the other eye even then.

The sūtra 3.1.10 suggests that the argument given in 3.1.9 is not correct as it is well known that even when a part is destroyed, the whole of the remaining part still functions in many cases. The sūtra 3.1.11 argues that this is not exactly the case and that where the so-called whole still continues to function if a part of it was destroyed, the whole itself should not be considered as one, but as consisting of many relatively independent sub-wholes. The sūtra 3.1.12 points out that not only does one recognise that the object one knows by one sense is the same as that which is known by another sense but also the apprehension by one sense brings to memory the qualities associated with the other senses with respect to the same object and sometimes in fact actually produces sensations in them. For example, one sometimes has the actual sensation of taste on seeing an object even when one has not tasted it if one had tasted it earlier and the experience was either extraordinarily pleasant or unpleasant and hence got associated with it in an indissoluble manner. The point is that such an amalgamation of experience from different senses, even when the object is present only to one sense, necessitates the postulation of some entity other than the senses to account for the experience. However, as was the case with other examples, the argument does not prove the existence of the soul but only the need for postulating some entity other than the senses to account for the experience.

The sūtra 3.1.13 suggests that the problem is one of memory and has nothing directly to do with the soul, but then the issue is how to account for memory for, memory is that which is not directly present to perception or to any of the senses in the present.

The sūtra 3.1.14 suggests that though it is true that the question is primarily one of memory, still it is not the case that memory cannot be understood without postulating a soul.

The sūtra 3.1.15 raises the issue as to why all these properties cannot be attributed to mind and have to be attributed to an entity other than the mind, for what the arguments uptil now have

established is only that some entity other than the senses and the body has to be postulated to account for such experiences.

The sūtra 3.1.16 says that ultimately the cognition can belong only to someone who cognizes and as mind also is the instrument of cognition, it cannot be regarded as the subject of cognition. It is not exactly clear what the sūtra says. At one point it seems that the sūtra is trying to suggest that the whole problem is a verbal one and whether you ascribe it to the mind or the soul the problem remains the same. The sūtra 3.1.17 perhaps tries to suggest that as there are objects of cognition which are different from those which are apprehended by the senses, we need to postulate an instrument for their cognition and mind must be regarded as such an instrument and hence cannot be identified with the soul on the basis of the very same arguments which have compelled us to postulate something apart from the senses to account for cognition. In case this interpretation of the sūtra is correct, it would give a non-sāṁkhyan reason for distinguishing between the self and the mind, for what is being argued is that there are objects of cognition which are not apprehended as one cognises the sense qualities and hence require the postulation of an instrument distinct from the senses for their cognition. Pleasure and pain and all the other states that are apprehended through introspection may thus be said to require the postulation of mind through which they are cognised, but which itself cannot be identified with soul or self.

The sūtra 3.1.18 raises the issue regarding the nature of the soul, particularly whether it is eternal or not. The sūtra 3.1.19 (3.1.18 in Ganganath Jha) argues that the very fact that when a child is born he shows joy, sorrow, fear etc. shows that he must be remembering and recognizing experiences that he is having as otherwise there can be no reason for the discriminatory emotional responses that he makes to objects in this life, for he has not yet learnt about them. The postulation of a soul before it is born is thus a necessity to account for the behaviour exhibited by the new-born baby and we also find that though the body

continues to change and grow, the sense of 'I' does not change substantially over one's whole lifetime.

The sūtra 3.1.20 raises the objection that there is no reason for postulating such a continuity as one finds even non-human objects which show a similar behaviour on their part without our postulating any soul in them. A lotus flower, for example, opens and closes with the rising and setting of the sun and yet we do not postulate any soul for it. The sūtra 3.1.21 argues that the analogy is not correct as the changes in a flower such as lotus are due to variations in the elements of which it is made. Similarly, there certainly has to be postulated a cause due to which there are variations in the emotions of a new-born baby with respect to the objects that it encounters. But this cause cannot be in the elements as it consists of feelings and emotions and involves consciousness and a type of response which can only make sense in terms of the previous experience of the object concerned and hence has to be ascribed to memory and recognition which require the postulation of a soul which exists prior to the moment of birth.

The sūtra 3.1.22 argues that the soul cannot be regarded as something whose existence is caused and hence which can come into being and also can be destroyed by other causes. The argument given in support of this is very strange and has played an important role in Indian philosophical thought for believing in the eternity of the soul. The argument given is that the child from the moment of birth shows a desire for the mother's breast in order to feed itself and such a desire cannot be understood without postulating that the child in some sense knows that it is good for its living and such a knowledge could not have been attained except in a previous birth which itself would require the postulation of infinite births in the past and hence one has to accept eternity of the soul which undergoes such experiences. The sūtra 3.1.23 suggests that the argument in sūtra 3.1.22 cannot be taken seriously as the movement observed is analogous to the one which is found in the case of the iron and the magnet. However,

though the iron is naturally attracted to the magnet no one postulates a previous experience in the iron which attracts it in such a way.

The sūtra 3.1.24 argues that after all one will have to postulate some differentiating cause in the iron because of which it moves towards the magnet as no other object seems to show that kind of motion. Similarly, one will have to postulate some sort of differentiating cause for the child's motion and this can only be accounted for in the way that has already been argued in the previous sūtras. However, no substantive reason is given why no other postulations can account for the child's behaviour nor is any reason given why the same postulation cannot be made in the case of the iron and the magnet. It seems that the author of the Nyāya Sūtra is struggling to find a radical distinction between the inanimate world of matter and the world of plants on the one hand and the animal world and the world of man on the other. The example of the human child does not apply to the human world alone but is a common feature of all mammals and hence would prove the existence of a soul in all of them. It is surprising that this objection has not been raised or answered by the author of the Nyāya sūtras. Physics and metaphysics seem to be deeply interlinked here and this, as far as I know, has not been noticed in the discussion. The sūtra 3.1.25 gives another strange argument for the so-called eternity of the soul. The sūtra says that we may infer the eternity of the soul from the fact that persons who are free from desire and longing are never found to be born again. It is a very strange argument as no one seems to know or rather there is no means of establishing whether they are born again or not; nor is it clear what is meant by being free from desire.

The sūtra 3.1.26 reverts back to the earlier issue of the child's behaviour on being born and suggests that the behaviour could be understood on the same pattern as the production of qualities along with the production or coming into being of substances. The point seems to be that everything that comes into being shows a lot of properties that are natural and inherent in it, and

hence there seems no reason to postulate a previous birth in the case of a child as his behaviour can be seen as a quality or property belonging to it just as other objects possess other qualities when they come into being. The sūtra 3.1.27 tries to give a reply to this objection and says that desire and aversion can only be attributed to *saṅkalpa*, that is, to consciousness or rather to will. The translation in Ganganath Jha of *saṅkalpa* as anticipation is strange though it makes more sense. Perhaps what the author of the sūtra wants to say is that desire and aversion are examples of purposive behaviour and a purposive behaviour cannot be understood on the pattern of natural qualities which are found in objects. The whole issue concerns the understanding of instinctive behaviour and has nothing to do with the specificity of the example that has been given. All life shows purposive behaviour from the moment it is born and the point is whether it can be understood in terms of normal causation which is considered adequate in understanding the behaviour of inanimate objects. Also, as pointed out earlier, the hypothesis of a previous birth and the memory thereof only shifts the problem as either we will have to postulate an unending series of previous births or some original first birth and then have the problem once again. It is surprising that such an obvious objection has not been raised in the discussion by the author of the Nyāya sūtras. The discussion of the soul seems to close with this sūtra and is obviously very unsatisfactory. However, two important facts may be noted with respect to the discussion : first, that the reasons given for postulating the self in sūtra 1.1.10 (इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुख–दुःखज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्गम्) are nowhere discussed or used in the arguments given here and second, none of these arguments, whether given in 1.1.10 or here, have anything to do with the establishment of God or Īśwara as a *prameya*. The latter point is even more important than the former, for, whenever it is said that Īśwara is not mentioned as one of the *prameyas* in the Nyāya sūtras it is said that he is included in the *ātman*.

The sūtras 3.1.27 to 3.1.29 deal with the body. The sūtra 3.1.28 states that the body is supposed to have the quality of the earth as it has the peculiar property associated with earth, that is, smell. The sūtra 3.1.29 suggests that even the *śruti* says this about the body.

The sūtras 3.1.30 to 3.1.50 are supposed to be concerned with the sense organs and their characteristics. The sūtra 3.1.30 is concerned with a peculiarity of the visual sense organ, the eye. This peculiarity is that the eye perceives the object even when the object has no direct contact with the eye or rather the pupil in the eye. It is equally true that if the pupil is damaged or destroyed, one cannot see at all and hence there arises the problem as to how to understand the sense of sight. Perhaps normally, in the case of other senses, the object is known or apprehended when it comes into contact with the senses. Touch and taste are the clearest examples of this, though in the case of sound and smell, one can also see the problem for we hear sounds which are far off just as we smell objects that are not ostensibly in contact with the sense organ. There is the other problem as to whether sense organs should be regarded as modifications of the five primal elements accepted in traditional physics, that is, earth, fire, water, *ākāśa* or sky and air, or to treat them as modifications of one fundamental primal matter as postulated by the Sāṁkhyans. However, it is not clear why the two characteristics of the visual organ should create any doubt about the problem. Perhaps, the doubt emanates from the fact that though the visual organ seems to be made of material substances, it still displays the property of seeing something which is not in contact with it, a property which *prima facie* cannot belong to a material substance. This perhaps is the problem of what in modem physics is called the problem of action at a distance, even though it has not been expressly formulated as such. The juxtaposition with the sāṁkhyan view however seems strange, for the Sāṁkhyan prakṛti is material and hence the problem cannot be posed with reference to it. Perhaps the author of the Nyāya sūtras has not understood the

Sāṁkhyan doctrine as, otherwise, he could not have contrasted the material elements of earth, fire, air etc. with the Sāṁkhyan prakṛti.

The sūtra 3.1.31 is supposed to raise the objection from the sāṁkhya point of view which says that the sense organs are composed not of elements but ultimately of *prakṛti* which is all pervading and the reason which is given for this is supposed to be the fact that because there is perception of large and small things. But it is not quite clear how the perception of large and small things entails the sāṁkhyan position nor is it clear why should the Sāṁkhya deny the five elements as they certainly accept the *panca mahābhūtas.* Nor is it clear why the term *aṇu* which is in the sūtra should be translated as small. Also, the general position is that one does not perceive *aṇus* if the term *aṇu* occurring in the sūtra is understood literally. It is also not clear whether one is discussing all the sense organs or just the eye alone. The sūtra 3.1.32 tries to suggest that the apprehension of large and small things is due to the peculiarity of the contact between the light rays emanating from the visual organ and the object perceived. It is interesting to note that the theory of vision in the Indian tradition postulates the notion of a light ray. However, the light ray is supposed to emanate from the eye and not from the object. It is not clear whether this is a generally accepted theory of the physics and optics of those times or is peculiar to the Nyāya school. Also, it is not clear why the emanation of a light ray from the eye to the object should provide a reason for the appearance of objects as large or small unless the time it takes to reach the object makes the difference. The sūtra 3.1.33 raises the objection that no one has seen these light rays and hence they cannot be given as an argument for accounting for the phenomenon concerned. The sūtra 3.1.34 suggests that if something is inferred, then the fact that it is not perceived cannot be held as an argument against it. It is strange to find Gautama taking recourse to this strategy for he has nowhere established by inference the existence of the light rays

in the sūtras and even if something is inferred, one can always demand its possible perception provided it is of such a nature that it can be perceived.

The sūtra 3.1.35 says that there is no uniform rule regarding the perceptibility or non-perceptibility of substances and their qualities and hence if something is not perceptible that cannot be a ground for denying its reality. The argument is interesting but it does not seem to make a distinction between actual non-perception and non-perceptibility in principle and, if so, then what should be the ground for our belief in the reality of the latter. There are important theoretical issues involved here and we should try to find whether the Bhāṣya, Vārttika or the *Parjśuddhi* discuss them. The sūtra 3.1.36 argues that the perceptibility of an object depends on many conditions and if those conditions do not obtain, then one does not perceive that object. It is perhaps being argued by implication that the non-perception of light rays may be due to this fact. However, the issue remains the same, that is whether the conditions are removable or irremovable in principle? In case they are the latter, what can be the possible ground for our believing in the reality of that object and in case they are removable, why do we not try to remove them and see if the object is there.

The sūtra 3.1.37 brings in consideration of a different kind and suggests that the sense organs are formed because of our past actions for achieving the purposes of the human being concerned. The sūtra uses the term *puruṣārtha tantra* which is interesting and important. However, though the sūtra seems to have been interpreted in a straightforward manner as meaning that the senses are only instrumental for achieving human purposes, a distinction is usually made between the *jñānendriyas* and *karmendriyas* and the problem of *puruṣārtha* raises the question of the relation between knowledge and action. All this however has little relation with the discussion at issue as to how the senses come into being. The sūtra 3.1.38 suggests that the non-perception of the light ray should not surprise us as there are other cases of non-perception

also. We do not, for example, see the light of the stars at midday, but there would have been no problem if we had sometimes seen the light rays which are the subject of discussion.

The sūtra 3.1.39 seems strange as it is supposed to be a reply to someone who makes a silly objection by saying that one could also argue that a stone has light but we cannot see it during the day because the light of the sun suppresses it, as it does the light of the stars. The answer is given in 3.1.39 by saying that the contention that there is light in the stone but it cannot be seen in the day because of the light of the sun cannot be accepted because the stones are not seen in the night. The sūtra 3.1.40 seems to argue that as the apprehension of objects seems to be due to the presence of external light, the non-apprehension of the light rays may be due to the absence of external light.

Perhaps the contention is that the external light both helps in the apprehension of objects and also the non-apprehension of some other objects like the stars at day and hence the fact that we do not perceive the light rays may be due to the presence or absence of some external light. However, firstly, unless something is perceived sometime under certain conditions we cannot know what are the obstructive conditions in the situation, and secondly, if light can come from the sun then it can certainly come from external objects and there is no necessity that in vision, it should always come from the eye alone. The sūtra 3.1.41 tries to argue that the light of the visual sense organ is such that it cannot be suppressed by any external light and the sūtra 3.1.42 elaborates this by saying that firstly, there are creatures who see in the dark such as cats, etc., and secondly, we see the light in their eyes even in the dark. These two things prove that there is natural light in the visual organ which is not suppressed by the light of the sun. The sūtra 3.1.43 tries to suggest that there are cases of perception or apprehension of objects without any direct contact with the object concerned. The examples given are of that of perception behind a glass or of rock crystal or even of vapour. The point perhaps is that in case the glass is transparent and there

is some object behind the glass we still perceive it even though the glass comes in between. Similar is the case with rock crystal and vapours. The point is that if perception can occur even when there is an intervening object which makes contact with the object impossible then we need not postulate the existence of light rays from the eyes which are supposed to go and meet the object in order to cause their visual apprehension. The sūtra 3.1.44 tries to raise an objection to this argument by pointing out that there are equally valid instances where one cannot see something if something obstructs the vision in between. For example, one cannot see what is behind the wall as the wall stands between our eyes and the object concerned. However, the objection seems irrelevant for even if there is one object which is visible when there is obstruction, the possibility of a counter-objection becomes legitimate and hence if Gautama had really to controvert the position he should have shown that the examples adduced by the opponent really require the postulation of a contact which is there but not apprehended because of certain circumstances.

The sūtra 3.1.45, in fact, does try to suggest that in the cases given by the opponent there is really no obstruction for the contact not to take place. But then it should have been clarified as to why the obstruction does not take place even when there is an intervening object in between. The sūtra 3.1.46 suggests other examples where even though there is an object in between there is no real obstruction. The example given are the sun's rays which can heat objects even though there is something in between and sometimes burn them even if there is a crystal in between.

The sūtra 3.1.47 raises the objection that basically the examples do not prove anything as there are examples of both kinds to be found in nature. The sūtra 3.1.48 suggests that just as in mirror and in water, even though there is an intervening medium, one can see, similarly, one can postulate substances which, though they are intervening, do not obstruct perception. The sūtra seems to be totally irrelevant and does not carry the discussion further as the issue had been raised earlier, nor does

it reply to the objection that no conclusion can be reached in the matter as both kinds of examples are available in common experience, (perhaps the sūtra 3.1.48 still continues the objection but even if it is so, it seems to be irrelevant as it only repeats what has already been said earlier.)

The sūtra 3.1.49 suggests that it is not right to question or deny things that are correctly perceived and inferred. The reply obviously is no reply at all as the objection relates not to what is perceived or inferred but to the explanation of what is perceived and inferred. The sūtras 3.1.50 to 3.1.59 are supposed to be concerned with the issue whether the sense organs are one or many. As far as the discussion of the visual sense organ was concerned, it is not only very unsatisfactory but it is not clear why the discussion occurs and why only the visual sense organ is being discussed. In fact the issue regarding the *prameyatva* of these senses is not even raised, for what is discussed is some particular issue about a specific sense organ and not the grounds on the basis of which the reality of the sense organs is to be established. Similarly, the issue whether there is only one sense organ or many presupposes the reality of sense organs which normally should have been established first. Also, logically, the discussion whether there is only one sense organ or many should have been raised first and then alone the discussion about any particular sense organ should have been raised

The sūtra 3.1.50 raises the issue of the singleness or multiplicity of sense organs on the ground that many objects which occupy many spaces are still regarded as one and hence, even though there appear to be many senses, they may possibly be regarded as only one sense occupying different spaces. The sūtra 3.1.51 argues that in reality there is only one sense, that is, the sense of touch, for it is the only sense which is never absent. The point perhaps is that the sense of touch pervades all the other senses and hence should be regarded as the one underlying sense from which all others are differentiated. The point is important as that is the one sense that may be considered as pervasive in all living

beings, at least in the animal world. The sūtra 3.1.52 tries to give a reason why the sense of touch cannot be regarded as the only sense. The reason given is that if it were so, that is, if there were only one sense organ, then all things would be perceived simultaneously. However, this is not so and hence there cannot be just one sense organ. The objection seems to be irrelevant as the problem of successive apprehension has nothing to do with there being one sense organ or many, for even with all the sense organs, whether one or many, we do not perceive everything at the same time. The problem of temporal differences or successive apprehension is different from the question whether there is only one sense or many. In fact, one can easily raise the question as to why there are only five senses and not more.

The sūtra 3.1.53 argues that the sense of touch cannot be the only sense organ, as this would lead to contradiction, for normally touch can only be had when there is a contact with the object concerned. But in the case of the perception of such things as colour or visual perception in general, there is no contact of the object with the body whatsoever. The sūtra 3.1.54 says that one will have to postulate in fact five senses in view of the fact that five different types of objects are perceptually apprehended. This obviously is an argument from commonsense and does not see the philosophical issues which have been raised, for even with the same sense organ we perceive multiplicity of qualities and we do not postulate a separate sense organ for the perception of each of the separate qualities. (The numbering of the sūtras here seems to be very erratic as the sūtra 3.1.54 is sūtra 3.1.58 in the text that I have.) The sūtra 3.1.55 objects that how can the senses be considered to be only five when the objects that are apprehended are many. The sūtra 3.1.56 argues that even though there may be a plurality which is apprehended, still there is a common universal quality shared by all of them as in the case, for example, of odour. This is of course a weak argument for on the basis of universality one can also argue that there is only one sense organ and it is also not clear what shall be common between all the

qualities that are perceived by a particular sense organ. The sense of sight perceives not only colour, but also shape and distance, but what could be common between these? The sūtra 3.1.57 makes the point that if things can be grouped under a commonality then it follows that all the sense organs should be regarded as one. The sūtra 3.1.58 objects that such a construction is not possible for there is a five fold character in the sense-object that are apprehended, that is, shape, location, process etc. It is not clear what exactly is the contention of the author.

The sūtra 3.1.58 seems to argue that each of the dimensions of a perceptible object being fivefold we have to infer that the sense organs themselves are five in number. The five dimensions of each perceptible object are given as *ădhisthāna, gati, ākṛtti, jāti*. Each of these four has five aspects. Interestingly, these have been mentioned as *buddhi lakṣaṇa* or aspects of perceptible objects as apprehended by *buddhi*. The theory seems interesting but is not very clear. Also, as *buddhi* has not yet been established as a *prameya,* it is not correct to bring it into the discussion. Furthermore, it seems that the contention of the author of the Nyāya sūtras is that the sense organs themselves are a matter of inference from the diversity in the objects we perceive and the different aspects that a perceptible object reveals. The issue has to be explored further as there may be an interesting theory about categories of perception involved in it on the analogy of Kant's famous categories of understanding. The sūtra 3.1.59 argues that the different sense organs are supposed to be of a nature analogous to the five main substances as the latter are revealed.by them. The point seems to be that there seems to be a correlation between the senses and their objects and that each sense is fitted to reveal the corresponding element in nature as it shares the same nature with it.

The sūtras from 3.1.60 to 3.1.71 discuss the nature of the objects of the sense organs. The discussion of the sense organs seems both incomplete and unsatisfactory and the sequence of the sūtras does not seem very logical as what should have been

discussed first and established is discussed later. Also, there seems to be too much emphasis on the visual sense organ and other sense organs seem to have been neglected. The sūtra 3.1.60 tries to establish a correlation between qualities of different sense objects and the fundamental material elements of the world. Thus it is said that odour, taste, colour and touch belong to earth or rather are correlated with the element denoted by the word "earth".

The sūtra 3.1.61 similarly correlates water, light and sky or space. The basic point of these two sūtras is to establish a correlation between the senses and their objects. The sūtra 3.1.62 raises the objection that such a correlation cannot be accepted as all the qualities which are found in the object concerned are not apprehended by the sense concerned. The sūtra 3.1.63 perhaps suggests that while all of the qualities are found in all the objects, they are not apprehended because one is dominant over others. The whole controversy does not seem very clear.

Is it being argued that each sense knows primarily the quality which is associated with one of the five fundamental elements of which nature is constituted? Or, is it being argued that all the qualities are found in all objects and that different senses select the quality which is prominent in them. In fact the whole discussion centres around the physics and optics of that time and one has to find from other sources as to what were the theories prevalent at that time in the context of which alone the Nyāya discussion makes sense. The sūtra 3.1.63 in fact tries to answer the question as to how is it that the elementary substances such as earth etc. are perceived to have not only the qualities specific to them but also other qualities which are supposed to belong to other substances which are different from them. The answer is because there is an admixture of the other elements in them. Does it mean that the notion of a pure element is a theoretical construct, for what we actually apprehend is always an admixture of elements. But if it is so then, are there only five basic qualities which are supposed to inhere and, are these basic qualities the

qualities specific to each of the senses? The point is whether the theory of five elements is a postulated construct from the fact that there are five senses and that each sense has only one specific property which it is supposed to apprehend. However, this would raise the issue that each of the properties which is apprehended by a sense is itself divided into a number of specific instances of its own. There is, for example, no such thing as a smell or odour which is supposed to be a property of an element called earth. There are only odours and hence one will have to postulate different kinds of earths corresponding to each of the smells that we apprehend. The same is the case with colours and sounds and almost every quality that is apprehended. It will be interesting to find whether these questions have been discussed in the literature concerned.

The sūtra 3.1.64 continues the same discussion. It is interesting to find that Vācaspati Miśra I commenting on this part of the discussion says that all this has to be learnt from the purāṇas as it cannot be directly known by us, for the matter is beyond the reach of our mind. This only shows that by the time of Vācaspati Miśra I, the whole controversy had become so distant and alien, that he could not even understand what the sūtras were discussing. This, inspite of the fact that he was commenting on Uddyotakara's Vārttika on the Nyāya sūtra. Those people who talk of the oral tradition should take note of this for inspite of the tradition Vācaspati Miśra failed to understand what really was the issue discussed in the sūtras. The sūtra 3.1.65 says that earth and water are actually perceived to have these properties. But, the argument from perception is meaningless as they are perceived to have other qualities also. In fact there seems to be a theory that the external substances like earth, water and light are endowed respectively with 4, 3 and 2 qualities while sound, or air perhaps is supposed to have only 1 quality. Similarly, the different senses have the capacity of apprehending more or less qualities according to their different capacities. The sūtra 3.1.66 bases itself on this and explains why the senses do not apprehend all the qualities

in the substances at the same time. The sūtra 3.1.67 seems to go back and argue that what is apprehended in a concrete object is the quality that is predominant. The sūtra 3.1.68 raises an interesting question that why do sense organs not apprehend their own qualities and answers that it is the nature of a sense organ to apprehend properties outside itself and not those of its own. The sūtra 3.1.69 further makes the point that a thing cannot be apprehended by itself, forgetting that if it were so, the self would never know itself. Perhaps that is the reason why Nyāya denies the property of consciousness to self, as otherwise it might become conscious of itself. There is a larger problem here and it has troubled almost all Indian schools of philosophy and there has been no satisfactory resolution of it. For, if what is to be known is necessarily other than that which knows, then the self qua subject, that is, qua 'knower' can never be known. However, the Nyāya sūtras do not seem to be aware of this aspect of the problem. The sūtra 3.1.70 raises the objection that, after all, this is not true in the case of sound as sound is the quality of ether or *ākāśa* and the auditory organ hears the sound. The whole discussion is embedded in the 'empirico-scientific' knowledge of those times which has to be clearly understood in order to make sense of the discussion in this *adhyāya* of the Nyāya sūtras.

It is not quite clear what is meant by the auditory organ being ether and as sound being a quality of ether, the auditory organ listens to itself. The sūtra 3.1.71 tries to give an answer to this objection by saying that both the quality and the substance, that is, sound and ether are peculiar and unlike other qualities and substances. This of course is no answer to the objection as it can be made with respect to any objection.

Part III - Section 2 - (72 Sūtras)

The section 3.2 starts with the examination of *buddhi* and the problem of knowledge in general. The first question which arises

in this connection is whether cognition is eternal or non-eternal. The reason given for raising this question is that as there is a similarity between knowledge on the one hand, and action and *ākāśa* on the other, doubt may naturally arise and the question be raised. The similarity postulated is very strange as, though there may be some similarity between action and knowing as both involve process, it is difficult to imagine what similarity could there be with *ākāśa* as is mentioned in the sūtra 3.2.1. Also, it is not clear how action could be regarded as eternal. The things which are non-eternal are supposed to be those which come into being and cease after they have come into being. This production and destruction of things is supposed to be the mark of their being non-eternal, but it is not quite clear why knowledge is supposed to lack these obvious characteristics, or how could action not have them. The sūtra 3.2.2 gives a strange reason for the possible eternality of knowledge and suggests that it is the element of recognition which is its integral part that makes it eternal. The condition seems to be that all knowledge necessarily involves an element in it of recognizing what one has known before and even the feeling that something is new could only arise in the context of a memory and a comparison with it, as otherwise there will be no justification for calling it either different or new. Plato had argued, almost at the very beginning of the western tradition, that all knowledge is recollection, but he had argued this primarily in the context of value apprehension which makes us feel or judge that things are not as they ought to have been, even though we may not be able to say how exactly things ought to be. It is strange to find Gautama raising this point in the context of knowledge, but in a way that seems, at least on a *prima facie* view, different from that of Plato. The sūtra 3.2.3 suggests that the argument from recognition cannot prove what is sought to be proved, for it would only prove, if it proves anything, the eternality of the conscious self to which knowledge belongs and not of the knowledge itself. The sūtra, it seems, tries to distinguish between the self and the act of knowing, but it does not appear to question

the inference of eternality or permanence from the fact of recognition.

The sūtra 3.2.4 presents an objection to the doctrine of eternality whether of *buddhi* or of self by pointing to the fact that all the objects are not cognized simultaneously, and if this is so, then obviously neither the intellect or reason nor the self could be regarded as eternal. The sūtra 3.2.5 raises the problem of the cessation of an act of knowing and the effect it will have on that which knows whether it be regarded as reason or self. The point seems to be that not only all the things are not known simultaneously but that one act of knowledge succeeds another and this can happen only if the former act of knowledge ceases to be. Yet, if this be accepted, then how will this cessation or destruction of the act of knowledge affect what is known or that which knows. Also, as the term *apratyabhjñā* is used in the sūtra which literally means non-recognition, it is not clear whether, besides the fact of cessation of the act of knowledge, the author wishes to refer to the fact that many a time we positively do not recognize an object that we had known before or that he wants to point to the fact that there are acts of knowledge in which no recognition is involved. In fact, if it be argued that all cognition is recognition then it would give rise to what can only be called an infinite regress as the first act of cognition will become impossible by definition.

The sūtra 3.2.6 reverts back to the problem of the non-simultaneity of apprehension of objects and suggests that the successive acts of knowledge occur in a sequence and hence, the simultaneous cognition of objects is not possible. The sūtra 3:2.7 tries to account for the non-recognition of objects mentioned in the sūtra 3.2.5 on account of the mind's being occupied with other things or because the attention is fixed somewhere else. The sūtra 3.2.8 suggests that for the acts of knowledge to be successive or for attention to be somewhere else, one would have to postulate the fact of change or movement in either mind or reason or consciousness which are not physical things and hence incapable

of motion. But strangely, according to Vātsyāyana the term *apratyabhijñā* here should be taken to mean not non-recognition but non-apprehension (p. 178.). The sūtra 3.2.9 tries to account for the plurality of cognitions and the unity of that which knows on the analogy of the crystal which though white appears to be possessed of different colours as it reflects them even though they do not belong to it nor affect its own pure crystalline nature. The sūtra 3.2.10 questions the example of the rock crystal given in the preceding sūtra to account for the problem as to how plurality can appear in a thing which is primarily unitary. The objection is given from the side of the Buddhists who argue that the ground of the example given in the earlier sūtra is mistaken as it too undergoes changes from moment to moment and there is nothing in it which may be said to last permanently there. The sūtra 3.2.11 counters this by saying that there is no reason for accepting the universal characterization of every thing as momentary and hence we have to go by our experience which distinguishes between things which are permanent and those which do not appear to be so. The hard core of the argument seems to be that a theoretical analysis which leads to the postulation of the doctrine of momentariness will make all things equally momentary and hence will not account for the apprehension of things as permanent or changing in our experience. The objection raises perhaps the deeper issue regarding the relation between the consequences reached by a purely theoretical analysis and actual experience and what is to be done in case there is a discrepancy between the two. The sūtra 3.2.12 carries the argument further by suggesting that in experience we find both the causes of the production of an object and also of its destruction and hence the postulation of a continuous production and destruction of entities leading to the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness cannot be accepted, for no such causes either of production or of destruction are apprehended.

The sūtra 3.2.13 tries to suggest that there are cases where we see changes or destruction in objects even though we do not directly see the cause of such change or destruction. For example,

when milk turns into curd, we do not exactly see what is the cause of this change or destruction. The sūtra 3.2.14 counters this by saying that in the example which is given, the change is actually apprehended which is not the case in the rock crystal. The sūtra 3.2.15, suggests that, basically, there is no actual destruction in the case of the milk, but only a transformation or a manifestation of a new quality. This perhaps is an additional argument against the Buddhists who are postulating destruction of the previous entity in all cases of change even when they are only cases of transformation or appearance of a new quality. The point perhaps is that one must distinguish change and destruction on the one hand and permanence and change as actual objects of apprehension on the other.

The sūtra 3.2.16 tries to meet this objection and suggests that when we observe a new substance coming into being, we obviously infer that the earlier substance has been destroyed. Strangely, the argument shifts to the change in substance and not in quality which was being suggested in the earlier sūtras. The term used in the sūtra is *dravya* and not *guṇa*. The sūtra 3.2.17 returns back to the argument that it is only in certain cases that the cause of destruction is apprehended while in others, the cause of destruction is not apprehended and hence there is no justification for universalizing the notion of destruction even when there is no evidence for it. The sūtra appears to be redundant as the point had already been made. Perhaps the sūtra 3.2.17 is supposed to close the discussion and hence repeats the argument.

The sūtra 3.2.18 starts a discussion regarding some other faculty of man to which knowledge can be ascribed as a property. The reason for postulating this faculty arises from the .fact that knowledge continues to exist even when the senses and the object of knowledge cease to exist. The sūtra 3.2.19 continues the discussion regarding whose quality knowledge should be considered to be and tries to suggest that it cannot be considered the quality of mind as its existence is inferred from the fact that the apprehension of things is not simultaneous and also because,

the case of simultaneous cognition on the part of the yogis, in case it occurs, cannot be attributed to mind. The point perhaps seems to be that, as mind has been postulated only to account for the fact that our cognition of objects is not simultaneous, cognition itself cannot belong to it. The bringing in of the simultaneous perception of the yogis should then perhaps imply that they lack the faculty of mind or that its functioning is inhibited for some reason. Furthermore, if yogic perception is admitted, then the eternality of knowledge will have to be accepted and the so-called non-eternality due to the arising and cessation of successive acts of apprehension be attributed only to the fact that mind is there.

The sūtra 3.2.20 does not seem clear as it uses the word *tulyam* with respect to knowledge being a quality of the self which does not make much sense. The sūtra 3.2.21 seems to raise the objection that in the event of their being no contact between the sense and the mind, knowledge does not arise and hence knowledge could not be the property of the same, for, in case it were so, even when the senses were not in contact with the mind, knowledge should have been there. The sūtra 3.2.23 suggests that the argument does not prove the conclusion, as the non-existence of knowledge in the self when the mind is not in contact with senses is only because all the conditions for the production of knowledge have not been fulfilled. The sūtra 3.2.24 raises the issue that as we do not know what exactly are the causes of the non-existence or cessation of knowledge we cannot determine its eternality or non-eternality. The sūtra 3.2.25 seems to argue that the transience of knowledge and its production and destruction seems to occur in the *buddhi* or intellect in the same way as the sound is produced and also destroyed. Perhaps, there is an interesting parallel in the discussion regarding the eternity or non-eternity of sound and the eternity or non-eternity of knowledge. There seem to be two independent discussions going on here: one regarding the eternity and non-eternity of knowledge and the other regarding knowledge being a property of the self

or that of the senses or the mind or the *buddhi.* Perhaps the two discussions are linked by j;he fact that if knowledge were to be a property of the self, then it should be eternal, for the self itself is supposed to be eternal. On the other hand, if knowledge is not eternal, then it should perhaps be a property either of the senses or of the mind or of the *buddhi.* On the other hand, if knowledge is regarded as non-eternal and yet considered as a property of the self, the problem will arise regarding the possession of a non-eternal quality on the part of something which itself is permanent or eternal. Will not a transient property make the self itself non-permanent or non-eternal in some sense or other? There is also another dimension to the discussion which is interrelated with these two issues and that seems to relate to the problem of the non-simultaneity of objects of cognition in the act of knowing. Here, perhaps, the problem relates to the non-simultaneous cognition of objects which themselves are simultaneously present and not of those objects, which themselves come successively into being. The problem is therefore twofold : one, there seems to be a temporality of successive acts of cognition with regard to objects which are simultaneously present as objects in the objective world. On the other hand, there is a temporal succession of objects in external time which has nothing to do with the temporality of acts of cognition and their successive apprehension is primarily due to their being themselves in the temporal series where one act of cognition succeeds another.

The sūtra 3.2.26 brings in the question of memory wherein there appears to be some sort of a simultaneous apprehension of both the present and the past which are fused together. Here again, perhaps one should distinguish between two types of memory, one in which something is recognized as the same as it was in the past. This should be distinguished from a pure act of memory where something in the past is remembered in the present and there is no question of anything in the present being recognized as the same. The sūtra 3.2.27 tries to bring in the notion of *antaḥ-śarīra-vṛtti,* i.e. an introspective act of attention which is supposed

to be a quality of the mind and is supposed, in some way, to account for the simultaneity of the past and the present cognitions in memory. The sūtras 3.2.28, 29, 30, 31 continue the discussion on memory and their detailed commentary has to be seen to exactly understand what the turn of the argument is. One of the problems which seems to be troubling the sūtrakāra arises from the fact that the soul is supposed to be all-pervading and if so, then obviously it should know everything all at once. The situation is saved by bringing in mind into the picture but the problem is why does the self need mind and the senses for knowledge if it is present everywhere. Another problem that seems to be discussed relates to the fact that if knowledge were to be a property of the self, then once it arises it can never be destroyed and hence how can we account for forgetfulness of knowledge. The answer to this interesting objection is that the destruction of knowledge occurs by another act of knowledge just as a sound is destroyed by another sound. The fact of memory however seems to controvert the hypothesis of the destruction of one knowledge by another as obviously, if the knowledge were to be completely destroyed, then it could not be remembered. Even here, the sūtrakāra seems to be concerned in sūtra 3.2.25 not with the issue raised regarding the destruction of knowledge by another knowledge but rather by the fact that there cannot be simultaneous acts of memory and if so, it must be due to the intervention of mind which does not allow simultaneity. The sūtra 3.2.26 raises the objection that the explanation given for the destruction of knowledge is not correct because the mind is an integral internal part of the body. Perhaps the term *antaḥa-śarīra* in the sūtra implies that. The problem seems to be created probably by the fact that the soul or the self is supposed to be all pervading while the limitation by the mind is confined only to the body.

The sūtra 3.2.27 questions the assumption and says that the limitation of the mind to the body has to be proved rather than assumed. The sūtra 3.2.28 counters this by saying that the

confinement of the mind to the body is proved by the fact that when one tries to remember something, one tries to concentrate one's mind through a mental effort after which alone the recollection usually occurs. It is not quite clear how this proves that mind is essentially related to the body unless the mental effort were to be confused with bodily effort. The sūtra 3.2.29 raises another objection deriving from the fact that the movement of the mind is very fast and hence it could not be tied to the body or, if it were so, its motion would also have to be constrained by the limits of bodily motion (It is not quite clear against which position the objection is being made, for obviously this would prove that mind is something independent of the body). The sūtra 3.2.30 tries to suggest that the argument from the speed of the motion of the mind does not seem to prove anything as there is no rule regarding the time to be taken by a recollection to fructify.

There seems to be at least a *prima facie* confusion between two or three different issues. The one concerns the relation between the mind and the self while the other concerns the relation between the mind and the body. These issues are only tangentially related to the issue whether knowledge is permanent or not and whether knowledge should be regarded as a property of the self or the *buddhi,* or the mind or even the senses. It would be interesting to disentangle the issues and see the arguments, or even develop them independently of the text. It may also be found as to how the tradition itself has developed them, in case it has done so. The sūtra 3.2.31 raises the issue regarding the direct contact between mind and the external world without the mediation of the body and suggests that such a thing cannot occur either by an effort of soul or by chance or by reason or intelligence. But, how will such a negative position explain the fact of telepathy which is normally accepted in the Indian tradition.

The sūtra 3.2.32 gives a strange example to suggest that perhaps the mind can be considered to be in contact with an

external object inspite of objections given in the preceding sūtra. The example given is that of a person whose mind is engaged elsewhere but is drawn away by the pain in his foot. Firstly, it is not clear what is sought to be proved and there are counter-instances in which when one is deeply involved in something one does not notice the pain unless it crosses a certain intensity. In fact there are many instances of people engaged in battle who have known only later that they have been seriously hurt or even lost a limb.

The sūtra 3.2.33 returns again to the issue of the non-simultaneity of recollections and suggests that they are not simultaneously present because the conditions such as attention, perception of the sign etc. are not all present together. The point seems to be that the non-simultaneity of cognition is not because of the mind but because of the fact that all the conditions for the occurrence of cognition are not fulfilled.

The sūtra 3.2.34 brings in a totally different consideration into the discussion and suggests that without the prior occurrence of desire or aversion, no activity can take place and thus, whether it is cognition or recollection, one will have to postulate a prior desire or aversion for the occurrence of the same, but desire and aversion can only belong to the self and not to the mind or the body.

The sūtra 3.2.35 tries to argue that, after all, desire and aversion are known only by bodily activities and hence they should rightly be regarded as belonging to the body and not to the soul, and if so, knowledge etc. will also have to be regarded as the property of the body. This, of course, is the extreme behaviourist position which is being taken by the thinker concerned and will not be acceptable to the Nyāya thinkers but it is interesting to see that the behaviourist argument is being raised as early as the Nyāya sūtras. Also in the context of the Nyāya sūtras, the argument achieves added importance as they have taken desire and aversion to be the grounds for inferring the existence of the soul.

However, the sutra 3.2.36 seems to suggest that the beginning and cesation of activity or absence of activity is also found in the material objects and hence cannot be the ground of ascription of consciousness or intelligence to them for, by definition, they are supposed not to possess them. The argument perhaps seems to be that the characteristics of desire and aversion which are being ascribed to the body share certain similarities with those that are found in purely material objects and yet are distinctly different from them. The materialist or the behaviourist is considering this similarity and ignoring the differences, but if one does so one will destroy the basic difference between living and non-living matter and hence desire and aversion cannot be ascribed to the body. (There is a problem with respect to the sūtra numbering, particularly 37, 38, 39. Numbering of the sūtras is different in N.S., Bhāṣya and Nyāya Sūcī Nibandha.)

The sūtra 3.2.40 gives an interesting ground for distinguishing between the behaviour of material and non-material objects. It suggests that the distinction lies between what may be called universality and non-universality. Perhaps, what the author wants to suggest is that in the world of nature there is a universality in behaviour just because there is no freedom or *saṁkalpa* to interfere or initiate changes leading in a different direction. The desire and aversion that are found in human or living beings is thus of a different kind than the beginning or cessation of activity in natural objects. In fact the translation of *niyama* and *aniyama* as unviersality and absence of universality seems to be incorrect. A better translation would be regularity or irregularity or lawfulness and absence of law as indicative of freedom. The sūtra 3.2.41 makes this clear as it brings in the notion of *pāratantrya,* that is subjection to something else and *akṛatābhyāgam,* that is, getting the fruits of some action even though one had not done it oneself. The latter has been translated as contingency but this is not exactly correct as the phrase is often used in the context of the theory of karma which propounds that if the theory is true then one cannot enjoy the fruit of some one else's action. The argument

here is that intelligence etc. cannot be ascribed to body or senses or mind or anything else except the soul as all of these depend for their activity on the latter, and also if all or any of these were to be ascribed the property, then there will be a problem as to whom to ascribe the real agency of the action and who will enjoy the fruits thereof. The argument is interesting but one could develop a theory of plurality of agencies and the concept of relative autonomy or relative independence. The relation of the soul to the *buddhi, manas, indnya,* etc. need not be postulated on a one-way autocratic model but as a series of hierarchies each with its own relative autonomy and independence and both influencing and being influenced by an agency higher than them, as it obtains in most social or political systems. It is strange to find that this latter model was not developed in the tradition, even though it was available to them not only in the socio-political field but also in the theory of *puruṣārthas* which is closely tied to the individual self. The sūtra 3.2.42 merely tries to strengthen the argument by suggesting that one may infer the same by a process of elimination, that is, as there is no other entity to which intelligence can be attributed and hence it can only be the property of that which remains, that is, the soul.

The sūtra 3.2.43 adds that recollection or memory also must belong to the soul, for the soul is supposed to be the cognizer. Perhaps the argument here should be that memory must be the property of the soul as it cannot belong to anything else because it is considered to be an entity which abides through all changes. The sūtra 3.2.44 is a long one and says that recollection arises from such causes as attention, association and a number of other causes which are detailed in the sūtra itself. However, it is not clear what is the point of giving these causes from which recollection may arise. The sūtras 3.2.42 to 3.2.45 are concerned with the issue whether apprehension is totally evanescent like sound or it is relatively evanescent, that is, durable for sometime like a jar. The view accepted is that it is totally evanescent and the reasons given are: (1) that we apprehend motion which itself

is fleeting. The translation of *buddhi* as apprehension is very strange.

Normally, *buddhi* should have been translated as intelligence but this has not been done and needs investigation. The argument seems to be that as we have apprehension of motion which involves constant change, the apprehension itself must involve continuous change also. However, this is a strange argument as we can also argue that motion involves something which is in motion and hence its apprehension, like that of memory, involves the apprehension of something permanent also. In fact the sūtra 3.2.43 raises the objection that if the *buddhi* were transient or evanescent then the perception of things would also become indistinct as we will not be able to observe anything which is even relatively permanent. Furthermore, this will make memory impossible as nothing that is apprehended will have any permanent characteristic in it. The sūtra 3,2.43 further explicates that just as during lightening flash, the light of the flash being evanescent, the perception of the colour is indistinct, so also must be the apprehension of all things. But as this is not the case, the argument about the evanescence of *buddhi* is mistaken. The sūtra 3.2.44 seems to turn the tables on the objection and says that, in fact, the argument given proves just the opposite. The sūtra 3.2.45 says that the said perception, in fact, is like the distinct perception of the continuous series of lamp flames. The argument is that even if cognition is evanescent the perception of things will always be distinct. The example given is that of the perception of the continuous series of lamp flames. The argument however is not clear for, as a matter of fact, we have both distinct and indistinct apprehensions. Also it is not quite clear whether the *buddhi* as a faculty itself consists of continuously changing events or processes, or it is the objects that it apprehends which have this nature. After all, the objects themselves are of many types, some fleeting and some not so fleeting. The sūtra, 3.2.46 to 3.2.55 try to discuss the issue as to whose quality *buddhi* is supposed to be and the doubt is expressed by pointing out that,

as a matter of fact, in any object we find qualities which both belong to it and those which do not exactly belong to it and belong to something else. One of the examples given in the Bhāṣya is that of water in which we perceive both fluidity and warmth. But while fluidity is the natural property of water, warmth is a natural property not of water but of fire. The sūtra 3.2.47 argues that *buddhi* or sentience is not a quality of the body because colour and other qualities continue to exist as long as the body exists. The argument seems to be that sentience is not a natural quality of the body as, for example, colour and other properties are, for the body is found to be without it as when the body is dead just as water is found without the warmth. The sūtra 3.2.48 suggests that the example is not quite correct as even in the case of an object which has a certain colour, the colour may change due to some reason such as that of baking. The sūtra 3.2.49 suggests that the argument is not quite correct as the qualities produced by heat are due to the presence of counteractive forces and so the analogy cannot be sustained. Moreover, in material objects, though the colour may disappear, another colour appears in its place while such a thing never happens in the case of the body when it loses its quality of sentience. Perhaps the author is groping for a distinction between essential and non-essential qualities or between a range of qualities which may belong to the object and those which cannot belong to it. The sūtra 3.2.50 gives another reason why sentience cannot be said to be a property of the body. The reason given is that it pervades the whole of the body and not just any one part of it.

The sūtra 3.2.51 objects to this by saying that this is not quite true as no sentience is found in hair and nails. One can cut or remove them without one feeling any awareness at all. The sūtra 3.2.52 answers the objection by suggesting that the body should be taken to extend only upto the point where there is skin and as both in the case of hair and nails the skin is not there they are not integral parts of the body. In fact both the nails and the hair are said to continue to grow even after the death of the body.

The sūtra 3.2.53 suggests that sentience is a quality which is completely different in character from the qualities of the body as while it is felt by itself, it is not perceived by the senses but rather by the mind. The sutra 3.2.54 objects to this by saying that many of the other qualities which are ascribed to the body such as colour etc. are also different from each other, yet even so they are ascribed to the body and hence there is no reason why sentience, even though it is different from other properties, should not be ascribed to the body. The sūtra 3.2.55 tries to answer this objection by saying that there is a basic difference between sentience and all the other properties in that the latter are all apprehensible by the senses while sentience is not perceived or apprehended by any particular sense organ which is concerned with it.

The sūtras 3.2.56-59 deal with the mind and the sūtra 3.2.56 argues that the mind must be only one as no two cognitions are apprehended simultaneously. The sūtra 3.2.57 raises an objection to this by asserting that this is not true for, as a matter of fact, we do perceive a number of actions simultaneously. The sūtra 3.2.58 answers this objection by saying that the said perception is like the perception of the fire circle which appears as one because it is moved in a circle very rapidly. This obviously is no answer, for in the case of the fire circle we know that it is moving rapidly and that if its motion is slowed it will not appear as unitary, while in the case of simultaneous cognition of objects, their rapid motion is only a matter of inference necessitated by the acceptance of a hypothesis which has no *prima facie* necessity about it. In fact, though the objection was concerned with actions which involve some sort of a motion, it need not have been so as we perceive simultaneously not merely many actions but also many objects. But, even if we confine ourselves to actions and accept the analogy of the fire circle, the question would arise as to what is ultimately the unitary action which is perceived and if that ultimate unit of action has to be completely static, that is, not consisting of any motion, then how can it be regarded as

an action. The sūtra 3.2.59 says that the mind must be atomic in character for the same reason, but it is not clear what is exactly meant by calling the mind atomic, particularly as mind does not occupy space and hence the notion of divisibility cannot normally be applied to it. (It is strange that both the Bhāṣya and the Vārttika do not seem to have devoted much attention to this problem.)

The sūtras 3.2.60-72 deal with the issue of how the body is formed. The sūtra 3.2.60 says that the formation of the body is due to the persistence of the effect of previous actions. This obviously is a reference to the theory of karma but, firstly, it does not seem to have any relevance at all and secondly, the theory of karma has neither been established nor yet been discussed. Nor, for that matter, the existence of past lives been established or discussed in any way. In fact, the issue is not even raised as to how the mind can become aware of past actions when they are past on the one hand and plural in number on the other. The sūtra 3.2.61 raises the objection that why should any difference be made between the production or formation of the body and the production or formation of other material objects which are also formed out of other material substances. The sūtra 3.2.62 says that this cannot be accepted because what is urged is still to be proved. The statement is strange because, if taken seriously, it would mean that nothing is produced except through the influence *of karma* and that matter cannot move on its own and that composite things cannot be formed out of it because of this reason. However, what is action and what causes it does not seem to have been discussed in the text upto this point. The sūtra 3.2.63 objects to this. It says that obviously the causes of the formation of the body are the parents. The point seems to be that living beings are formed out of other living beings while in the case of purely material objects this does not seem to be so. The sūtra 3.2.64 seems to give another argument that it is food that is needed for the formation of the body and its maintenance and growth which is not the case with material objects. The sūtra

3.2.65 seems to give a strange reason for believing in the influence of previous karma in the formation of the body in that it urges that if the formation of the body were independent of previous actions then every union between the parents should result in the formation of the body and as it does not obviously do so the material objects themselves could not be the cause of the formation. However, the argument is not only strange but does not seem to prove what is sought to be proved, for it is not quite clear how the existence of the past karma will be regarded as present when it is past and hence is already there and cannot be absent. Another point which is even more disturbing is as to how any choice is made between the past actions which are many and not only different but conflicting in nature. And, thirdly, how does the unity between these actions and the unity in the actions of some one else become relevant in the formation of the body. There is, of course, another problem which perhaps the author of the Nyāya sūtras did not know that the formation of the body is a result of the union between the sperm and the ovum which does not always occur in the case of every sexual union as he seems to suppose. The sūtra 3.2.66 argues that just as karma is the cause of the formation of the body, similarly it is also the cause of the connection of the body with a particular soul. The sūtra 3.2.67 suggests that this also explains how each soul is associated with a different body and how it is not possible for any one soul to be associated with any body whatsoever. The sūtra 3.2.68 says that if it be asserted that the formation of the body is due to *adṛṣṭa* as the mīmāṅsakas argue then, even after final release there will be likelihood of a body being produced and hence the hypothesis of *adṛṣṭa* cannot be accepted. However, it is not quite clear as to what is the difference between the postulation of karma and the postulation of *adṛṣṭa*. The sūtra 3.2.69 tries to argue that it could not be the relationship due to the action of the mind as, if it were the mind which was to be the cause of the formation of the body, there could be no severance of this connection. The point does not seem quite clear

as, surely, if a connection can happen at any point of time, then it implies that it was not necessary and the object could have been without it. However, the commentator seems to suggest that if mind were the cause of the bringing of the body into being then it could not be the cause of its death, as that which is the cause of life cannot be the cause of death and, in any case, the body was not in existence before so that mind could get into relation with it. According to the Bhāṣya this seems to be an objection to the Jain view. The sūtra 3.2.70 explicates this point further by saying that, in such a situation death would not be possible and the body will have to be regarded as everlasting. The sūtra 3.2.71 objects to this by saying that it would be like the eternality of the dark colour of the atom which even though eternal can change under certain conditions, as when it is obstructed or set aside by contact with fire as in baking. The point of the objection perhaps is that death may be seen as a temporary obstruction to life which may reappear when those obstructive conditions are removed. The sūtra 3.2.72 says that this is a fantastic hypothesis and cannot be accepted as not only would it involve the admission of what is not supported either by reasoning or fact but also because it would involve the absurdity of a person suffering the consequences of what he has not done thus violating the basic premise of the law of karma which is the foundation stone of the moral intelligibility of the universe. The point perhaps is that if death can occur due to external circumstances, then obviously a person has to suffer it not because of something that he had done but purely because of accidental, external conditions over which he had no control.

Part IV - Section 1 - (68 Sūtras)

The sūtra 4.1.1 deals with what may be called *pravṛtti or* the tendency of the mind to go outwards or the concern with external goals and objects which has been defined as activity, but the term *pravṛtti* is far wider than what is connoted by the term action in

the english language. The sūtra merely says that all that is to be said about the topic has already been discussed. The sūtra 4.1.2 talks about the defects or *doṣa* and makes the same statement about it. However, there are two problems which do not seem to have been attended to; one, there is a large part of thought on the subject which tends to argue that *pravṛtti* as such is a *doṣa* and hence its complete cessation alone is desirable. On the other hand, one may try to distinguish within *pravṛtti* itself that which is right and that which is wrong. If so, then *pravṛtti* as such cannot be considered to be a *doṣa* and hence one will have to distinguish between the right and wrong forms *of pravṛtti.* The sūtra 4.1.3 suggests that there are three groups of defects which are all included under *rāga, dveśa* and *moha* which are distinct from one another. But it does not seem clear as to how *moha* is different from *rāga* as one cannot have *moha* without *rāga* though there certainly can be *rāga* without *moha.* It will be interesting to think whether *dveśa* also generates *moha* of a certain sort. In any case, the statement in the sūtra that the three are distinct from each other does not seem to be correct. The sūtra 4.1.4 raises the objection that *rāga, dveśa* and *moha* cannot be regarded as different from each other as they have one and the same thing as their anti-thesis is one and it is usually known as *tattva jñāna.*

The sūtra 4.1.5 tries to answer the objection and says that it is not quite correct to hold that all things or properties which have the same antithesis are not different from each other. The example given not in the sūtra but in the Bhāṣya and in the Vārttka is from colour in the case of a pot etc. However, there is a more interesting logical point which has perhaps been missed. The point seems to be that in case the opposite of two properties is the same how can those properties be different. What is being assumed is that there must be a radical difference between the negation of one and the negation of the other in case they are different. Ultimately, the issue relates to the question what is to be regarded as the antithesis or the opposite or the contrary of any property. This would lead to a differentiated analysis of the

whole notion of negation which unfortunately does not seem to have been undertaken either by Vātsyayana or Uddyotakara who have commented on the sūtra. The sūtra 4.1.6 suggests that *moha* is the worst of them all, for if one did not have *moha,* the others that is *rāga* or *dveśa,* would not arise. But if it is so, then there should be only one *doṣa,* that is, *moha* for if there were no *moha, rāga* or *dveśa* will not arise. It is not clear what exactly is meant by *moha.* The translation of *moha* as infatuation does not seem correct. The sūtra 4.1.7 raises the issue that if what is said in sūtra 4.1.6 is correct, then *moha* cannot itself be considered to be a *doṣa* for, according to the sūtra 4.1.6, it itself is the cause of the coming into being of *rāga* or *dveśa* and the effect is always different from the cause. The sūtra 4.1.8 tries to counter this objection by saying that *moha* still can be regarded as a *doṣa,* for it possesses the characteristic of what has already been defined as a *doṣa,* that is, it leads to an activity. The point of the objection however, was not just this but also a deeper one that if *moha* is the cause of *rāga* and *dveśa* then there is no point in listing them separately and secondly, the cause of a *doṣa* cannot itself be a *doṣa* as this might lead to infinite regress. The whole discussion seems to be confused and, in any case, the logical and the epistemological issues involved have hardly been discussed.

The sūtra 4.1.9 suggests another answer to the objection that there is no bar for things belonging to the same class to bear among themselves the relation of cause and effect. The point seems to be that if things belong to the same class and if they also have a relation of cause and effect between them then, obviously, the cause can have the same property as the effect. The issue is important and needs further discussion. The sūtra 4.1.10 argues that rebirth is possible only if the soul is held to be eternal. The problem to which the sūtra seems to address itself appears to relate to the question that if the soul is eternal, then how can it ever be born and if so the whole question of *doṣa* along with the problem of *rāga, dveśa* and *moha* will become irrelevant. The sūtra tries to suggest that if the soul were not

eternal, there would be no point in talking about rebirth either. The sūtra 4.1.11 says that things that are *vyakta* arise only out of those which also are *vyakta* as is attested by perception. The previous sūtra seemed to suggest that birth and rebirth and death would be intelligible by the fact that the soul which is eternal got connected and disconnected with the body and all the other adjuncts which are necessary for the body. But as far as the production of the body is concerned it itself is like all other objects which seem to be produced from other perceptible objects. The use of the term *vyakta* is not quite clear. Does it refer to its *avyakta* stage when it was only potential and not manifest? On the other hand, does it mean that *avyakta* objects are bound to be eternal as they cannot come into being and that the soul is an *avyakta* object of this kind? The sūtra 4.1.12 objects to the contention made in 4.1.11 and points out that the idea that something which is *vyakta* is produced out of something which is also *vyakta* is not true, as a jar is not produced from another jar. The objection is silly as what was said was that the jar has to be produced from something else which is equally perceptible or *vyakta*. The sūtra 4.1.13 gives the obvious answer that the jar is actually produced from something which is equally perceptible, apprehensible or *vyakta*.

The sūtras 4.1.14-18 are supposed to discuss the contention that things may arise out of *abhāva* or *śūnya*. The sūtra 4.1.14 argues that entities are produced out of *abhāva* or nothingness or non-being as no object comes into existence without having destroyed its cause. The sūtra 4.1.15 points out a self-contradiction in this statement by suggesting that something that comes later cannot be the cause of destruction of something which occurred before it for that which destroys must already be in existence. The sūtra 4.1.16 tries to argue from the use of language against the charge of self-contradiction and suggests that the case denoting causal function is used both with respect to what has occurred in the past and what will occur in the future and hence if linguistic usage is taken seriously, the charge of self-contradiction

is untenable. The sūtra 4.1.17 tries to bye-pass this objection by saying that in any case there is no production out of things destroyed, for if a thing does not exist how can it produce anything else. The sūtra 4.1.18 says that what is said in 4.1.17 is not meant to deny that there is a sequence in the causal situation which may give rise to the impression that something has arisen out of the destruction of something else, but the destruction itself cannot be considered as the cause of what has come into being. The whole discussion is about the nature of causality and demands a more serious discussion than either the sūrakāra or his commentators seem to have done.

The sūtra 4.1.19 discusses an alternative view which says that God alone is the cause of everything because we find that what man tries to achieve is seldom achieved through his actions. The sūtra 4.1.20 says that God could not be considered as the cause of what happens as in the absence of any human agency, no fruit appears at all. The sūtra 4.1.21 suggests that if we take both the sūtra 19 and 20 seriously, that is, human actions do not always attain the ends for which they are undertaken, and that no end is achieved without human action, then it follows that the success or failure of human actions depends on the support or help given by God or its absence in the situation concerned. The sūtra 4.1.22 suggests that things can be produced without there being any *nimitta* for them. The example given is very strange as it refers to the sharpness of thorn. The commentator suggests that what is being denied in the term *nimitta* is the efficient cause and not causality of any other kind. However, there may be total denial of causality and not just of efficient causality alone as what is being asserted in the sūtra may be that it is chance and not any determinate causality which results in the production of things. The sūtra 4.1.23 suggests that as chance itself is being said to be the cause, causality is not being denied but only that something else is the cause than the one we usually think it to be. Also, perhaps, what is suggested is that, firstly, it is not clear what is meant by chance and secondly what is meant by chance being

the cause of something. The sūtra 4.1.24 says that 4.1.23 is confusing between *nimitta* and *animitta* wherein the latter is the negation of the former and as the two are completely different, the statement in 4.1.23 does not make any sense at all.

The sūtra 4.1.25 expresses the Buddhist position that all things are *anitya* as they both come into being and are destroyed. But this can not be true as it entails that at least *anityatā* is *nitya*. The sūtra 4.1.27 again tries to suggest that the objection raised in 4.1.26 is not alright as there are instances such as fire which after destroying all things itself vanishes or gets destroyed and hence remains no more. Similarly, the non-permanence of all things need not be regarded as permanent. It seems that in many of these sūtras, the author is struggling to make a distinction which nowadays has been clearly formulated in terms of language and meta-language or the first level use of language and the second level use of language. Many of the issues could perhaps be easily clarified in this manner. The sūtra 4.1.28 tries to suggest that the determination whether a certain thing is eternal or not can only be on the basis of what is actually perceived. The translation seems to be incorrect as what the sūtra means is that the denial of the permanence of something can only be made on the basis of the system that one builds in connection with what one apprehends or what one finds in experience. In case the terms *upalabdhi* and *vyavasthā* which are used in the sūtra are taken seriously it will lead to a more sophisticated contention than that which seems to be captured in the translation of the Bhāṣya and the Vārttika propounded on it. The sūtra 4.1.29 carries the argument in a different direction by pointing to the counter-position that everything is *nitya* or permanent because all the five basic substances or elements are eternal. This obviously is opposed to the Buddhist position which was presented by the sūtra 4.1.25 that everything is passing or impermanent. The sūtra 4.1.30 denies this as it has denied the earlier counterposition by suggesting that we actually perceive the causes of production and destruction or coming into being or passing away.

The sūtra 4.1.31 says that, after all, all things possess the characteristics of elementary substances and hence they must be present in them and as the elementary substances are supposed to be eternal, these things also will have the element of eternality in them. The sūtra 4.1.32 merely repeats the argument already given in 4.1.30. The sūtra 4.1.33 also gives another reason for denying the permanence of all things because of the presence of primary elements in them by saying that no *vyavasthā* would be possible if what is being urged was accepted. The sūtra is not quite clear. The translation says that the view cannot be accepted for there would be no possibility of differentiation. But surely there is differentiation between the primary elements and their properties. Also, the term *vyavasthā* cannot mean just differentiation though it certainly presupposes the existence of differentiation in what is to be organised. The sūtra 4.1.34 discusses another alternative which argues that all must be regarded as differentiated or diverse because everything can be characterized in terms of different properties. The translation again seems to be mistaken for it translates *bhāvas* as symbols or names which of course it cannot be. The sūtra 4.1.35 suggests against this that an entity is built out of different properties and hence the differentiation of properties does not entail that there is no single or unitary entity at all. The sūtra 4.1.36 further argues that symbols of things are restricted in their application to particular objects. The contention seems to be that after all even separate characterizations refer to unitary objects and hence one will not be able to assert that there is no unity at all and that every characterization is different from every other characterization. The problem seems to be that basically every quality is distinct from every other quality and if only qualities were to be real then everything will be different from everything else. And yet things have a unity even though one thing is different from another. How then to understand both the differences in qualities on the one hand and identity or unity of things and objects on the other. However, there is a deeper

problem regarding the identity of qualities themselves, for different instances of a quality are also supposed to be the same.

The sutra 4.1.37 discusses the contention that all things must be non-entities because everything is a negation of everything else. This perhaps refers to the Buddhist contention that every entity is a denial of all other entities and thus primarily consists of its differentiation from them. The sūtra 4.1.38 controverts this by saying that even if a thing is different from all other things, it has a positive nature of its own. The sūtra 4.1.39 raises an objection to this by suggesting that there is no such thing as the character of individuality of things as basically it is only a relational property relative to other things. There is, for example, no such property as long or short as these are relative statements and hence the same thing may be long or short in relation to different things. The sūtra 4.1.40 objects to this by suggesting that there is a self-contradiction involved in the statement. It is not quite clear what exactly the term *vyāhata* means but the discussion as given in the Bhāṣya and the Varttka seems to suggest that if one property is relative to the other then the other cannot be regarded to be relative to it, which obviously is a weak objection. The more important point is that all properties cannot be regarded as relational in character. A property like red, for example, is different from properties like long or short and yet the question is whether we will recognize any property as that property if there were no other properties belonging to the same class. If there were, for example, only one colour in the world would we recognize it as that colour, even if we accept that it would not be relational in the same sense in which properties like long or short are relational. The sūtra 4.1.41 seems to give a generalized argument as to why no absolute limitation can be imposed on the number of things in the universe. The reason given is that in case some argument is given for establishing or proving the number of things in the universe then the number will be larger than the number suggested since it will include the proof for establishing the number. On the other hand, if the

argument or the proof that is given is supposed to be included in the number of things that are already there in the universe then obviously no proof can be given for them, for a proof will have to be provided for the proof itself. Perhaps, the argument given for denying the limited number of existents in the universe could be given differently than the way it has been presented in the sūtra as there is always a possibility of everything being an object of consciousness and as this itself is or can be an object of consciousness at the second level, there will always be the possibility of the limited number suggested being out-numbered or increased by this fact. In any case the point seems interesting and should be the subject of greater discussion. In modern terminology, the distinction is made between levels or orders where one level or order is not supposed to be confused with the other. Also, there is a distinction between things which can be enumerated and those which cannot be enumerated. Beyond this we have a distinction between trans-finite numbers and the levels of infinity which obviously could not have been discussed by the author of the Nyāya sūtra. But, in any case, the problem which is being discussed remains the same. The sūtra 4.1.42 raises the objection that the argument given in sūtra 4.1.41 is not correct as the means of proving is only a part of what is to be proved and cannot be regarded as something apart from it.

The sūtra 4.1.43 raises an objection to this contention by saying that the contention cannot be made as it is not accepted that things can have any parts. For if it is accepted that things have parts then they cannot be finite in number as then the parts can have other parts also.

The sūtra 4.1.44 starts the discussion of a different issue. The discussion from sūtras 44-51 is concerned with the issue whether the fruits of action can reasonably be considered to cause rebirth as normally the effect of an action should be realized immediately and even if it is accepted that sometimes the fruit of an action does not occur immediately, then one will have to find as to why it does not do so. The sūtra 4.1.44 therefore starts with the doubt

whether the fruit occurs immediately or after the lapse of some time. The sūtra 4.1.45 says that the fruit does not occur immediately because it is of the sort which can be experienced only at a later time. The action in the context of which the discussion according to the commentary, is taking place, that is, if it is being done for the sake of attaining heaven, then it can only occur after a lapse of time. But the issue is a far wider one as the theory of karma is not confined to the performance of the Vedic Yajña alone, and even among the Vedic Yajñas, there are some that are done for relatively more immediate fruits in this life such as those concerning rain or getting a progeny. The sūtra 4.1.46 raises the objection that the fruition cannot appear after a lapse of time as the cause thereof will have ceased to exist long ago. The sūtra 4.1.47 suggests that it is not the case that no effect occurs immediately. It is only that the actual fruit that is wanted occurs later and that the effect that is produced immediately functions as the intermediate cause for the production of the final effect, as it is, for example, in the case of fruit of the trees. The sūtra 4.1.48 objects to this by saying that this is a very strange position as it is not clear what is the status of the so-called final fruit before it has fructified. Also, because it occurs long after the action was done it can neither be regarded as existent as it has not appeared, nor as totally non-existent because it is supposed to be there potentially, nor can it be regarded as both existent and non-existent because the two are totally dissimilar., The real effect can only be the intermediate one or the one immediately following the supposed cause of the ultimate fruit. The objection applies, in fact, to the whole notion of potentiality and is a challenge to understand it differently. The sūtra 4.1.49 takes recourse to ordinary experience and says that, after all, we observe both the production or the coming into being of objects and their destruction, disappearance or passing away and hence we have to assume that something was non-existent before and that it ceases to be existent when it passes away. However, this does not help in understanding the concept of potentiality which was the subject of discussion.

The sūtra 4.1.50 tries to suggest that the very idea of potentiality implies that the fruit thereof was non-existent and wonders where is the problem then. The sūtra 4.1.51 suggests that there is a radical difference between the example of the tree and its fruit and action and its results as both inhere in totally different kinds of entities. One is material, while the other is spiritual. The objection according to the Bhāṣya and the Vārttika relates not to the difference in the nature of the *āśraya* but rather in the fact that the person who does the act and the person who reaps the fruit are two different persons with two different bodies. This, of course, is to confuse the identity of the person with the identity of the body and raises the question wherein the identity of a person lies.

The sūtra 4.1.52 tries to answer the objection by pointing out that the soul or the self is the *āśraya* of both happiness and merit or dharma etc. and hence the objection does not hold. The sūtra 4.1.53 suggests that the answer given in 4.1.52 is not satisfactory as among the fruits mentioned, there are such things as son, wife, cattle, gold, food etc. which obviously cannot subsist in the soul. The sūtra 4.1.54 suggests that these things are called fruits only indirectly as their real effect is in the soul in terms of its happiness. This is plain hedonism and has all the defects that people have pointed out with respect to hedonism. Also, it is devoid of morality as it regards others instrumentally and not intrinsically. In fact, this is also to subvert the notion of *dharma* which in its true meaning is not concerned with one's happiness or unhappiness, but in the fulfilment of one's obligations and the doing of what is right.

The sūtras 4.1.55 to 58 are supposed to be concerned with the problem of suffering. The sūtra 4.1.55 suggests that birth itself is the basic suffering as it is associated with all the hinderances and encumbrances associated with it. The sūtra 4.1.56 says that it will not be proper to think of birth as identical with pain and suffering as it also provides the possibility of whatever happiness or pleasure one gets from life. The Bhāṣya and the Vārttika do

not seem to be correct in presenting it. The sūtra 4.1,57 tries to meet the objection by suggesting that it is not that the fact of pleasure is being denied but as the pleasure itself gives rise to the desire and longing for more and more of it, it itself becomes the cause of frustration and suffering. The sūtra 4.1.58 adds to this the point that there are many kinds of suffering, some of which are even wrongly regarded as pleasant.

The sūtras 4.1.59 to 68 are supposed to be concerned with the nature of final release. The sūtra 4.1.59 tries to say that there can be no such thing as release or *apavarga* because one has always to pay debts to the ṛṣis, gods and the forefathers. Also because man is afflicted with various *kleśas* such as ignorance, egoism, hatred, affection and yearning for life and also because he can never be free from activity of mind and body while he is alive. The sūtra 4.1.60 suggests that the terms *ṛṇa*, *kleśa* and *pravṛtti* etc. should not be understood in their primary sense but rather in their secondary sense for, in the context in which they have been used, the primary sense is inapplicable. One may see a detailed description of this in the Bhāṣya and the Vārttika. The sūtra 4.1.61 suggests that the Brāhmaṇa texts themselves speak of the transference of the sacrificial fire after a certain stage implying thereby that one ceases to be a householder and thus is not bound by all those debts and duties which belong only to a householder. The sūtra 4.1.62 gives the same argument in a different context, the main idea being that the so-called debts and duties are not universal but bound to the state of the householder only. However, the sūtrakāra does not see that he has argued in sūtra 4.1.60 that these terms should be taken in a secondary rather than a primary sense. If so, it will be obvious that the examples given are relevant only as far as the primary sense of these terms is concerned. Even a renouncer has obligations to his Guru and to the order or the *saṁpradāya* of which he is a member and also to the common laity on whom he depends for his physical needs and who, in turn, expect some spiritual nourishment from him. The discussion uptil now was only of the so-called debts which

a person incurs because of the fact of being born in this world. The sūtra 4.1.63 discusses the problem of the *kleśas* which were supposed to stand in the way of the possibility of final release or *mokṣa* and argues that the so-called *kleśas* are absent in the case of deep sleep when a person is having no dreams at all, for at that time he cannot be supposed to have any suffering etc. It is surprising to find the Nyāya sūtra referring to the state of deep sleep as, normally, it is only the Advaita Vedāntins who are supposed to refer to it. Perhaps the example was a common one in those times. The sūtra 4.1.64 further suggests that when *kleśas* have been destroyed, activity does not lead to rebirth. This again is a strange statement for it does not say that the activity ceases when the *kleśas* have ceased but only that the actions done in such a situation do not lead to rebirth. (The meaning of the term *pratisanghāta* is not clear.) This position recalls very much the view of action upheld by the Gītā, the only difference being that there the term *kleśas* is defined in a more precise manner. It may also be noted that the term *kleśas is* being used perhaps in the same sense as it is used in the Yoga sūtra. There, thus, seems to be a commonly prevalent terminology regarding the analysis of the human situation which seems to have little to do with doctrinal differences regarding the theory of proof or *pramāṇa* with which the Nyāya sūtra is supposed to be specifically concerned. The sūtra 4.1.65 raises an objection to the possibility of *kleśas* being destroyed by arguing that they belong to the very nature of man and hence cannot be got rid of. The sūtra 4.1.66 argues that it is not difficult to conceive of the cessation of some thing which is natural or intrinsic to man just as one notices continuously this negation or cessation of the beginningless non-existence of a thing when it comes into being. The analogy seems to be with respect to the cessation of some thing that is beginningless but the idea of a *svabhāva* has nothing to do with beginninglessness but concerns rather the essential property of a thing. The argument is that a thing cannot lose its specific property without losing its identity. The sūtra 4.1.67 suggests

another alternative. The cessation of the *kleśas,* even when they are natural, may be like the cessation of the dark colour of the atom. The analogy here is that the natural colour of the atom is supposed to be dark but it is destroyed by fire. Similarly natural properties may also undergo transformation under special circumstances. However, then we will have to distinguish between natural properties and essential properties as any property that can cease or undergo a transformation without affecting the being of the object concerned cannot normally be regarded as its essential property. The sūtra 4.1.68 gives another reason for suggesting that the opponent's contention is mistaken by pointing out that the source of desire along with all the other *kleśas* is *saṅkalpa* which strangely has been wrongly translated as misapprehension. *Saṅkalpa* is certainly not *avidyā* or ignorance.

Part IV - Section 2 - (50 Sūtras)

The sūtra 4.2.1 suggests that *tattva jñāna* or the knowledge of reality leads to the cessation of *ahaṁkāra* or the sense of egoity or 'I-ness' which is the cause of all the defects. This is very strange indeed for basically it is a *sāṁkhyan* position and goes completely counter to the Nyāya position which holds that *tattva jñāna* consists not in a process of deidentification of *puruṣa* with *prakṛti* or of consciousness with object or even of consciousness with self-consciousness as in Advaita Vedānta but rather with the knowledge of the topics mentioned in the sūtra 1.1.1. The sūtra 4.2.2 again is very strange as it seems to say that the objects are the causes of the defects arising in the self because they lead to a *saṅkalpa* which may in this context be translated as the desire that has arisen from them and the willed action of consciousness to pursue the end of desire. Basically this again is an Upaniṣadic position that it is the outgoing movement of consciousness which then gets entangled in all the objects which is the cause of the basic mistake and suffering in the human situation. The sūtra 4.1.3 is again very strange as it seems to suggest that the cause

of the defects arising in the mind is because it is concerned with the objects as a whole. The Bhāṣya and the Vārttika seem to give an even stranger interpretation of the sūtra as they suggest that the mind tends to be concerned only with the aggreable aspects of the object and ignore the disagreeable aspects while the author wants you to concern yourself only with the disaggreable aspects. This all is very silly as the disaggreable aspects also tend to involve one with the object and for the author of the Nyāya sūtra it cannot be a defect that the object is known as a whole as any one aspect will not allow true knowledge of it. Strangely also the sūtrakāra has used the word *abhimāna* which perhaps is the same as *ahaṁkāra* but the latter arises in the context of the self and not the object. All in all, the sūtras are very strange and the commentaries stranger.

The sūtra 4.2.4 raises the issue that the doubt arises as there is both *vidyā* and *avidyā or* knowledge and ignorance about the object. Here again the translation is very strange; in fact incorrect, as *vidyā* and *avidyā* have been translated as apprehension and non-apprehension. Also, it is not clear how *avidyā* can give rise to *saṁśaya* if it means ignorance. It can do so only if it is taken to mean false knowledge. On the other hand, doubt can only arise if there is a conflict about what is the case which obviously cannot be described as *vidyā* and *avidyā*. According to the commentator, the discussion is about the composites and its components. However, it is not clear how this judgement has been reached by the commentator.

The sūtra 4.2.5 says that there can be no doubt about the matter as it has been established before in sūtra 2.1.33 while discussing the problem of the whole and part. The sūtra 4.2.6 tries to suggest that obviously there can be no doubt because the *vṛtti* cannot obtain or, as the Bhāṣyakāra says, the existence of any such thing as the composite is impossible. The sūtra 4.2.7 tries to suggest that there cannot be any such thing as a composite. The discussion basically is about the relation of the whole and the parts and most probably comes from the side of the Buddhists

who maintain that this relation is incomprehensible for neither the whole can exist in the parts nor can the parts be conceived to exist apart from the whole. The point obviously seems to be that the whole is a construction on the basis of entities which can only be conceived of ultimately as completely separate from one another and do not consist of any parts at all. Thus, what is real are only unrelated 'reals' or ultimate partless atoms which cannot be called parts in any sense of the term as they have no relation to anything else. The sūtras 4.2.8 to 10 raise these objections in different ways. The sūtra 4.2.7 raises the difficulty regarding the various components of a whole which cannot be considered as either residing in the whole or in a part of it. The sūtra 4.2.8 merely explicates this by saying that obviously the whole cannot exist in the parts while 4.2.9 says that it also cannot exist apart from them and sūtra 4.2.10 says that the whole cannot be the same as its parts as it must be different from them.

The sūtra 4.2.11 answers all these objections by pointing that the questions themselves are wrongly posed as the whole is unitary and single in character and hence any term which connotes diversity or difference cannot be applied to it. The problems have arisen therefore because of a linguistic confusion and because the whole has not been regarded as a real whole. However, the author of the sūtra has not seen that after all, even a whole is distinguished from other wholes and hence predicates differentiating it from others can be applied to it. This however is a separate problem than the ones being raised in earlier sūtras.

The sūtra 4.2.12 tries to answer an objection where neither the objection nor the answer seems clear. The sūtra 4.2.13 continues the discussion and seems to argue that one can perceive wholes without assuming the reality of anything such as wholes as we see a mass of hair without seeing each individual hair. The point seems to be that we may perceive a whole without perceiving or even being consciously aware of the individual elements which constitute it. The example given is of hair where we are aware of the totality or the whole without being aware

of the individual hair which make up the whole and render it possible. The sūtra 4.2.14 makes a generalized observation suggesting that the distinctness or the indistinctness of the perception is due to the sensitivity or dullness of the sense organs even though they never go beyond the range in which they usually operate. The point perhaps seems to be that whether we perceive an indistinct whole or each of the distinct elements comprising the whole depends on the sharpness or dullness of our sense organs and not so much on the objects themselves. The sūtra 4.2.15 suggests that the difficulties which have been pointed in connection with the whole and its parts are unending and will continue till the world ceases. (The translation again seems to be strange because the term that has been used is *pralaya* which means total dissolution of everything). The Bhāṣya however suggests that after all everything we perceive is made up of wholes consisting of parts which are again wholes which have parts till we reach the ultimate atoms which do not have parts and which alone will remain when everything disintegrates but which, in any case, will never be the object of perception. The sūtra 4.2.16 reminds the sūtrakāra that even in *pralaya* at least the atoms will remain. The sūtra 4.2.17 seems to suggest that the atom perhaps may not be regarded as indivisible but only as that which is beyond the dyad. It is not quite clear as to what exactly is meant by this statement.

The sūtra 4.2.18 raises the objection against the very notion of atom or rather against its indivisibility, for it is urged that it must be pervaded by *ākāśa* or empty space, and thus be divisible, having parts. The sūtra 4.2.19 suggests that if this is not accepted then *ākāśa* would cease to be all pervading. The sūtra 4.2.20 tries to answer this objection by suggesting that the terms "inside" and "outside" are only applicable to that which is a product as the term "inside" stands for that constituent part of the object which is hidden by other constituents and the term "outside" is applied to that constituent part which hides the other. However, as the atom is not a product and does not have constituent parts the term

"outside" and "inside" cannot be applied to it. This is an interesting objection and a relatively modern one as it argues that unless certain criteria of applicability are fulfilled, terms cannot be unconditionally applied in all contexts. The Vārttika on sūtra 4.2.20 makes some interesting points regarding the meaning of permeation and what exactly could possibly be meant when it is said that the atom is premeated by *ākāśa*. The sūtra 4.2.21 suggests that *ākāśa* is regarded as all pervading due to the pervasion of sound and conjunction. It is not quite clear what exactly does the sūtra mean. It suggests perhaps that the all pervasiveness of *ākāśa* is itself a matter of inference because sound seems to spread in it indefinitely and that any two objects can only be conjoined to each other if there is *ākāśa* between them. It is strange that while the argument from conjunction is given, the argument from motion is not there. The sūtra 4.2.22 gives the properties *of ākāśa*. These are mentioned as lack of any displacement by things moving in it or striking against it as it happens in water. Also, lack of obstruction for things moving in it or striking against it and its being intangible. There is an interesting argument in the Bhāṣya which says that the non-eternality of things is due to destruction or dismemberment of their constituent parts and not by permeation of *ākāśa*. It is not quite clear what the term *ākāśa* means; is it the same as space or different from it. The sūtra 4.2.23 gives another reason why the atom must be made up of component parts. The reason given is that atoms are material and only material objects have a shape or form and that which has shape or form must have parts.

The sūtra 4.2.24 gives another reason why atoms must have parts and this reason is that they are capable of saṁyoga or conjunction, and if it were not so then no concrete objects would be made out of them. The sūtra 4.2.25 answers all these objections by saying that all of them lead to infinite regress and no argument can be accepted as valid if it leads to infinite regress.

The sūtras from 4.2.27 are supposed to be concerned with the refutation of the denial of the reality of the external world.

The sūtra 4.2.26 suggests that due to the analysis of reason or after it objects seem to lose their reality as it cannot be found after a thing has been analysed, just as a cloth does not seem to be there after its threads have been taken apart one by one. The sūtra 4.2.27 counters this by saying that this cannot be correct as it involves a self-contradiction because the very fact that reason analyses things means that there are things to be analysed and that the analysis is supposed to reveal the nature of what has been analysed. The sūtra 4.2.28 explains the non-apprehension of the whole when the parts have been taken from it explaining that this non-apprehension is due to the fact that it subsists in them and hence cannot be apprehended apart from them. However, what has not been pointed out is that the whole is a particular arrangement of the parts and when the parts are arranged differently the resultant whole will be different.

The sūtra 4.2.29 makes a generalized statement that in reality things are recognised by means of their appropriate means of cognition. The point perhaps is that in order to apprehend the whole one has to go about in a different manner than by taking its constituent parts apart one by one. In fact, even in modern analytical approach to the subject it is so, for a correct understanding of the object one should know not only the elements it consists of, but also how they all are put together. The sūtra 4.2.30 suggests that the argument is untenable at a deeper level for if it is successful then it proves at least that one thing is real, that is, the argument itself. And in case it is held not to prove even this, then it does not prove anything at all. This is the usual way of arguing which Gautama seems to adopt at many places and it will be interesting to find the number of places and the contexts in which he has used this argument.

The sūtra 4.2.31 argues that if every *prameya* has to have an appropriate *pramāṇa* for it then it will be something like a dreamt object which may be seen as the object of the dreaming process itself. Th sūtra attempts to reply to the position maintained in the earlier sūtra that appropriateness cannot distinguish between

truth and falsity of what is known. The point seems to be that the appropriateness of the means of knowing to the object known may be as mistaken as if some one were to argue that the reality of a dreamt object is a function of or depends upon the fact that it is dreamt. The objection is misplaced for, firstly, dreaming does not depend on us and secondly, even if one were to dream one cannot ensure the objects that will appear in the dream. The sūtra 4.2.32 suggests another alternative that it may be likened to the notion of reality found in magical phenomena, imaginary cities in the air or the mirage. These examples again are not on the same level. The mirage is an objective phenomenon which, though illusory, occurs to everyone and hence there is objectivity about it. The magical phenomena are produced by somebody who deludes others but not oneself while a *gandharva nagar* does not seem to be either here or there unless it refers to the phenomenon one sometimes observes in clouds and their formations.

The sūtra 4.2.33 gives the usual answer of the author of the Nyāya sūtras that these are pure conjectures and cannot be taken seriously as there is no attempt to give a reason why what is being stated should be accepted as true. The sūtra 4.2.34 suggests that the example of dream objects is not correct as, like memory, and objects of desire, they have been previously experienced independently. So the reality of these objects is a derived reality (strangely, the word *saṅkalpa* which occurs in the sūtra has been translated as desire by Ganganath Jha).

The sūtra 4.2.35 suggests that just as on waking the so-called reality of dreamt objects gets destroyed similarly on the arising of true knowledge the false knowledge vanishes. But even when one wakes up, the dreamt objects may continue to have their effects on one even though one may realize that they are not as 'real' as one thought they were. Not only this, one may like to go back to the dream 'world' if the dream was pleasant and the waking reality unpleasant. The analogy is not very correct unless one assumes that the knowledge of reality is deeply fulfilling in a sense which normal life can never do. However, one other

alternative has not been seriously considered which is different from both dream and waking reality and this is where one actively builds a world of imagination in which one finds more fulfilment than the world of dreams. This is the world of art or human creation. And this reality is not independent of human beings even though it may be independent of a person or a group of persons. The sūtra 4.2.36 argues that in the same manner, the existence of the apprehension also cannot be denied because we actually perceive both its cause and its occurrence. In any case, the contention seems to be that no universal or generalized denial is possible even from the examples of erroneous cognition as the fact of their being cognition, whether veridical or erroneous, obtains.

The sūtra 4.2.37 makes a further point by saying that an erroneous cognition has a two-fold character as, in order to be considered as erroneous, it has to be distinguished from true cognition which is of the object as it 'really' is and hence, it presupposes both true knowledge and the object of which it is a knowledge.

The sūtras 4.2.38 to 49 deal with the development of true knowledge and again strangely, the sūtra 4.2.38 says that true knowledge proceeds from the practice of a particular form of meditation which has never been mentioned earlier in any of the sūtras. The sūtra 4.2.39 suggests that this kind of mediation is not possible as certain kinds of objects are bound to appear in consciousness because they are extremely powerful and their appearance cannot be stopped. The sūtra 4.2.40 further suggests that such a process of meditation is not possible because of the natural disturbances arising from such things as hunger and thirst. The sūtra 4.2.41 suggests that a meditative state can arise from what has been previously accomplished which is capable of overcoming the obstacles mentioned in sūtras 4.2.39 and 40.

The sūtra 4.2.42 suggests that one should practice yoga in forests, caves and river banks. The sūtra 4.2.43 suggests that even after the so-called final release in case one gets it, the usual

problems of life are bound to arise and trouble one. The sūtra 4.2.44 tries to deny this by suggesting that this need not be so, for such a state of consciousness can arise only when the body itself has been prepared properly by the previous *karmas.* The sūtra 4.2.45 suggests that in the state of final release or *apavarga* even this is supposed to cease as there are no more fruits of any action, good or bad, to be realised. However, none of these sūtras, directly or indirectly, try to come to terms with the question whether the state of *apavarga* can only be realised after the cessation of all bodily and mental processes, or that such a state of *jīvana mukti* is possible or that the final state can be realised even when one is alive, in the usual sense of the term and if so, one will have all the biological needs such as those of food, air, water etc. and also be in relation with other human beings resulting in all the problems that these naturally entail for anybody. The sūtra 4.2.46 suggests that for retaining such a state of the body and the mind, one should pursue the usual methods of yoga which are described in the yoga sūtras such as *yama, niyama* etc. It is interesting to find that specific reference to Yoga occurs in the. Nyāya Sūtra which are supposed to be earlier than the Yoga Sūtra.

The sūtra 4.2.47 surprisingly adds that for achieving such knowledge one should also have friendly discussion with persons learned in the sciences. The sūtra 4.2.48 clarifies that such discussion should be carried on with the students, teachers, companions in study and other well known learned persons who wish to enquire and who are not jealous of one. The sūtra 4.2.49 suggests that one need not put forward counter theories or counter arguments even if one has them in such discussions as one is primarily interested in achieving clarification for oneself. However, it is not clear how one can get clarification without discussion and how discussion can be carried on without making relevant objections.

The sūtra 4.2.50 suggests that in some cases one may engage in *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* for the purpose of defending one's own

position just as the hedge of thorny branches is put up for the protection of newly sprouting seeds. This recommendation is strange indeed for the best strategy in this situation would be not to associate with such persons in the first place and not to discuss with them if one cannot get away from them, for if one engages in discussion one may again start doubting oneself or be convinced by what the opponent is saying. The sūtra 4.2.51 is even stranger as it recommends that one should even pick up a quarrel with such a person and then deal with them by disputation and wrangling. This is the last recommendation of 4.2, and one wonders what will happen to the meditative consciousness if one follows the recommendation of the author. Perhaps, the *Naiyāyikas* followed the recommendations and lost the art of meditation.

Part V - Section 1 - (43 Sūtras)

The very first sūtra of the first section of the fifth chapter clearly indicates that the heart of the author was not in meditation and that he had brought it in for extraneous reasons. The sūtra 5.1.1 gives a list of *kāryasama* which have been translated as futile rejoinders listed as twenty-four in the sūtra. The notion of *kāryasama* is interesting particularly as explained by some of the commentators. In fact if the commentators are right the translation should not have been futile rejoinder. According to their explanation the rejoinder has the characteristic that while it raises objections to what others have said, the objections are of such a nature that, though they controvert the opponents' position, they do not establish what the person is arguing for and in some sense, try to refute it. It will be interesting if the concept of *kāryasama* is worked out independently and all the twenty four forms of it are examined in detail. In fact it would be interesting to have concrete examples of each and analyse them individually. The sūtra 5.1.2 tries to discuss the first example of *kāryasama* where the argument is based either on similarity or dissimilarity and the

opponent objects on the same basis. The sūtra 5.1.3 suggests that such a kind of argument would be as futile as if some one were to say that a particular object is a cow because it has cowness in it. The sūtra 5.1.4 gives an example of those *kāryasama* which are described as *sādhyasama* meaning thereby that these are concerned with that which has to be proved. The sūtra 5.1.5 seems to suggest that only on the ground of some dissimilarity, nothing can be proved. However, the position is not quite clear. The heart of the problem seems to be that how far similarity or dissimilarity can be a ground for further valid inference. Perhaps it is being suggested that there is an asymmetry between .similarity and dissimilarity in this regard for while similarity can provide some ground for a valid inference, mere dissimilarity cannot do so.

The sūtra 5.1.6 tries to suggest that the example which is given can never provide a sufficient ground for what is to be proved as the presence of what is to be proved in the example may only be accidental. The point perhaps is regarding the role that an example plays in a proof. This is important if we remember that an example forms an integral part of the proof in Nyāya. The sūtra 5.1.7 proposes the dilemma that the relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* can only be of two kinds and in both the cases the proof will not be possible. The argument seems to be that either the *hetu* merges with the *sādhya* and is completely united with it or remains completely separate from it. In the first case it certainly cannot be a ground for proof as it becomes undifferentiated from it and in the second case as it is completely unrelated to it, it cannot prove it. The sūtra 5.1.8 tries to give concrete examples to suggest that the objection raised in 5.1.7 is uncalled for. The examples given are both positive and negative to show that an effect comes into being when the agents and the instruments etc. are in contact with each other and also an effect is produced when they are not in contact with each other. The example given in the first case is that of the production of the jar from the clay where you need a relation between the potter,

the wheel, the stick and the clay. The example in the second case is strange as it derives from killing by magic as it is effected without any contact between the two parties concerned. The sūtra 5.1.9 raises again the question of the example and suggests two kinds of dilemma with regard to it; one, where the opponent continues to question the nature of the example and suggests that it itself has to be proved. On the other hand, the opponent may give a counter-example to the one that has been offered, thus suggesting that the example does not prove anything. The sūtra 5.1.10 suggests that, after all, the questioning cannot be continued indefinitely as there has be to a limit to the questioning or it will naturally stop, as, for example, in the case of the burning of the lamp. Perhaps the point is that even though in some cases questions may be raised about what is being given as a ground for the assertion, the process cannot be carried on indefinitely without it becoming meaningless or vacuous in character. The sūtra 5.1.11 suggests that if the counter-instance is taken to be an effective argument then there is no reason why the positive example should be denied the character of being an argument. The reply does not seem to be correct as what the counter-instance is supposed to prove is only that the so-called positive instance does not decisively prove anything.

The sūtra 5.1.12 raises the objection that if the ground for proving the existence of something occurs before that thing has come into being, then, how can it be related to it for the latter does not exist at all and hence cannot be proved through it. The sūtra 5.1.13 tries to answer this dilemma by saying that, after all, we do talk about the cause of something when it has come into being and at that time to urge that something has been the cause of it cannot be groundless for the cause also had been earlier in existence. In fact, in many instances, cause need not disappear when the effect comes into being as it may continue to sustain it by its active presence. Many of these objections and replies seem to be concerned with how to make the relation of causality

intelligible. Also it seems that the Indian logicians have not been able to distinguish clearly between a logical and a causal ground involved in any argument. Thus, the two seem to be continually intermixed and are hardly separated from each other: The sūtra 5.1.14 is not quite clear particularly in the translation as the word "community" has been used which has not occurred in the sūtra. The basic point of the sūtra seems to be that when both the examples are perceptual in character, then, one can always emphasize some points of similarity or dissimilarity between the two to prove opposite conclusions. At a subtler level, Wittgenstein has shown that even ostensive definitions may fail totally in their purpose. The sūtra 5.1.15 argues that if a certain kind of similarity can give rise to a doubt then the recognition of a dissimilarity should be able to remove the doubt. However, if doubt still persists when both similarities and dissimilarities have been noticed then there will be no end to doubt for there will be no way left for removing it. Also, mere similarity is not accepted as an everlasting source of doubt and hence the dilemma pointed out in 5.1.14 is not exactly a dilemma. The sūtra 5.1.16 poses the dilemma that when an object is similar to two opposed or contrasting things, then there is likelihood of simultaneously two contrary views arising and this is what is meant by vacillation or hesitancy or not being able to make up one's mind.

The sūtra 5.1.17 suggests that, after all, the hesitancy can only arise if the opposite is believed to be reasonably established and hence the contrary view must be regarded as established before the hesitancy can even arise. The sūtra 5.1.18 tries to raise the dilemma that what proves can only be either before or after or together with that which it is intended to prove but, if it is before that which is to be proved how could it be supposed to prove it. On the other hand, if it is held to exist after what has to be proved then as what has to be proved does not exist how can it prove it and if the two were to exist simultaneously then there is no point in proving anything as both are present.

The sūtra 5.1.19 tries to answer this dilemma by saying that the objection is irrelevant as it is the function of that which proves to prove something which may be present or absent but whose presence or absence is irrelevant to the relationship or the ground on which its present or future existence is sought to be asserted. It is fairly clear in many of these examples that neither the objection nor the reply are very clear. Even the Bhāṣya and the Vārttika do not seem to grasp the issue or analyse it clearly. It would be interesting if the issues could be formulated with greater rigour with the help of modern developments in logic and epistemology. Also it would be useful to see if any more refined analysis of these issues has occurred in Navya Nyāya later.

The sūtra 5.1.20 further argues that, as, on the opponent's contention in 5.1.18, nothing can be denied or asserted, it is meaningless for him to assert a denial. This obviously is a repetition of the style of argument in which Gautama seems to be indulging continuously. It does not seem to distinguish between levels of discourse and between first level and second level statement. The sūtra 5.1.21 deals with the dilemma relating to presumption or *arthāpatti*. The dilemma here arises because both the position and its opposite is sought to be proved on the basis of similarity. The sūtra 5.1.22 seems to interpret *arthāpatti* in a strange sense as it tries to suggest something that is not stated but only implied and tries to refute the argument that if some implication is supposed to counter the contention that is being made, then some other implication which has not been stated may be counter to what the opponent is saying. Besides this, the sūtra 5.1.22 also suggests that *arthāpatti* or what is unstated but implied is always *anekāntika* in character. The use of the term *anekāntika* here is interesting as normally it is supposed to be used by the Jains. The point perhaps seems to be that what is presupposed or implied can be so diverse in character that nothing definite can be settled by such an argument. If so, the contention is both

philosophically and logically interesting and needs further investigation.

The sūtra 5.1.23 presents the dilemma arising from the contention that if the possession of a single common property were to make two things non-different then all things would have to be regarded as not different from each other, because the property of existence is present in everything. The sūtra 5.1.24 argues that the contention is not correct as, while in some cases it is true, in others it may not be the case and hence, nothing positive can be said on the basis of the fact that there is one common property between two objects. The sūtra 5.1.25 gives a dilemma on the basis of commonness of evidence for both the position and the counter-position. The sūtra uses the term *kāraṇa* which can be taken to mean evidence though not necessarily so. However, what perhaps the dilemma is supposed to consist in is that the same ground can establish both the position and the counter-position and hence is either equally relevant or irrelevant in the situation. The sūtra 5.1.26 seems to counter the dilemma by suggesting that in case the evidence *proves* the positive, it cannot simultaneously prove its opposite and hence there must be something wrong in the contention made in 5.1.25. The sūtra 5.1.27 suggests that the dilemma named parity of apprehension is based upon the fact that it is found even in the absence of what is offered as its ground or cause. The sūtra 5.1.28 suggests that instead of the ground or cause the event may have some other ground or cause and hence there is little point in treating the situation as a dilemma.

The sūtra 5.1.29 tries to discuss the dilemma of non-apprehension and suggests that such a dilemma arises when that which obstructs the apprehension is itself not apprehended and the fact that we are not apprehending it itself is not apprehended. However, this is a very strange situation as, if the non-apprehension is itself not apprehended, then the double negation should give rise to an affirmation which in this case does not happen.

However, the sūtra does not seem to state the dilemma in this form. One has to find out what exactly is the nature of the statement in the sūtra. The sūtra 5.1.30 merely says that the reason urged is no reason at all because non-apprehension is of the nature of negation of apprehension.

The sūtra 5.1.31 argues that whatever the state of knowledge, whether it be of existence or non-existence, it is always known to consciousness and hence the objections urged earlier do not hold. However, if there can be such a thing as doubt, then though the state of doubt is apprehended, that about which there is doubt is not definitely known. It is of course true that the fact that it is not definitely known is itself known fairly definitely but then the dilemma can only be solved by distinguishing between different levels of knowledge. The sūtra uses the term *adhyātma* in a very strange sense. The sūtra 5.1.32 presents the dilemma that if by reason of similarity, different things are regarded as having analogous properties, then everything will have to be regarded as having analogous properties, and if so everything will have to be regarded as ephemeral or non-eternal. The sūtra 5.1.33 merely adopts the usual technique which Gautama has adopted so often by suggesting that if similarity can be a ground for inference, then the opponent's denial can also be denied for there will be similarity between the two. The sūtra 5.1.34 further argues that the ground of inference cannot be just any similarity but only a particular kind of similarity. In fact in any example that is given as a ground of inference, there will be both similarity and dissimilarity with all other things and unless a relevant distinction is pointed out one may infer anything from anything. The sūtra 5.1.35 presents the dilemma that as the character of non-eternality or transience is itself permanent, it would follow that something at least would be eternal. The sūtra 5.1.36 argues that as the non-eternality of something which is non-eternal is accepted, there is no ground for denying it.

The sūtra 5.1.37 suggests that there is an ambiguity in saying

that something is produced because of effort as there is an ambiguity in the notion of production. The Bhāṣya seems to clarify that the ambiguity arises because the effort may only remove the obstruction in the apprehension of something which is already there. As the mere statement that something is produced by effort is intrinsically ambiguous, it does not clearly indicate what exactly is the case. The sūtra 5.1.38 suggests that even though there are several kinds of products, in cases where the causes of non-apprehension are present, effort could not be said to be the cause of apprehension but only of the removal of the obstruction which was standing in the way of apprehension.

The sūtra 5.1.39 says that whether one asserts or denies the argument, in both cases it seems to have the same defect. This does not establish anything and it is not quite clear what is the context of the assertion. The Bhāṣya and the Vārttika try to clarify it but it does not become very clear. The sūtra 5.1.40 suggests that this will be true of every thing everywhere. Perhaps the sūtras 39-40 have to be taken together as they relate to cases where both the opposite positions suffer from the same defect and hence it is difficult to choose between them. Perhaps, at a deeper level, what is being said is that all positions in philosophy seem to suffer ultimately from the same defects and hence there can be little ground to choose between them. However, this cannot be the Nyāya position. The sūtra 5.1.41 continues to argue that the denial of the denial would have the same fault as that which is true about the denial. However, normally, a denial of the denial is supposed to result in an affirmation and hence the term denial here must have been used in a different sense. The sūtra 5.1.42 seems to argue that as the opponent has accepted that the denial of the denial has the same defects, he has, in a sense, accepted that the earlier denial was obviously defective. The sūtra 5.1.43 urges that there is nothing to fear from the opponent's having accepted the defect in the denial as all the parties seem to be suffering equally

from all defects. This is a strange conclusion in a section devoted to dilemmas. In fact, the thrust of the whole section does not seem clear at all. It seems *prima facie* to be a total waste of effort on the part of a logician, and the commentators do not seem to clarify the issue in any way. In fact, they seem to confuse it even further by suggesting that the whole discussion is centered around the eternity and non-eternity of sound which had been discussed threadbare earlier in so many sūtras where also it was not clear why so much attention was being wasted on the issue. Here, in this section, it would be totally unjustified to think that the discussion is primarily concerned with the issue relating to the eternality or non-eternality of sound particularly as the notion of dilemma which is being discussed is far more general in character and the various types into which it has been subdivided, seem to share some common characteristics. All in all, it is a very unsatisfactory section even though some of the arguments remind one of those given by the Buddhists.

Part V - Section 2 (25 Sūtras)

Part II of the fifth chapter tries to give a detailed list of the situations in which one may be considered to be defeated in an argument conclusively. The sūtra 5.2.1 mentions these in detail and the later sūtras discuss them individually. The sūtra 5.2.2 explicates the first situation mentioned in sūtra 5.2.1 which is called *pratījñā hāni* meaning thereby that where the proposition which is to be established is itself violated. Th idea is explicated by pointing out that it occurs when the property of the counter-instance is admitted by one to be present in the example cited by oneself. This kind of situation is created as the opponent has contradicted himself in giving the example which has the elements of what disproves the contention to be proved. The sūtra 5.2.3 explicates the second situation mentioned in the sūtra 5.2.1. This merely means that when some problem is encountered in

establishing the contention with which one had started, one shifts to a different contention and hence what was to be proved is left behind and something else in its place is urged than what was to be proved. The sūtra 5.2.4 explicates the third situation mentioned in the sūtra 5.2.1 and suggests that such a situation takes place when the reason or the ground which one offers in support of the contention to be proved, proves just the opposite. The sūtra 5.2.5 explicates the fourth situation mentioned in the sūtra 5.2.1. This relates to the situation wherein the original thesis has been shown to be mistaken, the opponent retracts or withdraws what was formerly sought to be affirmed by him. This is called renouncing the contention. The first four situations thus relate to a contention which was sought to be proved by an opponent. It would be interesting to find as to what exactly is the difference between the first and the third, particularly as the terms used are *hāni* and *virodha*. Perhaps the difference lies in the fact that while in the first case the example given supports the opposite contention, in the second case it is the ground or the reason itself which leads to the opposite contention. The sūtra 5.2.6 explicates the fifth situation mentioned in sūtra 5.2.1. The situation occurs when someone has given a ground or a reason in unqualified form and which when shown to be deficient is modified and given in a qualified form. The sūtra 5.2.7 explicates the sixth situation mentioned in sūtra 5:2.1. This basically relates to what is irrelevant as the reason that is offered has no bearing or connection with that which is to be proved. The sūtra 5.2.8 explicates the seventh situation mentioned in the sūtra 5.2.1 and suggests that what has been said is totally meaningless as if one were uttering only sequences of syllables without forming sentences or words. The sūtra 5.2.9 explicates the eighth situation mentioned in the sūtra 5.2.1 and concerns the unintelligibility of what has been said even when it has been repeated three times both by the audience and the party concerned with whom the debate is being carried on. The sūtra is interesting because it, for the first

time, brings the audience into the picture and also because one is permitted three times to explain what one means and that the charge of unintelligibility has to be sustained both by the learned members of the audience and the person with whom the debate is being engaged in. The sūtra 5.2.10 explicates the ninth situation mentioned in sūtra 5.2.1 and relates to the case where there is no connection between the expressions which follow one another so that while each of them has a meaning or sense, but when taken together no coherent unified meaning emerges out of them. This is characterized as incoherence. The sūtra 5.2.11 explicates the tenth situation mentioned in sūtra 5.2.1 and is concerned with a reversal of order of the sequence in which the reasoning is stated by the person concerned. Normally, reasoning is supposed to move in a certain order where the first step leads to the second, the second to the third and so on. But, when such a situation does not obtain, it is considered to be a defect in the presentation of the argument. Interestingly, in the Vārttīkā on the sūtra it is said that some persons do not regard this as an adequate ground for defeat.

The sūtra 5.2.12 explicates the eleventh situation which occurs when some step has been missed or some factor omitted in the reasoning. This is characterized as incomplete reasoning. The sūtra 5.2.13 explicates the twelfth situation which is just the opposite of this as here, what is given as a ground or example is more than what is required for the proof. The situations mentioned in 5.2.12 and 13 are obviously not of such a serious character as to lead to the dismissal of the opponent's argument completely. Again there seem to be some persons who do not consider that they can be seen as leading to a defeat. The sūtra 5.2.14 says that the restatement of words and ideas constitute repetition except in the exceptional case when that which was to be proved is once again stated at the conclusion of the argument. It is not quite clear why this should be regarded as.a ground for defeat as it does not exactly invalidate the proof in case it has

been given. The sūtra 5.2.15 gives another ground of repetition where someone tries to state explicitly what has already been stated implicitly earlier. The sūtra 5.2.16 refers to the situation where the opponent fails to explicitly state what one has said three times, even though the audience has understood, then he should be taken as defeated in the argument. This is different from the earlier situation where the opponent was supposed to explicate what he himself had said while here he is expected to explain what has been said by the opposite party to the satisfaction of every one concerned. The sūtra 5.2.17 gives another situation where the statement has been repeated three times and has been understood by the audience but is not understood by the opponent, then, in this situation, he is regarded as being defeated. The sūtra 5.2.18 relates to a situation where one cannot answer what one has been asked and hence feels embarrassed because of this. The term *ajñānama* for embarrassment seems strange indeed. The sūtra 5.2.19 refers to the eighteenth situation mentioned in 5.2.1 that when a person does not understand the answer contained in the denial of one's position by the opponent, one is said to be defeated in the argument. The sūtra 5.2.20 refers to a situation where the party breaks of the discussion under the pretext of having some urgent business to attend to. The sūtra 5.2.21 refers to a situation where the party admits the flaw in one's own thesis but urges that the situation of the opponent is no better as what he is saying suffers from the same defect. The sūtra 5.2.22 refers to a situation where someone does not point out that the other has lost the argument even when he has lost it, then, the first one will be considered defeated. The sūtra 5.2.23 refers to a situation where one falsely alleges that the other person has lost the argument when he has not really lost it. In such a case one is considered defeated because one has made a wrong allegation. The sūtra 5.2.24 refers to a situation where, having taken up one standpoint, if one carries on the discussion without restriction to that particular standpoint, then one is considered to be defeated.

The sūtra 5.2.25 refers to fallacies which have been already pointed out and says that in case they occur in the argument, then one may also be considered to have been defeated in addition to all the situations that have been mentioned in 5.2.1.

Chapter 3

Some Further Reflections on the Sūtras after reading the Commentaries on it, particularly those of Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra I and Udayana*

I

The sūtra I.I.I centres not only around the enumeration of the sixteen padārthas or topics but also about their relation to *tattvajñāna* and *niḥśreyasa*. The Nyāya Sūtra does not refer to these sixteen topics explicitly as *padārthas*. It is only later commentators starting from Vātsyāyana who used the term and appear to refer specifically to them.

The closing part of the sūtra says "... निग्रहस्थानानाम् तत्वज्ञानात् नि:श्रेयसाधिगम:" The sūtra therefore, seems to say that by the knowledge of these sixteen topics one shall get *niḥśreyasa*. The discussion on the term *tattvajñāna* occurs in N.S. 4.2.1 where it seems to have been used as meaning true knowledge and not the knowledge of that which is ultimately real or true.

The term *tattvajñāna*, .therefore, here means the true knowledge of the sixteen *padārthas* mentioned in the sūtra I.I.I and states that the true knowledge of each and all of them will lead to *niḥśreyasa*.

* The references to Vātsyāyana, Uddoyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra I and Udayana are from the texts edited by Pt. Ananta Lal Thakur and published by Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1996, 1997.

The term *niḥśreyasa* does not seem to have been defined in the sūtra text itself, but it is extensively elaborated in the *Vārttika* of Uddyotakara which takes off from the way it is explicated by Vātsyāyana. Vātsyāyana has written "तदिदं तत्वज्ञानं निःश्रेयसाधिगमश्च यथाविद्यं वेदितव्यम्" (Bhāṣya on sūtra I.I.I, p. 6 वात्स्यायन भाष्य). This means that each area of knowledge has its own *tattvajñāna* and this *tattvajñāna* leads to a *niḥśreyasa* which is specific to that knowledge and that knowledge alone. Elaborating on this, Uddyotakara has specifically referred to the following *vidyās* and their *niḥśreyasas:* The *niḥśreyasa* of *Agnihotra* etc. is *swarga,* the *niḥśreyasa* of *vārtā* is 'भूम्यादिपरिज्ञानस्यफलम्', the *niḥśreyasa of* daṇḍanīti is 'पृथ्वीविजयं', the *niḥśreyasa* of *adhyātmavidyā* is 'अपवर्गप्राप्ति' It is clear that at least according to Uddyotakara and even Vātsyāyana each *vidyā* has its own separate specific *niḥśreyasa* and that it is only *adhyātma* or *ātmavidyā* whose *niḥśreyasa* is *apavarga or mokṣa.* Thus the general idea that the end of every knowledge is *mokṣa,* does not seem to have been accepted by *Naiyāyika* thinkers till Uddyotakara's time. Not only Uddyotakara but Vācaspati Miśra I also accepts this and writes "विद्यान्तराणि तावद् यत् तत्वज्ञानं कुर्वन्ति तत्स्वभावालोचनया हि तद्विद्यासाध्ये एव निःश्रेयसभेदे उपयुज्यन्ते नान्यत्र' (p. 59 टीका on sūtra 1.1.1).

This, however, raises the problem as to what is the *niḥśreyasa* of the Nyāya *Vidyā* itself which is also called *ānvikṣikī* to distinguish it from other *vidyās,* including the *ātma vidyā,* whose *niḥśreyasa* is *mokṣa.* Vātsyāyana is clearly aware of this as he writes, "सेयमान्वीक्षिकी प्रमाणादिभिः पदार्थैर्विभज्यमानाप्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानाम् ....तदिदँ तत्वज्ञानम् निःश्रेयसाधिगमोऽपवर्गप्राप्तिरिति!" (p. 5-6 Bhāṣya on sūtra 1.1.1). It is clear that Vātsyāyana self consciously demarcates *ānvīkṣikī* from *adhyātma vidyā* and considers only the latter's *niḥśreyasa* as *apavarga.* But he does not seem to mention any specific *niḥśreyasa* of *ānvīkṣikī* itself except that it is "प्रदीपः' सर्वविद्यानाम् उपायः सर्वकर्माणाम!" This does not really state what

exactly is its own *niḥśreyasa* apart from 'serving' the cause of other *vidyās* in realizing their own *niḥśreyasa*. Incidentally, this would have also to be true of *adhyātma-vidyā* and, if accepted, shall entail that no *adhyātma vidyā* can realize its *niḥśreyasa*, that is, *apavarga*, without the 'services' of *ānvīkṣikī* and hence, will have to depend on it in a way which is not clearly recognised in the tradition.

There is, in fact, another problem as to what exactly is to be construed as a '*vidya*'. Is a *vidyā* to have necessarily the form of a *śāstra* and, if so, what is the *lakṣaṇa* of a *śāstra*. This is important as there is a significant distinction between *prayoga śāstras* and others which are purely *saiddhāntīka* or theoretical in character. The former are primarily oriented to the acquiring of a skill such as is involved in dancing (*nṛtya*) or singing (*gāna*) or building (*vāstu*) or painting (*citrakalā*) etc. In all these areas theoretical-reflection and theory-building is secondary to the acquiring of the actual skill in their performance. *Adhyātma-vidyā* is usually considered to be similar in character as it involves *sādhanā* which is supposed'to result in the transformation of one's 'being' in such a way that one 'becomes' what one 'ought-to-be', or one 'realizes' what one really 'is'.

The term *vidyā* seems to have been used in the tradition for both types of knowledge and though a distinction was made from the very beginning between the *Prayoga śāstras* and the other *śāstras*, both were called *vidyā* as is evident in Nārada's enumeration of the *vidyās* that he had learned and yet remained unfulfilled or dissatisfied. "ऋग्वेदं भगवतोऽध्येमि यजुर्वेदंसामवेदमथर्वणं चतुर्थमितिहासपुराणं पञ्चमं वेदानां वेदं पित्र्यराशिं दैवं निधिं वाकोवाक्यमेकायनं देवविद्यां ब्रह्मविद्यां भूतविद्यां क्षत्रविद्यां नक्षत्रविद्यां–सर्पदेवजनविद्यामेतद्रभगवोऽध्येमि"२ (छान्दोग्य उपनिषद्, सप्तम अध्याय, प्रथम खण्ड)

The distinction that is being made here is between *parā vidyā* which is the same as *adhyātma-vidyā* and all other *vidyās* which are called *aparā vidyā*. *Ānvīkṣikī*, thus, will have to be included

among *aparā vidyās,* but it will have to be an *aparā vidyā* of a strange kind as it will not only be foundational for all the other *vidyās* including the *parā vidyā,* if it wants to be a *vidyā,* but also determine whether they are to be counted as *vidyā* at all. It will, thus, have to be considered, in modern terminology, a second-level *vidyā* or that which is foundational for all, as without fulfilling its condition they cannot successfully perform their own function, that is, be a *pramā* or valid knowledge of the field it claims to be a knowledge about.

But, then, what shall be the *niḥśreyasa* of *ānvīkṣikī* itself ? *Prima facie,* it can have no *niḥśreyasa* of its own as, its *niḥśreyasa* can consist only in being helpful or instrumental in getting the *niḥśreyasa* of all other *vidyās* fulfilled. The self-consciousness of 'rationality' could perhaps have been spelt in no better way. This is the crucial break in the Indian intellectual tradition as the *pramāṇa śāstra* proclaims itself to be "प्रदीपं:सर्वविद्यानाम् उपाय: सर्वकर्माणाम्" This, it should be noted, includes both theoretical and practical reason as it mentions both *vidyā* and *karma* separately and, thus, includes all those areas of human seeking which are primarily defined either in terms of knowledge or action. 'Action' would, or should, include both *dharma,* or what is called morality in the english language and art or realms where performance predominates, or where the 'world' of 'feeling', gets creatively embodied in an objective symbolization which makes it a permanent possibility for all human beings to recreate and, thus, re-live in it for themselves, if they so desire.

At a deeper level still, perhaps, *prayoga* is an essential element in all knowledge and the distinction between the 'theoretical' and the 'practical' is only a distinction in terms of that which is important and central to a particular discipline. Perhaps, the author of the N.S. wants to point this out by mentioning *vāda, jalpa* and *yitaṇḍā, chala, jāti* and *nighrasthāna* as integral parts of the *pramāṇa vidyā* itself as these may be considered as reason 'applied' in the act of 'reasoning' with others

and establishing one's own point of view effectively, at least at that time.

The distinction between the *niḥśreyasas* of different *vidyās* seems, however, to be a radical departure in the Nyāya and betokens not only the emergence of a powerful rational attitude in the field of knowledge but also the awareness of a radical distinction between the 'ends' or *prayojanas* or the desired fruits or *phala* for which the different *vidyās* are sought by man and whose correct knowledge is supposed to procure it for him. This should be seen in the light of the generally prevalent contention that the end of all *vidyās* is basically *mokṣa* or liberation. The segregation and isolation of *adhyātma vidya* from all other *vidyās* is a step in this direction, a step which is already implicit in the statement of *Nārada* in the Chāndogya upaniṣad quoted above.

1.1.2

The second sūtra is also called a *prayojana* sūtra by Vācaspati Miśra I and is included alongwith the sūtra I.I.I in this category. Thus the Nyāya Sūtra, paradoxically, has not one single *prayojana* as a *śāstra;* instead, it has two which are spelt out in the first two sūtras and which are supposed respectively to consist of *niḥśreyasa* and *apavarga.* The first sūtra, as already mentioned above, is concerned with *pramāṇa vidyā* or as Vātsyāyana called it *ānvīkṣikī,* and its own *niḥśreyasa* is supposed to lie in enabling all other *vidyās* to attain their own *niḥśreyasa.* The problem of the *niḥśreyasa* of *ānvīkṣikī,* apart from the *niḥśreyasas* of all other *vidyās,* does not seem to have been a subject of discussion in the commentaries on the N.S., but one may think of it as the fulfillment of the function of rationality or *buddhi* in a human being. *Buddhi* is supposed to be a *guṇa* of the *ātman* and there is a discussion in the N.S. about its *nityatva.* Interestingly, at least according to Vātsyāyana, the following are supposed to be equivalent terms for *buddhi* and hence are said to be the *guṇas* of the *puruṣa* which stands for *ātman* for him. These terms are

jñāna, darśana, upalabdhi, bodha, pratyaya and *adhyavasāya* ("पुरुषधर्मः खल्वयं ज्ञानं दर्शनम् उपलब्धिर्बोधः प्रत्ययोऽध्यवसाय इति" p. 176 Vātsyāyana bhāṣya on sūtra 3.2.3) and are supposed to stand for the same thing ("चेतयते जानीते बुध्यते पश्यति उपलभत इत्येकोऽयमर्थः same p. 176 भाष्य on sūtra 3.2.3). *Pramāṇa vyāpāra*, thus, should be the *vyāvartaka lakṣaṇa* of *buddhi us* it alone can distinguish between what may be called *tattvajñāna* on the one hand and *mithyājñāna* on the other and, thus, be essential for the attainment of *apavarga* through the removal of *mithyājñāna* of the particular *prameyas* mentioned in the sūtra 1.1.9. However, Vātsyāyana in his *upodghāta* does not appear to confine the *pramāṇa vyāpāra* to man alone, but extends it to cover all living beings as they all not only show evidence of having knowledge, but also of engaging in determining 'what is true knowledge' on the basis of its *pravṛtti sāmarthya*. He writes "सोऽयं प्रमाणार्थोऽपरिसंख्येयः प्राणभृद्भेदस्यापरिसंख्येयत्वात् ।" (Introduction Bhāṣya, p.1). This would imply that *buddhi* is characteristic of all living beings and not that of man and man alone. But then one will have to give the *vyāvartaka lakṣaṇa* of human beings in this respect which would involve the contention that the attainment of *apavarga* can belong to man only and that this is radically different from the so-called attainment of pleasure and avoidance of pain which is a characteristic of all living beings.

The concept of *buddhi* and its relation to the *puruṣa* or *ātman*, on the whole, remains unclear in the sūtras just as the answer to the question whether it should be regarded as *nitya* or *anitya*. There seems, however, an interesting discussion where the relation of consciousness to knowledge is sought to be understood. It is perhaps suggested that the so-called *mtyatva* of knowledge arises from, or is a reflection of, the *nityatva* of consciousness, an argument which anticipates Śaṅkara's argument given later in this context, (see Vātsyāyana's discussion (bhāṣya) on sūtra 3.2.3, p. 177). The reference to *pratyabhijñā* along with the contention that all cognition is essentially 'recognition' implies that 'cognition'

presupposes or involves some underlying permanent entity to which consciousness belongs and which has 'knowledge'. But, as knowledge is supposed to be the result of an activity such as that of 'know-ing', and as all activity implies an agent and an immediate cause which is called *karaṇa* in the Nyāya tradition, the question arises whether *buddhi* which may be regarded as the immediate cause of knowledge and hence itself involves recognition, is to be regarded also as *nitya* on the same ground as we consider consciousness to be *nitya* in this context. The complicated discussion on this issue in the *Vārttika* and the *Ṭikā* needs to be looked into as it provides interesting insights into the nature of the issues that engaged the minds of the philosophers of that time.

(The question whether the *tattvajñāna* which leads to *niḥśreyasa* is supposed to be that of *nigrahasthāna* alone or of all the other topics mentioned in the sūtra I.I.I is settled by Vātsyāyana in his remark "प्रमाणादीनां तत्वमिति शैषिकी षष्ठी" that all of them have to be taken into consideration and not just *nigrahasthāna*.)

1.1.4

The term *avyabhicārī* in the definition of the *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* is meant to exclude perceptual illusions but neither the author of the sūtra nor his commentators seem to have discussed the question as to how the 'illusoriness' of a perceptual experience is to be proved except through another perception along with the assumption that the two perceptions must not cohere, for opposed properties can not belong to the same object. Perception by itself can never provide the ground for the distinction between an 'illusory' and 'veridical' perceptual experience. The characteristic of '*avyabhicārti*', thus, can only be non-perceptual in character and hence can not belong to perception-qua-perception.

The term *avyapadeśya* in the sūtra seems to refer to the fact that perceptual knowledge is primarily non-linguistic in character and that its linguistic designation is only secondary in character.

It does not mean that it can not be grasped in or through language, though there will always remain an element in it which language will never be able to get hold of as it is both non-linguistic and trans-linguistic in character. The perceptual experience of animals is an evidence of this.

There is, however, the problem which does not seem to have been discussed in this connection. At the human level perception is always of the form "This is this", or "This is that" where a distinctive predicate is asserted of something and hence both 'recognition' and 'naming' is involved. The problem of recognition has already been discussed in connection with knowledge and its relation to *buddhi*. Thus, there will arise the issue of the relation between perceptual knowledge and *buddhi*. In case *buddhi* is considered as an essential instrument then it can not be *avyapadeśya*. On the other hand, if it is really *avyapadeśya*, that is, totally *nirvikalpaka* in character then it can not function as a *pramāṇa* in the usual sense of the term. The author of the N.S. does not seem to be clear whether the definition that he is giving in sūtra 1.1.4 is that of *pratyakṣa* or of *pratyakṣa* as a *pramāṇa*, as *pratyakṣa*-qua-*pratyakṣa* can not distinguish between what is 'real' and what only 'appears' to be so. In the realm of the senses, 'appearance' is the reality. The distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality' at the perceptual level can occur only because of non-perceptual considerations.

There is another problem to which much attention has not been paid in the Nyāya literature. This is that the ascription of '*abhidheyatva*' as a necessary characteristic of all reality is opposed to the *avyapadeśya* character ascribed to perception or perceptual reality. If reality is essentially 'nameable' or 'in other words, graspable by language, then perception can not be said to give us a knowledge of reality if it is essentially *avyapadeśya*, as is mentioned in the sūtra.

The characteristic mentioned as *vyavasāyātmaka* raises problems of another kind. First, as mentioned by Vācaspati Miśra I, it applies to *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* only while, according to

him, the characteristic of *avyapadeśya* applies to *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa.* Ultimately, the question is, whether the term perception is to be confined to that sense experience which clearly recognises that "This is this", or is treated as applicable to any sense-apprehension which is of the form "There is something". Perhaps, the latter can not be considered as a *pramāṇa* and hence the term *vyavasāyātmaka* is added in the definition. But, then, the term *avyapadeśya* will normally not be applicable to such a *vyavasāyātmka* perception. This is the point that Vācaspati Miśra I is making in his discussion on the issue. The author of the N.S. does not seem to be clear in his mind nor, for that matter, are the commentators.

The complicated discussion on this subject raises other issues such as the relation of the senses to the mind and of the mind to the *buddhi* and of the buddhi to the *ātman* in the process of perceptual cognition. There is also the added problem of the relation between cognition, however determinate, to recognition, or between *vyavasāya* or *anuvyavasāya,* an issue already discussed in connection with the idea of *pratyabhijñā* and its role in cognition. The detailed discussion of the problem of perceptual knowledge in the Bhāṣya, the Vārttika, the Ṭīkā and the Pariśuddhi will be rewarding to any student of the subject who has been concerned with its philosophical importance in western philosophy.

1.1.6

The discussion on *upamāna* in Vācaspati Miśra's Ṭīkā appears to draw attention to the term *prasiddha* and suggests that it should be the *vacana* of an *āpta* person in order that it may be regarded aṣ *prasiddha.* But in case it is so, it will have to be subsumed under *śabda* unless a distinction is made between those statements of an *āpta puruṣa* which are *upadeśa* and those which are primarily informative in character. Also, the term *sādṛṣya,* is defined as "भिन्नप्रधानसामान्यवृत्ति" (p. 165 ṭīkā on sūtra 1.1.6) meaning thereby that the term similarity can only be used in the

context of two different universals between which the apprehension of difference predominates. This is an interesting definition as it draws attention to the fact that the concept of similarity is based on 'the apprehension' of difference. Later, Udayana will go further and raise the question whether all *sāmānyas* give rise to a *jāti* and, if not, what are the criteria to distinguish between those *sāmānyas* which give rise to a *jāti* and those which do not. These criteria need a detailed discussion as the problem of distinguishing between universals and pseudo-universals has plagued philosophy since Plato focussed attention upon the reality of universals for understanding reality even at the perceptual level.

1.1.7-8

The sūtras dealing with *śabda pramāṇa* do not give any criteria to determine who is an *āpta puruṣa* and who is not. Vātsyāyana explicates these in the following "आप्त: खलु स्वाक्षात्कृतधर्मा यथादृष्टस्यार्थस्य चिख्यापयिषया प्रयुक्त उपदेष्टा।" (p. 14 भाष्य on sūtra 1.1.7). But it is Samantabhadra, the great Jain thinker, who in his *Āpta Mīmāṁsā* not only discusses the issue in detail, but also gives a different definition which states that the *āpta puruṣa* is one who is completely devoid of *rāga* and *dveśa* and is a *sarvajña*.

In this context he discusses why none can be regarded as an *āpta puruṣa* except Mahāvīra. Interestingly in this context, he discusses only two possible claimants for the title of being an *āpta puruṣa;* these are Kapila and Buddha and he discusses in detail why they can not be regarded as fully *āpta*.

It was perhaps Samantabhadra's discussion which resulted later in Vācaspati Miśra's and Udayana's detailed discussion on the issue suggesting that the *āpta puruṣa* must not only be devoid of *rāga* and *dveśa* and have relevant existential knowledge of what he is advising one to do, but also be filled with compassion and the desire for helpfulness towards those whom he is giving the *upadeśa*. The bringing in of the notion of *karuṇā* and of his being

parama kāruṇika is reminiscent of the Buddha. Udayana even brings in the issue of the creation of the Nyāya Śāstra for those who were not entitled to study the śruti or the Vedas according to the orthodox Indian tradition. It was, thus, the *śūdras* and the women for whom the Nyāya *Śāstra* may be said to have been created as they could attain the knowledge leading to the path of liberation through its study. It may be remembered in this connection that the same is said about the *purāṇas,* the *Gītā* and the other literature which makes available the truth of the *śruti* to those who are not entitled to it in the strict sense of the term. (It is not clear whether Udayana argues for this position or merely discusses it as one of the positions offered by others for the creation of the Nyāya Sūtras by Gautama when *Upaniṣads* were already available to attain *mokṣa* or *apavarga* which was agreed to by all to be the supreme end of human life.)

Alternatively, one may argue that the N.S. was created for those persons who were addicted to reason and obsessed by it in order that they may be freed from their 'doubts' and pursue the path to liberation without being troubled by the spurious or pseudo-arguments of the Buddhists and the Jains and the Sāṁkhayanas and all other heretic thinkers.

1.1.9

The enumeration of the *prameyas,* as already pointed out, raises many problems but perhaps what the author of the N.S. wants to suggest is that among the innumerable *prameyas* the most important for a human being is his own self and hence the first question that is to be settled is whether there is anything different from and beyond the body, the senses, the sense-objects, the mind and the intellect, for unless there is something beyond these, it will be difficult to accept that human life has any meaning whatsoever. The establishment of the reality of *ātman* or that which is beyond these is the first and the foremost task of any rational inquiry about the reality of man with which

philosophy ought to be concerned. This is supported by the evidence that the number of sūtras devoted to the establishment of the reality of ātman amount to about 114 (4.1 & 4.2). Besides this, the most important *prameya* for man would be to determine whether there is any meaning in the life that he lives and whether there is any *puruṣārtha* whose attainment may be regarded as the complete fulfillment of one's being in an absolute sense as that alone will provide a foundational meaning to his life. The term *apavarga* refers to this *prameya* in the system. The *ātman* and the *apavarga* are, thus, the two *prameyas* which according to the author of the N.S., need to be established through the *pramāṇas* which the sūtra 1.1.1 has already described in detail and as these involve necessarily discussion and disputation amongst different and conflicting views about these, the author has included the art of disputation along with the strategies and deception involved in it, in his consideration. There seems little reason for the inclusion of *śarīra, indriya, artha, buddhi* and *manas,* in *the prameyas as* nobody entertains any doubt about them. As for the Cartesian doubt, the same does not seem to be accepted by Gautama as relevant in the human situation. The inclusion of *pravṛtti, doṣa, pretyābhāva* and *phala* seem to be heavily influenced by the wide-spread acceptance of the diagnostic analysis of the human situation in India which involves the ideas of *karma* and re-birth as essential parts of it. There is also the acceptance of the almost axiomatic belief that *pravṛtti* or involvement with the world is the fundamental cause of suffering and is almost analytically involved in it. It will be interesting to think if an alternative diagnostic of human situation can be given without the presuppositions involved in the usual Indian analysis. The Buddhists gave up the idea of *ātman* but could not give up other elements of the analysis. (It is perhaps time India gets liberated from the unconscious bondage of this analysis.)

1.1.10

The grounds mentioned for the belief in *ātman* include, as

pointed out earlier in our comment on the sūtra, *duhkha* which was mentioned as a *prameya* in sūtra 1.1.9. However, the term *pravṛtti may* be said to include or imply *icchā, dveśa, prayatna* in it while the *phala* which is mentioned as a separate *prameya* may be said to include *sukha-duhkha* in it. Similarly the term *jñāna* may be treated as included in the *buddhi* or alternatively may be regarded as its *phala* or result.

The sūtra mentions these as the ground for the belief in the *ātman,* but it does not make clear in what sense they have to be regarded as 'grounds' for believing in it. Is it to be regarded as the cause of these and, if so, the inference will be from effect to cause. But, then, it will have to be argued that *manas* can not be the cause of these and, as has been argued recently by Pt. Badarī Nāth Sūkla in his lecture on *dehātmavāda* one need not postulate two different entities when the postulation of one will suffice for the purpose. The Nyāya will have to argue why the postulation of *manas* alone can not suffice for the purpose.

The postulation of *Īśwara* later in the system and the suggestion that it is included in the *ātman* as a *prameya* raises difficulties of its own as not only it can not be conceived of without the presence of the "creative power" within it in its ever-liberated state in contrast to the *ātman* which is not even supposed to have consciousness when it gets free from bondage and attains *apavarga* according to Nyāya, but will have to be granted consciousness as its intrinsic property which the *ātman* is not supposed to have.

1.1.12-14

The sūtras 1.1.12-14 deal with the senses and their objects. Two things have to be noted in this connection: *One,* the term *artha* or object is defined in terms of the basic five elements that is, earth, air, fire, sky, water and not the specific objects which are grasped by the senses. *Two,* Vātsyāyana in his Bhāṣya clearly

maintains that because of the intrinsic diversity of the sensed qualities, one can not postulate only one *prakṛti* but has to accept five different *prakṛtis,* each with its own individual nature: "नानाप्रकृतीनामेषां सतां विषयनियमः नैकप्रकृतीनाम् ।" (Bhāṣya on sūtra 1.1.12, p. 17). This is in contrast to the Sāṁkhyan position which postulates only one *prakṛti* and makes qualitative distinctions in it which constitute it in their totality. The *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* are 'qualities' pervading all levels of *prakṛti,* a possibility that the sūtras do not even seem to discuss. What is the relation of the *panca mahābutas* and their sensed qualities to mind etc. is not made clear. What are *manas* and *buddhi* constituted of? Does the notion of "subtle matter" exist in Nyāya? Are there independent qualities belonging to *manas* and *buddhi* and even the senses which can not be reduced to the qualities that belong to the five different material elements that are supposed to extensionally define them. An answer to these questions may help in understanding the differences between the Nyāya analysis on the one hand and Sāṁkhya analysis of perceptual experience on the other. (The position of the Vaiśeṣika, the Buddhists, the Jains and the different *āgamic* traditions in India needs to be investigated in this connection.)

1.1.15—It seems from the commentaries on the sūtra that what is being denied is the Sāṁkhya view that knowledge is the result of *buddhi* which, according to it, belongs to *prakṛti* which is unconscious. It is also being held by the commentators that the sūtra by identifying buddhi with jñāna also establishes the reality of *ātman* which alone is held to be conscious and hence to which alone knowledge can belong as it can belong only to something that is conscious. Such an interpretation will imply that there is no such separate faculty as *buddhi* in Nyāya and that the whole discussion about its being nitya or anitya is absurd. The situation can only be saved if the discussion about the eternity or non-eternity of buddhi is understood in terms of eternity or non-eternity of knowledge. But if it is remembered that according to Nyāya, knowledge is always to be 'new', then

the idea of the eternity of knowledge will be a contradiction-in-terms. On the other hand, if re-cognition is considered to be necessary for cognition to take place, then 'knowledge' can never be new. The Naiyāyikas do not seem to have realized the problems raised by the sūtra 1.1.15 which identifies *buddhi* with upalabdhi and *jñāna*.

There is another problem which does not seem to have been faced by the commentators. It relates to the conscious nature of the *ātman*. Nyāya, generally, is not supposed to accept consciousness as the intrinsic and eternal property of the *ātman* or even as its essential nature or *svarūpa as* the Vedānta does. Ultimately, for it, it is an 'emergent' property which arises by the conjunction of the senses, the objects and the mind. But this is the Cārvāka position. It may also be remembered that *manas* is given an independent position alongwith the body, the senses and the sense-objects.

There is, and can be, no such thing as buddhi in the Nyāya system if it is to be held identical with *jñāna as* is mentioned in the sūtra 1.1.15. It is a result or *phala* of a certain *vyāpāra* which is, for it, ultimately a conjunction of the *ātman, manas, śarīra, indriyas* and the *panca mahābhūtas.* If this is not acceptable to Naiyāyikas then they will have to accept a separate, independent status for *buddhi* as an ontological entity on the analogy of one that is accorded to *manas* in the system.

1.1.16—The contention that a number of 'knowledges' can not arise at the same time and hence the existence of mind has to be assumed in order to account for this is a strange argument indeed. For, firstly, it assumes that knowledge is a temporal event and that as time has necessarily a succession in it, "acts of knowledge" have also to be successive in character. Secondly, it is being assumed that but for the existence of mind, the *ātman* could have simultaneous knowledge of all things at once. Mind, on this view, will be the temporal organ *par excellence* as without it there will be no apprehension of succession of events and, presumably, the distinction of past, present and future will vanish.

Not only this, the *ātman* will lose all individuality as it will have to be considered omniscient and, thus, being identical with God or *Īśwara* in the system. The Naiyāyikas do not seem to have faced the dilemma which Gautama's definition of *manas* has raised. Nor do they have noticed that as mind does not seem to be the subject of *icchā, dveśa, sukha, duhkha prayatna* etc. and as there is no *buddhi,* the poor *ātman* is the only entity left which has to be saddled with these unless they are transferred to the body along with everything else in it. A reconsideration of the notion of *manas* is required if nyāya thinking is to be freed from this strange formulation of its founder in the Nyāya Sūtras.

1.1.17—The sūtra 1.1.17 tries to suggest that *pravṛtti* is caused by *śarīra, vāk* and *buddhi* which can only mean that human activity is a joint product of these three independent factors. Unfortunately the commentators from Vātsyāyana onwards confused the matter by suggesting that *buddhi* should be understood as *manas,* as if the *sūtrakāra* did not know the difference between the two and had not already established the difference in their meaning in the sūtras immediately preceding this sūtra (1.1.15-16) (See bhāṣya on sūtra 1.1.17, p. 19. "मनोऽत्रबुद्धिरित्यभिप्रेतम् ।"). Vācaspati Miśra makes the situation even worse as, according to him, instead of *buddhi,* it is the term *vāk* which should be taken to mean *manas* along with such other things as the senses, "तेन मनसा इष्टदेवताद्यनुचिन्तन चक्षुरादिभिश्च साध्वसाधुदर्शनादिसूचितं भवति ।" (Ṭīkā on Sūtra 1.1.17, p. 197). Udayana complicates the situation further by concentrating on the term *ārambha* and suggesting that *pravṛtti* efects a change both in the object and in the self simultaneously. Thus, it is both *kriyāhetu* and *jñānahetu* at the same time, "जन्महेतुः स्थिरात्मविशेषगुणजनकः प्रयत्न आरम्भः । सा च य द्विविधेति । ज्ञातुं ज्ञापयितुँ वा प्रयत्नः उभयथापि ज्ञानहेतुः (परिशुद्धि on sūtra 1.1.17, p. 260) कर्तुं कारयितुं वा प्रयत्नः उभयथापि क्रियाहेतुः ।

Interestingly *pravṛtti* itself has been supposed to be ten-fold in nature. Vātsyāyana had only said, "सोऽयमारम्भः शरीरेण वाचा

मनसा च पुण्यः पापश्च प्रत्येकं दशविधः" (p. 19) which perhaps means that *pravṛtti* may be either bodily or mental or because of speech, each of which is ten-fold in nature and as each of these can result in *pāpa* or *puṇya,* the same may also be assumed to be tenfold in nature. Thus if the phrase "प्रत्येकं दशविधः" is taken literally then we will have thirty kinds of *pravṛtti* resulting in thirty kinds of *pāpa* and *puṇya* respectively. Uddyotakara on the other hand seems to say in the Vārttika that the term "प्रत्येकं दशविधः" refers only to the *pāpa* and *puṇya* and gives a detailed specific description of it as follows: "पुण्या कायेन परित्राणं परिचरणं दानमिति। वाचा सत्यं हितं प्रियं स्वाध्यायश्चेति। मनसा दया अस्पृहा श्रद्धा चैति। विपर्ययेण पापा दशविधैव।" (p. 78). The term *manas* here obviously is performing a function different from the one mentioned in the sūtra 1.1.16 and it is clear that, from the beginning, the Nyāya is never able to decide the exact sense in which the term *manas is* to be used in the system. The same, to a certain extent, is also true of *buddhi* resulting from the fact that it is defined as *jñāna* or *upalabdhi* and not as reason or intellect. It will be interesting to ask the Naiyāyika that if *buddhi* is defined in such a way, then the whole *pramāṇa vyāpāra,* including *tarka,* belongs to which faculty in a human being.

1.1.18—The necessary linkage between *pravṛtti* and *doṣa* is sought to be established by the commentators through the postulate that *pravṛtti* can not occur without there being *rāga, dveśa* and *moha* and as these are essentially 'defects' they can not but give rise to *mithyājñāna* which has to result in *doṣa.* The commentators forget that they had themselves suggested that *pravṛtti* can lead both to *pāpa* and *puṇya* and that if the necessary linkage *of pravṛtti with doṣa* is accepted then the distinction between *pāpa* and *puṇya* will collapse.

It will be difficult to accept that all the virtues mentioned by Uddyotakara are the result of *mithyajñāna* which is caused by *rāga, dveśa* and *moha.* Not only this, *nivṛtti* will become impossible if this analysis is accepted, particularly if an individual

is considered 'unfree' or 'helpless' to reverse the situation. In this context Uddyotakara raises the interesting question that "का पुनरियं प्रवर्तना, यया अवशः प्रवर्तते ?" (p. 78) but does not proceed to answer it. Vācaspati Miśra only explicates the *word* "avaṣa" used in the question and explicates it as "*asvatantraḥ*" but does not pursue the problem further (p. 198).

1.1.20—The term *phala* is taken to mean pleasure and pain or *sukha* and *duhkha*. In Vātsyāyana's crisp definition "सुखदुखसंवेदनं फलम्।" (p. 21). Uddyotakara introduces the notions of *dharma* and *adharma* and suggests that *dharma* is the cause of *sukha* and *adharma* the cause of *duhkha.* Vācaspati suggests that *pravṛtti may* directly cause *phala* without necessarily producing *doṣa* but, in a poetic mood, he suggests immediately the reverse of what he said, "दोषसलिलावसिक्तायां खल्वात्मभूमौ धर्माधर्मबीजे सुखदुखे जनयतः, नाऽन्यथा।" (p. 199).

Interestingly, he also seems to suggest that *nirveda,* though opposed to *pravṛtti,* may still be said to arise from it or even be the result from it. "यद्यपि शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धिसुखदुःखोपभोगातिरिक्तं गौणमुख्यफलं भिन्नँ नास्ति ते च यथायोगं पूर्वं लक्षिताः, तेनापि च रुपेण ते निर्वेदोपयोगिनः, तथापि प्रवृत्तिदोषजनितत्वेनापि रुपेणामी निर्वेदोपयोगिन इति तेन रुपेण लक्ष्यन्ते।" (p. 198-199).

1.1.26-31—Vātsyāyana defines the notion of *tantra* in terms of *śāstra* and says "तन्त्रमितरेतराभिसंबद्धस्यार्थसमूहस्योपदेशः शास्त्रम्।" (p. 27). Vātsyāyana explicates the four types of *Siddhānta* as given in the sūtra. According to him, the term *siddhānta* is defined as *sansthitiḥ* meaning that wherein one rests or where reasoning reaches a conclusion. The process through which one reaches this state is twofold. One is through what is called *adhikaraṇa* and the other which is called *abhyupagana.* The first is again divided into two different types: one, where what is known to be true is also seen as implying something else which, therefore, is also believed to be true. The second is the reverse of this, that is, when something that is already known to be true on some ground is seen to imply what one is considering and hence the latter is

accepted as true on the ground of the former. The two when seen together, are both said to be *adhikaraṇa siddhānta.* In modern terminology, if p implies q and p is known to be true than q is also known to be true. Conversely, if q is known to be true and is seen as implied by p then p is also known to be true. The stronger example of this is strict implication where we say that p implies q and q implies p. Udayana gives the clearest formulation of this when he states, "तदत्र पक्षद्वयेऽपि फलतो न कश्चिद् विशेष इति मन्वानः श्लिष्टं भाष्यं व्याचष्टे साध्यस्य वा हेतोर्वेति।" (p.282).

The *abhyupagama siddhānta* on the other hand does not start with anything known but with a supposition or hypothesis which 'demands' to be proved or justified or established. The process of proof or justification or establishment is detailed in the commentaries and when this is completed, what was regarded as a supposition or hypothesis becomes an established doctrine that is called *siddhānta.* The difference between *abhyupagama* and *abhyupagama siddhānta* is, that while the former is *aparīkṣita* the latter is *parīkṣita.* The discussion in the commentaries seems to go in strange direction, one of which seems to be concerned with acceptance or establishment of doctrines which are not mentioned in sūtras but are somehow implied in the system. There is also a discussion how one should treat somebody who is less intelligent than oneself. Uddyotakara clearly criticizes the view of Vātsyāyana in this regard. On the whole, the commentators do not seem to have understood the notion of *abhyupagama siddhānta* Vācaspati elaborates it thus, "सामान्योपक्रमस्य अभ्युपगमस्य प्रमाणतो विशेषपर्यन्ततापरिसमाप्तिः संस्थितिरित्यर्थः।" (p. 221) but does not pursue the matter further.

The notions of *sarvatantra* and *pratitantra siddhānta* could have been elaborated further. The discussion in the commentaries does not seen to throw any light upon them as to how the conclusion or the *saṅsthiti* is reached in them. As already stated in the earlier comments neither the notion of '*sarva*' nor the notion of '*prati*' seem to be clearly defined. The discussion about *sarvatantra siddhānta* starts by giving concrete examples of such

siddhāntas. Vātsyāyana's examples (घ्राणादीनिइन्द्रियाणि) are concrete and empirical while Uddyotakara's example (प्रमाणानि प्रमेय–साधनानि) appears to be analytic in nature, though he does not seem to be aware of the difference between the two. He seems to suggest in his discussion that commonly accepted empirical propositions based on perception can not be regarded as *sarvatantra siddhānta.* On the other hand, he seems to suggest that only that should be regarded as *sarvatantra siddhānta* which is; based on *anumāna* and *āgama.* He rejects the objection that these are ultimately based on *pratyakṣa.* The whole discussion is not very clear and should be analysed for the presuppositions involved in it.

The discussion in the commentaries on the sūtra defining what is meant by *pratitantra* concentrates on the term *samāna* and Vācaspati suggests that it should be taken to mean as one and one only (समान शब्द एक पर्याय: p.222), Udayana, agreeing with this writes, "तथापि अनेकसम्बन्धापेक्षया एकमपि समानशब्दवाच्यं भवति ।" (p. 281). But this is to do violence to the sūtra text and 'super-impose one's own meaning on it which it ostensibly could not had have for the simple reason that the sūtrakāra could easily have avoided the use of the term *samāna* whose primary meaning is 'similar' and involves an intrinsic plurality in it. The term can, in an extended sense that is *gauṇa,* may also be used to denote one or *ekam,* as one is similar to oneself. Interestingly, the Bhāṣya gives Sāṁkhya and Yoga as examples of *paratantra* denoting thereby that these were the main counter systems to Nyāya in Vātsyāyana's time. Surprisingly, the absence of the mention of Buddhism as a 'para tantra' is perplexing as it was the main opponent of Nyāya in this period. The mention of Yoga as a separate philosophical system is both interesting and surprising as generally the Yoga system is not regarded as a separate independent system of philosophy by Indian thinkers.

1.1.32-39—The hard core of the Nyāya theory of *anumāna* is given in the sūtras dealing with *avayava* and are mainly

concerned with what may be called the joint method of agreement and difference to establish the relation between the ground and that which is inferred on its basis. This, later, will be known as *vyāpti* in the system and give rise to innumerable problems as the method of agreement and difference can not be applied in cases where something is universally present or universally absent which are known in the Nyāya tradition as *kevalānvayī* and *kevalavyatirekī*.

1.1.40—The discussion on *tarka* does not even raise the question as to why it should be discussed at all, particularly when the whole process of *anumāna* has been discussed starting from *saṁśaya* to *avayava*. It is to be clearly indicated why the discussion on *tarka* and *nirṇaya* has to be engaged in again and how does it add to our understanding of the *pramāṇa vyāpāra* with which the text is concerned with. It should be noted that *tarka* itself is defined in such a way as to involve *saṁśaya* as one of its essential elements and the process by which it is removed resulting in *nirṇaya*.

One of the interesting statements in this connection is that of Uddyotakara "एतस्मिन् अविज्ञाते सामान्यतोऽधिगते....यदि पुनः सामान्यमपि नाधिगतं स्यात्, न ब्रूयात् अविज्ञाततत्त्वे इति।" (p. 131) which means that in order to have *saṁśaya* one should have some kind of knowledge which needs determination in its speciflcity.

There is also a puzzling discussion in Uddyotakara of what could be meant by the phrase "अविज्ञाततत्त्वेऽर्थे" as it involves a *samāsa* which can be interpreted differently (p. 131). Similarly, Vātsyāyana seems to suggest that *jijñāsā* necessarily involves undecidability between two opposed positions in respect of the same object. In his own words, "योऽयं ज्ञाता ज्ञातव्यमर्थं जानीते, तं तत्वतो जानीयेति जिज्ञासा। स किमुत्पत्तिधर्मकोऽथानुपत्तिधर्मक इति विमर्शः।" (p. 36).

1.2

The second section of the first *adhyāya* is concerned with all

the topics mentioned in the sūtra 1.1.1 after the ones that have been discussed in the first section. The topics are concerned with the different ways in which persons try to win in an argument which is not supposed to be fair according to the rules of debate and discussion. One of the ways which is described as (1.2.13) *sāmānya chala* needs perhaps a more elaborate and intensive discussion. All argument necessarily involves a movement between universalization and instantiation, that is, seeing the particular as an instance of the universal and conversely testing the universal by the particular example in which it is supposed to be exemplified. This double movement is the essence of thinking as it simultaneously reveals the limitation of both the universalization and the power of the particular to establish a point in a rational discussion where it can not do so without being taken as an instance of a universal. Similarly, the discussion of the topic under *jāti* (1.2.17-18) is also not clear and needs to be explained further.

2.1

The second adhyāya begins with an examination of *saṁśaya* and tries to answer the objections which might possibly be raised against the definition given in the sūtra 1.1.23. The discussion seems to centre around the examples which may be confused with the characteristics given of doubt in the earlier definition. One may, for example, consider a discussion where conflicting positions are held by the disputants and think that it is an example of doubt as two opposed positions are being entertained by them. Similarly, one may think that the discussion of *pūrva pakṣa* in a sūtra is a sign of 'doubt' in it. But these can not obviously be considered cases of doubt as 'doubt' has to be entertained by the same person who is not sure or certain about either of the positions entertained.

The discussion on this in the commentaries is not clear and in fact, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra seem to question both the interpretation and contention of Vātsyāyana in this regard.

One of the issues raised is how the *parīkṣā* or examination of the topics given in the sūtra 1.1.1 starts with *saṁśaya* and not *pramāṇa*. The logic of the change in sequence is revealed in sūtra 2.1.8 which questions the very possibility of there being *any pramāṇa,* as all *pramāṇas* are themselves subject to essential doubt. This obviously refers to Nāgārjuna's powerful attack on the possibility of their being any *pramāṇa,* including *pratyakṣa,* for the establishment of anything as, according to him, the very notion of *pramāṇa* is self-contradictory, for it assumes that the ground of justification itself needs no justification. The process of justification is as unending as any other process and hence nothing can ever be really 'proved', as that on the basis of which something is proved itself needs a proof. The recourse to the idea of 'self-proved' or *svataḥ pramāṇa* can not help in the matter as if something is accepted as 'self-justified' then why should not everything else be considered to be so? One would have to grant this at least as a logical possibility and in case this is accepted the very necessity of engaging in *pramāṇa vyāpāra* will lose all rational justification. Prabhākara's is perhaps the only position which comes close to this, but it is more psychological than epistemological in nature.

After the discussion on the possibility of *pramāṇa* itself, the text turns to the specific examination of each *pramāṇa* from 2.1.21 onwards. The objection that in the definition of *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* in 1.1.4 the contact of *ātman* and mannas has not been mentioned even though it is necessary for perceptual cognition to arise is answered by pointing out that, firstly, such a contact is required in all cognition and is not specific to perceptual cognition only and secondly, that if this were to be mentioned then the other eternal objects such as space, time etc. will have to be mentioned also. The discussion on sūtras 2.1.26-30 draws attention to certain phenomena which may be characterized as involuntary apprehension of sensory objects where the object forces itself on our attention even when there is no voluntary effort on our part, as in suddenly waking up on hearing some

loud sound. In such a case the contact of *ātman* and mind for the apprehension of the sensed object will only be 'postulational' in character and, in any case, will have to be given only a secondary or marginal importance. Attention, however, is also drawn to instances where even though *mdriyārtha sannikarṣa* exists, but if mind is absent then no perception takes places. (The discussion on the sūtra 2.1.26 is not quite clear and the commentaries need to be closely examined in this regard).

The discussion from sūtras 2.1.31 to 36 raises the question regarding the inevitable presence of inference in perceptual cognition as what we actually perceive is only a part and never the 'whole' that we are said to perceive. The discussion tries to answer the objections at two levels. One, that even if the point were to be conceded the conclusion will not fallow as at least the 'part' will have to be perceived. The second point in respect of the objection tries to distinguish between 'wholes' whose parts themselves can be perceived if one wishes to do so and 'wholes' whose parts can not be perceived in principle, even if one tries to do so. The example of the second is supposal to be provided by such entities as ultimate atoms which are said to constitute all physical objects that we perceive. These atoms are supposed to be imperceptible, even though they constitute the 'wholes' that we perceive. The parts of the 'wholes' of former type are said to be such as those that constitute a forest or an army. The discussion in the commentaries does not seem to distinguish between 'wholes' that are perceptually apprehended and hence are essentially perceptual in nature and those which are built out of theoretically postulated entities and hence themselves have to be thought of as theoretical in character. There is an interesting discussion regarding the notion of identity and difference and it is contended that the concept of a 'perceptual whole' involves necessarily the notion of identity. The crucial discussion regarding the notions of *bheda* and *abheda* is carried on in the context of the debate between the advaitin and the non-advaitin, but it has not generally been noticed that the concepts have been discussed

earlier in the context of our perceptual knowledge of the parts and the whole. The discussion in the commentaries may be closely examined from this point of view. Uddyotakara, for example, writes, "अस्ति च भिन्ने उपलभ्यमानें भेदस्यादर्शनात्। and अनेकस्मिन्नुपलभ्यमानेपि भेदस्यादर्शनादभेदप्रत्ययों भवति" (p. 230 वार्तिक on 2.1.36). It may be noted that he already shows an awareness of the idea of ultimate atoms as constituting physical objects that are perceived by the senses, an idea which is generally ascribed to *Vaiśeṣika* as if it were their discovery.

The discussion of *anumāna* from sūtra 2.1.37 onwards is primarily based on the relation between cause and effect and not on what is called *upapatti* in the Indian logical tradition. Also, the objections raised are primarily empirical in character and are based on what is called plurality of causes and intermixture of effects in the western logical tradition. Furthermore, as the causal relation necessarily involves a temporal relation, the discussion of time is brought in and the usual problems in respect of the distinction between present, past and future is raised in connection with the problem of inference or *anumāna*. An interesting point is made that if 'causality' provides the basis for the inference either in respect of the past or of the future, then their reality has to be accepted. Not only this, the idea of action is brought in and it is argued that action necessarily involves the distinction between the present and the future and hence the reality of the distinction has to be accepted if action is to be regarded as real.

Besides this there is an interesting discussion of the phenomenon of 'falling' (2.1.39) which recalls to some extent the paradoxes of motion as articulated by Zeno in the Western tradition. The paradox is, however, formulated not in terms of the infinite divisibility of space or time, but rather of the impossibility of conceiving any state in the process of 'falling' as being 'present' which is essential to the concept of 'time' without which the phenomenon of 'falling' can not be understood at all. The paradox may be presented as follows; " 'Falling' necessarily involves the notion of time and the notion of time

necessarily involves the distinction between the present, past and the future. But in the state of 'falling' the 'present' can never be conceived to be present at all and hence 'falling' can not be regarded as being in time. But if it can not be so regarded, it can not be real."

The analysis of time and the problems relating to it need to be understood further as they are articulated in the discussion given later in the commentaries. (See the discussion in Vārttika on p. 239 and Ṭīkā on p. 356.)

It appears that the problem regarding the phenomenon of "falling" was raised by Nāgārjuna and, if so, one will have to assume that the problem was being generally discussed at that time or alternatively, either Nāgārjuna or Gautama borrowed the example from the other.

The discussion on *upamāna* becomes more sophisticated and complex in the commentaries where its relation to *pratyakṣa* on the one hand and the *śabda* of an *āpta puruṣa* on the other is explored further and its distinction from them is articulated. However, one of the basic problem with respect to both *upamāna* and *śabda* does not seem to have been noticed and it is this that the notions of 'similarity' and 'reliability' or 'trustworthiness' are fundamental to all knowledge as it is inconceivable without them. Even in *pratyakṣa* there is said to be the essential element of *pratyabhijñā* which involves recognition and hence similarity of the present with the past. As for *śabda,* one has to accept reliability and trustworthiness of even one's own memory, let alone of that which is said by someone else. Knowledge is a collective enterprise and, in case it is so, *śabda pramāṇa* will have to be regarded as the most foundational in its acquisition. At a deeper level, language itself involves recognition and though *upamāna* can not be reduced completely to the recognition of similarity, still it has to have it as an essential element without which it can not even be conceived to be what it is.

In *Śabda viśeṣa parīkṣā* Vācaspati Miśra introduces the notion of Īśwara in the context of *śabda pramāṇa* and in doing so

destroys the notion of the "*āpta puruṣa*" in terms of which the idea of *śabda pramāṇa* was defined by the author of the N.S. If Īśwara alone can be an *āpta puruṣa* then obviously there can be no other person or persons who can be given that appelation. The explicit denial of the characterization to both the Buddha and the Mahāvīra supports this, for if they can not be regarded as *āpta puruṣa,* who can be regarded as such? Udayana also accepts this introduction and calls him "*parameśwara*" but neither he nor Vācaspati Miśra see the problem created by the bringing in of the notion of Īśwara or *Parameśwara* to safeguard the authority of the Vedas. The sūtra 2.1.68 explicitly refers to Āyurveda as example to support the contention that there is such a thing as *śabda pramāṇa* but then Āyurveda will have to be regarded as the word of Īśwara and hence final in respect of what it deals with. This obviously will be difficult to maintain in face of the fact that the texts known as Āyurveda show unmistakable signs of additions and alterations even at the time when Vācaspati and Udayana were writing their commentaries.

There is another problem which does not seem to have been faced by either of the commentaries, that is, if *śabda* in order to be regarded as *prāmāṇika* has to be the *śabda* of Īśwara, then how can it be *anitya,* a doctrine that the author of the Nyāya sūtra vigourously supports as against the theory of *śabda nityatva* propounded by the *Mīmāṁsakas.*

It may also be noted that while both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara used the term "*puruṣa*", Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana used the terms Īśwara and *Parmeśwara,* thus suggesting that the whole idea of *śabda pramāṇa* had undergone a sea-change since the times it was propounded by Gautama in his N.S. and when Vātsyāyana had said: "ऋष्यार्यम्लेछानाँ समानँ लक्षराँ (p.14)"

2.2

The discussion regarding *arthāpatti* raises two interesting issues which do not seem to have been distinguished in the

commentaries on the sūtra. The first relates to the question whether *arthāpatti* can be regarded as an instance of *anumāna* and hence need not be considered as an independent *pramāṇa* in itself, while the second concerns the question as to how can *arthāpatti* be regarded as a *pramāṇa* at all when it is essentially infected by *anekāntīkatā*. In the former case, *arthāpatti* is regarded as a valid form of inference; what is questioned is only the acceptance of it as an independent *pramāṇa* which is irreducible to *anumāna*, or any of the other *pramāṇas* accepted by the Nyāya sūtra. The defect of *anekāntikatā*, however, is supposed to infect *anumāna* itself. Gautama's reply to this in the sūtra 2.1.6 is that in case the objection is correct, it will infect the argument given by the opponent and hence invalidate it also.

The various commentaries do not appear to have seen the problem raised by Gautama's rejoinder as no attempt is made to find the distinguishing character of that type of *anumāna* which is not infected by *anekāntikatā*. Uddyotakara has tried to define *anekāntīkatā* as "स्वविषयतज्जातीयान्यवृत्तिः" (p. 265 वार्तिक on sūtra 2.2.6) but the lead given by him does not seem to have been followed further.

It is interesting to note that Vācaspati Miśra uses the term *avacchedaka,* perhaps for the first time in his Ṭikā on sūtra 2.2.6 when he writes "गृहावच्छिन्नाभावेन गृहसत्वँ विरूद्धत्वात् प्रतिषिध्यते" (p. 392).

The discussion on *abhāva* seems to take a strange turn as the reason for denying *abhāva* as an independent *pramāṇa* is given in terms of the non-existence or *asiddha* character of that which it is supposed to establish. This, it should be noted, is the complete opposite of what shall happen when *abhāva* is accepted as an independent *padārtha* by the Vaiśesikas after Śivāditya's specific formulation of it in his *Saptapadārthī.*

The discussion takes an interesting turn from Vācaspati onwards when he brings in the notion of *prāgabhāva* into the picture and seems to suggest that *prāgabhāva* is something that is inferred from the perception of the object whose *bhāva* or

existence is known through it (It may be noted in this connection that Vācaspati uses the more appropriate term for what he wants to convey.) Udayana appears to go a step further and suggests that the object of *pratyakṣa* should be seen as a *pratiyogī* of its *prāgabhāva*. This is real introduction of *navya nyāya* terminology which later becomes standard in the description of *abhāva* in the *navya nyāya* tradition (p. 393). The extensive use of the term *pratiyogī* in connection with the discussion in *Pariśuddhi* on this topic may be specifically noted.

The inclusion of *aitihya* under *śabda* raises a problem which has not been seen either by the author of the N.S. or his commentators. In case *aitihya* is considered to be *paraṁparā*, then it will have to be regarded as beginningless in character and hence as *apauruṣeya*, thus, destroying the distinction between *pauruṣeya* and *apauruṣeya* as argued for by the mīmāṁsakas.

Śabda anityatva—One of the interesting issues in connection with the non-eternality of sound occurs in sūtra 2.2.31, 32 and 33 where the problem of identity and difference is raised. The discussion in Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra should be closely examined for the issues that they raised. Uddyotakara, for example, writes, "यदिदमन्यदिति मन्यसे इदमन्यस्माद् अन्यद् वा स्याद्, अनन्यद् वा। यद्यन्यत्, अन्यत् न भवति। यथा ब्राह्मणादन्यो न ब्राह्मरा इति। अथानन्यत्, तथाप्यन्यत् न भवति, अनन्यत्वात्" (p. 288) and Vācaspati Miśra writes, "तयोरन्यानन्योर्मध्येऽनन्यस्यापेक्षत्वसिद्धेरित्यर्थः" (p. 412). Perhaps the contention is that neither identity nor difference can be understood apart from each other and hence every assertion of identity or difference implies the assertion of the other in the context of which alone it makes sense.

The discussion from sūtras 2.2.39-57 deals with two different problems. The first relates to the question whether sound can be treated as a quality in the same sense as other qualities belonging to the different sense organs. The reason given for a radical difference between sound and other sense qualities is that it is

never the same and continuously varies in intensity which is not the case with other qualities which are apprehended by different sense organs. The other problem that is being raised depends firstly on the distinction between *dhvani* and *varṇa* and secondly on the fact that sound in the form of letters undergoes transformation when combined with each other. The discussion in th commentaries does not seem to see the importance of the issue raised in the sūtra (both Vācaspati and Udayana interpret the sūtras in the context of the *Sāṅkhyan* contention that the *prakṛti* is *nitya pariṇāmī* and do not see that the problem discussed is the generalized issue of change and permanence in the context of sound in the sūtra concerned. Interestingly, Udayana makes a contention that the change can occur only in *dravya* and not in the *guṇas* "प्रकृतिविकारभावस्यापि द्रव्यमात्रविषयत्वात्" (p. 410). Also, he distinguishes between Buddhist notion of change and the *Sāṁkhyan* notion of *pariṇāma* which have not generally been seen in this perspective, 'विकासे हि नाम न बौद्धनयवत् पूर्वस्य निरन्वयनिवृतावुतरस्य प्रादुर्भावः सांख्यस्य विवक्षितः, किं त्ववस्थितस्यैव धर्मिणः पूर्वधर्मतिरोभावे धर्मान्तरस्याविर्भावः।' (p. 410). Also, it is not clear that the term *varṇa* used in the sūtra should be translated as indicating the ultimate units of meaning or as letters, a term that does not clearly distinguish between what is denoted by the terms *svara* and *vyanjana* in the Sanskrit language.

The sūtras 2.2.57 onwards discuss the power of words to convey meaning and through that to determine action and feelings. In this connection Vātsyāyana propounds the 'use theory of meaning' which is associated with the name of Wittgenstein in the modern times. He writes, for example, 'शब्दस्य प्रयोगसामर्थ्यात् पदार्थवधारणम्' (p. 129 Bhāṣya on sūtra 2.2.59). Also, there is an extended discussion in Uddyotakara regarding the issue whether a word primarily indicates an individual, a form or a universal or all of these together. There is an interesting statement which states that if the universal is truly a universal it can have no '*bheda*' or 'difference' within it. The exact statement is "एका

जातिः । तस्या विशेषणमनर्थकम्" (p. 300 Vārttika on sūtra 2.2.60). The problem is complex as in case the universal itself is to be differentiated from other universals, it is bound to have difference within it as it will have to be defined in terms of that from which it is different. In case it is truly universal in the sense that it is universal of universals, then it will have no difference within it as there will be no 'other' universal besides it. This is the problem of defining Being qua Being, that is, 'being' that is exemplified in everything. But, in that case one would have to deny completely the intelligibility of the notion of "non-being", a problem which thought has not been able to solve for, if *abhāva,* or non-being, is treated as a *padārtha* then there will be the related problem of defining 'being' not in terms of that which 'is' but also that which it 'is not'. This, however, would once again bring in difference within that which was supposed to have no difference within it.

3.1

The sūtras 3.1.1-3 seem to be concerned with the unity of the object that is perceived by different senses. The restriction to the sense of touch and sight in the sūtra 3.1.1 may perhaps more appropriately be seen as concerned not with the unity, but with the independent reality of the object as it is the sense of touch which ensures that something is 'really' there. The problem of the unification of different sensory objects into one complex whole is not adequately raised at all nor is its importance seen, particularly when one remembers the discussion on the subject in Kant where this becomes the central point in understanding what knowledge really involves.

The discussion from 3.1.4 onwards seems to be concerned with the question why *manas* can not be regarded as performing the function of the 'knower' and the answer seems to be that the *manas* itself performs the same function as that of the senses as it may be said to know pleasure and pain. There seems to be a systematic ambiguity in the use of the terms *manas* and *buddhi*

in the text as, on the one hand, they are supposed to be not instruments of cognition like the. senses but as performing only a restrictive function ensuring that only one knowledge arises at one time *(manas)*, while *buddhi* is supposed to be a synonym of knowledge itself. This is supposed to be the formal 'official' position of Nyāya, but the discussion continuously interchanges *manas* with *antaḥkaraṇa* which is supposed to be the organ of introspective cognition and not just of pleasure and pain, while *buddhi* is supposed to be the instrument of inferential cognition, that is, *anumāna.* The argument is that as these are instruments of cognition, like the senses, the knowledge that is produced by them can not belong to them and hence there is the need for the postulation of an entity separate from them which can be said to be the organiser or the knower to whom the knowledge may be said to belong. A simpler argument would have been that as these themselves are the objects of cognition, they can not be treated as that to which the cognition belongs.

There is another problem which has not been paid sufficient attention either by the author of the N.S. or by the other schools of Indian philosophy. This relates to the question regarding the relation between the objects known by the sense organs, the mind and the intellect and the relation that obtains between these instruments of cognition which are supposed to be different from one another. The body along with the senses, it should remembered, dies and one may assume that the objects which are known through them cease to be known in case they are supposed to be exclusively known by the sense alone. One would then have to postulate that the mind and intellect which are supposed to be *independent* instruments of knowledge will survive the death of the body. In case one does not want to accept this, one will have to accept that these are also located in the body in the same sense as the senses are, or they are its functions as the so-called sensory functions are supposed to be.

The notion of *antaḥkaraṇa* is widely prevalent in Indian philosophy but it is seldom made clear what exactly does it

connote. Also, if it is regarded as *jaḍa* or unconscious as in advaita Vedānta on the analogy of *buddhi* in *sāṁkhya,* then how can it be said to 'know' and what will be the difference between it and the senses which so obviously belong to the body which certainly is not *jaḍa* or inert as it is alive. The Upaniṣaic upāsanā of *prāṇa* or the principle of life has not been sufficiently explored in Indian thought which, like its western counterpart, has been satisfied with the distinction between 'conscious' and 'unconscious', or between mind and matter, forgetting that the body is not material as it is living, full of life and zest.

Interestingly, the discussion on the sūtra is intrigued by the fact that while we have two eyes there is supposed to be only one act of 'seeing'. But there are other senses like ears and nose which are also dual in nature. As for touch it is spread all over the body and is co-extensive with it. Taste seems to be the only exception, though it is difficult to say whether tongue alone tastes, or the other parts of.the mouth are also actively involved in it, as they are supposed to be in the production of speech or sound.

The sūtra 3.1.28 specifically cites the *śruti* for the first time in support of an argument. Vātsyāyana in his *bhāṣya* specifies the *śruti vākya* as belonging to the *Ṛgveda* 10.16.3. The *mantra* seems to say that the eyes belong to the sun while the body belongs to the earth as they arise from these. It is strange to find that the senses are supposed to be different from the body. Not only this, normally smell or *gandha* is supposed to be apprehended by the *ghrāṇendriya* which is supposed to be located in the nose just as the sight is located in the eyes. There seems little reason, therefore, to ascribe *gandha* to the *śarīra* or the body as the *bhāṣya* seems to say. The exact wording of the mantra is "सूर्यं ते चक्षुर्गच्छतात्...पृथिवी ते शरीरम् ।" and the *bhasya* thereon reads as follows "सेयँ कारणाद विकारस्य् स्प्रतिरभिधीयत इति ।" (p. 153). This seems a purely *sāṁkhyan* position where the *kārya* is the विकार of *kāraṇa.* Uddyotakara in his Vārttika seems to be aware of this and hence tries to modify the position by saying "प्रलयशब्देन च कार्यशून्यं कारणमभिधीयते, न पुनः कार्यस्य कारणे लयः प्रलयः ।" (p.

351).

Vācaspati has nothing new to say on the subject except that the term *sprati* means *utapatti* (p. 478). Udayana tries to deal with the question whether all the five *mahābhūtas* of which the five senses are supposed to be subtle modifications are so, separately from each of them or from all of them together. As the Sāṁkhya position unifies them all ultimately in *prakṛti,* Udayana seems to try to distinguish the Nyāya position from that of Sāṁkhya on this issue. The discussion should be seen in detail in order to understand Udayana's position and his relation to the earlier commentaries on the sūtra (p. 447). All in all, the appeal to the *śruti* only seems to have confused matters instead of clarifying them. Not only this, the author of the N.S. as well as the commentators on it seem to have forgotten that if the *śruti* were to be treated as a *śabda pramāṇa,* then the mantra quoted will have to be treated as an *upadeśa* of an *āpta puruṣa* which it certainly is not as it deals with a factual matter.

The sūtra 3.1.36 seems to propound a general view that the perceptibility or non-perceptibility (अनुपलब्धि) of substances and qualities depends on the difference in their properties (धर्म). The discussion in the *Bhāṣya* brings in the knowledge of physics and optics of those times and suggests that the imperceptibility of the substances is because of the size of the molecules contained therein. Surprisingly, it suggests that it is the molecules of water in the air that are supposed to be responsible for cold while it is the molecules of light that are responsible for warm weather (p. 155). The discussion provides an important clue to the physics of those times and should be examined from this point of view. Unfortunately, Uddyotakara does not seem to be interested in this aspect of Vātsyāyana's discussion. Vācaspati does not carry the discussion forward; Udayana avoids the discussion altogether, showing that the philosophers had become far removed from the empirical knowledge of their times.

There is another point which needs to be paid some attention. This relates to the question whether the term 'dharma' in the sūtra

is to be applied to *dravya* only or to *guna* also. In case the latter is permitted, it will imply that qualities or *guṇas* can have their own dharma, that is, properties. This will go against the accepted orthodox position of Nyāya that a property can not have a property of its own. This perhaps was a later development as the N.S. shows little evidence of having propounded such a position.

The sūtras 3.1.31-50 discuss in great detail the peculiar problem raised by the sense of sight and, surprisingly, give a picture of philosophical discussion which generally is neglected when people talk about Indian philosophy. The wealth of empirical detail mentioned in the sūtras and the critical attitude displayed in assessing them is worth noting.

The same thing is displayed in the discussion of the sūtras from 3.1.50 onwards where the discussion centres on the question whether one need postulate five different senses or they all may be regarded as modifications of one sense which may be identified with the sense of touch. This reminds one of the theory generally accepted in modern times that all the senses are differentiations from one primal sense which life displays at all levels and this is the sense of touch.

The argument in 3.1.58 not only suggests that there are categories of perception but also that each of these categories has a five-fold aspect into which it is necessarily differentiated. The term used is strange and once again raises the problem as to how the term '*buddhi*' is to be understood in the context of the N.S. in particular and the Nyāya tradition in general.

The sūtras 3.1.60 onwards discuss the puzzling problem of the relation between the senses and their objects and the qualities they apprehend in them. There is also the problem whether senses by themselves are capable of knowing the qualities along with their object or they need co-operation from some other faculties such as mind etc. for having the knowledge effectively. There is the, even stranger, problem of the uniqueness of the auditory faculty which is said to be radically different from all others. One reason that has been given for this problem is that sound is

supposed to be the quality of *ākāśa* which is not known on any other ground, or from any other source, whatsoever. One of the strange conclusions is supposed to be reached in the statement that the auditory organ itself may be regarded as identical with *ākāśa* which is sought to be justified by Uddyotakara in his statement "आकाशं परिशेषात् ।" (p. 375). Not only this, the Vārttika even raises the question regarding the identification of the auditory organ with space or time or *dik* and *kāla*. Vācaspati gives up the whole set of problems in desperation and argues that these are not empirical matters at all and may be left to purāṇas for decision about them. He writes "भूतसृष्टिप्रतिपादकेषु पुराणेषा नैतर्हीति । नेदानीमननुभवादित्यर्थः ।" (p. 492). Perhaps what Vācaspati means is that the question of origination and beginning can not be decided by empirical observation and arguments. But, then, the argument was not concerning either the origination or the beginning of the senses or the knowledge of their objects. Udayana, in his turn, ignores the issues altogether. There could be no greater evidence of the decline of the empiricist tradition in Indian philosophy than the one that occurs from Gautama to Udayana as evidenced and documented in the Bhāṣya, Vārttika and Pariśuddhi during the first millenium A.D.

The discussion in *adhyāya* 3.1 raises certain issues regarding visual and auditory perception which need to be paid attention as they raise some problems which need serious consideration even now. The following are some of the issues raised in the text: (1) Light not only reveals but also hides as in the case of sunlight which makes it impossible to see stars in the light. (2) Darkness does not necessarily entail that one can not see anything in it, for animals see in the darkness. (3) Eyes must have a natural light of their own as some of the animals' eyes shine brightly and are visible in the darkness. (4) Everything that intervenes between the eyes and the object does not necessarily obstruct the vision as is the case with transparent objects. (5) The ears have a cavity or an empty space within them which seems to be necessary for the appearance of sound therein. But sound is only produced

when two different things are struck together. What is it then which strikes the ear and how can an empty space be struck by anything at all? (6) Why should not all the senses be regarded as different examples of the universal sense?

3.2

The surprising mention *of karma* and *ākāśa* in the context of the question of eternity or non-eternity of *buddhi* is sought to be explained by the Bhāṣya on the ground that *buddhi* seems to share some properties with both of them and as *karma* is obviously *anitya* and *ākāśa* is *nitya,* the doubt regarding the eternity or non-eternity of *buddhi* arises. This, though plausible, is hardly credible as one can always find such instances to create artificial doubt in one's mind.

The meaning of the term *buddhi* is not clear in the context as, on the one hand, it is identified with knowledge or *jñāna* which itself is considered as something acquired or as something which is the 'result' of an activity, that is, *upalabdhi.* But, if it is understood in this sense then it obviously can not be *nitya,* a point that is clearly formulated by Vācaspati "अथ तु नित्यत्वसाधनानि प्रतिसन्धानादीनि न बुद्धिनित्यत्वस्येशते, ततो वृत्रय एव बुद्धयो न तु तदतिरिक्तं बुद्धितत्वं सिध्यतीती सिध्यति।" (p. 496, sūtra 3.2.1).

The term '*buddhi*' may also be understood in the sense of a faculty or even as an instrument that results in knowledge and it is in this sense that the discussion occurs in Vācaspati and Udayana where it is articulated in the context of Sāṁkhya notion of *buddhi* and *mahat. Buddhi* in this discussion is seen as involving *kriyā, kartā* and *karaṇa* and as *jñāna* is supposed to be *upalabdhi* of this *kriyā,* its *āśraya* can not be *buddhi* but has to be the self or *ātman.* In Vācaspati Miśra's own words "प्रधानक्रियाचेयभुपलब्धिः। अतों यदाधारा सा प्रतीयते स कर्ता न करणम्। तथा च प्रतत्यभिज्ञानाद्युपलब्ध्या तदाधारः कर्ता आत्मा सिध्यति नित्यो नान्तःकरणमित्यर्थः।" (*Ṭīkā* on sūtra 3.2.3, p. 497). As for the notion

of *karaṇa* Vācaspati gives the following interesting definition of it; "प्रधानक्रियानाधारः करणम्।" (p. 497)

The fact that knowledge persists even when the object of knowledge ceases to be there is given as an argument for the contention that knowledge therefore has to be accepted as a property of something else and this can only be the self or the *ātman.* Vātsyāyana in his explication of the sūtra adds that knowledge can only be the property of the self as when the self 'ceases', there can be no knowledge. The argument is strange as it presupposes both that the self is *'independently'* known to exist and that it is something that can *'cease'* to be. Normally, the Naiyāyika treats the self as *nitya* and proves its existence on the ground that knowledge has to belong to it as it can not belong to anything else. The exact statement of Vātsyāyana reads as follows "न च ज्ञातरि विनष्टे ज्ञानं भवितुमर्हतीति।" (p. 185, sūtra 3.2.18).

Uddyotakara also seems to accept the possibility of the cessation of, or the non-existence of, the knower or the experiencer. Uddyotakara writes, "यथैव ज्ञातारमन्तरेण ज्ञानं न भवति, एवमनुभवितरि नष्टे अनुभवितारमन्तरेण स्मृतिरप्ययुक्तेति" (p. 395 on sūtra 3.2.18). Udayana makes another astounding statement which normally would not be acceptable to "orthodox" Naiyāyikas of modern times. He not only accepts the possibility of activity of the 'self but also seems to argue for the position that 'knowledge' involves essentially an activity on the part of the *ātman* or the self. Besides this, he also makes the self the *āśraya* of the *saṁsakāra* and *anubhava.* In his own words, "तथापि परलोकिनमात्मानं साधयता बुद्धिं प्रति कर्तृत्ववत् शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तस्यैव स्मृतिसंस्कारनुभवाश्रयत्वमपि प्रसाधितम्...." (p. 478 on the same sūtra). Udayana, thus, seems to make a distinction between knowledge and experience or *jñāna* and *anubhava* on the one hand and *smṛti* and *saṁskāra* on the other. Uddyotakara had already mentioned *anubhava* in his Vārttika but had not mentioned *saṁskāra.* The distinctions, however, do not seem to have been developed further in the

Nyāya tradition. Nor, as far as we know, attention has been drawn to the use of the term *kartṛtva* in connection with the knowing activity of the self.

The discussion deals with the question as to how our knowledge is confined and limited both in space and time when the self is supposed to be omnipresent or *vibhu*. There is a lot of interesting discussion regarding the problems raised by memory in the understanding of knowledge and what is its relation to mind on the one hand and self on the other. There is also the problem as to whether mind or even self can be regarded as confined to the body alone or be considered as independent of it. In this connection some interesting notions such as those of *antaḥ śarīra vṛtti* and *karmāśaya* are brought in without however leading to any clearer understanding of the problems raised. Nor for that matter, is the *vibhu* character of the soul discussed, for how can there, be plurality of selves if each soul is regarded as *vibhu* in character. The discussion on these issues has to be closely looked into and critically evaluated for its philosophical relevance in the contemporary context of discussion.

The discussion seems to centre around two basic issues: (1) whether the apprehension of change necessarily involves an element of continuous changefulness in the '*apprehension*' itself and, if this be accepted, how can any unitary knowledge be possible. (2) It relates to the question whether any relevant distinction can be made between phenomena that are considered as 'living' and the self or the *ātman* on the other. Two important distinctions are pointed out in the discussion; the one concerning freedom from causality and the second relating to the idea of moral responsibility. The former perhaps distinguishes, at least relatively, between the 'living' and the 'non-living', while the latter may be said to distinguish between man and all other living beings as the former alone seems endowed with moral responsibility whose essence is indicated in the Indian tradition by the theory of karma.

One interesting point which has been made in this connection

in the Bhāṣya and the Vārttika relates to the question whether the body, the senses and the mind can relevantly be ascribed the property of freedom and moral responsibility and as this can not be done, the soul alone is left to which these characteristics may be said to belong. But this is a Sāṁkhyan position which radically distinguishes between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* and puts not only the gross and subtle elements on the side of *prakṛti* but also the senses, the mind and even the *buddhi* which it considers as a faculty separate from them. There is an interesting formulation in the Bhāṣya in this connection which reads as follows; "परतन्त्राणि भूतेन्द्रियमनांसि धारणप्रेरराव्यूहनक्रियासु प्रयत्नवशात् प्रवर्तन्ते।" (p. 196 on sūtra 3.2.38).

The bhāṣya in this connection makes another statement which seems to imply that only one soul which is distinguished by different bodies seems to constitute the world. The sentence reads as follows, "एकसत्वाधिष्ठानश्चानेकशरीरयोगः संसार उपपद्यते।" (p. 197 on sūtra 3.2.39).

The sūtras 3.2.46-55 deal with the question whether *buddhi* can be considered a property of the body and comes to the conclusion that it can not be so attributed. Once again, it is not clear what does the term '*buddhi*' exactly mean? The *Nyāya Sūcī Nibandha* mentipns the prakaraṇa discussed in the sūtra as "*buddhiśarīraguṇavyatireka prakaraṇa*" but the bhāṣya clearly uses the term *cetanā* in this context and the discussion also makes sense if it is construed in that context as many of the examples given such as those of hair and nails will not make sense otherwise. Uddyotakara in his Vārttika uses the same term again and even Vācaspati Miśra I uses the term in spite of the fact that in the title of the *prakaraṇa* he explicitly states that while earlier consciousness has been denied as a property of the five elements, the senses and the mind, now it is being explicitly denied of the whole body itself. He writes, "पूर्व हि भूतेन्द्रियमनसाँ चैतन्यँ साक्षात् निराकृतमुपेक्षात् शरीरस्य, संप्रति तु शरीरस्यैव साक्षात् चैतन्यँ निरस्यत इति तात्पर्यभेदादपुनरूक्तम्।" (p. 539, sūtra 3.2.47). (It is not clear

whether the term *bhūtendriya* means only the five senses or the five elements along with the five senses.)

The problem arising from the term '*buddhi*' in the *prakaraṇa* and *cetanā* in the bhāṣya may perhaps be resolved by seeing that for the author of the N.S. there is an equivalence between knowledge which is a synonym for *buddhi,* that is, *jñāna* and consciousness, that is, *cetanā.* And as knowledge is supposed to be a property of *ātman,* so also is consciousness and as the *buddhi* is supposed to be *anitya,* the *ātman* can not have consciousness as a permanent intrinsic property of itself.

The argument in the commentaries deals with the issue whether consciousness can be considered as a property of body, particularly as it is present when body is present and absent when body is absent. The counter-objection to this is made by pointing out that even if it is so, it does not prove what is sought to be proved as conjunction and disjunction or *saṁyoga* and *vibhāga* are present only when motion is present and absent when motion is absent and yet can not be ascribed as properties to motion. The *pūrva pakṣin* is then supposed to argue that after all a property is ascribed to the 'object' in which it is apprehended and consciousness is obviously apprehended as the property of the body. The objection against this given in the sūtra and elaborated in the commentaries is that even when a property is apprehended as belonging to an object, it may not intrinsically belong to it. The sūtra reads "द्रव्येस्वगुणपरगुणोपलब्धेः संशयः।" (3.2.46). The Bhāṣya clarifies it further and says "चेतनायां संशयः किं शरीरगुणश्चेतना सति शरीरे गृह्यते, अथ द्रव्यान्तर गुण इति।" (p. 203) and gives the example of warmth as property of water even when it does not essentially belong to it. But, while this would make consciousness an accidental property of the body, it will not deny its actual presence in it. The term "dravyāntaram' should be specially noted as it implies that a substance may come to possess a property which intrinsically belongs to some other substance. The body in the context of the discussion is supposed to be the substance or *dravya* to which the consciousness belongs even

though it is not its essential property which it can only be of the self or the *ātman*. Also, it will make it an essential property of the *ātman* and thus will go against the orthodox nyāya position which denies it absolutely. Not only this, if the identification of *buddhi* with *cetanā* or consciousness is accepted, then *buddhi* will have to be treated as *nitya* and not as *anitya* the way in which it is generally construed by Naiyāyikas.

The discussion on mind from sūtras 3.2.56-59 is puzzling in the extreme as it concentrates on a dubious fact that one knows only one thing at a time and that it has to be atomic in character because of this. Normally, the term mind or '*manas*' is postulated to account for the fact of introspection or the phenomena that it reveals such as wishing, desiring, willing, feeling etc. which are usually designated as "mental" processes. The sūtra text as well as the commentaries on it have earlier talked of *antaḥśarīravṛtti* and *antaḥkaraṇa* which normally should have been ascribed to manas but, strangely, the latter does not seem to have anything to do with them in the nyāya thinking on the subject. If it is remembered that the only other faculty after mind which the nyāya postulates is the *ātman,* then one will have to ascribe all the so-called mental processes revealed by introspection to it. The N.S. does talk of *icchā, dveśa, prayatna, sukha, duhkha* etc. but nowhere clarifies how they are known except in behavioural terms. The basic problem seems to arise from the fact that the term '*buddhi*' does not mean anything except knowledge without explaining what the term would then mean in this context.

The long discussion on the sūtras 3.2.60-72 deals with the problem posed by the birth and death of the living body and the question whether one need postulate any radical distinction between this and the formation and dissolution of material objects which are essentially non-living in nature. The problem is not clearly articulated and suffers from the unconscious hypothesis that motion, even in material objects, can only come from a force outside them. This has given rise to the notion of a *nimitta kāraṇa* or an efficient cause without which no causality can ever operate,

an idea that ultimately leads to the postulation of God as the creator of the material universe. It took long for man to realize that the idea was not necessary for understanding the physical universe and that motion might be regarded as a natural property of objects, and that what required explanation was rest and not motion. In any case, the discussion does not seem either relevant or adequate. Also, if the problem of the birth of the body is supposed to create a problem, then so should the question of 'birth' or 'coming into being' of mind and *buddhi* or *jñāna* or knowledge.

4.1

The discussion in 4.1 starts with the consideration of *pravṛtti* and *doṣa* which are further specified in detail in the commentaries where particular definitions are given for each of them. The three *doṣas* which are mentioned in the sūtra 4.1.3 as *rāga, dveśa* and *moha* are further divided by Vātsyāyana into "काम, मत्सर, स्पृहा, तृष्णा, लोभ" which come under *ragā;* "क्रोध, ईर्ष्या, असूया, द्रोह, अमर्ष" come under *dveśa* and "मिथ्याज्ञान, विचिकित्सा, मान, प्रमाद" come under moha (p. 220). Udayana adds *māyā* and *daṁbha* under rāga, *avamānanā* under dveśa and *bhaya* and śoka under *moha.* The term *māyā* means परवँचनेच्छा (p. 501). Interesting definitions of these are offered by the successive commentaries giving evidence of subtle phenomenological observation of mental states which are ascribed and designated by these terms. To give but a few examples, Uddyotakara gives the definition of *dveśa* as "असहिष्णुता दुःखस्य दुखसाधनानां चेति द्वेषः।" (p. 426 on sūtra 4.1.3). This is a strange definition of *dveśa.* Vācaspati seems to be aware of this and though accepting it reluctantly, modifies it in an interesting way to suggest that the usually accepted definition of *dveśa* is only a specific example of this general definition. He writes, "नन्वयं कृतापकारस्य या असहिष्णुता सोमर्ष इति द्वेषस्यैव विशेष इत्युक्तम्, कथं स एव द्वेषसामान्यमुच्यते इत्यत आह–असहिष्णुता दुखस्य दुखसाधनानां चेति।" (p. 552 on same sūtra).

Udayana gives an even stranger definition of *māyā* indicating that he was not aware of the way the concept was used in *advaita vedānta* or the Gītā. This definition reads as follows "तत्र माया परवँचनेचछा।" (p. 501, 4.1.3). There is also an interesting definition of what has been called *ārya prajñā* given by Vācaspati which reads as follows, "आरात् तत्वाद् याता आर्या/आर्या चासौ प्रज्ञा चेति आर्यप्रज्ञा।" (p. 552, 4.1.4).

The discussion of *rāga, dveśa* and *moha*, as is well known, occurs not only in the N.S. but is a general feature of the Indian tradition, Udayana shows an awareness of this and tries to suggest the specific difference in the Nyāya discussion of the subject from the one found in the *sāṁkhya-yoga* tradition. He writes in this context, "इन्द्रियादिदोषहेतुको हि मोहः, सुखानुशयी रागः, दुःखानुशयी द्वेष इति भावः" (p. 502, sūtra 4.1.6). Earlier he had mentioned five different views about *doṣas* amongst his contemporaries. These are, (i) *kāma, krodha* (ii) *śoka, moha* (iii) *avidyā, asmitā, rāga, dveśa* and *abhiniveśa* (iv) *avidyā* (v) *māna, matsara* etc. (p. 501, sūtra 4.1.3). Interestingly, most probably the advaitins thought that the basic cause of all *doṣas is avidyā and avidyā* alone as all the rest followed from it. The N.S. seems to suggest this when it says that as the *tattva jñāna* is the antithesis of all these three, that is, *rāga, dveśa* and *moha*, and hence they all may be considered as one. However, it counters this objection by saying that even when there may be one common quality which is opposed to a large number of qualities, they remain essentially different from one another. The example given is that of black which is opposed to all the other colours and thus shares the common quality of 'being different from them'; yet, they still remain different from one another. The detailed discussion on all these topics in the *Bhāṣya*, the Vārttika, the *Ṭikā* and the *Pariśuddhi* is rich and deserves to be studied in detail to taste the phenomenological flavour of nyāya writing on this psychological-cum-spiritual topic.

The sūtras 4.1.10-13 argue that the idea of rebirth can only

be intelligible if the eternity of the soul is accepted. The argument, in fact, rests on the acceptance of the doctrine of *karma* and not that of re-birth as what is being argued is that in case the doctrine of *karma* is accepted and it has to be accepted if life is to be morally intelligible, then one has also to accept the identity of the agent who does the action and the one who suffers pleasure and pain because of the actions that one has done. Thus, the identity between the doer of the actions and the one who enjoys its consequences leads, it is argued, to the 'permanence' or *nityatva* of the self or the soul which is another name for that which is supposed to be the 'doer' and the 'enjoyer' at the same time. However, Nyāya does not believe that *kartṛtva* and *bhoktṛtva* are essential properties of the self. There is also the anomaly that for exercising both these functions, the self has to depend essentially on the body and all the adjuncts that the exercise of these functions requires.

The sūtras 4.1.14-24 discuss the issue concerning that which may be regarded as the final or ultimate cause which is mentioned as *śūnya* or non-being which is usually ascribed to the school of Nāgārjuna, but it was mentioned as early as the *nāsadīya sūkta* in the Vedas. As for the hypothesis of God or Īśwara, the reason given for postulating it reminds one of Malebranche who had argued that the hypothesis of God alone can ensure the objectivity and stability of causal connection, without which moral actions would be come impossible. But none of these alternatives are exhaustively discussed in the sūtras and the commentaries thereon.

The author of the sūtras does not seem much interested in God or Īśwara and treats the hypothesis as an *upādāna kāraṇa* almost on the same level as that of *śūnya*, or that of non-being or chance and does not seem to accept it even as an *upādāna kāraṇa*. But, from Vātsyāyana onwards, the hypothesis of God assumes a different form and is taken seriously to account for the existence of all that is. The detailed discussion on this subject from Vātsyāyana to Udayana has to be examined closely to understand the development of philosophical thought about the

necessity for believing in the existence of God in order to understand the world. The usual idea that Nyāya becomes "theistic" only much later is, therefore, wrong and needs to be corrected accordingly.

The discussion on the sūtras 4.1.25-30 regarding the eternality or non-eternality of the world is divided into two parts, the first contending that everything is *anitya,* the second contending that everything is *nitya.* As the author seems to deny both the positions he may be taken to adopt the commonsensical position that some things are *nitya* while others are *anitya.* But there seems to be no discussion about what does it mean to say that something is '*nitya*' or '*anitya*'. Vātsyāyana seems to give a criterion of what is to be regarded as *anitya.* He suggests that if something is born or comes into being and is destroyed or disappears then that may be said to be *anitya.* He writes, "यस्य उत्पतिविनाशधर्मकत्वमुपलभ्य–तेप्रमाणतस्तदनित्यम्। यस्य नोपलभ्यते तद्विपरीतम्।" (sūtra 4.1.28, p. 231). There can be little doubt that in case one does observe origination or destruction then the object or the phenomenon concerned is *anitya,* but in case it is not so observed, then it does not follow that the object is *nitya,* as there can be no guarantee that its cessation or destruction shall never be observed in future. This can be ensured only if the nature of the object itself is such that temporal predicates such as origination and destruction can not be applied to it in principle. But within the Nyāya framework such a criterion is difficult to apply as it does not seem to make any distinction between empirical and non-empirical objects or objects that are essentially spatio-temporal in nature and those to which spatial and temporal predicates can not be applied because they are radically different in nature. The nyāya list of eternal objects includes such things as *parama sūkaṣama bhūtas, ākāśa,* kāla, dik, *ātman, mauas* and their qualities. No reason is given as to why these entities should be regarded as *nitya.* In fact, it is difficult, if not impossible, to give any reason or *hetu* for such a *sādhya* as the *lakṣaṇa* of the *sādhya* can not be given nor the *vyāpti* between the *hetu* and *sādhya* established. Strangely,

Nyāya does not seem to know any relationship except that of *vyāpti* on the basis of which it can establish a valid inference.

The discussion from sūtras 4.1.37-39 is concerned with the issue of difference and identity in objects and concludes that one has to accept both in order to understand phenomena as all that we know consists of *dravya* and *guna* on the one hand and *avayava* and *avayavī* on the other. In other words, everything that exists consists of substance and qualities and of whole and parts. Substances always give unity just as wholeness does, while qualities and parts always give a differentiating character to that which exists.

The *Bhāṣya* makes some interesting observations which, however, do not seem to have been elaborated. These concern the differentiating and unifying properties imposed by language on that which is regarded as 'given' or 'real'. Also, there is an interesting formulation which may be translated as "to be" is to be "differentiated" "भावस्य लक्षणमभिधानम्, येन येन लक्ष्यते भावः स समाख्याशब्दः, तस्य प्रथग्विषयत्वात् ।" (sūtra 4.1.34, p. 234). This, of course, is the *pūrva pakṣa* whose answer is given in the sūtra 4.1.35 "नानेकलक्षणैरेकभावनिषपत्तेः ।". Vātsyāyana's own comment on this states, "गुणाव्यतिरिक्तँ च द्रव्यम्" (p. 235).

The discussion on the sūtras 4.1.40-42 is interesting in more than one ways. Vātsyāyana seems to suggest that the answer to a question itself will generate a series of larger and larger number of distinctions intended by the person concerned. For example, in case one says that there is only one reality in the universe, he will make a distinction between the one that is *nitya* or, in other words, unchanging and eternal and all the rest which is *anitya,* that is, changing and impermanent. But in case he makes this distinction, he generates another distinction which consists of at least three entities in the universe. These will consist of the knower, the known and the knowledge, that is, *jñātā, jñeya* and *jñāna.* But in case one accepts the notion of *jñāna,* that is, something that is proved or established then one will have to

accept the existence of at least four entities, *pramātā, prameya, pramāṇa* and *pramiti.* The series can go on expanding and could perhaps have been developed in a different way. The sūtras themselves provide this other direction by suggesting that the contention that reality is one will have to be proved and a ground or a *hetu* provided for it. This itself will increase the number of entities in the universe as the *hetu* will have to be different from *sādhya,* an argument that will be given later by Samantabhadra to refute the advaitic position.

There is also another argument given in the sūtras which asks the question whether the so-called one reality is a whole or not and in case it is an avayavī, it is bound to have parts, and if it has parts the total number of entities can not be just one.

The discussion is important as it leads to the question of infinite divisibility on the one hand and indefinite proliferation of entities through the very process of proof of statements on the other. Russell's generation of an infinite number of classes because of the distinction between classes and classes of classes and their indefinite enlargement in this way resulting in the theory of types is well-known in modem times. So also is the distinction between a statement and a statement about the statement resulting in the distinction between object-language and meta-language and the resulting proliferation if one so wishes, is equally well known. It will be interesting to find if the paradoxes of self-reference were encountered in the Indian discussion of the subject. Strangely, later Nyāya discussion on the subject seems to have forgotten the 'objective' aspect of the discussion and centred more on the paradox of self-conscious cognition or *anuvyavasāya* resulting in the distinction between *viṣayatā* and *viṣayitā* and the indefinite proliferation that this might possibly generate.

The discussion on sūtras 44-51 centres around the problem of causality in human actions and its relation to moral predicates. It also concerns the relation between morality or *dharma* and happiness which has been a central concern of philosophical

thought all over the world. But it raises the question as to whom the moral predicates belong, specially as some of them necessarily involve a reference to the body. There is also a reference to the almost insoluble problem of the notion of 'potentiality' without which the very idea of human action can not be understood as it tries to conceive of causality in the context of its 'utilization' for bringing about an end or result which can be achieved through it. There is, of course; an attempt to distinguish between causality as it operates in the material realm and the way it operates in the human realm, but there seems no clear formulation of the issues which have been discussed in depth in philosophical traditions elsewhere.

Uddyotakara and Vācaspati discuss the issue in detail and at least Uddyotakara's discussion suggests that the very notion of human action entails the use of predicates which can not be understood or translated completely in empirical observable terms. He introduces the notion of *dharma* in this regard and suggests thereby that such a non-empirical property can only belong to something non-empirical in nature, that is, the *ātman* or self. In other words, the human self to the extent it has to be regarded as a moral agent can not be conceived of, in principle, in empirical terms. Uddyotakara seems to suggest further that such a non-empirical property, however, if it is real, must have consequences which themselves will have to be essentially non-empirical, even if they have an empirical dimension to them. Thus, the consequences of moral action have to have a non-empirical aspect even when they are treated as empirical in character.

The discussion is interesting in more ways than one, as it tries to bridge the obviously unbridgeable gap between the death of one body and the rebirth of the other. Strangely, the discussion brings in the notion of something which can neither be described as *sat, asat* or *sadasat*, concepts which are supposed to be used exclusively in the context of the description of the reality of the world in *advaita vedānta*.

The discussion on the sūtras 4.1.55-56 does not raise the fundamental question why *janma* or coming into being itself must be regarded as the cause of suffering. It is true that without it there can be neither suffering nor happiness, but it can not be regarded as the 'cause' of either. Nor has it been even thought that the thing that comes into being need not necessarily be conscious in nature and hence capable of feeling pleasure or pain. Material objects do come into being and also cease to exist, but no one will consider them as undergoing suffering. Not only this, no distinction seems to have been made between what may be called 'life' and 'consciousness'. Plants are considered to be 'living', but can they be regarded as possessing 'consciousness' or as feeling pleasure and pain, or 'suffering' because of the very fact that they have come into being.

Interestingly, Vātsyāyana makes a distinction between four grades of intensity of suffering and calls them *utkṛṣṭa, madhyama, hīna* and *hīnatara* and suggests that all beings including gods and those who are supposed to be *vītarāga* have to suffer. This, according to him, is because all of them possess bodies of some sort or other. According to him, "विविधा च बाधना हीना मध्यमा उत्कृष्टा चेति। उत्कृष्टा नारकिणाम्, तिरश्चां तु मध्यमा, मनुष्याणां हीना, देवानां हीनतरा वीतरागाणाम च।" (p. 245, sūtra 4.1.55). But, this is to forget that suffering can be mental also and even beyond that arises from causes that have nothing to do with either body or mind. Not only this, incurable dissatisfactions may arise because of the gap between the 'is' and the 'ought' or between what man 'is' and what he 'wants' to be or what he thinks he 'ought to be'. Still, one should see the discussion in the Bhāṣya as well as in the Pariśuddhi closely, particularly as the latter brings in consideration of sāṁkhya into the discussion.

The sūtras 4.1.59-68 discuss the objections that may be raised against the possibility of *apavarga* and should be taken seriously as they raise fundamental objections and also try to give possible replies to them within the tradition. One of the central issues relates to the question whether ignorance and suffering belong

to the very nature of the self or the self is essentially free of them. The example of sleep is invoked to show that one can and actually does get rid of suffering at least temporarily showing that it can not be the intrinsic nature of self. There is also a reference to the inherent conflict between the performance of dharma in the form of *agnihotra* etc. and the pursuit of *apavarga* which is supposed to involve the giving up of the obligation to perform these sacrifices. The reference to the householder's life wherein these sacrifices are supposed to be necessary, once again reveals the conflict between the householder's life and the pursuit of *apavarga* or *mokṣa*. There is also a reference to the renouncement of the fruits of action, but it is both uncertain and unclear.

There does not seem to be much discussion either in the *Bhāṣya* or Vārttika and the so-called reference to the *brāhmaṇa* texts is not clearly indicated. The discussion in the Bhāṣya seems to refer more to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka upaṇiṣad rather than to the *brāhmaṇa* texts where in case it had occurred, it would have gained an added 'significance'.

4.2

The discussion in 4.2 seems very strange, particularly as it occurs immediately after the discussion of *pretyabhāva* and *apavarga* in 4.1. The long discussion from 4.2.1 to 4.2.36 regarding the reality of whole and parts, atoms and *ākāśa* does not seem to make much sense in the context of the attainment of *apavarga* by the self after getting rid of all the *doṣas* which are said to be due to *pravṛtti* or *rāga, dveśa* and *moha* which constituted it. Perhaps, the discussion may be given some meaning if it is seen in the context of the *ātman* whose nature is to be determined. Is the *ātman* a whole consisting of parts or is it like an atom which can not have parts at all and to which the distinction of 'outside' and 'inside' can not be applied. If so, what is its relation to *ākāśa* or to other selves, for if it can have *saṁyoga* and *viyoga* or conjunction and disjunction, then one will

have to assume the reality of *ākāśa* in relation to it. In fact, the conjunction of the self with the body, the *indriyas* and the *manas* itself will have to be regarded as some sort of a conjunction whose disjunction results in what may be called *apavarga* and if so *rāga, dveśa* and *moha* will have to be regarded as the three different forms of relationships which connects the self to those. But the problem of the relation of self with other *ātmans* will still remain.

The problem has troubled thinkers in the western tradition also and Leibnitz's formulation of the concept of 'monad' as an immaterial atom or centre of conscious force and activity may be seen as a step in this direction.

In any case, the discussions in the commentaries do not seem to throw any light on these questions and as far as the author of the N.S. is concerned, he seems to be of the opinion that none of these questions can be answered in any definitive way. Still the relevance of the discussion and the level at which it occurs do not seem to make much sense. Perhaps the obsession with the Buddhists may explain to some extent the discussion as also the postulation of the notion of atom to understand the world around us.

The discussion from sūtras 4.2.27-37 is concerned with the nature of erroneous cognition or *mithyājñāna* which is the theme of the sūtra 1.1.2 as its removal alone leads to *tattvajñāna* which is supposed to lead to *apavarga*. The necessary relationship between *tattvajñāna* and *mokṣa* or *apavarga* on the one hand and *mithyājñāna* and bondage on the other, is the unquestioned assumption of Indian philosophical thought in general and Nyāya seems to be no exception to it. The Nyāya, however, is supposed to deny the necessary relationship between *apavarga* or *mokṣa* and bliss or *ānanda*, generally accepted by almost all schools of Indian philosophy, even though it accepts the necessary relationship between *mithyājñāna*, bondage and suffering. Ultimately, Indian thought seems so much afraid of 'suffering' in any form whatsoever that it has to postulate that in case one is suffering, it must be because of some 'falsity' in one's knowledge, even though the

general belief is that it is due to some wrong that was committed by one, either in the past life or this. The necessary relationships between truth, morality and happiness seem to be analytically postulated by Indian thinkers, even though there is no substantive evidence or argument in support of this contention. It is this postulate in its pristine purity which may be said to characterize Indian civilization and differentiates it from all the other major civilizations of the world.

The discussion from sūtras 4.2.38-52 is a statement of the standard Indian position on the subject and one is surprised to find it stated in the N.S., as it completely contradicts what has been said earlier in the text. Neither the process of yoga nor the practice of *samādhi* has anything to do with the *pramāṇa prameya vyāparā* with which the text had opened the discussion. Nor do the sixteen *padārthas* mentioned in the sūtra 1.1.1 have any relevance to the real enterprise of gaining the knowledge of 'reality' or *tattvajñāna* which is mentioned here. It is true that the sūtras from 4.2.47 onwards do bring in argumentation, even in the forms of *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā,* back into the picture. But they hardly seem relevant after one has already been advised to go and meditate and find the knowledge of reality through it.

5.1

The fifth chapter deals with fallacies and the discussion, specially as elaborated in commentaries, throws light on the way in which the processes of thought in argumentation were understood in the Indian tradition Vātsyāyana suggests that all argument is based on the apprehension of similarity or dissimilarity and the inference of other associated qualities on their ground. But similarity or dissimilarity can not only be of various kinds but also stretch along the lines of what Wittgenstein called 'family resemblance' and what in literary context, is known as simily and metaphor. But these can be misleading in character and lead to false conclusions. Vātsyāyana's pithy formulation summarizes

this in a preeminent way. He writes, "साधमर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्याँ प्रत्यवस्थानस्य विकल्पाज्जातिबहुत्वमिति संक्षेपेणोक्तम्" (p. 283, sūtra 5.1.1). The same is explained in detail as mentioned immediately after "तद्विस्तरेण विभज्यते". The detailed explication classifies the types of false conclusions which are reached on the basis of similarities and dissimilarities and hence is interesting on its own account and needs to be examined independently.

The discussion is primarily in terms of the notion of *'jāti'* as used in the sūtra 1.1.1 where it is mentioned along with *chala* as one of the *padārthas* and which in the context of a debate may lead to *nigrahsthāna*. But the issue is a far wider one and needs to be disengaged from the specific context in which it has been formulated in the Nyāya tradition. What needs to be explored is the forms which argumentation takes place and the natural mistakes which it makes when engaged in that process. Besides the argument based on similarities and differences, the other important basis for it is the relation between two entities or properties which are of such a nature that whenever one is present the other is present also. This has been called *vyāpti* in the Indian tradition and is generally based on the relation of causality. But it need not necessarily be so as the standard example of the relation between smoke and fire illustrates.

The ground provided by similarity or dissimilarity on the one hand and causality on the other, are both empirical, that is, based on sensory experience. But it need not necessarily be so and a history of self-reflection of thought on its own thinking process may be said to discover more and more of such bases which are either purely non-empirical or only half-empirical in character. The relation of material implication, for example, is an instance of this in modern logic. The same may be said about the relation of *āpādyatā* in the Indian tradition. In any case, the detailed discussion in chapter five needs to be looked into closely for the light it may throw on the notion of fallacy and its different types in the Indian tradition.

The sūtra 5.1.14 raises an interesting question, specially in the context of the Nyāya position that universals or *jāti* is perceptually apprehended as much as the particular or individual. And, hence, one apprehends simultaneously that which is *nitya,* that is *jāti* and that which is *anitya,* that is, particular or individual, at the same time. The problem is posed in respect of language which simultaneously apprehends or grasps both the universal and the particular through that which itself is particular in its aspect as '*occurant*' or '*event*' and universal in its semantic function or aspect.

The sūtras 5.1.15-20 deal with a situation where doubt occurs either because of similarity or because of dissimilarity and considers the situation where the appeal to dissimilarity or similarity is not able to resolve the doubt for some reason or other. It also brings in complex cases where multiple examples of similarity or dissimilarity engender unresolvable doubt.

There seems to be an important distinction between the use of similarity or dissimilarity in thinking about anything and their giving rise to doubt which needs to be resolved in favour of one or other alternatives. The significance of the issues raised does not seem to have been grasped as neither the role of similarity or dissimilarity has been grasped in the context of thinking in general nor the part they play in engendering doubt in respect of that which we encounter in experience.

At a deeper level the question of the importance of similarity or dissimilarity does not seem to have been raised, nor has it been seen that the relevance of the question or its importance varies with the context in which we are considering the issue or the purpose for which we are trying to engage in the discussion.

The discussion in 5.1 seems to deal with dilemmas created by arguments based on similarity and dissimilarity on the one hand and the relation of cause and effect on the other. Perhaps, the discussion is triggered by Nāgārjuna's dialectical presentation of the dilemmas through which he tried to disestablish the possibility of any *pramāṇa* establishing anything at all. The

argument, however, seems to be more general and seems to present a counter-dilemma to all those who manufacture such dilemmas and ask them as to how they can regard their own refutation as valid or establishing anything. At another level, it seems to suggest that all extreme positions are vitiated by the same defect and that perhaps the structure of reason itself is such that it pushes thought to logical extremes which, when reflected upon, seem equally untenable.

The whole section needs to be carefully examined from the view point of the structure of reason and the pure logic of argumentation, an approach later developed by Kant in the western tradition. The discussion also needs to be differentiated from the way dilemmas have been treated in the western logical tradition in order that a clearer picture may emerge of the way Gautama has treated the subject.

5.2

The discussion on nigrahatāna in 5.2 seems to be the most puerile and useless discussion that one finds in the Nyāya sūtra. It also shows that the discussion and debate held during those times were not concerned with exploring the truth or finding answers to questions by engaging in a joint exploratory intellectual activity. Instead, the whole thing seems to have centred around '*winning*' an argument which seems to have become the centre of intellectual life in those times. The inclusion of the topics from *vāda* onwards in the sūtra 1.1.1 explains this aspect, as otherwise the discussion about them will make no sense. The situation seems to have vitiated even the Upaniṣads as is found by what happened in the discussion at Janaka's court.

Chapter 4

A Short Note on Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña

Jayanta's *Nyāya Mañjarī* is a strange work in the Indian tradition. It is not a Bhāṣya or a Vārttika or even a Ṭīkā on the Nyāya Sūtras. And, though it calls itself a *Vṛtti,* it is nothing of that kind. It is an independent work, related only tangentially to the Nyāya Sutras and, in fact, falls outside the interpretative tradition set up by Vātsyāyana and followed by Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra I and Udayana. In this, it reminds one of Bhāsarvajñya whose work entitled "*Nyāya Bhūṣaṇa*" is also an independent work standing outside the main tradition formed by the four thinkers mentioned above.

There seems, however, a difference between Jayanta's work and the work of Bhāsarvajñya, as there seems to have been no commentary on the former during the whole period of about 1200 years, if we believe Potter's data mentioned in his Bibliography of Indian Philosophy. Bhāsarvajñya, on the other hand, seems to have found commentators on his work.

It is true that Jayanta seems to have mentioned Vācaspati Miśra I, though scholars differ regarding the identity of the exact person referred to by the name of Vācaspati in Jayanta's work. Udayana, on the other hand, seems to have referred to him as an 'old' Naiyāyika; the term used is "jaraja" and as contrast, he calls himself an *ādhunika.*

Jayanta's work discusses the 16 *padārthas* mentioned in the Nyāya Sūtra 1.1.1, ignoring details of the discussion in the Nyāya Sūtra, and though he refers to both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara,

he does not seem to take them as seriously as, say, Vācaspati Miśra I or Udayana who wrote directly on them.

Strangely, half of the work of Jayanta is concerned with elucidation and discussion of the first *padārtha,* that is, the *pramāṇas* which shows that, according to him, this was the heart of the matter and that the rest of the *padārthas* were marginal in nature. 392 pages are devoted to the discussion of this one topic only, while the rest numbering 15 get only 208 pages in the edition published in the Kashi Sanskrit Series, number 106.

The break-up of the pages devoted to the other topics mentioned in sūtra 1.1.1 is as follows:

prameya 117, saṁśaya 7, prayojana 1, dṛṣṭānta 1/2, siddhānta 2, avayava 13, tarka 3, nirṇaya 2, vāda 1, jalpa 1, *vitaṅḍā* 1/2, hetvābhāsa 15, chala 3, jāti 17, nigrahasthāna 18.

Among the prameyas, ātmā gets 43 pages, śarīra 3, indriyas 8, artha 3, buddhi 8, manas 2, *pravṛtti* 1, *doṣa* 2, pretyābhāva 3, phala 1, duhkha 2, apavarga 40.

A break-up of Jayanta's discussion of the *pramāṇas* reveals a strange picture as the number of pages occupied by the discussion on *śabda* far outnumber the pages deveoted to all the other *pramāṇas,* even when they are taken together. The *śabda pramāṇa* occupies 260 pages. The other three *pramānas,* that is, *pratyakṣa,* anumāna and *upamāna,* occupy together only 78 paes. The remaining 60 pages deal with the nature of *pramāṇa* in general. Among the three *pramāṇas,* pratyakṣa occupies 40 pages, anumāna 32 and *upamāna* only 6 pages. In case the number of pages is treated as an index of the importance of the subject for the author concerned, there can be little doubt that *śabda pramāṇa* occupies the pride of place for Jayanta followed by pratyakṣa (40), anumāna (32) and *upamāna* (6). Perhaps, the *upamāna* was included by him only because Gautama had mentioned it as an independent *pramāṇa* in the Nyāya Sūtra.

The relative importance of the respective *pramāṇas* gets even more sharply focussed in Bhāsarvajña. He eliminates *upamāna* as an independent *pramāṇa* and gives the lion's share to śabda

pramāṇa which occupies 219 pages in his work entitled *Nyāya Bhūṣaṇa* as compared with pratyakṣa which occupies 187 pages and anumāna 188. There seems to be, *prima facie,* a greater balance in the treatment of the three *pramāṇas* in Bhāsarvajña than one finds in Jayanta. Not only this, Bhāsarvajña seems to organise the material differently, and treats the whole issue of śabda *pramāṇa* as a part of the wider problem of *āgama prāmāṇya* which later on becomes an independent issue as evidenced in the work of Yāmunācārya entitled *Āgama-Prāmāṇya.* Bhāsarvajña's discussion of śabda *pramāṇa* in *āgama pariccheda* specifically treats both Buddhists and Jains as belonging to this tradition. Besides this, he squarely places the discussion of both *ātmā* and Īśwara in this part of his work. His extended discussion on Īśwara is another evidence that, by the middle of the 10th century, God had begun to occupy an important place in Nyāya discussion and that Udayana alone should not be credited with making Nyāya theistic in intent, as has generally been said by writers on the subject. Interestingly, Bhāsarvajña raises the issue of *abādhitatva* of knowledge and thus seems to bring into focus the problem raised by Śaṁkara in his formulation of *abādhitatva* as a criterion of reality. The exact formulation of the issue is as follows:

(p 3 96) The advaitins do not seem to have faced the problem squarely as they seem to have assumed that the knowledge of *Brahman* is *abādhita* in principle, and not merely *abādhita* as a fact. The problem was later formulated by a thinker belonging to the *Vallabha Saṁpradāya* who formulated the distinction as obtaining between knowledge that was *abādhita* and knowledge that was *bādhayogya-vyatirikta,* a distinction which does not seem to have caught the attention of other thinkers in the Indian philosophical tradition.

Bhāsarvajña also uses the term *jaraja* to refer to older Naiyāyikas, a term which is also found later in Udayana. The context of Bhāsarvajña's discussion seems to suggest that he is referring to Vātsyāyana (p.419) and hence the term seems to mean 'older' without implying any explicit negative connotation as it

seems to do in Udayana who contrasts it with *ādhunika* or *naveen* in his writings. Bhāsarvajña also uses the term '*pratiyogī*' (p.434) thus suggesting that, by his time, the *anuyogī-pratiyogī* mode of analysis had come into being, though it is not clear whether it had taken the specific form which it acquired in later *Navya Nyāya* formulations. As Udayana (984 A.D.), who comes only a little after Bhāsarvajña, is supposed to have carried the *anuyogī-pratiyogī* mode of analysis further, it appears that the analysis of negative statements was creating a problem for the Naiyāyikas and that Śivāditya's proposal to accept *abhāva* as an independent *padārtha* in his *Sāptapadārthi* around 1180 A.D. merely reflects an ontological acceptance of something that had become an epistemological necessity. It was thus the Naiyāyikas who seem to have precipitated the acceptance of *abhāva* as a new *padārtha* rather than the other way 'a round, as has generally been thought up till now. This all, of course, depends on the acceptance of the relative dates of the writers concerned.

Chapter 5

The Possible Extension of the Methodology for the Understanding of Other Texts in the Indian Tradition

THE methodology developed above in chapters two to six is illustrative of an approach towards the understanding of India's *Śāstric* texts in various fields of knowledge. The 'approach' treats the 'texts' as evidence of someone's serious engagement in the cognitive enterprise of his times. It places it in his historical context and sees it as "taking off" from what earlier 'entrepreneurs' in the tradition had achieved and relates it to the questions and problems which had given rise to the enterprise itself in earlier times. It also 'sees' it in the light of his successors whose critical and creative responses reveal the achievements and limitations of the text in a way in which one could never have seen it if one had confined one's attention to the text as if it was cut off from them, isolated and self-sufficient unto itself.

The process, in fact, starts from the 'present' in which one is cognitively situated and moves backwards to understand the text through an interrogative dialogue with it, asking questions, raising doubts and seeing the problems with which the writer of the text was struggling in order that some solution to them may be found to the satisfaction of oneself and one's peers. The 'questions' and 'problems' arise from a close study of the text and the text is seen in their light and the whole is seen once again in the context of the contemporary concerns which obtain in that field of knowledge. Each affects the other, and while the present

cognitive 'concerns' affect the apprehension of the past, the latter also substantially affect the former.

The methodology takes another turn when it self-consciously seeks to understand the way successive thinkers tried to understand the 'original' text from which the particular tradition of philosophizing is said to have started. The text now is seen through the successive mirrors in which its meaning is reflected. These inevitably are juxtaposed against the 'refractions' which occur through the cognitive mirror, that is, the mind of the author of this work, built by the intellectual training in the 'modem' world which is primarily shaped by the western intellectual tradition in all fields of knowledge, including philosophy.

The juxtaposition, strangely, not only brings out the unconscious prejudices and pre-suppositions of the intellectual enterprises of the past and the present but also illumines each other and increases our appreciation and understanding of both in a way which would not have been possible otherwise. Beyond this, it challenges one to think about the questions and problems once again in a manner which is "freed" from the intellectual bondages of both the past and the present. This perhaps is only a hope, or just an illusion; but there can be little doubt that unless the ground is clear and one becomes self-conscious of the intellectual prejudices and pre-suppositions involved one can hardly think of going further.

India's intellectual traditions are rich and diverse. They need to be looked at afresh, cultivated anew, questioned again and again in order that they may yield their intellectual insights for further development in the contemporary context. For this, they have to be seen as human enterprises engaged in by fallible men who were infected with doubt and uncertainty like each one of us and whose achievements, however great, are only human, all too human. Also, they have to be disengaged from much of their irrelevancies in which they are inevitably involved, just as 'our's' are involved in our own times.

The methodology that has been explored and exemplified in

this work is independent of the specific results achieved therein. Like all other methodologies it is flexible and modifiable, depending upon the person who uses it, the nature of the text and the field of knowledge with which one is concerned. It's cognitive usefulness can only be determined by the 'results' it may achieve in the hands of diverse persons in the future.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

THE tradition of Nyāya which starts from the Nyāya Sūtra and continues down upto recent times is a complex, variegated tradition which has deep internal tensions and conflicting directions within itself. These, however, have generally been ignored or pushed under the carpet and treated as insignificant so that a unitary, monocromatic picture of the school may be built up to the satisfaction of all concerned. The Nyāya tradition of philosophizing is usually described as *"āstika"* in character and ultra-realistic in its epistemological intent. Its ontological commitments are supposed to be the same as those of the Vaiśeṣika, assuming that the latter have no inbuilt ambiguity and are not 'problematic' in their characterization. No one seems to take seriously the fact that the seventh *padārtha* of the Vaiśeṣika was added only much, much later, sometime around 1180 A.D. if Śivāditya's date as given in Potter's bibliography is accepted and if it is also accepted that before his *Saptapadārthī, abhāva* was not accepted as an independent *padārtha* in the Vaiśeṣika ontology. Not only this, Praśastapāda's radical reformulation of the number of *guṇas* and the various criteria on the basis of which they need to be classified has to be totally ignored to make the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika marriage seem full of harmony and joy. Strangely, the Naiyāyikas do not even seem to feel that the radical distinction drawn by *Kaṇāda* in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras between *padārthas* which are *buddhyāpekṣā* and those which are not renders the so-called ultra-realism of Nyāya split at tis very foundations as both *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*

are not supposed to be independently existing *padārthas* in themselves. Imagine the fate of Nyāya realism if each *sāmānya* is supposed to be *buddhyāpekṣā,* the way Kaṇāda wanted them to be understood. And, what would the Naiyāyikas do if *'buddhi'* is taken as 'upalabdhi' or *'jñāna',* the sense in which Gautama defines it in the Nyāya Sūtra. The neglect of Kaṇāda's distinction by the Naiyāyika gave rise to insoluble problems later in Navya-nyāya analysis of *Śābda-bodha* where epistemological necessities gave rise to ontological 'reals' which proliferate endlessly without any means in the Naiyāyika armoury to check them. Udayana's valiant attempt to demarcate between universals and pseudo-universals did not seem to have helped the later Naiyāyikas as they do not seem to know how to stop the proliferation of universals in their analysis.

There is a deeper problem about Nyāya which stems from Gautama himself and which seems to have hardly been seen by the Naiyāyikas who seem to feel that the tradition of Nyāya has solved all problems and that they are only to present it as the realist system *par excellence* to contemporary students of the subject. The term *'buddhi',* as used in the Nyāya sūtras is so misleading as to make it impossible for even a sophisticated student of the subject to see that what is being talked about is not 'reason' or 'intellect' which it is usually taken to mean in its philosophical usage in the Sanskrit language, even though it may have overtones which are not usually associated with the term in the english language. In fact, there is no such 'faculty' in the Nyāya framework, as the term is supposed to mean only *upalabhdhi* or *jñāna* as defined in the sūtra 1.1.16. It is surprising that no Naiyāyika since Gautama's times has asked himself the simple question as to how one can have *anumāna* as a *pramāṇa* if there is no such thing as *'buddhi'* in the usual sense of the term. Infact, there are only *indriyas,* the *manas* and the *ātman* besides, of course, the *indriyārthas* or the sense-objects. But as *manas* itself has only a negative or a restrictive function as defined in the N.S. 1.1.10, there remain only the *indnyas* and the *ātman* to play any

active role or perform any positive function in the context of either knowledge or action. The *ātman*, however, is only a residual category in the Nyāya Sūtras whose postulation is necessitated because *icchā, sukha, dveśa, prayatna, duhkha and jñāna* can not be ascribed, for some reason or other, to either the body, the senses or the mind. But, strangely, the *ātman* which is postulated in order that these may belong to it is defined in such a manner that it is impossible in principle for these to belong to it. The *ātman*, as is well-known, is supposed to be totally bereft of consciousness in its pure state or state of liberation and in case it is so, it can not in reality be said to have *icchā, sukha, duhkha, dveśa, prayatna, jñāna* in it. To think that they belong to it is to have *mithyā jñāna*, or to suffer from the foundational illusion which, according to it is, or ought to be, the root cause of suffering which is in all *pravṛtti*, that is, *sukha, duhkha* etc. But, if *jñāna* or knowledge can not belong to the *ātman* because of its very nature, then how can *mithya jñāna* belong to it either, or produce the consequences that it is supposed to produce according to the analysis presented in sūtra 1.1.2 and explained in. detail later?

In fact, if the criterion of *pravṛtti sāmarthya* is taken to be the criterion of the truth of any *jñāna*, then the so-called *mithyājñāna* will have to be accorded the status of 'real' knowledge as it has *pravṛtti sāmarthya* of an order that the so-called real *jñāna* is only *postulated* to have and is 'believed' to have only on grounds of faith or belief in the authority of the *āpta puruṣas* whose *āptatva* can hardly be established on the grounds of any *pramāṇa* independent of the belief that they are so. One wonders if the criterion of *pravṛtti sāmarthya* can reasonably be applied to the *upadeśa* of an *āpta puruṣa* in order to determine whether it is 'true' or not.

There is another problem in respect of the criterion of *pravṛtti sāmarthya* which, as far as I know, is accepted as the criterion of *pramātva* of knowledge in Nyāya. The criterion is applied in the context of the achievement of *sukha* or pleasure and the

avoidance of pain *(duhkha),* but both *sukha* and *duhkha* are supposed to be the result of knowledge that is *apramā* in character, or what has been called *mithyā jñāna* in the system.

The sūtra 1.1.2 reminds one of the Buddhist analysis of human situation and, in fact, seems to represent the standard Indian analysis which completely ignores the self-contradiction involved in it. The usual Indian analysis is centered around the hedonistic view of human nature which sees it as naturally seeking pleasure and avoiding pain and has a pragmatic view of knowledge which sees the 'truth' of knowledge in terms of its ability to avoid pain and afford pleasure to the humankind. But on this view no distinction is possible between the human and the animal world as the latter also is supposed to seek pleasure or avoid pain and 'sees' the 'truth' of its knowledge in terms of the 'success' achieved by it in this enterprise. In fact, the whole learning theory in modern psychology and the training of animals is based on this premiss.

Yet, what is really surprising in the standard analysis which is epitomized both in the notions of *pravṛtti sāmarthya* and *arthakriyā kāritva* is the fact that it totally ignores the first step taken by Indian thought in distinguishing the animal and human world. The human world is differentiated in the well-known saying ascribed to Manu that man is distinguished by the awareness of the distinction between good and bad, right and wrong or, in oher words, what is called *'dharma"* in the Indian tradition. The pursuit of *dharma,* it should be remembered, does not care for pleasure and pain and does not even think in terms of them, at least as far as one's own self is concerned. The total neglect of considerations of *dharma* in the philosophical traditions of India including Nyāya, is astounding, even if it is sought to be explained by saying that these are *mokṣa śāstras* or concerned with *mokṣa* and not *dharma* which is the business of the *dharma śāstras or* the *smṛti* texts in the tradition.

In fact, the omission, specially in Nyāya, appears to be even more surprising if it is remembered that it had defined the *śabda*

pramāṇa in terms of the *upadeśa* of an *āpta puruṣa* where the term *upadeśa* surely covers, or should cover, advice regarding what ought to be done and what ought not to be done. The discussion of this *pramāṇa in the Nyāya* tradition seems to be concerned more with extraneous and perhaps even irrelevant issues such as those of *nityatva* and *apauruṣeyatva* than with those which arise from the very definition of *pramāṇa* as given in 1.1.7. It does not discuss either the criterion of being an 'āpta' or as to what is to count as an *upadeśa*. The commentaries do discuss the issues related to the problem but mostly in a tangential and indirect manner. In fact, the discussion of the first issue is taken up in an intensive manner in a Jain work by Samantabhadra which is devoted to the whole issue and is titled *Āpta mīmāṁsā*. As for the second issue, it has been discussed at the deepest philosophical level, not in Nyāya, but in Mīmāṁsā which has explicitly argued for the *pramāṇatva* of *śabda*, that is, of the Veda or the *Śruti*, only in respect of the *vidhi-niṣedha vākyas* contained therein. Nowhere in the world, the 'injunction-centric' character of language has been explored or emphasized to the extent it has been done in this school of Indian philosophy. Not only this, it has argued most consistently for the subservience of the informational character of language to its injunctive character and, at a different level, even for the understanding of what may be called the imaginative-creative and poetic function of language as essentially subserving the purpose of injunction which perhaps has never been done by any other school of linguistic meaning elsewhere.

The strange situation thus created by the fact that the Nyāya definition of *śabda pramāṇa* comes so close to what the Mīmāṁsā says in this regard and yet departs from it radically is perhaps the result of their non-acceptance of the authority of the śruti or the Veda which was an article of unquestioned faith amongst the Mīmāṁsākas in the tradition. The pre-supposition becomes explicit in the reorganisation of Bhāsarvajña who treats Śabda *pramāṇa* under *āgama pariccheda,* thus, clearly indicating that the *pramāṇa* in question concerns the whole authority of what has

been called *āgama* in the Indian tradition and not just the *Veda* and the *śruti* as understood by the Mīmāṁsākas.

The problem today may be seen in a still wider perspective as we have not only other 'revelatory' traditions in the world, but face the question of 'authority' in every field of knowledge and action as evidenced explicitly in the field of law and implicitly in the discussion of all knowledge claims made in any domain whatsoever.

The Nyāya definition thus tries to capture what may be called the 'secular' aspect of the necessity of postulating an authority so that any claim may be settled, however temporarily, at the human level. But it is not clearly aware as to why the necessity is there or why it need be confined only to statements giving advice regarding what ought to be done. The heart of Nyāya however is not in this *pramāṇa* or even that of *upamāna*, even though some Naiyāyikas like Bhāsarvajña devote a substantive portion of their work to it. It's interest lies in the discussion of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, and at a still deeper level in the intrinsic rationality of self-consciousness in its ratiocinative aspect where it questions every formulation of itself and tries to resolve the doubt or the *saṁśaya*, however temporarily, with all the resource at its command. There is, thus, an integral relationship between *saṁśaya*, the third *padārtha* in the Nyāya Sūtra and the *pramāṇa vyāpāra* which along with *prameya* constitute the first two *padārthas* in the Nyāya Sūtra. This has not generally been appreciated by those who have written on the Nyāya. Nor has it been seen that the Nyāya, like most other schools of philosophy, wants to establish through reason what is believed on grounds of faith by the culture in which it is situated. The mention of the *prameyas* in the Nyāya Sutras attests to this fact and it is surprising that no one has seen the 'absurdity' of a *pramāṇa śāstra* which decides in advance what *prameyas* it wants to establish. This seemingly impossible 'absurdity' defines the paradoxical situation of Nyāya in the Indian tradition.

But, at a still deeper level, the paradox defines the human

situation as life can not wait for the certitudes of thought as action has to be undertaken and choices made even when one knows that, there is no "certainty" either about the knowledge on which the action is based or the ends for which the action is to be pursued. Wisdom seeks a way out of the impossible situation where. action is defined by the uncertain relation of the present with the future and where "knowledge" both seeks and asserts a certainty which has nothing to do with time.

The history of Nyāya after Udayama needs to be looked at in the light of these considerations alongwith the break and the continuity with what has occurred in the first millennium A.D. which has been covered to some extent in the preceding chapters. The methodology involved, however, is not confined to the text of the Nyāya Sūtra alone but can easily be extended with modification to apply to other texts in the tradition. And, basically, what has been attempted in terms of the methods used has, in principle, no restrictions to the texts of any one culture or civilization. It will be interesting to apply it to the foundational works of, say, western philosophical traditions and find how the text of Plato or of Aristotle functions when subjected to the above methodology. Ultimately, the methodology developed here is only an elaboration of that which naturally takes place when one really "reads" anything or when one "listens" to what someone else is saying. To "read" or "listen" in such a way is to question in order that one may understand what is being said and to "understand" is to "see" the significance, the imperfections and the undeveloped possibilities in that which one apprehends through what one 'hears' or reads.

Appendix 1

The Text of the Nyāya Sūtras: Some Problems*

THE Indian intellectual and literary traditions are not known for any special concern for discovering the originals of their texts. In fact, normally the question itself does not arise, and hence the problem of additions, modifications, deletions, interpolations, etc., is not even seen as a problem which needs to be tackled. The recent search for the so-called *Ur texts* and their reconstruction on the basis of diverse criteria is due to the demands which western scholarship has imposed in the field of all classical studies, including those relating to India. It is therefore surprising to find that even in classical times attempts had been made to fix the authoritative text of the Nyāya Sūtras, the foundational work for Nyāya in the Indian tradition. Till now little thought has been given to these attempts to ascertain why there were these attempts in the first place, and to asses their significance.

This exercise in fixing the text of the *Nyāya Sūtras* becomes even more intriguing if we remember that *Nyāya* has had a more continuous and sustained tradition of thought and discussion than any other philosophical school not only in India but, perhaps, elsewhere also. From Gautama to Gadādhara or Baccā Jhā[1] or Badrinatha Shukla[2] is certainly a long period of sustained intellectual inquiry to be found anywhere in the world. The first attempt to settle the text of the Nyāya Sūtras was made by no less a person than Vācaspati Miśra I who, in his *Nyāya-Sūcī-Nibhandha*, not only fixed the text of the *Nyāya Sūtras*, but also divided them in proper order. This fact is well known to scholars, yet no one seems to have asked himself the simple question as

to why Vācaspati Miśra I felt the necessity of fixing the text of the Nyāya Sūtras, specially when sensitivity to textual purity does not seem to have been a distinctive characteristic of Indian scholarship, then or now. Vācaspati Miśra does not seem to have undertaken this exercise with respect to the text of any other philosophical school on which he had also written his commentaries. He was also not the first commentator on the Sūtras, as both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara had already written their Bhāṣya and Vārttika on them. As Vācaspati Miśra's own work on Nyāya is supposed to be a Ṭīkā on Uddoyotakara's Vārttika, it may be assumed that it was available to him. The relation between Uddyotakara's *Vārttika* and *Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya* is not clear as a Vārttika is not supposed to be a full commentary like the *Bhāṣya*. It would be interesting to know what were the special issues chosen by Uddyotakara to write his *Vārttika* upon. The same thing applies to the work of Vācaspati Miśra I as well as to those of subsequent writers on Nyāya. Unfortunately, neither the traditional pandits, nor modern scholars of Indian philosophy have been interested in undertaking this task.

It has been said that Vātsvāyana had no Sūtrapāṭha before him to write his Bhāṣya upon, or that there is even a 'hidden *vārttika*' in 'the *Bhāṣya* itself.'[3] The suggestion seems to be that there was a 'floating body of *sūtras*' from which he picked out some and treated them as authoritative. In other words, he first did what Vācaspati Miśra I was to do later, though more explicitly and clearly than Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*? There are supposed to be technical difficulties in this as the way in which the sūtras are referred to is not such as to clearly demarcate them from those that are not part of the original sūtras. In fact, there seems to be a lot of confusion even about such a simple fact as the manuscripts of the *Nyāya Sūtras* themselves. H.P. Sastri, in his article entitled *An Examination of the Nyāya Sūtras*, published in 1905, has stated that "ninety-nine percent of the manuscripts of this work are accompanied with some commentary or other. Manuscripts giving the sūtra only are extremely rare."[4] However, Gaṅgānātha

Jhā has referred to at least three manuscripts containing only the *sūtras* which he had consulted for his own translation of the text along with the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana and the Vārttika of Uddyotakara. He refers to "A palm-leaf Manuscript of the Sūtra only," "Paper manuscript of the *sūtra* only belonging to Jagadish Mishra," and "Paper Manuscript of Sūtra only belonging to Babu Govindadasa."[5] He does not mention any discrepancies in the manuscripts. Instead, according to him, "Every one of these manuscripts was found to be quite correct."[6] Gopīnātha Kavirāja, in his Introduction to this monumental work of translation of Pt. Gangānātha Jhā, seems to be unaware of any problem regarding the paucity of manuscripts containing the text of the *Nyāya Sūtras* only. Instead, he writes that "a critical edition of the *Sūtra-Pāṭha* of Nyāya, based upon a collection of all available manuscripts of different recensions and of the *Sūtras* as accepted by the various glosses and commentaries still existing, is the greatest desideratum of the day, and until this is done it is vain to endeavour to determine the *sūtratva* of a particular aphorism."[7] This obviously implies that it is not the absence of manuscripts of the *Nyāya Sūtras* which has made their collation impossible, but only the fact that nobody has tried to undertake it. In fact, Karl Potter in his bibliographical entries under Gautama refers to a host of editions of the *Nyāya Sūtras* published between 1821 and 1977, and it may be assumed that at least some of them would have consulted the original manuscripts of the work.[8] The reference in the *New Catalogus Catalogrum* X, p. 276 at the beginning of the bibliography on the *Nyāya Sūtras* may be treated as additonal evidence for this assumption.

Yet, though the *Nyāya Sūtras* seem to have been edited and translated a number of times, no one appears to have made an exhaustive list of the variant readings of the text, or of their significance. Even H.P. Sastri, who writes of discrepant readings, does not give any concrete examples of the discrepancies he is referring to. What is, perhaps, even more surprising is the fact that nobody accepts the text of the *Nyāya Sūtras* as given in the

Nyāyasūcīnibandha of Vācaspati Miśra I as finally authoritative, though no one has given reasons for doubting either their authenticity or his authority. Pt. Gopīnātha Kavirāja, for example, has said in his Introduction to Gaṅgānātha Jhā's work that "in the translation efforts have been made to determine this, as far as possible. From the very nature of the present work, the translation has had to rely upon the verdict, direct or implied, of the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārttika*, *Tātparya* and also upon Vācaspati Miśra's *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*; but help was also derived from two old manuscripts, obtained from two different sources."[9]

This statement is surprising in more ways than one. Firstly, it does not indicate in what ways the sources he has cited differ between themselves with reference to the text of the *Nyāya Sūtras*. Normally, one would have expected either Gopīnātha Kavirāja or Gaṅgānātha Jhā to have pointed out the issue, discussed the discrepancies, and given reasons for their choice or reconstruction of what they considered to be the correct rendering of the sūtras. Gaṅgānātha Jhā has not given even the Sanskrit version of the sūtras so that one could do the required exercise oneself. Not only this, Gopīnātha Kavirāja finds no problem in referring both to the *Tātparya* and the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* as independent sources for the determination of the text of the Nyāya Sūtras. By the *Tātparya*, he presumably means the *Nyāya-Vārttika-Tātparyaṭīkā*. But if this is so, then as everybody knows, both the *Tātparya* and the Nyāyasūcīnibandha are works of one and the same person, that is, Vācaspati Miśra I, and it would be strange to think that there are discrepancies between the two. The *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, it should be remembered, was itself written to establish the authentic *sūtras* and must have been based not only on Uddyotakara's *Vārttika* on which the *Tātparyaṭīkā* is ostensibly written, but also on Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* to which the *Vārttika* is related and which must have been available to him independently. The only reason for postulating a divergence between the text as given in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and those found in the works of *Vātsyāṇya*

and Uddyotakara would lie in the assumption that the texts of these works which were available to Vācaspati Miśra I were different from those that are available to us today. But, then, it should have been the task of Gaṅgānātha Jhā, if not of Pt. Gopīnātha Kavirāja, to have pointed out the discrepancies between the text of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and those found in the texts of the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārttika* as they are found today.

What is, however, even more surprising is the total lack of any reference to the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* either by Gaṅgānātha Jhā or Gopīnātha Kavirāja when that work also tries to fix the text of the *Nyāya Sūtras* like the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* to which they refer to. It is inconceivable that either of these scholars, justifiably renowned in their times, did not know of this work. Gopīnātha Kavirāja explicitly refers to Haraprasada Sastri's article published in 1905 [10] which specifically refers to the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*. The translation of the *Nyāya Sūtras* by *Gaṅgānātha* Jhā was originally published in *Indian Thought* (Vols. IV-XI) from 1912 to 1919. Thus, a careful scholar such as Jha also may be assumed to have known of H.P. Sastri's article. But even if he did not, he should have known independently of the work as it had already been published in the Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series in 1896 as their publication No. 9 along with the *Nyāya Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana. Pt. Gopīnātha Kavirāja does write about it later in his work entitled *Gleanings from the History and Bibliography of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature*, but even there he neither mentions where it has been published, nor discusses its discrepancies with the text of the *sūtras* as given in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*. He treats it only as a Maithila recension of the Sūtras. In his own words, "this booklet was intended to determine the number and true readings of the genuine *sūtras* as distinguished from those which have been interpolated into the text from time to time. This work is therefore in its object, of a similar nature with its predecessor, the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* of Vācaspati Māśra I. Its principal interest however consists in the fact that it represents the Maithila rescension of the *Sūtrapāṭha*."[11]

It is unbelievable that a scholar of Pt. Gopīnātha Kavirāja's eminence should have failed to see the problems raised by this statement. He did not ask himself the simple question as to why Vācaspati Miśra II felt even the necessity of settling the text of the *Nyāya Sūtras* when Vācaspati Miśra I had already done so, or what were the interpolations that he thought needed to be rectified, and what were the discrepancies between the text as established by Vācaspati Miśra I and the text as established by Vācaspati Miśra II. His conslusion seems even stranger, for if his intention was "to determine those which have been interpolated into the text from time to time" then how can it be treated as a mere Maithila recension of the text? And, what is the evidence of its being such a recension? Has the whole Maithila school accepted it? And, is not Vācaspati Miśra I himself supposed to belong to Mithilā?

Not only does Pandit Gopīnātha Kavirāja fail to raise these questions, he does not give any indication of the text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* he is referring to, whether in published or manuscript form so that one could establish the truth of what he is saying.

Haraprasad Sastri is himself, of course, mistaken in his reference to the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*. First, though writing in 1905, he is under the mistaken impression that the work has not been published at all till it was given by him to Dr. Venis, and it was published at Benaras. He writes "I got one from Midnapore, and gave a copy of it to my friend Dr. Venis and it was published at Benaras."[12] Secondly, he seems to be under the Impression that both the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* are the works of the same person. He writes, "The difficulty which I feel in regard to the *Nyāya-Sūtras* was also felt about a thousand years ago, when Vācaspati Miśra, who flourished about the end of the tenth century, twice attempted to fix the number of Sūtras and their readings, namely, the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* and in *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, both of which go by his name. If both are the works of one man, as they profess to be, it is apparent that

the author did not feel sure of his ground."[13] It is obvious that the writer is not aware of the existence of Vācaspati Miśra II, who flourished centuries after Vācaspati Miśra I, the author of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha.*

The neglect of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* by such outstanding scholars even after its publication as early as 1896 in one of the most prestigious Sanskrit Series defies all explanation. The facts about this work seem to have been wrongly given even in prestigious bibliographical reference works. Potter's classic reference work on Indian philosophies published as late as 1983 does not seem to be aware of the fact that the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* had already been published, and that too as early as 1896. The entry under *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* only states "(Partly in ms., acc. To DB, 147; cf. Also UM, 292)."[14] Similarly, in the Volume on *Nyāyā-Vaiśeṣika*, the only reference to Vācaspati Miśra II occurs not with reference to his work entitled *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* but in connection with the name of the author of the *Ratnakośa* mentioned by him.[15] There is a reference to the publication No. 9 of the Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, but without any mention of the fact that it published the text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* for the first time.[16]

Dinesh Chandra Bhattacarya has tried to deny the authenticity of the text as being the text of *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* of Vācaspati Miśra II. He writes, "the so-called Gautamasūtras printed along with the *Nyāyabhāṣya* in pp. 28 with the introductory verse, *Śrīvācaspatimiśreṇa mithaleśvarasūriṇā likhyate munimūrdhanyaśrīgautamamatam mahat*, is not an edition of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, as is sometimes supposed but only a text of the *Nyāyasūtras* prepared by the editor of the *Bhāṣya* after consulting various books including a copy of the *Sūtroddhāra.*"[17] However, this is a statement unsubstantiated by any evidence whatsoever. Not only this, he does not state as to what is the authentic text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* in manuscript or published form, and how this text departs from it. Furthermore, as he has not here given exact reference to the edition of the *Bhāṣya* he

is referring to, it is not easy to check what he is referring to. Later, of course, in his article entitled *Nyāya* Works of *Vācaspati* Miśra II of *Mithilā*, he does give the reference in the footnote as Viz. ed. 1896[18] which obviously refers to Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī's edition of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* published in that series. But if it refers to that, then it has to be explained as to why the Sūtrapāṭha given therein has been preceded by the verse he has quoted, for it ascribes it to Vācaspati Miśra and not to the editor Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga. Secondly, in case he is the compiler of the *Sūtra*-Pāṭha, as alleged by Dinesh Chandra Bhattacarya, why should he have given such extensive footnotes to the Sūtras claiming in the case of many of them that the pramāṇa of their *sūtratva* does not seem to be available, a point we will discuss in detail later on. Also, though the editorial statement in the beginning (*pṛthaka sūtrapāṭhaśca Vāscapatimiśrakṛt sūtroddhāranāmakaṁ bangākṣaralikhitam nātiprācīnaṁ pustakamālocya saṁyojitāḥ*) is capable of being interpreted the way Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya has done, it generally has not been so interpreted. And there is no reason to do so, unless someone produces a more authentic text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* based on manuscripts which have been critically edited. However, even if there were to be such a text, it will only prove our main point that not only the text of the *Nyāya Sūtras* has been repeatedly sought to be fixed by eminent Naiyāyikas in the past without having given sufficient grounds for their choice, but that the practice continues in the present with the added anomaly that the present scholars do not seem to be aware of each other's works or even of the implication of their statements.

The scholar who takes the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* seriously for the first time is, perhaps, Pandit Sri Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla who, in his edition of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī has not only printed the text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* at the end of the work but also compared it with other renderings of the *Sūtras* or their existence or non-existence in other standard texts on the subject. It is perhaps the most comprehensive statement of the Nyāya Sūtras

as rendered by different texts.[19] However, as the appendix is neither listed in the table of contents of the book nor discussed by the author in his Preface, it seems to have escaped the attention of most scholars of the subject. This could also be the reason why Potter, though mentioning it in the Bibliographical section on Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, fails to include it under the bibliographical references on Gautama's *Nyāya Sūtras.*

In fact, even earlier, Rāma Bhavana Upādhyāya had published the variant readings along with the deletions and additions of the Sūtras in an article in the *Pandit* New Series.[20] However, it had confined itself only to the text of Viśwanātha's *Vṛtti* on the *Nyāya-Sūtras* as found in the Sarasvati Bhavan Library Manuscript on a *tāḍapatra*, referred to in his article as अ०वृ०, an edition of the same as edited by Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara and published in Varanasi, referred to as मु०कृ० and as given in *Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya* published in the *Pandit* Series itself referred to as मु०भा० along with the sūtras as given in the published text of the *Nyāya Vārttika* edited by Pt. Vindhyeshwari Prasad Shastrī in 1888 A.D. referred to as मु०भा०. Thus the article compares the sūtras as given in the manuscript of Viśwanātha's Vṛitti found in the Saraswati Bhavan Library with the published version of the text edited by Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara, along with the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārttika* published earlier.

However, though the article was written around 1922, the author who himself edited and published Viśwanātha's *Vṛtti* on the *Nyāys Sūtras*, did not refer either to the Nyāyasūcīnibandha or the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, the two known texts which earlier had tried authoritatively to fix the text of the *Sūtras.* In fact, there seems to be an extreme arbitariness amongst scholars regarding what shall be accepted as the source of pramāṇa for the sūtratva of a *sūtra* in the Nyāya tradition. If we take, for example, the text of the Nyāyasūtroddhāra as first published by Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailanga in 1896 as a text of the *Nyāya Sūtras* with Vātsyayāna's *Bhāṣya* in the Vizianagaram Sanskrit series, Vol.

IX, we find that, according to him, no pramāṇa is available for as many as 184 sūtras out of a total of 531 sūtras given in the text. That this is a surprisingly large number needs to be emphasized. Yet, what is perhaps even stranger is the fact that the learned editor of the text is not bothered about it nor, for that matter, is anyone else. The situation becomes even more intriguing if one remembers that there is not a single *sūtra* out of the first chapter whose *pramāṇatva* has been questioned by him, and as the whole of the second part of the fifth chapter is problematic in a special sense, the real proportion of the non-*prāmāṇika sūtras* is found amongst Chapters 2 to 5.1, that is, the first *āhnika* of Chapter V. Even amongst these the distribution of the *non-prāmāṇika sūtras* varies as will be evident from the following list:

Chapter	*Total No. of sutras*	*The number of non-prāmāṇika sūtras*
2.1	68	17
2.2	66	19
3.1	73	20
3.2	77	32
4.1	68	38
4.2	51	30
5.1	43	27

It is obvious from the above that in Chapter 4.1, 4.2 and 5.1 the proportion of the non-*prāmāṇika sūtras* is above 50%, while in Chapter 3.2, it is not very far from it. How could any text have been taken seriously in such a situation, and why did Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailang waste so much time over it, and publish it in the beginning of his scholarly edition of the *Nyāya-Sūtras* in 1896? What is, however, even more surprising is the fact that inspite of his considering so many of the *sūtras* as un-*prāmāṇika*, he treats them as a part of the *Nyāya Sūtras* in the main body of the text. All the 183 sūtras about each of which he writes 'nopalabhyate asya pramāṇam' are reproduced in the

main body of the published text without giving any reason as to why, if there is no authentic foundation for treating them as genuine sūtras, as he has explicitly stated, they should be treated as the sūtras on which Vātsyāyana had written his Bhāṣya. And in case the latter is treated as a *Bhāṣya* on those *sūtras*, then is it not sufficient ground for treating them as genuine? The lack of any discussion on the part of the learned Pandit makes it difficult to answer these questions. In fact, even when he departs from the reading of the *Sūtra* as given in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* text published by him in the main body of the work, as he does in the case of sūtras 5.1.17 and 5.1.34, he does not give any reasons for the change, or why he prefers the variant version, and on what basis.[21]

The problem is even more complicated by the fact that when Pandit Śrī Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla tries to find the *pramāṇas* for those sūtras, he finds them either in *Nyāyatattvāloka Nyāyasūcīnibandha* or *Anvīkaṣānayatattvabodaḥ*. While one may accept the possibility of Pandit Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailang not being aware of *Nyāyatattvāloka*, as the only known copy of it was in the India Office Library in London, and that too in incomplete form,[22] it is inconceivable that he did not know of *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* which is the most well-known compilation of the *Nyāya Sūtras* done by Vācaspati Miśra I who had himself written the famous *Nyāya-Vārttika-Tātparyaṭīkā*, or of *Anvīkṣānayatattvabodaḥ* about which, according to the entry in *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, mention had been made in the Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavan Studies, III, p. 133–34.[23] Even if it is assumed that the latter wrok was not known to Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailang, the neglect of *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* remains a problem which can only be solved by assuming that he did not accept its *prāmāṇika* character. But as he does accept Vācaspati Miśra's *Tātparyaṭīkā* as *prāmāṇika*, it is surprising why he should not have accepted the *pramāṇic* character of his *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* also, particularly when it was ostensibly written to fix the text of the *Nyāya Sūtras*, and classify them

according to the topics dealt within. The only way this anomaly could be dealt with would be to assume that, in his opinion, these two texts were not written by the same person or, in other words, that the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Tātparyaṭīkā* were written by two different persons. This, however, will be an even more radical position to take, and one would have to explicitly justify it on cogent grounds rather than just assume it, as seems to have been done by Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅg.

But if one does accept the identity of the authors of the two texts, as most authorities do, then it is incomprehensible as to how one can cite them as *independent pramāṇa* for the *sūtratva* of a *sūtra*. But that is just what Pandit Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla does in his attempt to find *pramāṇa* for the *sūtras* given in the text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*. He gives both *Tātparyaṭīkā* and *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* as *pramāṇa* for the *sūtratva* of a *sūtra*, forgetting that as they are written by the same person they cannot be independent *pramāṇas*. In fact, it is not clear why, if one of these texts provides a basis for the authenticity of a *sūtra*, the other would not do the same unless one were to assume that there was variation in what are counted as *sūtras* in the two texts. However, if one were to assume this, one would have the problem of explaining how the two could then have been written by the same person.

In fact, Pandit Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla not only cites both *Tātparyaṭīkā* and *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* as sources for the authenticity of the *sūtras* as given in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, but also *Tattvāloka* which is supposed to be a work written by the author of the Nyāyasūtroddhāra itself. But this he could have done only if he did not know the identity of the authorship of the two texts. But to have known the text and not to have known the author would be strange indeed, particularly as it is not considered to be an anonymous work. There is, of course, the further problem as to how Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla could have seen the work in such detail as the only manuscript of the work, according to the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, is in the India Office Library.[24] He, of

course, could have got a photocopy of the manuscript, but considering the facilities available in the early thirties, it is extremely unlikely that it was so. There was perhaps, a manuscript of the *Tattvāloka* in the Saraswati Bhavan Library at Benaras, not known to the compilers of the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*.

In any case, it is baffling as to why Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla had to go to unpublished sources for establishing the *pramāṇatva* of the *sūtras*, when most of them could have been easily found in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*. To give but one example, the *pramāṇa* for *sūtras* 2.1.47 and 2.1.48 is given as *Tattvāloka* on p. 7 of the Appendix to his edition of the *Nyāyamañjarī*. But both 2.1.47 and 2.1.48 can be found in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, the former with a little modification and the latter with none. The *sūtrapāṭha* in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* is '*nāpratyakṣe gavaye pramāṇārthamupamānasya paśyāmaḥ*' (2.1.47) and '*tathetyupasaṁhārādupamānasiddhernāviśeṣah*' (2.1.48). In the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* they are given as '*nāpratyakṣe gavaye pramāṇārthamupamānasya paśyāmaḥ iti*' and '*tathetyupasaṁhārādupamānasiddhenāviśeṣaḥ*' (12–13). Of course, the numbering of the *sūtras* in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* is not 2.1.47 and 2.1.48, but 2.1.48 and 2.1.49 respectively. But that hardly matters, and is easily explained by the fact that while there are only 68 *sūtras* in the first *āhnika* of the second *adhyāya* in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, the corresponding number of *sūtras* is 69 in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*. In fact the situation is the same even with the remaining ones where *Tattvāloka* alone is given as a *pramāṇa*. Why this has been done and what purpose it serves is beyond all comprehension. The situation is even more baffling if one remembers that the author has given in the case of many *sūtras* more than one source of authentication. *Sūtras* 2.1.59 to 2.1.64, for instance, provide one such example where both *Tattvāloka* and *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are cited as *pramāṇa* for the *sūtratva* of these *sūtras*.

In fact, as only 10 *sūtras*[25] of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* are missing from the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, all the rest may be

authenticated from *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* if its *prāmāṇika* character is accepted by a thinker. In case variant readings are also taken into account, about eleven *sūtras*[26] in the *Nyāyasūttroddhāra* have a variant reading (including additions, deletions, etc.) from the one found in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*. Hence, all in all, we would have only a problem of about 21 *sūtras* if we confine our attention to these two texts alone. On the other hand, if we take the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* as our base, we find 8 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* missing in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*.[27] Thus, there is a discrepancy of 18 *sūtras* between the two texts. In case we include the variant readings also, it would all come to 29 *sūtras*.

However, the story does not end with these two texts alone. If we forget the pre-*Nyāyasūcīnibandha* attempts to fix the text of the *Nyāya Sūtras*,[28] there are a number of post-*Nyāyasūtroddhāra* attempts which cannot be ignored. The most prestigious of these is, of course, the *Vṛtti* of Viśvanātha Bhaṭṭācārya, originally published in 1922 in *Pandit* New Series 2.2. edited by Rāma Bhavana Upādhyāya and reprinted in 1985 in the Anandashram Sanskrit Series, No. 91. If we take the *sūtra-pāṭha* as given in the appendix to the work as the base, we find that 11 *sūtras* of the *Vṛtti* are missing in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and 6 *sūtras* in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*.[29] Conversely, we find 3 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* missing in the *Vṛtti* (2.1.20, 2.2.43 and 3.1.73). As for the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, it appears that none of its *sūtras* is missing in the *Vṛtti*. If we take the *sūtras* with the variant readings from the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* (with additions etc.) their number comes to about 16.[30] If we take them from the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, the variant reading in the *Vṛtti* are also around 16, though this time they relate to different *sūtras*.[31] Thus, in all, Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti* has a difference in about 30 *sūtras* (missing or variant reading with additions, etc.) from the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and of about 22 *sūtras* from the Nyāyasūtroddhāra.

Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti* is a well-known work and the discrepancies in the *sūtra-pāṭha* from both the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the

Nyāyasūtroddhāra may be deemed to be important. The same can hardly be said about the *Nyāya Sūtra* text given by Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī Bhaṭṭācārya published in the *Pandit* New Series, 23, 24, and 25 in 1901, 1902 and 1903 along with his commentary on them entitled *Vivaraṇa* by S. T. G. Bhattacharya.[32] Though it was brought to the notice of the scholarly world at the very beginning of the century, it has been little discussed in any significant way by the scholarly community. In this respect, it seems to have had the same fate as the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* which was published only a little earlier, in 1896. However, if the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* had the good fortune of having caught the attention of Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailang and Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla whose work we have discussed earlier, the text of Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī has had the good fortune of finding an advocate in Śrī T. K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar who has written a couple of aritcles trying to draw attention to its importance in the context of the question as to what exactly is the text of the *Nyāya Sūtras*. In his article entitled *A Critique of the Nyāya-Sūtra Text* (as interpreted in the *Nyāya-Sūtra Vivaraṇam*),[33] he has given in the Appendix to the article a detailed comparison of the readings of the *sūtras* between the *Vivaraṇa* ,and the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* where the two differ. According to him, seven *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are missing in the *Vivaraṇa* and six sūtras of the Vivaraṇa are missing in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*.[34] The variant readings between the two texts, on the other hand, seem to be unbelievably large. If we take *Vivarṇa* as the base of comparison, then the *sūtras* that have a variant reading come to about 85, while if we make the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* as the base, they come to about 87. These are rather large discrepancies, and should have been the subject of intensive discussion and investigation by scholars interested in Nyāya philosophy in the country. But, as far as I know, nothing of the kind seems to have taken place even after the publicatin of Gopalswamy Aiyangar's article.

However, Gopalswamy Aiyangar compared the *Vivaraṇa* text only with the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and not with the

Nyāyasūtroddhāra or with Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*, though he does mention both in the lsit of editions of the *Nyāya Sūtras* which were available at that time. One reason for this seems to be his belief tht both the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* were written by the same Vācaspati Miśra, an opinion he derives from Pt. Hara Prasad Sastri whom he quotes to this effect. But while there might have been some justification for Pt. Hara Prasad Sastri to have made the mistake in 1905, there could have been none in Aiyanagar's case in the year 1947. Surprisingly, he does not even know of the *Nyāyṭtattvāloka* and thinks that the references to it by the editor of *Vivaraṇa* is the result of some confusion. He writes: "I wish to draw the attention of the readers to the fact that the editor of the *Nyāya-Sūtra-Vivaraṇam* refers to a *Nyāya-Sūtra* text known as *Nyāyatattvāloka* as being ascribed to Vācaspati Miśra . . . and very frequently refers to the book to point out the variations in the reading with reference to *Nyāyasūcīnibandha.* He does not refer to *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* at all. So it is doubtful whether the editor identifies *Nyāyatattvāloka* with *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* or refers to a separate work of Vācaspati Miśra. Perhaps, *Nyāyatattvāloka* is an outcome of a third attempt of Vācaspati Miśra in collecting the *Nyāya-Sūtras.* Anyhow no such work is available."[35] It is obvious that he has not seen the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* text published by Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla in the text of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, which he edited and published in 1936. Otherwise, it would have been obvious to him that *Tattvāloka* was not only a different work from the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, but also that it was well known to scholars in Kashi. However, the fact that the editor of the *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* made a reference to it in 1901 suggests that the information given about *Tattvāloka* in both the *New Catalogus Catalogourum* and the *Darśanamañjarī* is incomplete as some other manuscript of it, besides the one in the India Office Library at London, must have been available at Banaras. As for the informatin in Potter's *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. I, it is doubly wrong as it not only identifies *Nyāyasūttroddhāra*

with *Tattvāloka*, but assumes that it is available only in manuscript form, and that too only partly.[36] In a sense, it appears that Gopalswamy Aiyangar has not even carefully seen Dr. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī's text in the Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, No. 9 to which he refers in the article mentioned above. For, had he done so, it is unbelievable that he would not have been struck by the fact that according to the learned editor no *pramāṇa* was available for so many *sūtras* in the text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* which he had published therein. His reference to *Nyāya Koṣa* seems even more otiose as there is no discussion about the text of the *Nyāya Sūtras* in it except for stating that there are in all five *adhyāyas* in the *Nyāya Sūtras* each consisting of two *āhnikas*, and the total number of *sūtras* being 537.[37] Surprisingly, in his article on the same subject published 23 years later, he does not show any awareness of the gross confusions and downright mistakes of which he is guilty in this article.[38]

The two subsequent works that surprisingly show a self-conscious awareness of the problem are the *Gautamīya-Sūtra-prakāśaḥ* of Keśava Miśra and the *Nyāya-Tātparya-Dīpikā* of Bhaṭṭa Vāgīśvara, both edited by Dr. Kishore Nātha Jhā and published by Ganganath Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, Prayaga, in 1978 and 1979 respectively. In his Introduction to the first volume, Dr. Kishore Nath Jha quite clearly states that in any discussion about the text of the *Nyāya Sūtras*, one would have to take into consideration besides the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* of the elder and the younger Vācaspati Miśra, the *Vivaraṇa-Pañjikā* of Aniruddha, the *Pariśuddhi* of Udayana, the *Prakāśa* of Keśava Miśra, the *Vṛtti* of Viśvanātha Pañcānana, the *Khadyota* of Gaṅgānātha Jhā, the corrected *Bhāṣya* of Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarakavāgīśa, the *Nyāya-Bhūsaṇa* of Bhāsarvajña, the *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and other relevant works where the *Nyāya Sūtras* have been explicitly stated and counted. It is not quite clear why he has not included Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī Bhaṭṭācārya's *Vivaraṇa* in it, as it is unlikely that he is unaware of it, or of *Tattvāloka*, specially when

so much had already been written about them. In any case, Dr. Jha has shown a considerable degree of awareness about the complexity of the problem, and he is perhaps the first person who has taken into account a work written in a language other than Sanskrit, that is, the outstanding work of Pt. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa in Bengali.

But though he has indicated the enormity of the task, he has confined himself to noting the problems raised for the *sūtrapāṭha* only by the text he is editing, that is, the *Gautamīya-Sūtra-Prakāśaḥ* of Keśava Miśra Tarkācārya.[39] Pt. Ānanta Lal Thakur, on the other hand, says in his Introduction to the *Nyāya-Tātparya-Dīpikā* that for determining the text of the *Nyāya Sūtras* it would be best to take the *Nyāya-Tattvāloka* of the younger Vācaspati, the *Nyāyasūtravṛtti* of Vaṁśīdhara, the *Gautmīyasūtraprakāśa* of Keśava Miśra and the *Nyāya-Tātparyā-Dīpika* of Bhaṭṭa Vāgīśvara.[40] It is not quite clear if the learned pandit is once again confusing *Tattvāloka* with Nyāyasūtroddhāra of Vācaspati Miśra II for, if he is talking of the *Tattvāloka* whose manuscript is supposed to be in the India Office Library, London, then it can hardly serve as the basis for establishing the text of the *Nyāya-Sūtras* as it is supposed to be incomplete. And, pray, why not the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* of Vācaspati Miśra I which, as far as we know, is the earliest known attempt at fixing the text of the *Nyāya Sūtras*? In any case, the self-consciousness of these two scholars about the problem as displayed in their Introduction to these two recently edited works is a welcome change and needs to be pursued more systematically by others.*

If we compare the *sūtrapāṭha* given in these two recently edited texts, we find that 13 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* are missing in the *Gautamīya-Sūtra-Prakāśa* and 39 *sūtras* in the *Nyāya-Tātparya-Dīpikā* of Keśava Miśra and Bhaṭṭa Vāgīśvara

* The Nyāyatattvāloka of Vācaspati Miśra II was published in 1992 by Ganganatha Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Prayāga under the Editorship of Dr. Kishore Natha Jha after this article was first published in the Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Vol. VII No. 2, January-April, 1990.

respectively. Conversely, 5 *sūtras* of *Prakāśa* and 29 *sūtras* of *Dīpikā* are missing from the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*. The variant readings between the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* and the *Prakāśa* are roughly about 14, while those between the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* and the *Dīpikā* are about 53. Thus the total *sūtras* missing between the *Dīpikā* and the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* comes to 60, while that between the *Prakāśa* and the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* comes to 18. The comparison of these two texts with the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* reveals that 40 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are missing in the *Nyāya-Tātparya-Dīpikā* and 8 *sūtras* in the *Gautamīya-Sūtra-Prakāśa* of Keśava Miśra. On the other hand, 25 *sūtras* from the *Nyāya-Tātparya-Dīpikā* are missing in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, while only 3 *sūtras* from the *Gautamīya-Sūtra-Prakāśa* are not found therein. The variant readings between the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the two texts is about 31 and 12 respectively. (For details see Appendices I, II, III and IV).

The comparative situation between the six texts that we have examined up till now may be summarized thus :

1. 8 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are not found in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*.
2. 10 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* are not found in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*. (Total 18.)
3. The variant reading in the existing *sūtras* between the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* occurs in the case of about 11 *sūtras* only.
4. 3 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are not found in the *Vṛtti* of Viśvanātha.
5. 11 *sūtras* of the *Vṛtti* are not found in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*. (Total 14.)
6. No *śutra* of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* seems to be missing in the *Vṛtti*.
7. 6 *sūtras* of the *Vṛtti* are missing in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*. (Total 6.)
8. The *Vṛtti* has about 16 *sūtras* which have a variant reading from that of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*.

9. The *Vṛtti* has variant readings from the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* in about 16 *sūtras* also, though they are not the same as have the variant reading when compared with the *sūtras* in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha.*

10. 7 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are missing in the *Vivaraṇa.*

11. 6 *sūtras* of the *Vivaraṇa* are missing in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha.* (Total 13.)

12. The variant readings between the *Vivaraṇa* and the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* seem to range between 85 and 87.

13. 13 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* are not to be found in the *Gautamīya-Sūtra-Prakāśaḥ.*

14. 5 *sūtra* of the *Gautamīya-Sūtra-Prakāśaḥ* are not found in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra.*

15. The variant readings between the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* and the *Gautamīya-Sūtra-Prakāśaḥ* are roughtly about 14.

16. 8 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are missing in the *Gautamīya-Sūtra-Prakāśaḥ.*

17. 3 *sūtras* of the *Gautamīya-Sūtra-Prakāśaḥ* are missing in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha.* (Total. 11)

18. The number of variant readings between the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Gautamīya-Sūtra-Prakāśaḥ* comes to about 12.

19. 31 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* are not to be found in the *Nyāya-Tātparya-Dīpikā.*

20. 29 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* are not to be found in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* (Total. 60)

21. The variant readings between the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* and the *Nyāya-Tātparya-Dīpikā* come to about 53.

22. 40 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are missing in the *Nyāya-Tātparya-Dīpikā.*

23. 25 *sūtras* of the *Nyāya-Tātparya-Dīpikā* are missing in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha.* (Total 65).

24. The variant readings of the *sūtras* in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*

and the *Nyāya-Tātparya-Dīpikā* occur in about 32 *sūtras* of the two texts.

If we treat the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* as the reference point, we find the following situation obtaining in respect of the texts we have examined in the article:*

	NST	Vṛtti	Vivaraṇa	Prakāśa	Dīpikā
Missing total	18	14	13	11	65
Variant Readings	11	16	85 to 87	12	32

On the other hand, if we take the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* as our base, we find the following situation:

	NS	Vṛtti	Vivaraṇa	Prakāśa	Dīpikā
Missing total	18	6	—	18	60
Variant Readings	11	16	—	15	53

Note: The comparison of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*. with the *Vivaraṇa* has not been done as we have not been able to procure a copy of the latter.

The two tables reveal that the most radical situation obtains in the case of the *Dīpikā* and the *Vivaraṇa* which seem to be very unorthodox in their approach to the text of the *sūtras*. The *Dīpikā* has a difference of as many as 65 *sūtras* from the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and of 60 from the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*. Even if we take into account the editor's contention that many of these additional *sūtras* are statements taken from the *Bhāṣya* and elevated to the status of the *sūtras*, the difference still remains substantial as the total number of what may be called the *Bhāṣya-Sūtras* is only 13. So, even if we ignore them, the total difference will still amount to 52 and 47 respectively. The variant readings

* The abbreviations stand for the following texts:
(i) NS - Nyāyasūcīnibandha (ii) NST = Nyāyasūtroddhāra, (iii) Vṛtti = Viśvanātha Bhaṭṭācārya's Vṛtti on Gautama's *Nyāya Sūtra* (iv) Vivaraṇa = Nyāyasūtra-Vivaraṇa of Rādhāmohana Gosvāmi Bhaṭṭācārya, (v) Prakāśa = Gautamīyasūtraprakāśaḥ of Keśava Miśra and (vi) Dīpikā = Nyāyatātparyadīpikā of Bhaṭṭavāgīśvara.

in the case of the *Dīpikā* are also unusually high: they run to around 32 when compared with the text of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha,* and to about 53 when compared with the text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra.* The only comparable situation is found in the case of the *Vivaraṇa* where the variant readings come to about 85 or 87. This is almost the combined variant readings of the *Dīpikā* with respect to both the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra.* Surprisingly, the total number of missing *sūtras* in the *Vivaraṇa* is only 13, though we should remember that it is perhaps only a one-way comparison between the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Vivaraṇa,* and does not include the reverse comparison which is necessary to get a complete picture of the situation.

The author of the *Dīpikā,* according to Pt. Ananta Lal Thakur, seems to belong to a period before Udayana and is in the tradition of older Nyāya.[41] As for the author of the *Vivaraṇa* he is supposed to belong to the seventeenth century and is well-versed in Navya-Nyāya, according to T. K. Gopalswamy Aiyangar.[42] From the tenth century (if we accept Udayana's date as eleventh century)[43] to the seventeenth century is a long period, and yet the freedom with respect to what to accept or not as a *sūtra,* or which reading of the *sūtra* to adopt, seems to remain the same. It is not as if the older author is more concerned with accepting the so-called authority of the venerable elders than the younger—a situation one would have normally expected given the way the Indian intellectual tradition is usually presented to us in the text-books on the subject. It is instead the elder who seems more independent, as he does not hide what he accepts or rejects or modifies under the guise of finding a new manuscript of the text.

Keśava Miśra Tarkācārya's *Prakāśa* comes in between the two as, according to Potter's *Bibliography,* he flourished around 1525.[44] *Prakāśa's* variant readings or the missing *sūtras* are not very different in number from those in the other texts, though it seems closer to the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* than to the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra,* at least in numerical terms. Viśvanātha

Pañcānana's *Vṛtti* belongs to a slightly later period than Keśava Miśra as the former is supposed to have flourished around 1540, according to the same source.[45] If we accept the date of Vācaspati Miśra II, the author of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra,* as 1450 A.D.[46]; and of Vācaspati Miśra I as 960 A.D,[47] then the chronological order of the six texts we have considered would be the following:

(1) *Nyāyasūcīnibandha,*
(2) *Nyāyatātaparya-Dīpikā,*
(3) *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*
(4) *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśaḥ,*
(5) *Viśvanātha's Vṛtti* and
(6) Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī.
Bhaṭṭācārya's *Vivaraṇa.*

It should, however, be remembered that the *Dīpikā* is a text only recently discovered and edited, and that its author's date is only conjecturally suggested by Pt. Ananta Lal Thakur in his Introduction to the text on the basis of internal evidence. In fact, the text is not listed either in the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* or in Potter's *Bibliography* or Thangaswami Sarma's *Darśanamañjarī.* The only work referred to by that name both in the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* and the *Darśanamañjarī* is one by Jayasiṁhasūrī, being a commentary on Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyasāra.*[48] As for *Vivaraṇa,* it is primarily a commentary on a *Nyāya Sūtra* text supposed to have been found by Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī Bhaṭṭācārya, and as no one else seems to have seen the original text, neither its dating nor its author is known. In fact, if the authenticity of that text is accepted, then one would have to believe that in some essential respects the Nyāya tradition from Vātsyāyana onwards has been essentially mistaken. In T. K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar's words, "So in the light of a clear deviation of the readings of many *sūtras,* and of the disclosure of some new *Nyāya-Sūtras* unknown as yet to the world of the Nyāya scholars, and of the unflinching fidelity on the part of the commentator to a different text, it can be admitted that the *Nyāya-Sūtra* text as found edited in the *Nyāya-Sūtra-Vivaraṇa* belongs

to a different recension of the *Nyāya-Sūtras* unknown either to the Bhāṣyakāra, Vārttikakāra, or Vācaspati Miśra or Udayana."[49] He is, of course, aware that "most of the critics may contend that Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī Bhaṭṭācārya, who flourished somewhere in the seventeenth century A.D. even perhaps subsequent to Viśvanātha Pañcānana might have interpolated some into the body of the text to suit his line of Nyāya conception."[50]

He rejects this possibility, but does not explore or even show any awareness of the problems raised by such a situation. If Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī has not interpolated the *sūtras* and the variant readings, then either the writer of the manuscript did, or we would have to hold Vātsyāyana guilty of deleting, modifying and interpolating the *sūtras,* and the *sūtra*-variations in his text. The other alternative of two recensions with such divergent readings would only push the problem still further back, and also raise the question as to why there is no prior evidence of the other recension till Rādhāmohana Goswāmī Bhaṭṭācārya in the seventeenth century. Furthermore, the whole notion of 'recension' is so loosely applied in scholarly writings relating to classical Indian studies that one is usually unaware of the many problems hidden under this rubric.[51]

However, the question of the missing *sūtras* or the variant readings is, as we have already seen, and as T. K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar should have known, not confined to Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī Bhaṭṭācārya's *Vivaraṇa* alone. The only unique thing about his additions, omissions and variations is their supposedly radical difference from the accepted Nyāya position, but even that would have to be established by a comparative study of the other additions, omissions and variations found in different texts, only some of which we have noted in the course of this essay. Why, for example, are the omissions, additions and variations in the *Dīpikā,* which are far greater in number than in the *Vivaraṇa,* considered to be of less significance, is not clear. Unfortunately, the editor of the *Dīpikā* has not even referred to the work of Rādhāmohana, let alone compared it with the *Dīpikā.*

In fact, the lackadaisical manner in which classical scholarship in this field has functioned is truly unbelievable. How could one possibly account for the fact that Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailang, who perhaps was the first person to edit and publish the text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra,* has nothing to say about how he found the manuscript, where it was located, what problems it raised for the text of the *Nyāya Sūtras,* what variations it has and what are their philosophical importance. The only thing he says is that he has separately given the *sūtra-pāṭha* of a text named *Sūtroddhāra* written by Vācaspati Miśra found in a not very ancient book written in Bengali script after having critically edited it.[52] This is perhaps the same-text about which Hara Prasāda Śāstrī had written in 1905: "Manuscripts giving the *sūtra* only are extremely rare. I got one from Midnapore and gave a copy of it to my friend Dr. Venis, and it was published at Benaras. It is known, as the *Nyāyasūtrpddhāra.*" If the two works are the same, as is most likely, then it is surprising that even after nine years of its publication, the learned pandit does not know that this is not the work of the author of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* with whom he confuses him. Not only this, he does not even care to compare the two texts and discuss the differences therein. And though he refers to Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī in the article, he not only places him in the nineteenth century, but also shows no awareness of those supposed radical variations in the readings of the *sūtras* or of those new *sūtras* which are alleged by T. K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar to lead to the postulation of a totally different recension of the *Nyāya Sūtras,* even though the *Vivaraṇa* commentary had been published in the *Pandit* New Series 23 (1901), 24 (1902) and 25 (1903).[54] Furthermore, surprisingly if the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* entry under *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*[55] is to be believed, he has entered it as a commentary, and that too incomplete, assuming, of course, that he is the author of the *Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts, Second Series,* published in 4 volumes by the Government of Bengal, Calcutta in 1900, 1904, 1907 and 1911. The anomaly is even more incomprehensible if we remember

that while the article was published in 1905, the relevant notice of the manuscript of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* is supposed to be in Vol. II of the *Notices* which was published in 1904, This is perhaps a different manuscript from the one claimed to have been given by Pt. Hara Prasad Sastri to Dr. Venis.* In any case, what is surprising is that no one has tried to check the veracity of the statements of Pt. Hara Prasad Sastri made in his article of 1905, or the correctness of the entry in the *Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts,* Vol. II, published in 1904 or that of the entry in the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* published in 1978.

The problems relating to the works of Pt. Gaṅgādhar Śāstrī Tailaṅga, Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla, and Shri T. K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar in this connection have already been referred to earlier. So also have been those arising from the Introduction by Pt. Gapīnātha Kavirāja.[56] One may say that the traditional Indian pandit did not have much interest in textual or historical matters. He was primarily concerned with the philosophical issues, and only secondarily with historical questions relating to the authenticity of the text. In fact, it may be urged that it was the intrusion of the western way of looking at the texts and their tradition that, in a sense, forced Indian scholars in this century to work in this field and as their heart was not in it, they produced the kind of inexcusablv shoddy work we have seen them doing.

But, then, what about the modern scholars? They do not seem to show any awareness of the problem either. Instead, they seem to be blind to things before their eyes, which perhaps is even more inexcusable than that of the pandits. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, for example, seems completely unaware of the falsity of the statements made by Hara Prasad Sastri in his article *'An Examination of the Nyāya -Sūtras'* which he has included not only in the second volume of *Studies in the History of Indian Philosophy* edited by him and published in 1978, but also referred to approvingly in his long Introduction to Mrinal Kanti Gango-

* I say 'claimed', as Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstri Tailaṅga has made no mention of this fact in his *Introduction* to the V.S.S. 9 publication of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*.

padhyaya's translation of the *Nyāya Sūtra* with Vātsyāyana's commentary published in 1982. Similarly, Matilal in his discussion of the *Sūtras* in his recent work, *Perception,* shows hardly any awareness of the problem. Not only this, though he refers to Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī,* edited by Sūryanārāyaṇa Śukla and published by Chowkhamba from Banaras in 1936 he does not seem to have seen the text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* published therein, or noted the problems we have referred to in our discussion of it earlier.[57]

Thus the traditional and the modern scholars both seem to be either uninterested or unaware of the problems that we have tried to highlight in this essay. And the situation with respect to one of the most ratiocinative, argument-oriented schools of Indian philosophy today is that there is no standard, authoritative edition of its basic work, that is, the *Nyāya Sūtras* giving all the additions, deletions and variant readings with an assessment of their philosophical significance, if any. Even such a prestigious publisher of classical works of Indian philosophy as Motilal Banarasidass has not taken the opportunity to ask an outstanding scholar in the field to survey the problems relating to the text when recently reprinting Gaṅgānātha Jhā's well-known work, *The Nyāya Sūtras of Gautama.* Perhaps, the Indian Council of Philosophical Research and the Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan could undertake this work jointly with the help and collaboration ot the well-known Nyāya scholars in the country.

Any such work, however, will first have to come to terms with the following:

1. What is the manuscript on the basis of which Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga published his version of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* in V.S.S. 9?
2. What is the exact nature of the entry under *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* in the second volume of *Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts* by Hara Prasād Sastri and published by the Government of Bengal in 1904?

3. Where is the manuscript of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* referred to under this entry?
4. Is this the same as has been published in VSS, volume, IX or is it a commentary as mentioned in the *New Catalogus Catalogorum?*
5. What are the grounds for the assertion that the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* is the work of Vācaspati Miśra II, and not of Vācaspati Miśra I?
6. What is the manuscript of the *Nyāyatattvāloka* said to be in the India Office Library, London, about? Is it the same as the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra,* as is asserted by Potter in his *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies,* vol. I? In case it is different, what are the grounds for believing it to be the work of Vācaspati Miśra II?
7. What could be the grounds for Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstri Tailaṅg's denying the *prāmāṇikatva* of so many *sūtras* in the footnotes to the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* as given in V.S.S. 9?
8. What could be the possible reasons for his accepting almost all the *sūtras* whose *pramāṇatva* he could not discover, as genuine *sūtras* in the main body of the text?
9. What could be the possible reasons for Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla giving *Tattvāloka* as a *pramāṇa* for *sūtras* in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* in his 1936 edition of *Nyāyamañjarī,* when the two are usually supposed to be works by the same person?
10. Where is the manuscript on the basis of which Shri S.T.G. Bhattaccarya edited and published Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī Bhaṭṭācārya's *Vivaraṇa* on the *Nyāya-Sūtras* in *Pandit* New Series 23, 24 and 25 in 1901, 1902 and 1903 (according to Potter in the Vol. I of his *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*?
11. Did Shri S.T.G. Bhattaccarya write any editiorial note giving information about the manuscript he had found. and the radical character of the additions, omissions and variant readings pointed out later by T.K. Gopalswamy Aiyangar?

12. Why are *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and *Nyāya-Vārttika-Tatparyaṭīkā* mentioned separately as authoritative sources when they are supposed to be the works of the same person, that is, Vācaspati Miśra I?
13. If Vācaspati Miśra I's *Nyāya-Vārttika-Tātparyaṭīkā* is supposed to be a *ṭīkā* on Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika* then how can it reject the *sūtratva* of those *sūtras* which have been accepted as such in the *Vārttika?*
14. The problem of something occurring in Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* being taken as a *sūtra* should be distinguished from someone accepting as a *sūtra* something which does not occur in the *Bhāṣya.*
15. The variant readings should be divided into those which are philosophically significant from those that are only linguistic in character, or where *sūtra-pāṭha* has been separated or combined to make one *sūtra* read as two *sūtras*, or two *sūtras* as one. Special attention should be paid to *sūtras* where the variant readings include or exclude the negative prefix, which makes its sense totally different.

Notes

1. Baccaā Jhā, 1860.
2. Perhaps, the most outstanding *Naiyāyika* in 20th Century India. He recently passed away. Sometime back he had propounded the theory of *Dehātmavāda* within the Nyāya framework at a gathering of more than a hundred Nyāya scholars at Sarnath, Banaras. The text of the lecture along with his reply to the objections raised is proposed to be published by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi. An English translation by Dr. Mukund Lath has been published in JICPR, Vol. V, No. 3, 1988.
3. Karl H. Potter, (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika upto Ganngeśa* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), p. 239.
4. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (ed.), *Studies in the History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II (Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & Co., 1978), p. 88.
5. Ganganatha Jha, *The Nyāya-Sūtras of Gautama*, Vol. I, Preface (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, Reprint (1984), Originally published in *Indian Thought from* 1912–1919.

6. *Ibid.*, p. ix.
7. *Ibid.*, p. xvi.
8. Kral H. Potter (Ed.) *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. I: Bibliography (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, Second Revised Editon, 1983). p. 46–47.
9. Ganganath Jha, p. xii, xv.
10. Ganganath Jha, p. xii, xv.
11. Gopinatha Kaviraja, *Gleanings from the History and Bibliography of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature*, in *Indian Studies: Past and Present* (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyaya, 1962), p. 46. Originally published in Princess of Wales, Sarswati Bhawan Studies, Banaras from 1924 to 1927 in Vols. 3, 4, 5, & 7.
12. Debiprasad Chattopadhyays, p. 88.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
14. Potter, Vol. I. p. 234. Potter's reference to *History of Navya-Nyāya* in Mithila by Dinesh Chandras Bhattacharya does not exactly corroborate what he has written, as nowhere on p. 147 is it said that the text is partly in ms. It only says "It appears that the late Mahamahopadhyaya V.B. Dwivedi has access to a ms of this work copied in Caitra 1418." Reference under DB on p. x also needs correction for the year of publication; it is 1958 and not 1959 given in Potter's *Encyclopedia.*
15. Potter Vol. II on *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, p.* 684.
16. Potter, Vol. I, p. 43, No. (788).
17. Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya, History of *Navya-Nyāya* in *Mithila* (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post- Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1958) p. 147.
18. *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Vol. IV, 1947, p. 300
19. Sri Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla (ed.), The *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, (Kashi Sanskrit Series, No. 106, Chowkhamba, Benaras, 1936); p. 1–28 (the end of the work).
20. Ram Bhavan Upadhyaya, Pan-Ns. 2–1, 1922. I owe this reference to Pt. Thangawami Sarma, the outstanding scholar who has compiled perhaps the most exhaustive refence bibligraphy on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika published under the title Darśanamañjarī, Part I by the University of Madras in 1985.
21. 5.1.17 reads in the main body of the text as: *pratipakaṣātprakaraṇasiddheḥ pratiṣedhānupapattiḥ pratipakṣopapatteḥ* (p. 240), while in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* it reads as: *pratipakṣātprakaraṇasiddheḥ pratiṣedhānupapattiḥ* (p. 25). Similarly 5.1.34 reads in the main body of the text as: *dṛṣṭānte ca sādhyasādhanabhāvena prajñātasya dharmasya hetutvāttasya cobhayathābhāvānna viśeṣaḥ* (p. 253) while in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* it reads as: *dṛṣṭānte ca sādhyasādhanabhāvena dharmasya hetutvāttasya cobhayathābhāvānna viśeṣaḥ.* (p. 26).

22. R. Thangaswami Sarma, *Darśanamañjarī. Pt. I. p. 34.*
23. V. Raghavan, *New Catalogus Catalogorum* (University of Madras, 1968, Vol. I), p. 242.
24. See *New Catalogus Catalogorum, Vol. X. p. 247.* The entry mentions, 'in 2 chs. by Vācaspati Miśra. IO 1868'. First, it may be pointed out that according to the detailed indication regarding the abbreviation IO on p. ix of the first volume there is no such catalogue published in 1868. It specifically says 'A catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakrit manuscripts in the India Office Library. By Julius Eggeling. 2. parts (London, 1887, 1896) and Vol. II in 2 parts by A. B. Keith, with a supplement—Buddhist Manuscripts—By F.W. Thomas, London, 1935. This may be regarded as printing mistake, but it is inexcusable on the part of the Editor not to have indicated whether it was Vācaspati Miśra II who is supposed to be the author of the work. By the year 1978, when the tenth volume was published, it was generally accepted that there were two different Vācaspati Miśras and that the *Tattvāloka* is the work of the later one. It is not that the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* does not know of the fact as it refers to the auihor of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* as 'Vācaspati Miśra (Junior) of Mithila (15 cent.)'. (p. 280). But even here the entry is wrong in two respects. One, it classifies the text as a commentary, which it certainly is not. Secondly, it mentions it as incomplete which also is mistaken. The editor relies on what is written by Hara Prasad Sastri in his Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts, Second Series, published in 4 volumes by the Govt. of Bengal, Calcutta in 1900, 1904, 1907 and 1911 which is cited as the authority for the statement. But the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, as we know, had already been published by Pt. Gaṅgādhara Ṣāstrī Tailaṅg in 1896, a fact, which does not seem to be known either to Hara Prasad Sastri in 1904 or to Prof. Kunjuni Raja, the editor of Vol. X of the *New Catalogus Catalagorum* in 1970. If we remember that the text of the *Nyāyasūtrodhāra* had once again been published in between by Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla in 1936 with new footnotes, the situation is unbelievable indeed. Or, is there another *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* which is a commentary on the Nyāya Sūtras to which Hara Prasad Sastri refers to in his *Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts* published in 1904. Strangely, even Pt. Thangaswami Sarma who in his *Darśanamañjarī,* Part I, published in 1985, mentions the 1896 publication of *Nyāyasūtroddhāṛa* in VSS 9, does not question the correctness of its classification as a commentary in the *New Catalogus Catalogorum.*
25. The missing sūtras of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are 3.1.15, 3.1.38, 3.1.63 3.1.69, 3.1.70, 3.2.34, 3.2.38, 3.2.47, 3.2.69 and 3.2.70.
26. The following *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* have variant readings (with additions etc.) in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*: 2.1.47, 2.2.17, 2.2.52, 3.2.14, 3.2.26, 3.2.48, 5.1.17, 5.1.18, 5.1.19, 5.1.20 and 5.1.24.

27. The missing *sūtras* of the Nyāyasūcīnibandha in the Nyāyasūtroddhāra are 2.1.20, 2.2.28, 2.2.43, 2.2.49, 3.1.29, 3.1.30 and 3.1.73.
28. Prof. Thangaswami Sarma informs me in a personal communication that even Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavāttika* tries to do this to some extent.
29. The sūtras in the Vṛtti missing in the Nyāyasūcīnibandha are 3.1.15, 3.1.38, 3.1.53, 3.1.63, 3.1.69, 3.1.70, 3.2.40, 3.2.44, 3.2.47, 3.2.70. The *sūtras* missing in the Nyāyasūtroddhāra are: 3.1.29, 3.1.30, 3.1.31, 3.1.53. 3.2.10 and 3.2.44.
30. The list of the sūtras in the Vṛtti which have a variant reading (with additions, etc.) from the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha are:* 2.1.25, 2.2.13, 2.2.17, 2.2.48, 2.2.49, 2.2.52, 2.2.61, 3.1.62, 3.2.10, 3.2.14, 3.2.25, 4.1.49, 4.1.61, 4.2.10 and 5.2.15.
31. The variant readings in the *Vṛtti* and the Nyāyasūtroddhāra relate to the following sūtras: 2.1.25, 2.1.44, 2.1.53, 2.2.13, 2.2.48, 2.2.61, 3.1.62, 3.2.10, 3.2.14, 4,1.49, 4.1.61, 4.2.10, 5.1.18, 5.1.19, 5.1.20, 5.1.24 and 5.2.15.
32. Potter, *Encyclopedia.* Vol. I, *p. 43,* entry 790.
33. T.K. Gopalaswami Aiyangar, *Journal of Shri Venkatesvara Oriental Research Institute, Tirupati, Vol. VIII, 1947, p. 34–47.*
34. The sūtras of the Nyāyasūcīnibandha missing in the *Vivaraṇa* are 2.1.20, 2.2.37, 2.2.43, 3.1.38, 3.1.55, 4.2.7, and 4.2.8. The sūtras of the *Vivaraṇa* which are not to be found in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are: 3.1.15, 3.2.10, 4.1.45, 4.1.49, 4.2.50m and 5.2.20.
35. T.K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar, Footnote. p 35. Italics mine.
36.Potter. p. 334.
37. Bhīmācārya, Nyāyakośaḥ (Poona: Bhandarkara Orients Research Institute, 1978), p. 2.
38. T.K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar. 'Lost Nyāya-Sūtras as restored by Radhamohana Gosvami Bhattacarya'. *The Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute,* Vol. XXVI, No. 14., (Oct. 1970), pp. 41–44.
39. Though the editor has not added 'Tarkācārya' to his name it is necessary to do so to distinguish him from Keśava Miśra, the author of the Tarkabhāṣā.
40. Kishore Nath Jha (ed.), Nyāyatāparyadīpikā by Vāgīśvara Bhaṭṭa (Allahabad: Ganganath Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, 1979), p. tha. da.
41. Kishore Nath Jha, p. 2.
42. T.K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar, 'Lost Nyāya-Sūtras as restored by Radhamohana Gosvami Bhattaccarya'. *The Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute,* Allabhad, Vol. XXVI, No. 4 (Oct. 1970), p. 41.
43. On Udayana's date, see Potter (ed.), Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. II (Delhi: Moti Lal Banarsidass, 1977), p. 523.
44. Potter, p. 345.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 411.
46. Potter, p. 334.
47. Potter, p. 205.
48. *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, Vol. X, p. 248. Also, *Darśanamanjarī*, p. 74.
49. T.K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar, 'A Critique of the Nyāya-Sūtras Text', p 41.
50. Ibid., p. 41.
51. See for a further illustration and discussion of this point my article 'The Vedic Corpus: Some questions'JICPR, Vol. VIII, No. 1, 1985.
52. The only thing he says about it is '*pṛthak sūtra-pāṭhaśca-vācaspvtimiśrakṛtasūtroddhāraṇ*āmakam vaṅ*gākṣaralikhitamekaṁ pustakaṁ*ālocya samyojitaḥ'.
53. H.P. Sastri, p. 88.
54. There does not seem to be any mention of these in the New Catalogus Catalogorum.
55. Vol. X. p. 280.
56. Interestingly Ganganatha Jha refers to three different manuscripts consisting of the *Sūtra-pāṭha* only. These are (i) A palm-leaf manuscript of the sūtra only, (ii) Paper manuscript of the sūtra only belonging to Jagadish Mishra, and (iii) Paper manuscript of the *sūtra* only belonging to Babu Govindadas.' (p. ix of the Preface)'. This is in contrast to the statement by Hara Prasad Sastri in the 1905 article already referred to. *The New Catalogus Catalogorum* seems to refer to a number of manuscripts without commentaries (Vol. X. p. 276) but none seems to have collated or checked the standard reading of the sūtras with them.
57. Bimal Krishna Matilal, Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 429.

Sub-Appendices to Appendix 1

(i)

A

Sūtras in the Nyāyasūtroddhāra missing in the Nyāya-Tātparya-Dīpikā of Bhaṭṭa Vāgīśvara

1. 2.1.61
2. 3.1.15
3. 3.1.18
4. 3.1.54
5. 3.1.71
6. 3.2.14
7. 3.2.16
8. 3.2.21
9. 3.2.34
10. 3.2.37
11. 3.2.38
12. 3.2.39
13. 3.2.46
14. 3.2.47
15. 4.1.15
16. 4.1.16
17. 4.1.33
18. 4.1.49
19. 4.1.60
20. 4.2.6
21. 4.2.11
22. 4.2.12
23. 4.2.14
24. 4.2.17
25. 4.2.20
26. 4.2.21
27. 4.2.22
28. 4.2.25
29. 4.2.27
30. 4.2.28
31. 4.2.29
32. 4.2.30
33. 4.2.32
34. 4.2.33
35. 4.2.34
36. 4.2.37
37. 4.2.42
38. 5.1.20
39. 5.1.34

Total: 39

B

Sūtras in the *Nyāya- Dīpikā of Bhaṭṭa Vāgīśvara missing in the Nyāyasūtroddhāra.*

1. 2.1.20
2. 2.1.21

3. 2.1.27	17. 3.1.30
4. 2.1.34	18. 3.1.31
5. 2.1.56	19. 3.1.32
6. 2.1.60	20. 3.1.41
7. 2.1.64	21. 3.2.16
8. 2.2.7	22. 3.2.19
9. 2.2.10	23. 3.2.20
10. 2.2.11	24. 3.2.22
11. 2.2.50	25. 3.2.37
12. 2.2.51	26. 3.2.42
13. 2.2.52	27. 3.2.60
14. 3.1.1	28. 4.2.22
15. 3.1.18	29.4.2.30
16. 3.1.28	
	Total: 29

C

Variant readings of the sūtras in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* and the *Nyāya-Tātparya-Dīpikā* of Bhaṭṭa Vāgīśvara.

1. 1.1.28	28. 3.2.24
2. 1.1.40	29. 3.2.29
3. 1.2.17	30. 3.2.45
4. 2.1.1	31. 3.2.48 (Variant reading with न)
5. 2.1.24	32. 3.2.54 (Variant reading with न)
6. 2.1.25	33. 3.2.65 (Variant reading with न)
7. 2.1.48	34. 3.2.74
8. 2.1.44	35. 3.2.76
9. 2.1.46	36. 4.1.4
10. 2.1.55 (variant reading with न)	37. 4.1.7
11. 2.2.7	38. 4.1.10

12. 2.2.8
13. 2.2.9
14. 2.2.11
15. 2.2.15
16. 2.2.17
17. 2.2.31 (Variant reading with अ
18. 2.2.56
19. 3.1.13 (Variant reading with न)
20. 3.1.16 (Variant reading without न)
21. 3.1.28
22. 3.1.34
23. 3.1.38
24. 3.1.46
25. 3.1.53
26. 3.1.65
27. 3.1.12 (Variant reading with अनुपलब्धि)

39. 4.1.36
40. 4.1.39
41. 4.1.40
42. 4.1.47
43. 4.1.62
44. 4.2.10
45. 4.2.15
46. 4.2.23
47. 4.2.35
48. 4.2.47
49. 4.2.49
50. 5.1.17
51. 5.1.38
52. 5.2.3
53. 5.2.15

Total: 53

(ii)

A

Sūtras of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* missing in the *Gautamīya-Sūtra-Prakāśaḥ* of Keśava Miśra.

1. 1.1.8
2. 2.1.25
3. 3.1.15
4. 3.1.54
5. 3.1.60
6. 3.1.65
7. 3.1.71
8.3.2.38
9. 3.2.47
10.3.2.71
11.3.2.73
12.4.2.7
13.4.2.8

Total: 13

B

Sūtras of the *Gautamīya-Sūtra-Prakāśaḥ* missing in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra.*

1. 2.1.20
2. 3.1.28
3. 3.1.29
4. 3.1.30
5. 3.2.10

Total: 5

C

Variant readings of the *sūtras* in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* and the *Gautamīya-Sūtra-Prakāśaḥ.*

1. 2.1.55 (Variant reading with न)
2. 3.1.6 (Variant reading with न)
3. 3.1.30
4. 3.1.36
5. 3.1.38
6. 3.1.50
7. 3.1.53
8. 3.2.54 (Variant reading with न)
9. 4.1.7
10. 4.1.24
11. 4.2.44
12. 4.2.45
13. 5.1.17
14. 5.1.20

Total: 14

(iii)

A

Sūtras in the *Nyāyasūcīnibanda missing in the Nyāya-Tātparya-Dīpikā of* Bhaṭṭa-Vāgīśvara.

1. 2.1.25
2. 2.1.46
3. 2.1.61
4. 2.2.28

5. 2.2.43
6. 2.2.51
7. 2.2.52
8. 3.1.17
9. 3.1.38
10. 3.1.55
11. 3.1.71
12. 3.2.14
13. 3.2.16
14. 3.2.35
15. 3.2.44
16. 4.1.15
17. 4.1.16
18. 4.1.33
19. 4.1.48
20. 4.1.59
21. 4.2.6
22. 4.2.11
23. 4.2.12
24. 4.2.14
25. 4.2.17
26. 4.2.20
27. 4.2.21
28. 4.2.22
29. 4.2.25
30. 4.2.27
31. 4.2.28
32. 4.2.29
33. 4.2.30
34. 4.2.32
35. 4.2.33
36. 4.2.34
37. 4.2.37
38. 4.2.42
39. 5.1.20
40. 5.1.34

Total: 40

B

Sūtras in the *Nyāya-Tātparya-Dīpikā* of Bhaṭṭa Vāgīśvara missing in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha.*

1. 2.1.21
2. 2.1.27
3. 2.1.34
4. 2.1.35
5. 2.1.49
6. 2.1.56
7. 2.1.60
8. 2.1.64
9. 2.2.7
10. 2.2.15
11. 3.1.1
12. 3.1.18
13. 3.1.28
14. 3.1.41
15. 3.1.42
16. 3.1.68
17. 3.2.16
18. 3.2.19
19. 3.2.20
20. 3.2.42
21. 3.2.60
22. 3.2.69
23. 4.1.42
24. 4.2.22
25. 4.2.30

Total: 25

C

Sūtras with variant reading in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Nyāya-Tātparya-Dīpikā* of Bhaṭṭa Vāgīśvara.

1. 1.2.8
2. 1.2.17
3. 2.1.26 (A mixture of 2.1.25 and 2.1.26)
4. 2.1.46
5. 2.1.58
6. 2.2.8
7. 2.2.10 & 11 (combined into 2.2.9)
8. 2.2.18
9. 2.2.34 (Variant reading without अ)
10. 2.2.55
11. 2.2.57
12. 3.1.14 (Variant reading with न)
13. 3.1.29
14. 3.1.38
15. 3.1.50
16. 3.1.63
17. 3.2.22
18. 3.2.30
19. 3.2.47
20. 3.2.63 (Variant reading with न)
21. 3.2.71
22. 4.1.4
23. 4.1.7
24. 4.1.36
25. 4.1.37
26. 4.1.38
27. 4. 1.44
28. 4.2.9
29. 4.2.34

31. 5.1.18

Total: 31

(iv)

A

Sūtras in the Nyāyasūcīnibandha which are missing in the *Gautamīya-Sūtra-Prakāśaḥ* of Keśava Miśra.

1. 1.1.8
2. 2.1.26

3. 3.1.38
4. 3.1.55
5. 3.1.61
6. 3.1.71
7. 4.2.7
8. 4.2.8

Total: 8

B

Sūtras in the *Gautamīya-Sūtra-Prakāśaḥ of* Keśava Miśra missing in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha.*

1. 2.1.32
2.3.2.10
3.4.1.45

Total: 3

C

Variant reading of the *sūtras* in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Gautamīya-Sūtra-Prakāśaḥ* of Keśava Miśra.

1. 1.1.27
2. 3.1.32
3. 3.2.46. (Variant reading with न)
4. 3.2.48
5. 4.1.17
6. 4.1.24 (Variant reading with अ)
7.4.1.36
8.4.2.42
9. 4.2.43
10. 5.1.33
11. 5.2.11
12. 5.2.15

Total: 12

Appendix 2

Topics Dealt with in the Nyāya Sūtras

The topics or the prakaraṇas in the Nyāya Sūtras according to the author of the Nyāya Sūcīnibandha number eighty two. Of these, the topics in each adhyāya are:

Adhyāya	Prakaraṇas/Topics
1.1	7
1.2	4
2.1	9
2.2	4
3.1	9
3.2	7
4.1	14
4.2	6
5.1	15
5.2	7

In adhyāya one, the total number of prakaraṇas is eleven, in the adhyāya two total number is thirteen adhyāya three has 16, four has 20 and five has 22.

The number of sūtras in each *prakaraṇa* are the following:

Prakaraṇa	Number of Sūtras
N.S. 1.1	
(1) प्रयोजन	2
(2) प्रमाण	6
(3) प्रमेय	14
(4) पूर्वांगलक्षण	3
(5) आश्रय सिद्धान्त	6

(6) न्याय प्रकरण	8
(7) उत्तरांग लक्षण	2
N.S. 1.2	
(1) कथा लक्षण	3
(2) हेत्वाभास	6
(3) छल लक्षण	8
(4) पुरूषशक्लि लिगं दोप सामान्य लक्षण (जाति, निग्रहस्थान)	3
N.S. 2.1	
(1) संशय परीक्षा	7
(2) प्रमाण सामान्य परीक्षा	13
(3) प्रत्यक्ष लक्षण परीक्षा	10
(4) प्रत्यक्षानुमानत्व परीक्षा	7
(5) अनुमान परीक्षा	2
(6) वर्तमान परीक्षा प्रकरण	5
(7) उपमान परीक्षा	5
(8) शब्द सामान्य परीक्षा	7
(9) शब्द विशेष परीक्षा	12
N.S. 2.2	
(1) प्रमाण चतुण्टय परीक्षा	12
(2) शब्दनित्यता प्रकरण	27
(3) शब्द परिणाम	18
(4) शब्दशक्ति परीक्षा (पदार्थ निरूपण) (Note शब्द पर 19+27+18+12=76)	12
N.S. 3.1	
(1) इन्द्रिय व्यतिरिक्त आत्म	3
(2) शरीर व्यतिरिक्त आत्म	3
(3) प्रासँगिक चक्षुरद्वैत निराकरण	8
(4) आत्ममनो व्यतिरेक	3

(5) आत्मनित्यता	9
(6) शरीर परीक्षा	5
(7) इन्द्रिय भौतिकत्व परीक्षा	20
(8) इन्द्रिय नानात्व	10
(9) अर्थ परीक्षा	12

N.S. 3.2

(1) बुद्धयनित्यता	9
(2) औपोद्धातिक क्षणभंग	8
(3) बुद्धेरात्मगुणत्व	24
(4) बुद्धेरूत्पन्नापवर्गित्व	4
(5) बुद्धेः शरीरगुण व्यतिरेक	10
(6) मनः परीक्षा	4
(7) शरीर अदृप्टनिष्पाद्यत्व	13

N.S. 4.1

(1) प्रवृत्तिदोष सामान्य परीक्षा	2
(2) दोप त्रैराश्य	7
(3) प्रेत्यभाव परीक्षा	4
(4) शून्यतोपादान	5
(5) ईश्वरोपादानता	3
(6) आकस्मिकत्व	3
(7) सर्व अनित्यत्व निराकरण	4
(8) सर्वनित्यत्व निराकरण	5
(9) सर्वपृथक्त्व निराकरण	3
(10) सर्वशून्यता निराकरण	4
(11) संख्यैकन्तवाद निराकरण	3
(12) फलपरीक्षा	11
(13) दुःख परीक्षा	4
(14) अपवर्ग परीक्षा	10

N.S. 4.2

(1)	तत्वज्ञानोत्पत्ति	3
(2)	प्रासंगिकमवयवावयविप्रकरणम्	14
(3)	औपोद्घातिकं निरवयवत्व	8
(4)	प्रासंगिक बाह्यार्थभंगनिराकरण	12
(5)	तत्वज्ञान विवृद्धि	12
(6)	तत्वज्ञान परिपालन	2

N.S. 5.1

(1)	सत्प्रतिपक्ष देशनाभास	3
(2)	साध्यदृष्टान्तधर्म विकल्पप्रभावोत्कर्षसमादिजातिष्ट्क	3
(3)	प्राप्त्यप्राप्तियुगनद्धवाहिविकल्पोपकृमजति	3
(4)	युगनद्धवाहिप्रसंगप्रतिदृष्टान्तसमजातिद्वय	3
(5)	सम अनुत्पत्तिसम	2
(6)	संशयसम	2
(7)	प्रकरणसम	2
(8)	हेतुसम	3
(9)	अर्थापत्तिसम	2
(10)	विशेपसम	2
(11)	उपपत्तिसम	2
(12)	उपलबिधसम	2
(13)	अनुपलब्धिसम	2
(14)	अनित्यसम	3
(15)	नित्य सम	3
(16)	कार्य सम	2
(17)	षट्पक्षीरूपकथाभास	2

N.S. 5.2

(1)	प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वन्यतराश्रितनिगृहहस्थानपञाविशेंषलक्षण	6
(2)	प्रकृतोपयोगिवाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिफलशून्यनिग्रह–स्थानचतुप्क	4
(3)	स्वसिद्धान्तानृरूपप्रयोगभासनिग्रहस्थानत्रिक्	3

(4)	पुनरूक्तिग्रहस्थान	2
(5)	उत्तरविरोधिनिग्रहस्थानत्रिक	3
(6)	दोषनिरूप्यतानुज्ञादिनिग्रहस्थानत्रिक	3
(7)	कथकान्योक्तिनिरूप्यनिग्रहस्थानद्वय	2

Out of the 82 topics or prakaraṇ as discussed in the N.S., the largest are in chapter 5 which deals with the fallacies. The topics in this chapter are 22.

The distribution of the topics in the other chapters is given in the following table:

adhyāya 1	=	11 prakaraṇas	
2	=	13	''
3	=	13	''
4	=	20	''

The largest number of sūtras seem to be concerned with the establishment of the reality of the ātman. It is dealt with in chapter 3 from 3.1.1 to 3.2.41.

The second topic which is dealt with in the largest number of sūtras is *Śabda.* And the sūtras that discuss it are seventy-six in number. They occur from 2.1.45 to 2.2.69.

Sūtra 1.1.7, 1.1,8 on शब्द

शब्द सामान्य परीक्षा—2.1.49—56 sūtras refute the contention that śabda can not be regarded as a *svatantra pramāṇa* and can be subsumed under the other *pramāṇas.* It also discusses the dispute about the conventional vs. natural relationship between word and object. No distinction seems to have been made between meaning and reference on the one hand and meaning and object on the other in the discussion.

The discussion about the authority of the Veda, introduced from 2.1.57 onwards seems to be .abrupt as it has no relation to the previous sūtras. Nor has it been established that they are the *upadeśa* of an *āpta puruṣa.*

The discussion on the Vedas occurs from the sūtras 2.1.57 to 2.1.69 in 12 sūtras and is one of the weakest discussion in the text. The discussion ends with the mention of the Āyurveda

as the concrete example of the authority which the four Vedas may be said to enjoy. But, if the example is to be taken seriously, it undermines the authority of the Vedas in a foundational manner, a position that seems to be supported by the sūtras that follow which argue against the eternity of sound. The other example of *mantra* as a śabda pramāṇa does not seem to make sense as it does not say anything about the nature of the authority of the Veda. Also, the term '*upadeśa*' does not seem to have been explicated clearly as one does not know whether the authority of the *āpta puruṣa* is to be confined only to the advice he gives or extends to all other statements that he may make such as, say, the nature of reality or the theory of *karma* or rebirth etc.

The sūtras 2.1.1 to 2.1.12 discuss the other *pramāṇas* such as *aitihya, arthāpatti, saṁbhava* and *abhāva* and give reasons why they need not be accepted as independent *pramāṇas* as they can be subsumed under the four *pramāṇas* accepted by the system. The two important points raised in the discussion relate to the *anekāntika* character of the inference in the context of *arthāpatti* where it is said that as the same effect may follow from different causes, one is not justified in inferring a cause from the effect as one does in the case of *arthāpatti*. The discussion of *abhāva* is important in more ways than one as it gives evidence of the fact that the discussion on *abhāva* was very much alive at the time of Gautama and hence raises the question why it was only sometime around the 10th century AD that it was accepted as an independent *padārtha* by the thinkers in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. There is also the question as to why the Vaiśeṣika sūtras do not mention *abhāva* as a separate *padārtha*, even though the Nyāya Sūtra seems to support such a position, at least implicitly. There is also a reference to the Buddhist position of *apoha* which appears to be accepted by the author of the Nyāya Sūtras. But, in spite of all this, it is not clear how *abhāva* can be treated as an *anumāna* except in the sense that if something is asserted to be absent then its presence in some sense or other may be inferred

also. As for *saṁbhava,* there seems to be hardly any discussion of it in the sūtras.

The discussion on sound or *śabda pramāṇa* extends from sūtra 2.1.49-68 and 2.2.13-69 and is divided into following prakaraṇas:

2.1.49—68

(i) शब्द सामान्य परीक्षा

(ii) शब्द विशेष परीक्षा

2.2.13—69

(i) शब्दानित्यता

(ii) शब्द परिणाम (Transformation)

(iii) शब्द शक्ति परीक्षा (पदार्थ निरूपण) Performative power of words

The discussion on the *ātman* from 3.1.1 to 3.2.42 is concerned with establishing the necessity for the postulation of something that is different from the senses, the body, the mind and the intellect or reasoning, even though each of these has been mentioned as a *prameya* in 1.1.9.

(i) इन्द्रिय व्यतिरिक्त आत्मप्रकरण—3

(ii) शरीर व्यतिरिक्त आत्म—3

(iii) प्रासंगिक चक्षुरद्वैत निराकरण—8

(iv) आत्ममनोमनोव्यतिरेक—3

(v) आत्म नित्यता—9

(vi) शरीर परीक्षा—5

(vii) ऐन्द्रिय द्वैतिकत्व परीक्षा—20

(viii) एन्द्रिय नानात्व—10

(ix) अर्थ परीक्षा—12

3.2

(i) बुद्धयापत्यता—9

(ii) उपोद्घातिक क्षणभंग—8

(iii) बुद्धरात्मगुनात्म—24

One of the problems to be investigated is how does the text

distinguish the body from the senses on the one hand and from mind on the other. Similarly the discussion on the senses is independent of the issue regarding the establishment of the separateness of the *ātman* from them. There is also the problem regarding the discussion of the permanence or eternity or nityatva of *buddhi.* It is not clear why the same discussion is not raised in respect of mind or even of the body or the senses even though the latter are supposed to be subject to death. But, the hypothesis of *sūkṣama śarīra* or the subtle body and the subtle senses which are supposed to survive after death should have provided a sufficient ground for the discussion of the issue. The problem would also arise in the case of the gross and subtle elements which are supposed to be the objects of the senses. This is also necessary as *pretya bhāva* or rebirth is itself accepted as a *prameya* in the system.

The discussion on the senses in 3.1 should be clubbed together—

(i) इन्द्रिय व्यतिरिक्त आत्म—3
(ii) प्रासंगिक चक्षुद्वैत निराकरण—8
(iii) ऐन्द्रिय भौतिकत्व परीक्षा—20
(iv) ऐन्द्रिय नानात्व—10
(v) अर्थ परीक्षा—12 = 53

The discussion on *buddhi* is strange as instead of giving a *lakṣaṇa* of *buddhi* and its examination, it discusses whether cognition is evanescent or relatively permanent and the question whether it should be considered as a property of *ātma* or not. Strangely, the author reverts back to the discussion of *manas* in the sūtras 3.2.56—59 and examines the nature of mind. Once again the author reverts back to the discussion of the body and tries to discuss a completely non-philosophical issue, that is, how the body is formed. The interesting point made in this connection is to bring in the theory of *karma* to explain the formation of the body.

Appendix 3

Nyāya Sūcī Nibandha

श्रीवाचस्पतिमिश्रसंकलित :

न्यायसूचीनिबन्ध :

नमामि धर्मविज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्यैशालिने।
निधये वाग्विशुद्धीनामक्षपादाय तायिने।।१।
यक्षपादमराीतानां सूत्राणां सारबोधिका।
श्री वाचस्पतिमिश्रेण मया सूची विधास्यते।।२।

अथ प्रथमोऽध्याय :

१ प्रमाराप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावचवतकैनिराांयवादजल्पवितण्डाहेत्वाभास्च्छ लजातिनिग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञानात्रिःधेयसाधिगमः। २. दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्ति दोषमिथ्याज्ञानाना–मुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः।

इति द्वाभ्यां सूत्राभ्यामभिधेयप्रसोजनसम्बनधप्रकरणम्।।१।।

१. प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाराानि। २. इन्द्रिपार्थसत्रिकर्षोत्पत्रं ज्ञानमव्व्थपदेश्ये–सव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम्। ३. अथ तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविमनुमानं पूर्ववच्छेषवत्सामा सवोदृष्टं च। ४. प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यति् साध्यसाधनमुपमानम्। ५. आतोपदेशः शब्दः। ६. स द्विविधो दृष्टाद्दष्टार्थत्वात्।

इति षड्भिः सत्रै प्रमाणलखणप्रकरणम् ।। २।।

१. आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिमानःप्रवृत्तिदापेषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गास्तु प्रमेयम् २. इच्छा द्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञानान्यात्मानो लिङम्। ३. चेष्टेनिद्रयार्थाश्रयः शरीरम्। ४. घ्रारारसनचक्षुस्त्वक्श्रोवारान्द्रियारिा भूतेभ्यः ५. पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायुराकाशमिति भूतानि। ६. गन्धरसरूपस्पशैशब्दाः पृथिव्यादिगुरास्तदर्थाः। ७. बुद्धिरूपलब्धिर्ज्ञानमित्यनार्थालक्षरण दोषाः। ११. पुनरूत्पत्तिः प्रेत्यभावः ।१२. प्रवृत्तिदोषजनितोऽर्थः फलम्। १३. बाधनालक्षरां दुःखम्। १४. तदत्यन्तविमोक्षोऽवर्गः।

इति चतुर्दशभिः सूत्रैः प्रमेयलक्षणप्रकरणम्।। ३ ।।

१. समानानेकधर्मोपपतेविप्रतिपतेरूपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातश्र विशेषापेक्षो विमर्शः संशयः। २. यमर्थमधिककृत्य प्रवर्तते तत्प्रयोजनम्। ३. लोकिकपरीक्षकारां यस्मिन्नर्धे बुद्धिसाम्यं स दृष्टान्तः।

इति त्रिमिः सूत्रैर्न्यायपूर्वाङलक्षणप्रकरणाम् ।। ४ ।।

१. तन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसंस्थिर्थोतः सिद्धान्तः। २. स चतुविधः सर्वजन्त्र–प्रतितन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसंस्थित्यथन्तिरभावात्। ३. सवर्तन्त्राविरूद्धस्तन्त्रेऽधिाकृतोऽर्थः सर्वतन्त्रासिद्धान्तः। ४. समानतन्त्रासिद्धः परतन्त्राासिद्धः प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्तः। ५. यत्सिद्धावन्यप्रकणासिद्धिः सोऽविकरणासिद्धान्तः। ६. अपरीक्षिताभ्युपगमात् तद्विशेषपरीक्षणामभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तः।

इति षड्भिः सूत्रैर्न्यायाश्रयसिद्धान्तलक्षणाप्रकरय्यम् ।। ५ ।।

१. प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः । २. साध्यनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञा। ३. रणासाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनं हेतुः । ४. तथा वैधर्म्यात्। ५. साध्साधर्म्यात् तद्धर्मभावी दृष्टान्त उदाहरणाम्। ६. तद्वपर्ययाद्वा विपरीतम्। ७. उदाहरणापेक्षस्तथेत्युपसंहारो न तथेतिं वा साध्यस्योपनयः। ८. हेत्वपदेशात् प्रतिज्ञायाः पुनवंचन निगमनम्।

इत्यष्ट भिः सूत्रैर्न्यायप्रकरणम् ।। ६ ।।

१. अविज्ञाततस्वेऽर्थे कारणोपपत्तिस्तत्त्वज्ञानाथे मुहस्तकः। २. विमश्य पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्यामर्थावधारणां निर्णायः।

इति द्वाभ्यां सूत्राभ्यां न्यायोत्तरङलक्षणप्रकरणम्।। ७ ।।

इत्येकचत्वारिशता सूत्रैः सप्तभिः प्रकरणैः प्रथमा ध्यायस्य प्रथममाहिकं समाप्तम्

अथ द्वितीयमाहिकम्

१. प्रमारणार्कसाधनोपालम्भः सिद्धान्ताविरूद्धः पञ्चावयवोपपत्रः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहो वादः। २. यथोक्तोपपत्रश्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानसाधनोपालम्भो जल्पः। ३. स प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनो वितण्डा।

इति त्रिभिः सूत्रैः कथालक्षणप्रकरणम्।। १ ।।

१. सव्यभिचारविरूद्धप्रकरणासमसाध्यसमकालातीता हेत्वाभासाः २. अनकान्तिक सव्यभिचारः। ३. सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्य तद्विरोबी विरूद्धः। ४. यस्मात् प्रकरणाचिन्ता स निर्णायार्थमपदिष्टः प्रकरणासमः। ५. साध्याविशिष्टः साध यत्वात् साध्यसमः। ६. कालात्ययापदिष्टः कालातीतः।

इति षड्भि+ सूत्रैः हेत्वाभासलक्षणप्रकरणम्।। २ ।।

१. वचनविधातोऽर्थविकल्पोपपतया छलम्। २. तत् त्रिवियं वाक्छलं सामान्यच्छलमुपचारच्छलं च। ३. अविशेषाभिहितेऽर्थे वक्तुरभिप्राया–दर्थान्तरकल्पना वाक्छलम्। ४. स्भवोऽर्थस्या तिसान्यायोगादसम्यूर्ताकल्पना सामान्यच्छलम्। ५. धर्मविकल्पनिर्देशेऽर्यसद्धावप्रतिषेध उपचारच्छलम्। ६. वाक्छलमेवोपचारच्छलं तदविशेषात्। ७. न तदर्थान्तरभावात्। ८. अविशेषे वा किञ्चत्साधर्म्यदिककच्छलप्रसङ्ः।

इत्यष्टभिः सूत्रैश्छललक्षणप्रकरणम्।। ३ ।।

१. साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यभ्यिां प्रत्यवस्थानं जातिः। २. विप्रतिपतिरप्रतिपत्तिश्र निग्रहस्थानम्। ३. तद्विकल्पाज्जातिनिग्रहस्थानबहुत्वम्।

इति त्रिमिः सूत्रै पुरूषाशक्तिलिडदोष सामान्यलक्षणप्रकरणाम् ।४।।

इति विशस्या सूत्रैश्रतुर्भिः प्रकरणौः प्रथमा-ध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाहिकं समाप्तम्

समाप्तश्र प्रथमोऽध्यायः

(अत्र प्रकरणानि ११, सूत्राणिा ६१)

अथ द्वितीयोऽध्यायः

१. समानानेकधर्मोध्यवसायादन्यतरधर्मोध्यवसायाद्वा न संशयः। २. विप्रतिपत्त्पव्यवस्थाध्यवसायाच्च। ३. विप्रतिपतौ च सम्प्रतिपतेः। ४. अव्यवस्थात्मनि व्यवस्थितत्त्वाच्चाच्चाव्यवस्थायाः। ५. तथाऽत्यन्तसंशयस्तद्ध–भैसातत्योपपलेः। ६. यथोक्ताध्यवसायादेव तद्विशेषापेक्षात् संशये नासंशयो नात्यन्तसंशयो वा। ७. यत्र संशयस्तत्रैवमुत्तरोत्तरप्रसङः।

इति स्पतभिः सूत्रैः संशयपरीद्वाप्रकरणम्।। १ ।।

१. प्रत्यंक्षादीनामप्रामाण्यं त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः। २. पूर्व हि प्रमाणासिद्धौ

नेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षात् प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः। ३. पश्चात् सिंद्धौ न प्रमारणोभ्यः प्रमेयसिद्धिः। ४. युगपतित्सद्धौ प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वात् क्रमवृत्तित्वाभावो बुद्धीनाम्। ५. त्रैकाल्यासिद्धः प्रतिषेधनुपत्रिः। ६. सर्वप्रमाणाप्रतिपेचाच प्रतिपेधानुपपत्तिः। ७. तत्प्रामाण्ये वा न सर्वप्रमाणाविप्रतिषेध'। ५. त्रैकाल्याप्रतिषेधश्र शब्दादातोद्यसिद्धिवत् तत्सिद्धे।। ६. प्रमेया च तुला प्रामाण्यवत्। १०. प्रमारणातः सिद्धेः प्रकाणानां प्रमारणान्तरसिद्धिप्रसङः। ११. तद्विनिवृत्तेर्वा प्रमाणासिद्धिवत् प्रमेयसिद्धिः। १२. न प्रदीपप्रकाशवत्तत्सिद्धेः। १३. कचिन्निवृतिदर्शना–दनिवृत्तिदर्शनाच कचिदनेकान्तः।

इति त्रयोदशभिः सूत्रैः प्रमाणसामान्यपरीताप्रकरणम् ।। २ ।।

१. प्रत्यक्षलक्षरण्णनुपपत्तिरसमग्रवचनाम्। २. नात्मनसोः सन्निकर्षाभावे प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः। ३. दिग्देशकालाकाशेष्वप्येवं प्रसङः। ४. ज्ञानलिङत्वादात्मनो नानवरोधः। ५. तदयोगपद्यलिङत्वाच न मनसः। ६. प्रतयद्वानिमित्तत्वा–च्चेन्द्रियार्थयोः सन्निकर्षस्य स्वशग्देन वचनम्। ७. सुप्तव्यासक्तमनसां चेन्द्रिसार्थयोः संन्निकर्षनिमित्तत्वात्। ५. तैश्चापदेशो ज्ञानविशेषाणाम्। ६. व्याहतत्वादहेतुः। १०. नाथविशेषप्राबल्यात्। ११. प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमेकदेशग्रहणा–दुपलब्धेः। १२. न प्रत्यक्षेणा चावत्तावदप्यपलम्भातु।

इति द्वादशभिः सूत्रैः प्रत्यक्षपरीक्षाप्रकरणम्।। ३।।

१. साध्यत्वादवर्यावनि सन्देहः। २. सर्वाग्रहणामवयव्यसिद्धेः। ३. ६ ारणाकर्षणोपपत्तेश्र। ४. सेनावनवद् ग्रहणामिति चेत्रातीन्द्रियत्वादणानाम्।

इति चतुर्भिः सूत्रैः प्रासङिक मवयविपरीताप्रकरणम्।। ४।।

१. रोधोपद्यातसादृश्येभ्यो व्यभिचारादनुमानमप्रमाणाम्। २. नैकदेशत्राससाद श्येभ्योऽर्थान्तरभावात्।

इति द्वाभ्यां सूत्राभ्यामनुमानपरीक्षापकरणाम्।। ५ ।।

१. वर्तमानाभावः पततः पतितपतितव्कालापपनतेः। २. तयोपप्यभावो वर्तमानाभावे तदपेक्षत्वाल्। ३. नातीतानागतयोरितरेतरापेद्वाासिद्धिः। ४. वर्तमानाभावे सर्वाग्रहणां प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तेः। ५. कृतताकर्तव्यतोपपत्तेस्तूभयथा ग्रहताम्।

इति पश्रभिः सूत्रैरौपोद्धातिर्क वर्तमान परीक्षाप्रकरणाम्।। ६।।

१. अत्यन्तप्रार्यकदेशसाधमयादुपसनासिद्धि। २. प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यदुिपमान–सिद्धेर्यथोक्तदोनानुपपत्तिः। ३. प्रयद्वाोणाप्रत्यक्षांसिद्धेः। ४. नाप्रत्यक्षे गवये प्रमाणार्थमुपनामस्य पश्यामः। ५. तथोप्युपसंहारादुपमानसिद्धेर्नाविशेषः।

इति पलभिः सूत्रैरूपमानपरीक्षाप्रकरणम्।। ७।।

१. शब्दोऽनुमानमर्थस्यानुपलत्त्बेरनुसेबत्यात्। २. उपलब्धेरद्विप्रवृत्तित्वात्। ३. सम्बन्धाच्च। ४. आप्तोप्देशसामर्थ्या च्छब्दादर्थराम्प्रत्ययः। ५. पूरणाप्रदाहपाटनानुपलब्धेश्च सम्बनधभावः। ६. शब्दार्थव्यवस्थानादप्रतिषेधः। ७.न सामायिकत्वाच्छब्दार्थसम्प्रत्ययस्य। ५. जातिविशेषे चानियमात्।

इत्यष्टभि. सूत्रै शब्दसामान्यपरीक्षा प्रकरणाम्।। ८।।

१. तदप्रामाण्यमन्तव्याधतपुनसक्तदोषेभ्यः। २. न कर्मकर्तृसाधानवग्गुण्यात्। ३. अभ्युपेत्य कालभेदे दोपचनात्। ४. अनुबादोपपतेश्र। ५. वाक्यविभागस्य चार्थग्रहणात्। ६. विध्यर्थवादानुवादव चनार्वानयागात्। ७. विध्बिवधयकः। ८. स्तुतिनिन्दा परकृतिः पुराकल्प इत्यर्थवादः। ६. विविविहितस्यानुवचनमनुवादः। १०. नानुवादपुनरूक्तयोर्विशेषः शब्दाभ्यासोपपत्तेः। ११. शोध्रत रगमतोपदेशवबभ्यासात्राविशेषः। १२. मन्त्रायुर्वेदप्रामाण्यबञ्च तत्प्रामाणण्यमाप्तप्रामाण्यात्

इति द्वादशभिः सूत्रैः शब्दविशेषपरीक्षाप्रकरणम्।।६।।
इति अष्टोत्तरषष्टया सूत्रैर्नवभिः प्रकरणैर्द्वितीयाध्या यस्याद्यमाहिकं समाप्ततम्

अथ द्वितीयमाहिकम्

१. न चतुष्टमैतिहार्यापत्तिसम्भवाभावप्रामाण्यात्। २. शब्द ऐतिहानर्थान्तरभावाद नुमानेऽर्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावानर्थान्तरभावाञ्चाप्रातंषेधः। ३. अर्थापत्तिरप्रमाणामनैकान्तिकत्वाम्। ४. अनार्थापत्तावथापत्त्यभिमानात्। ५. प्रतिषेधाप्रामाण्यं चानेकाकिन्तकत्वात् ६. तत्प्रामाण्ये वा नार्थापत्यप्रामाण्यम्। ७. नाभावप्रामाण्यं प्रमयासिद्धेः। ८. लक्षितेष्वलक्षणलक्षितत्वाद लक्षितानां तत्प्रमेयसिद्धिः। ६. असत्यर्थे नाभाव इति चेत्रान्यलक्षणोपपत्तेः। १०.

तस्द्धिरलक्षितेष्वहेतुः। ११. न लक्षणावस्थितापेक्षसिद्धेः। १२. प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावोपपत्तेश्च।

इति द्वादशभिः सूत्रैश्रतुष्टपरीक्षाप्रकरणम्।। ६।।

१. आदिमत्त्वौन्द्रियकत्वात् कृतकवदुपचाराच्च। २. न घटाभावसामान्य–नित्यत्वा त्रित्येष्वप्यनित्यवदुपचाराच्च। ३. तत्त्वभाक्तयोर्नानातवस्य विभागादव्यभिचारः। ४. सन्तानानुमानविशेषणात्। ५. कारणद्रव्यस्य प्रदेशशब्देनाभिधात्। ६. प्रागुच्चाररणादनुपलब्धे रावरणाद्यनुपलब्धेश्च। ७. तदनुपलधेर नुपलम्भावादरणोपपत्तिः। ८. अनुपलम्भादप्यनुपलब्धि ासद्रावववत्रवरणानुपपत्तिरनुपलम्भात्। ६. अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वादनुपलब्धेरहेतुः। १०. अस्पर्शत्वात्। ११. न कर्मानित्यवात्। १२. नारगुनित्यत्वात्। १३. सम्प्रदानात्। १४. तदन्तरालानुपलब्धेरहेतुः। १५. अध्यापनादप्रतिषेघः। १६. उभयोः पक्षयोरन्यतरस्याध्यापनादप्रतिषेधः। १७. अभ्यासात्। १८. नान्यत्वेऽप्यभ्यासस्योपचारात्। १६. अन्यदन्यस्मादनन्यत्वादनन्यदित्यन्ताऽभावः। २१. विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः। २२. अश्रवणाकारणानुंपलब्धेः सततश्रवणाप्रसङ। २३. उपलभ्यमाने चानुपलब्धेरसत्त्वादनपदेशः। २४. पणिनिमित्तप्रश्लेषाच्छब्दाभावे नानुपलब्धिः। २५. विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेश्चावस्थाने तत्रित्यत्वप्रसङ। २६. अस्पशत्वादप्रतिषेघः। २७. विभक्त्यन्तरोपपत्तेश्च समासे।

इति सप्तर्विशल्या सूत्रैः शब्दानित्यत्वप्रकरणाम्।। २।।

१. विकारोदशोपदेशात् संशयः। २. प्रकृवितविवृद्धौ विकारविवृद्धेः। ३. म्यूनसमाधिकोपलब्धेर्विकाराणामहेतुः ४. द्विविधस्यापि हेतोरभावादसाधनं दृष्टान्तः ५. नातुल्यप्रकृतीनां विकारविकल्पात्। ६. द्रव्यविकारवैषम्यवद्वर्णांविकार विकल्पः। ७. न विकाधर्मामुपपत्तेः। ८. विकारप्राप्तानामपुनरापत्तेः। ६. सुवण्प्रदीनां पुनरापत्तेरहेतुः। १०. न तद्विकारणां सुवर्णौभावाव्यतिरेकात्। ११. नित्यत्वेऽविकारादनित्यत्वे चानवस्थानात्। १२. नित्यानामतीन्द्रियत्वात् तद्धर्मविकल्पाच्च वर्णविकाराणामप्रतिषेघः। १३. अनवस्था यित्वे च वरर्गो पलब्धिवत् तद्विकारोपपत्तिः। १४. विकारधर्मित्वे नित्यत्वाभावात् कालान्तरे विकारोपपत्तेश्चाप्रतिषेघः १५. प्रकृत्यनियमात्। १६. अनियमे नियमात्रानियमः १७. नियमानियमविरोधादनियमे नियमाच्चाप्रतितषेधः। १८. गुणन्तरापत्युपमर्दंहासवृद्धिलेशश्लेषेभ्यस्तु विकारोपपतेवैणाविकारः।

इति अरूटादशभिः सूत्रैः शब्दपरिणामप्रकरणाम्।। ३।।

१. ते वभक्त्यन्याः पदम्। २. व्यक्त्याकृतिजातिसत्रिधावुपचारात् संशयः। ३. याशब्दअसमूहत्यागपरिगंहसंख्यावृद्धय पचयवणासमासानुबन्धानां व्यक्तावुपचाराद्वयाक्तिः। ४. न तदन वस्थानात्। ५. सहचरणास्थानता दर्श्यवृत्तमानधरणासामीप्ययोग साध्नाध्पितयेभ्यो ब्राहाणामञ्चकटराजस क्तुचन्दनगङाशाटकात्र पुरूषेष्वतद्रावेऽपि तदुपचारः। ६. आकृतिस्तदपेक्षत्वात् सत्वव्यवस्थान सिद्धेः। ७. व्यकत्याकृतियुक्तेऽप्यप्रसङात् प्रोक्षणादीना मृद्गवके जातिः। ८. नाकृतिव्यक्त्यपेक्षत्वाजात्यभिव्यक्तेः। ६. व्यक्तयाकृतिजातयस्तुं पदार्थः। १०. व्यक्तगुणा विशेषश्रयो मूर्तिः। ११. आकृतिर्जातिलिङाख्या। १२. समानप्रसवात्मिका जातिः।

इति द्वादशभिः सूत्रैः शब्दशक्तिपरीक्षा (पदार्थनिरूपल) अकरणम्।। ४।।

इति नवोत्तरषष्टया सूत्रैश्रतुर्भिः प्रकरचौहिर्साया ध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाहिकम

समाप्तश्र द्वितीयोऽध्याय

(अत्र प्रकणानि १३, सूत्राणि १३७)

अथ तृतीयोऽध्यायः

१. दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणत्। २. न विषयव्यवस्थानात्। ३. तद्वयवस्थाना देवात्मसद्रावादप्रतिषेध।

इति त्रिभिः सूत्रैरिन्द्रियव्यतिरेकात्मप्रकरणम् ।। १।।

१. श्रीरदरहे पातकाभावात्। २. तदभावः सात्मकप्रदाहेऽपि तत्रित्यत्वात्। ३. न कार्याश्रयकतृंवघात्।

इति त्रिभिः सूत्रैः शरीरव्यतिरेकात्मप्रकरणम्।। २।।

१. सव्यद्दष्टस्येतरेणा प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्। २. नैकस्मित्रप्तास्थिव्यवहिते द्वित्वाभिमानात्। ३. एकविनाशे द्वितीयाविनाशात्रैकत्वम्। ४. अवयवनाशेऽप्यवयव्युपलब्धेरहेतुः। ५. द्दंष्टान्तविराधादप्रतिषेधः। ६.

इन्द्रियान्तरविकारात्। ७. न स्मृतेः स्मर्तव्यविषयत्वात्। ८. तदात्मगुणात्वसदावाप्रतिषेधः

इत्यष्टभिः सूत्रैः प्रासङिकं चतुरद्वैतप्रकरणम् ।। ३।।

१. नात्मप्रतिपतिहेतूनां मनसि सम्भवात्। २. ज्ञातुर्ज्ञानसाधनोपपत्तेः संज्ञाभेदमात्रम्। ३. नियमश्च निरनमुानः।

इति त्रिभिः सूत्रैर्मनोव्यतिरेकप्रकणम् ।। ४।।

१. पूर्वाभ्यस्तस्मृत्यनुबन्धाज्जातस्य हर्षभयशोकसम्प्रतिपत्तेः। २. पद्मादिषु प्रबो धसम्मीलन विकारवत् तद्विकारः। ३. नोष्णाशीतवर्षाकालनि मित्तत्वात्पञ्चात्मकविकाराणाम्। ४. प्रेत्याहाराभ्याकृतात् स्तन्याभिलाषात्। ५. अयसोऽयस्कान्ताभिगमनवत् तदुपसर्पणम्। ६. नान्यत्र प्रवृत्त्यभावात्। ७. वीतरागाजन्मादर्शनात्। ८. सगुणद्रव्योत्पत्तिवत् तदुत्पतिः। ९. न सङ्ल्पनिमित्तत्वाद्रागादीनाम्।

इति नवभिः सूत्रैर्त्यिताप्रकरणाम्।। ५।।

१. पार्थिवं गुणान्तरोपलब्धेः। २. पार्थिवाप्यतंजसं तद्गुणोपलब्धेः। ३. निः श्वासोच्छ्वासोपलब्धेश्चातुभोतिकम्। ४. ॅन्धक्लेदपाकव्यूहावकाशदानेभ्यः पाञ्चभौमिकम्। ५. श्रुतिप्रामाण्याञ्च।

इति पञ्चभिः सूत्रैः शरीरपरीक्षाप्रकरणाम् ।। ६।।

१ कृष्णासारे सत्यृपलम्भाद् व्यतिच्य चोपलम्भात् संशयः। २. महदणुग्रहणात् ३. रश्मर्थसन्निकर्षविशेषात् तद्ग्रहणाम्। ४. तदनुपलब्धेरहेतुः। ५. नानुमीयमानस्य प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धिरभावहेतुः। ६. द्रव्यगुणधर्मभेदाञ्च उपलब्धिनियमः। ७. अनेकद्रव्यसमवायाद्रूपविशेषाच्च रूपोपलबब्धिः। ८. कर्मकारितश्चेन्द्रियाणां व्यूहः पुरूषार्थतन्त्रः। ९. माध्यन्दिनोल्काप्रकाशानुपलब्धि ावत्तदनुपलब्धिः। १०. न रात्रावप्यनुपलब्धेः। ११. बाहाप्रकाशानुग्रहाद् विषयोपलब्ध ोरन भिवयक्तितोऽनुप लब्धिः। १२. अभिव्यक्तौ चाभिभवात्। १३. नक्तसूरनयरनश्मिदर्शनाच्च। १४. अप्राप्तग्रहण। काचा भ्रपलटलस्टफटिकान्त रितोपलब्धेः। १५. कुडयान्तरितापुपलब्धेरप्रतिषेधः। १६. अप्रतिघातात् सन्निकर्षोपपत्तिः। १७ आदित्यरश्मेः स्फटिकान्तरितेऽति दाहोविघातात्। १८.

नेतरेतरधर्मप्रसङ्गात्। ११. आदर्शोदकयोः प्रसादस्वाभाव्याद्रूपोपलब्धिवत्तदुपलब्धि ।। २०. दृष्टानुमितानां हि नियोगप्रतिषे धनुपपत्तिः

इति विशल्या सूत्रैरिन्द्रिय (भौतिकत्व) परीक्षाप्रकरणाम् ।। ७।।

१. स्थानान्यत्वे नानात्वादवयविनानास्थानत्वाच्च संशयः। २. त्वगव्यक्तिरेकात्। ३. न युगपदर्थानुपलब्धे। ४. विप्रतिषेधाच्च न त्वगेका। ५. इन्द्रियाथ्रपञ्चत्वात्। ६. न तदर्थबहुत्वात्। ७. गन्ध्त्वाद्यव्यतिरेकाद् गन्ध ादीनानामप्रतिषेधः। ५. विषयत्वाव्यतिरेकादेकत्वम्। ६. न बुद्धिलक्षणाधि ाष्ठानगत्याकृतिजातिपञ्चत्वेभ्यः। १०. भूतगुणविशेषोपलब्धेस्तादात्म्यम्।

इति दशभिः सूत्रैरिन्द्रियनानात्वप्रकरणम्।। ८।।

१. गन्ध्रसरूपस्पर्शशग्दानां स्पर्शपर्यन्ताः पृथिव्याः। २. अप्तेजोवयूनां पूर्व पूर्वमपोह्याकाशस्योत्तरः ३. न सर्वगुणानुपलब्धेः। ४. एकैकश्येनोत्तरगुणासद्रा वादुत्तरोत्तराणां तदनुपलब्धिः। ५. विष्टं हापरम्परेणा। ६. न पाथिवाप्ययोः प्रत्यक्षत्वात्। ७. पूर्वपूर्वगुणोत्कर्षात् तत्तत्प्रधानम्। ८. तद्व्यवस्थानं तु भूयस्त्वात्। ६. संगुणानामिन्द्रियभावात्। १०. तेनेव तस्याग्रहणाच्च। ११. न शब्दगुणोपल ब्धेः। १२. तदुपलब्धिरितरेतरद्रव्यगुणवैधर्म्यात्।

इति द्वादशभिः सूत्रैरर्थपरीक्षाप्रकरणाम्।। ६।।

इति त्रिसप्तत्या सूत्रैर्नवभिः प्रकरणैस्तृतीयम्याद्यमाहिकं समाप्तम्

अथ द्वितीयमाहिकम्

१. कर्माकाशसाधर्म्यति् संशयः। २. विषयप्रत्यभिज्ञानात्। ३. साध यसमत्वादहेतुः। ४. न युगपदग्रहणात्। ५. अप्रत्यभिज्ञानं च विनाशप्रसङ्गू। ६. क्रमवृत्तित्वादयुगपद्ग्रहणाम्। ७. अप्रत्यभिज्ञानं च विषयान्तरव्यासङ्गात्। ६. स्फटिकान्यत्वाभिमानवत् तदन्यत्वाभिमानः।

इति नवभिः सूत्रैबुद्धयनिस्यना प्रकरणाम्।। ६।।

१. स्फटिकेऽप्यपरापरोत्पतेः क्षाणिाकत्वाद् व्यक्तीनामहेतुः। २. नियमहेत्वभावाद् यथार्दानमभ्यनुज्ञा। ३. नोत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः। ४. क्षीरविनाशे कारणानुपलब्धिवद् दध्युत्पत्तिवच्च तदुपपत्तिः। ५. लिङ्गतो

ग्रहणात्रानुपलब्धिः। ६. न पयसः परिणामगुणान्तरप्रादुर्भावात्। ७. व्यूहान्तराद् द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिदर्शन पूर्वद्रव्यनिवृत्तेरनुमानम्। ८. क्वचिद्विनाशकारणानुप– लब्धेः क्वचिच्चोपलब्धेरनेकान्तः।

इत्यष्टभिः सूत्रैरौपौद्धातिकं क्षणभङ्गप्रकरणम्।। २।।

१. नेन्द्रियार्थयोस्तद्विनाशेऽपि ज्ञानावस्थानात्। २. युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्ध्नें मनसः। ३. तदात्मगुणात्वेऽपि तुल्यम्। ४. इन्द्रियैर्मनसः सन्निकर्षाभावात् तदनुत्पत्तिः। ५. नोत्पत्तिकारणानपदेशात्। ६. विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेश्चावस्थानं तन्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः। ७. अनित्यत्वग्रहणात् बुद्धेर्बुद्धयन्तराद्विनाशः शब्दवत्। ८. ज्ञानसमवेतात्मप्रदेशसन्निकर्षान्मनसः स्मृत्युत्पत्तेने युगपदुत्पत्तिः। ९. नान्तःशरीरवृत्तित्वान्मनसः। १०. साध्यत्वादहेतुः। ११. स्मरतःशरीरधरणोपपतेर प्रतिषेधः। १२. न तदाशुगतित्वान्मनसः। १३. स्मरणाकालानियमात्। १४. आत्मप्रेरणायदृच्छाज्ञताभिश्च न संयोगविशेष। १५. व्यासक्तमनसः पादव्यथनेन संयोविशेषेणा समानम्। १६. प्रणिाधनलिङ्गदिज्ञानानामयुगपद्भावाद् युगपदस्मरणाम्। १७. ज्ञस्येच्छाद्वेषनिमित्तत्वादा रम्भनिवृत्त्योः। १८. तलिङ्गत्वादिच्छाद्वेषयोः पार्थिवाद्येष्वप्रतिषेधः। १९. परश्वादिष्वारम्भनिवृत्तिदर्शनात्। २०. नियमानियमौ तु तद्विशेषकौ। २१. यथाक्तहेतुत्वात् पारतन्त्र्यादकृताभ्यागमाच्च। च मनसः। २२. परिशेषाद्यथोक्तहेतुपपत्तेश्च। २३. स्मरणां त्वात्मनो ज्ञस्वाभाव्यात्। २४. प्रणिांवाननिबन्धभ्यासलिङ्गलक्षणा सादृश्यपरिग्रहाश्रयाश्रितसम्बन्धानन्तयं वियोगैककार्य विरोधतिशयप्रप्तिव्यवस्थान सुखदुः खेच्छाद्वेषभयार्थित्व– क्रियारागधर्माधमंनिमित्तेभ्यः।

इति चतुर्विंशल्या सूत्रैर्बुद्धेरात्मगुणात्व प्रकरणम्।। ३।।

१. कर्मानवस्थायिग्रहणात्। २. अव्यक्तग्रहणमनवस्थायित्वाद् विद्युत्सम्पाते रूपाव्यक्तग्रहणावद्। ३. हेतूपादानात् प्रतिषेद्धव्याभ्यनुज्ञा। ४. दीपार्चिषः सन्तत्यभिव्यक्तग्रहणावत् तद्ग्रहरणाम्।

इति चतुर्भिः सूत्रैर्बुद्धैरूत्पत्रापवर्गित्वप्रकरणम्।। ४।।

१. द्रव्ये स्वगुणापरगुणोपलब्धेः संशयः। २. यावच्छरीरभावित्वाद्रूपादीनाम्। ३. न पाकजगुणान्तरोपतेः। ४. प्रतिद्वन्द्विसिद्धैः पाकजानामप्रतिषेधः। ५.

शरीरव्यापित्वात्। ६. न केशनखादिष्वनुपलब्धेः। ७. त्वक्पर्यन्तत्वाच्छरीरस्य केशनखादिष्वप्रसङः। ८. शरीरगुणावैधर्म्यात्। ६. रूपादीनामितरेतरवैधर्म्यात्। १०. ऐन्द्रियकत्वाद्रूपादीनामप्रतिषेधः।

इति दशभिः सूत्रैर्बुद्धेः शरीरगुणाव्यतिरेकप्रकरणाम्।। ५।।

१. ज्ञानायोगपषदेकं मनः। २. न युगपदेनकक्रियोपलब्धेः। ३. अलातचक्रदर्शनवत् तदुपलब्धिराशुसञ्चारात्। ४. यथोक्तहेतुत्वाच्चारणा।

इति चतुर्भिः सूत्रैर्मनः परीक्षाप्रकरणाम्।। ६।।

१. पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धात् तदत्पत्तिः। २. भूतुभ्यो मुत्युंपादानवत् तदुपादानम्। ३. न साध्यसमत्वात्। ४. नोत्पत्तिनिमित्तत्वान्मातापित्रोः। ५. तथाहारस्य। ६. प्राप्तौ चानियमात् ७. शरीरोत्पत्तिनिमित्तवत् संयोगोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं कर्म। ५. एतेनानियमः प्रयुक्तः। ६. तददृष्टकारितमिति चेतू पुनस्तत्प्रसङोऽवर्गे। १०. मनःकर्मनिमित्तव्वाच्च संयोगाद्यनुच्छेदः। ११. नित्यत्वप्रसङश्च प्रायणानुपपत्तेः। १२. अणुश्यामतानित्यत्ववदेतत्स्यात्। १३. नाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङात्।

इति त्रयोदशभिः सूत्रैः प्रासञ्किम दृष्टन्रिूपाधत्वप्रकरणम्।। २।।

इति द्विसप्तत्या सूत्रैः सप्तभिः प्रकरणैस्तृतीया

घ्यायस्य द्वितीयमाहिकम्

समाप्तश्च तृतीयोऽध्यायः

(अत्र प्रकरणानि १६, सूत्ररणि १४५)

अथ चतुर्थोऽध्यायः

१. प्रवत्तियंथाक्ता। २. तथा दोषाः।

इति द्वाभ्यां सूत्राभ्यां प्रवृत्तिदोषसामान्य परीक्षा प्रारणाम्।। १।।

१. तत्त्रैराश्यं रागद्वेषमोहार्यान्तरभावान्। २. नैकप्रत्यनीकत्वात्। ३. व्यभिचारादहेतुः। ४. तेषां मोहः पापीयान् नामूढस्येतरोत्पनेः। ५. निभित्तनेमित्तिकभावादर्थान्तरभावो दोषेभ्यः। ६. न दोषलक्ष्णा व रोधन्मोहस्य। ७. निमित्तनैमित्तिकोपपत्तेश्रच तुल्यजातीयानामप्रतिषेधः

इति सप्तभिः सूत्रैर्दोषत्रै राश्यप्रकरणम्।। २।।

१. आत्मनित्यत्वे प्रेत्यभावसिद्धिः। २. व्यक्ताद्व्यक्तानां प्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्यात्। ३. न घटाद् घटानिष्पत्तेः। ४. व्यक्ताद् घटनिष्पत्तेरप्रतिषेधः।

इति चतुर्भिः सूत्रैः प्रेत्यभावपरीक्षा प्रकरणम्।। ३।।

१. अभावाद् भावोत्पत्तिनभिुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावात्। २. व्याघातादप्रयोगः। ३. नागतयोः कारकशग्दप्रयोगात्। ४. न विनष्टेभ्योऽनिष्टत्तेः। ५. त्रमनिर्देशादप्रतिषेधः।

इति पचभिः सूत्रैः शून्यतोपादानप्रकरणम्।। ४।।

१. ईश्वरः कारणां पुरूषकर्माफिल्यदर्शनात्। २. न पुरूषकर्माभावे फलानिपत्तेः। ३. तत्कारितत्वादहेतुः।

इति त्रिभिः सूत्रैरीश्वरोपादानताप्रकरणम्।। ५।।

१. अनिमित्ततो भावोत्पत्तिः कण्टकर्तक्ष्ण्यादिदशंनात्। २. अनिभित्त्वनिमिच्त्वात्रनि मित्ततः। ३. निमित्तानिमित्तयोरर्थान्तरभावाद–प्रतिषेधः।

इति त्रिभिः सूत्रैराकस्मिकत्वप्रकरणाम्।। ६।।

१. सर्वमनित्यमुत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकत्वात्। २. नानित्यता नित्यत्वात्। ३. तदनित्यत्वमग्नेदहिां विनाश्यानुविनाशवत्। ४. नित्यस्याप्रत्याख्यानं यथापल ब्धिव्यस्थातात्।

इति चतुर्भिः सूत्रैः र्स्वानित्यत्वनिराकणाम्।। ७।।

१. सर्व नित्यं पञ्चभूतनित्यत्वात्। २. नोत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः। ३. तल्लक्षणावरोधदप्रतिषेधः। ४. नोत्पत्तितत्कारणोपलब्धेः ५. न व्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः।

इति पलभिः सूत्रै सर्वनित्यत्वनिराकणप्रकरणाम्।। ८।।

१. सर्व पृथग् भवलक्षणापृथक्त्वात्। २. नानेकलक्षणारेकभावनिष्पत्तेः। ३. लक्षणाव्यवस्थानादेवाप्रतिषेधः

इति त्रिभिः सूत्रैः सर्वपृथक्त्वनिराकरणम्।। ६।।

१. सर्वमभावो भावेष्विवतरेतराभावसिद्धेः। २. न स्वभावसिद्धेर्भावानाम्। ३. न स्वभावसिद्धिरापेक्षिकत्वात्। ४. व्याहतत्वादयुक्तम्।

इति चतुमिः सूत्रैः सर्वशून्यतानिराकरणप्रकरणम्।। १०।।

१. संख्यैकान्तासिद्धिः कारणानुपपतयुपपत्तिभ्याम्। २. न कारणावयवभावात्। ३. निरवयवत्वादहेतुः।

इति त्रिभिः सूत्रै संख्यैकान्तवादप्रकरणम्।। ११।।

१. सद्यः कालान्तरे च फलनिष्पत्तः संशयः। २. कालान्तरेणानिष्पत्तिर्हेतुविनाशात्। ३. प्राङ्निष्पत्तेवृंक्षफलवत्तत् स्यात्। ४. नासत्र सत्र सदसत् सदसतोवैधर्म्यात्। ५. उत्पादव्ययदर्शनात्। ६. बुद्धिसिद्धं तु तदसत्। ७. आश्रयव्यतिरेकाद् वृक्षफलोप्तत्तिवदित्यहेतुः। ८. प्रीतेरात्माक्षयत्वादप्रतिषेधः। ६. नपुत्रस्त्रीपशुपरिच्छदहिरण्यात्रादिपफलनिर्देशात्। १०. तत्सम्बन्धात् फलनिषात्तेस्तेषु फलवदुपचारः।

इति दशभिः सूत्रै फलपरीक्षाप्रकरणम्।। १२।।

१. विविधवाधनायोगाद् दुःखमेव ज्मोत्पत्तिः। २. न सुखस्याप्यन्तराल निष्पत्तेः। ३. वाधनानिवृंतेर्वेदयतः पर्येषणादोषादप्रतिषेधः। ४. दुःखविकल्पे सुखाभिमानाञ्च।

इति चतुर्भिः सूत्रैर्दुःखपरीक्षाप्रकरणाम्।। १३।।

१. ऋणाक्लेशप्रवृत्यनुबन्धापदवर्गाभावः। २. प्रधानशब्दानुपपत्तेर्गुणाशब्देनानुवादी निन्दाप्रंशसोपपत्तेः। ३. समारापणादात्मन्यप्रतिषधः। ४. पात्रचयान्तानुपवत्तेश्रच फलाभावः। ५. सुषुप्तस्व स्वप्नादर्शने क्लेशाभाववदपवर्गः। ६. न प्रवृत्तिः प्रतिसन्धनाय हीनक्लेशस्य। ७. न क्लेशसन्ततेः स्वाभिविकत्वात्। ८. प्रागुत्पतेरभावानित्यत्ववत् स्वाभाविकेऽप्यनित्यत्वम्। ६. अणाुश्यामतानित्यत्ववद्वा। १०. न सङल्पनिमित्तत्वाच्च रागादीनाम्।

इति दशभिः सूत्रैरपवर्गपरीक्षाप्रकरणाम्।। १४।।

इति सप्तषष्टया सूत्रै चतुर्दशभिः प्रकरणैश्रतुर्थाध्यायस्याद्यमाहिकम्।

अथ द्वितीयभह्निकम्

१. दोषनिमित्तानां तत्त्वज्ञानादहङारनिवृत्ति। २. दोषनिमित्तं रूपादयो विषयाः सहुल्पकृताः। ३. तन्निमित्तं त्ववयव्यभिमानः।

इति त्रिभिः सूत्रैस्तरवज्ञोनोत्पत्तिप्रकरणाम्। १।।

१. विद्याविद्याद्वैविध्यात् संशयः। २. तदसंशयः पूर्वहेतुप्रसिद्धत्वात्। ३. वृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरपि तहि न संशयः। ४. कृत्स्नैकदेशवृत्तित्वादवयवानामवयव्यभावः। ५. तेष चादृत्तेरवयव्यभावः। ६. पृथकृ चावयवेभ्योऽवकेः। ७. न चावयव्यवयवाः। ८. एकस्मिन् भेदाभावादभेदशब्दप्रयोगानुपपत्तेरप्रश्नः। ९. अवयवान्तराभावेऽप्य–वृत्तरहेतुः। १०. केशसमूहे तैमिरिकोपलब्धिवत् तदुपलब्धि। ११. स्वविषयानतिक्रमेणोन्द्रियस्य पटुमन्दभावाद्विषयग्रहणास्य तथाभावो नाविषये प्रवृत्तिः। १२. अवयवावयाविप्रसङश्चैवमाप्रलयात्। १३. न प्रलयोऽणासद्रावात्। १४. परं वा त्रुटेः।

इति चतुर्दशभिः सूत्रैः प्रासङिकमवयवादयदिप्रकरणम्।। २।।

१. आकाशव्यतिभेदात् तदनुपपत्तिः। २. आकाशसर्वगतत्वं वा। ३. अन्तबंहिश्रच कार्य द्रव्यस्य कारणान्तरवचनादकार्ये तदभावः। ४. शब्दसंयोगविभवाच्च सवंयतम्। ५. अव्यूहाविष्टम्भविभुत्वानि चाकाशधर्माः ६. मूतिमतां च संस्थानोपपत्तेरवयवसद्रावः। ७. संयोगोपपत्तेश्रच। ५. अनवस्थाकारित्वादनवस्थानुपपत्तश्रचाप्रतिषेघः।

इत्यष्टभिः सूत्रैरौपोद्धातिकं विरच यदप्रकरणम्।। ३।।

१. बुद्धया विवेचनातु भावनां याथात्म्यानुपलब्धिस्तन्त्वपकषंणो पटसद्रावानुपलब्वि धवत् तदनुपलब्धिः। २. व्याहतत्वादहेतुः। ३. तदाश्रयत्वादपृथग्‌हणाम्। ४. प्रमाणातश्रचार्थप्रतिपत्तोः। ५. प्रमाणानुपपत्त्युपपत्तिभ्याम्। ६. स्वप्नविषयाभिमानददयं प्रमाणाप्रमेयाभिमानः। ७. मायागन्धर्वनगर मृगतृष्णिाकावद्वा। ८. हेत्वभावादसिद्धिः। ९. स्मृतिसङल्पवच्च स्वप्ननिषयाभिमानः। १०. मिथ्योपलब्धेर्विनाशस्तत्त्वज्ञानात् स्वप्नविषयाभिमानप्रणाशवत् प्रतिबोधे। ११. बुद्वेश्रचैवं निमित्तसद्रावोपलम्भात्। १२. तत्त्वप्रधनभेदाच्च मिथ्याबुद्धेद्वैविध्योपपत्तिः।

इति द्वादशभिः सूत्रैः प्रासङ्गिकं बाहार्थभङ्निराकरणप्रकरणम्।। ४।।

१. समाधिविशेषाभ्यासात्। २. नार्थविशेप्राबल्यात्। ३. क्षुदादिभिः प्रवर्तनाच्च। ४. पूवृकृतफलानुबन्धत् तदुत्पत्तिः। ५. अरण्यगुहापुलिनादिषु योगाभ्यासोपदेशः। ६. अपंवर्गेऽप्येवं प्रसङ्। ७. न निष्पत्रावश्यम्भावित्वात्। ८. तदभावश्र्चापवर्गे। ६. तदर्थ यमनियमाभ्यामात्मसंस्कारो योगच्चाध यात्मविव्युपायैः। १०. ज्ञानग्रहणाभ्यासस्तद्विद्यैश्र्च सह संवादः। ११. त शिष्यगुरूसब्रहा चारिविशिष्टश्रेयोऽर्थिभिरनसूचुभिरभ्युपेयात्। १२. प्रतिपक्षहीनमपि वा प्रमोजनाथं मर्थित्वे।

इति द्वादशभिः सूत्रैस्तत्त्वज्ञानविवृद्धिप्रकरणम्।। ५।।

१. तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणाथं जल्पवितण्डे बीजप्ररोहसंर क्षरणाथं कण्टकशाखावरणावत्। २. ताभ्यां विग्रहा कंथनम्।

इति द्वाभ्यां सूत्राम्यां तत्त्वज्ञानपरिपालनप्रकरणम्।।६।।

इत्येकपञ्चाशता सूत्रैः षड्भिः प्रकरणैश्र्चतुर्थाध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाहिकं समाप्तम्।

समाप्तश्र्चायं चतुर्थोऽध्यायः

(अत्र प्रकरणानि २०, सूत्राणि ११८)

अथ पञ्चमोऽध्यायः

१. साधाम्यं वैधाम्यो त्कर्षपकषं वण्यविण्ये विकल्पसाध्यप्राप्त्य प्राप्तिप्रसङ्प्रतिद्दष्टान्तानुत्पत्तिसंशयप्रकरणाहेत्वर्थापत्त्थविशेषोपपत्थुपलब्ध यनुपलब्धिनित्यानित्याकार्यसमाः। २. साधर्म्यवैधमर्याभ्यामुपसंहारे तद्धमंविपयेयोपपत्तेः साधम्यवैधम्यैसमौ। ३. गोत्वाद् गोसिद्धिवत् तत्सिद्धिः।

इति त्रिभिः सूत्रैः सत्प्रतिपक्षदेशनाभासप्रकरणम्।। १।।

१. साध्यद्दष्टान्तयोधर्मविकल्पादुभयसाध्यत्वाच्चोत्कर्षपकर्ष वर्ण्यावण्य विकल्प साध्य समाः। २. किञ्चित्साधर्म्यादुपसंहारसिद्धवैधमर्यादप्रतिषेघः। ३. साध्यातिदेशाच्च द्दष्टान्तोपपत्तेः।

इति षड्भिः सूत्रैः साध्यदृष्टान्तधर्मविकल्पप्रभवोत्कर्ष समादिजातिषट् कप्रकरणम्।। २।।

१. प्रपत्य साध्यमप्रात्य वा हेतोः प्राप्त्याविशिष्टत्वादप्राप्त्सासाधकत्वाच्च प्राप्त्यप्राप्तिसमौ। २. घटादिनिष्पत्तिदर्शनात् पीडने चाव्यभिचारादप्रतिषेधः।

इति द्वाभ्षां सूत्राभ्यां प्राप्श्रयप्राप्ति युगनद्धवाहि विकल्पोपक्रम जातिद्वय प्रकरणम्।। ३।।

१. दृष्टान्तस्य कारणानपदेशात् प्रत्यवस्थानाच्च प्रतिदृष्टान्तेर प्रसङ्प्रतिदृष्टान्तसमौ। २. प्रदीपोपादानप्रसङ्विनिवृत्तिव् तद्विनिवृत्तिः। ३. प्रतिदृष्टान्तहेतुत्वे च नाहेतुदृंष्टान्तः।

इति त्रिभिःः सूत्रैर्युगनड्दाहिप्रसङ्प्रतिदृष्टान्तसमजातिद्वय-प्रकरणम्।। ४।।

१. प्रागुत्पत्तेः कारणाभावादनुत्पत्तिसमः। २. तथभावाद्रुत्पत्रस्य कारणोपपतेनं कारणाप्रतिषेधः।

इति द्वाभ्यां सूत्राभ्यामनुत्पत्तिसमप्रकरणम्।। ५।।

१. सामान्यदृष्टान्तयोरैन्द्रियकस्वे समाने नित्यानित्यसाधर्म्यात् संशयसमः। २. साधर्म्यात् संशये वैधर्म्यादुभयथा वा संशयेऽत्यन्तसंशयप्रसङ्गो नित्यत्वानभ्युपगमाच्च सामान्यस्याप्रतिषेधः।

इति द्वान्यां सूत्राम्यां संशयलमप्रकरणम्।। ६।।

१. उभयसाधर्म्यात् प्रक्रियासिद्धेः प्रकरणसमः। २. प्रतिपक्षात् प्रकरणासिद्धेः प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः प्रतिपक्षोपपंत्तेः।

इति द्वाम्या सूत्राभ्यां प्रकरणासमप्रकरणम्।। ७.।।

१. त्रैकाल्यानुपपत्तेर्हेतोरहेतुसमः। २. न हेतुतः साधसिद्धेस्त्रैकाल्यासिद्धिः। ३. प्रति पेषानुपपत्तेश्रच प्रतिषेद्धव्याप्रतिषेधः।

इति त्रिभिः सूत्रैर्हेतुसमप्रकरणम्।। ८।।

१. अर्थापत्तित प्रतिपद्वाासिद्धेरर्थापत्तिसमः। २. अंनुक्तस्यार्थापत्तेः

पश्नचहानेरूपपत्तिरनुक्तत्बादनकान्तिकत्वाञ्चाथपितेः।

इति द्वाभ्यां सूत्राभ्यामर्थापत्तिसमप्रकरणम्।। ६।।

१. एकधर्मोपपत्तेरविशेषे सर्वाविशेषप्रसङ्गात् सद्भावोपपत्तेरविशेषसमः। २. कचित् तद्धर्मोपपत्तेः कचिच्चानुपपत्तेः प्रतिषेधाभावः।

इति द्वाम्यां सूत्राम्यामविशेषसमप्रकरणम्।। १०।।

१. उभयकारणोपपतेरूपपत्तिसमः। २. उपपत्तिकारणाभ्यनुज्ञज्ञनाद प्रतिषेधः।

इति द्वाभ्यां सूत्राभ्यामुपपत्तिसमप्रकरणम्।। ११।।

१. निदिष्टकारणाभावेऽप्युपलम्भादुपलब्धिसमः। २. कारणान्तरलपि तद्धर्मोपपतेरप्रतिषेधः।

इति द्वाभ्यां सूत्राभ्यामुपलब्धिसमप्रकरणम्।। १२।।

१. तदनुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भादभाव सिद्धौ तद्विपरीतोपपतेरनुपलब्धिसमः। २. अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वादनुपलब्धेरहेतुः। ३. ज्ञानविकल्पानां च भावाभावसंवेदनाद ध्यात्मम्।

इति त्रिभिः सूत्रैरनुपलब्धिसमप्रकरणाम्।। १३।।

१. साधर्म्यात् तुल्यधर्मोपपतेः सर्वानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गादनित्यसमः। २. साध र्म्यादसिद्धेः प्रतिषेधासिद्धिः प्रतिषेध्यसामर्थ्यात्। ३. दृष्टज्ञन्ते च साध्यसाध नभावेन प्रज्ञात्सय धर्मस्य हेतुत्वात् तस्य चोभयथाभावात्राविशेषः।

इति त्रिभिः सूत्रैरनित्यसमप्रकरणम्।। १४।।

१. नित्यमनित्यभावाद नित्ये नित्यत्वोपपतेर्नित्यसमः। २. प्रतिषेध्ये नित्यमनित्यभावादनित्ये नित्यत्वोपपत्तेः प्रतिषेधभावः।

इति द्वाभ्यां सूत्राभ्यां नित्यसमप्रकरणम्।। १५।।

१. प्रयत्नकार्यनेकत्वात् कार्यसमः। २. कार्यान्यत्वे प्रयत्नाहेतुत्वमनुपलब्धि का रणोपपतेः।

इति द्वाभ्यां सूत्राभ्यां कार्यसमप्रकरणम्।। १६।।

१. प्रतिषेधेऽतिप समानो दोषः। २. सवंत्रैवम्। ३. प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधे प्रतिषेधदोष वद्दोषः। ४. प्रतिषेधं सदोषमभ्युपेत्य प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधे समानो दोषप्रसङ्गो मतानुज्ञा। ५. स्वपक्षलक्षणापेक्षोपपत्त्युपसंहारे हेतनिर्देशे परपक्षदोषाभ्युपगमात् समानो दोषः।

इति पञ्चभिः सूत्रै षट्पक्षीरूपकथाभास प्रकरणम्।।१७।।
इति त्रिचत्वारिशता सूत्रैः सप्तदशभिः प्रकरणैः पञ्चमाध्यायस्यादयमाहिंक समाप्तम्

अथ द्वितीयमाहिकम्

१. प्रतिज्ञाहानिः प्रतिज्ञान्तर प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासो हेत्वन्तरमर्थान्तर निरर्थकमविज्ञातार्थमपार्थकमप्राप्तकालं न्यूनमधिकं पुनरूक्तमननुभाषणा मज्ञानमप्रतिभ विक्षेपो मतानुज्ञा पयंनुयोज्योपक्षणां निरनुज्योपक्षणां निरनंयोज्यानुयोगोऽपसिद्धान्तो हेत्वाभासाश्रच निग्रहस्थानानि। २. प्रतिद्दष्टान्तधर्माभ्यनुज्ञा स्वद्देष्टान्ते प्रतिज्ञाहानिः। ३. प्रतिज्ञाताथंप्रतिषेधे धर्मविकल्पात् तदर्थनिर्देश प्रतिज्ञान्तरम्। ४. प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोर्विरोधः प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः। ५. पक्षप्रतिषेधे प्रतिज्ञा तार्थापनयनं प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासः। ६. अविशेषोक्तो हेतौ प्रतिषिद्वे विशेषमिच्छतो हेत्वन्तरम्।

इति षट्भिः सूत्रैः प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वन्यतराक्षितनिग्रहस्थानपश्रचक विशेषलक्षण प्रकरणम्।। १।।

१. प्रकृतादर्थादप्रतिसम्बद्धाथंमर्थान्तरम्। २. वणांत्रमनिर्देशवत्रिरर्थकम्। ३. परिषतप्रतिवादिभ्यां त्रिरभिहितमप्यविज्ञातमविज्ञातार्थम्। ४. पौर्वापर्यायोगादप्रतिसम्बद्धार्थमपार्थकम्।

इति चतुर्भिः सूत्रैः प्रकृतोपयोगिवाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिफशून्यनिग्रहसथान चतुष्क प्रकरणम्।। २।।

१. अवयवविपर्यासवचनमप्राप्तकालम्। २. हीनमन्यतमेनाप्यवयवेन न्यूनम्। ३. हेतूदाहरणाधिकमधिकम्।

इति त्रिभिः सूत्रैः स्वसिद्धान्तानुरूपप्रयोगा मासनिग्र हस्थानत्रिक प्ररणम्।। ३।।

१. शब्दार्थयोः पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तमन्यत्रानुवादात्। २. अर्थादापत्रस्य स्वशदेन पुनर्वचन पुनरुक्तम्।

इति द्वाभ्यां सूत्रभ्यां पुनरुक्तनिग्रहस्थानप्रकरणम्।। ४।।

१. विज्ञातस्य परिषदा त्रिरभिहितस्याप्यप्रत्युच्चारणामननुभाषणाम्। २. अविज्ञांत चाज्ञानम्। ३. उत्तरस्या प्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिभा। ४. कार्यव्यासङ्गात् कथाविच्छेदो विक्षेपः।

इति चतुर्भिः सूत्रैरुत्तरविरोधि निग्रह स्थान चतुष्क प्रकरणम्।।५।।

१. स्वपक्षे दोषाभ्युपगमात् परपक्षे दोषप्रसङ्गो मतानुज्ञा। २. निग्रहस्थानप्राप्तस्या निग्रहः पयंनुयोज्योपेक्षणम्। ३. अनिग्रहस्थाने निग्रहस्थानाभियोगी निरनुयोज्यानंयोगः।

इति त्रिभिः सूत्रैर्दोषनिरूप्यमता नुज्ञादिनि ग्रह स्थान त्रिक प्रकरणम।।६।।

१. सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेतयानियमात् कथाप्रसङ्गोऽपसिद्धान्तः। २. हेत्वाभासाश्रच यथोक्ताः।

इति द्वाभ्यां सूत्राभ्यां कथकान्योक्तिनिरूप्य निग्रह स्थान द्वय प्रकरणम्।।७।।

इति चतुर्विशत्या सूत्रैः सप्तभि प्रकरणैः पञ्चामाध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाहिकं समाप्तम्

समाप्तश्रच पञ्चमोऽध्यायः

(अत्र प्रकरणानि २४, सूत्राणि ६७)

अस्मिन्न्यायशास्त्रेऽध्यायाः ५, आहिकानि १०, प्रकरणानि ८४,

सूत्राणिा ५२८, पदानि १६६६, अक्षराणि ८३८५।

यदलम्भि किमपि पुणयं दुस्तरकुनिबन्धपङ्कमग्नानाम्।

श्री गौतमसुगवीमा मतिजरतीनां समुद्धरणात्।। १ ।।
संसारजलधिसेतौ वृषकेतौ सकलदुःखशमहेतौ।
एतस्य फलमखिल मर्पिठमेतेन प्रयतामीशः।। २ ।।
न्यायसूचीनिबन्धोऽसावकारि सुधियां मुदे।
श्रीवाचस्पतिमिश्रेणा वस्वङ्वसुवत्सरे।। ३ ।।
इति न्यायाचार्यसन्मिश्रश्रीवाचस्पतिविर चितोन्यायसूचीनिबन्धः समाप्तः